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Abstract
Firm entry, growth and diversification are central drivers of industrial development. 
However, firms often perform very differently when facing the same institutional 
environment. Using original data from field research in Pakistan, I find evidence of 
diverging firm performance in Pakistan’s textile industry during trade liberalisation in 
which only two thirds of Pakistan’s textile firms maintain their pre-liberalisation level 
of exports and market share is gained by better performers. Using data on firm origins 
and growth, I show how firm performance is related to pre-founder (or Director) 
experience which includes education, industry-related employment and industry 
exposure. Representative case studies show that this experience is manifested in the 
firm’s entry strategy, its initial production and organisational capabilities, and persists 
via its procedures to improve productivity, quality and marketing. In particular, higher 
managerial quality results in effective recruitment and incentives which enable 
workers to improve shop-floor performance. Further, I analyse Pakistan’s broader 
industrial diversification to date and show that an increase in competition during trade 
liberalisation encouraged firm diversification as profitability o f the textile sector fell. 
However, I find that most textile firms and business groups enter protected domestic 
industries while, in contrast, the founders of firms in higher value-added sectors such 
as pharmaceuticals and information technology have greater industry-specific 
education and experience. This further highlights the role of founder experience in 
shaping industrial diversification and the firm-level roots of growth. In conclusion, I 
suggest how policy measures to accumulate industry-related experience and increase 
firm competition could enable low-income countries to break out of the equilibrium of 
poor industrial development.
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Chapter 1 The role of founder experience in industrial 
development: firm entry, growth and diversification in 
Pakistan’s textile industry during trade liberalisation
1.1 Theoretical framework and research design
The exposure of Pakistan’s textile industry to trade liberalisation between 1994 and 
2004 provided a unique opportunity to identify determinants of firm performance and 
industrial development in an emerging economy.1 As price and quality competition 
increased during the phase-out of the Multifibre Arrangement, a large shakeout 
occurred in which only some firms survived and market share was gained by better 
performers. In this thesis I investigate the determinants of this heterogeneity in firm 
performance and its implications for development theory and policy. In particular, I 
examine the role of pre-founder experience -  including education, employment and 
industry exposure -  in shaping a firm’s entry strategy, its initial production 
capabilities and organisational design, and its subsequent ability to improve 
productivity, quality and marketing during liberalisation. I argue that it is high quality, 
industry-related education and employment experience among founders that is at the 
root of high achieving firms and can deliver equilibrium-breaking industrial growth in 
low-income countries.
The entry, growth and diversification of firms is central to industrial development and 
has been a focus of policy work and academic research within development studies. 
The quality of the institutional environment, for example, including macroeconomic 
stability, the regulatory framework and the quality of governance, is recognised to 
shape the incentives for entrepreneurship and firm growth (see for example 
Acemoglu, 2009; Nelson, 2007; World Bank, 2007, Branstetter et al, 2006; Khan, 
2004).2 Investment in physical and human capital is recognised to provide the
1 Throughout this thesis I use ‘textiles’ and ‘textiles and clothing’ interchangeably for brevity. Both 
industry segments are the subject o f  the research.
2 The private sector strategy o f the World Bank Group, for example, places emphasis on enhancing the 
investment climate. The activities o f the International Finance Corporation o f the World Bank include 
the development o f  financial markets and the provision o f advisory services to improve the regulatory
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infrastructure and skills to support firm formation and industrial diversification 
(Caselli, 2008; Arora and Gambardella, 2004; Lall, 1999; Young, 1995). There has 
also been a focus on how firms acquire technological capabilities and ‘upgrade’ into 
higher value-added products through interactions with buyers, suppliers and joint 
venture partners (Blalock and Veloso, 2007; Altenburg et al, 2007; Schrank, 2005; 
Schmitz, 2004; Pack, 2000; Gereffi, 1999, Lall, 1987). Further, in some cases 
industrial policies such as public sector research and regulated licensing are argued to 
have spurred firm formation and the accumulation of these capabilities (Breznitz, 
2007; Wade, 2004; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002; Amsden, 1992).
However, there is often variation in the performance of firms facing a similar 
institutional environment. Only a small number of firms typically dominate exports in 
many industries, drive industry growth or provide the roots of further industrial 
diversification. In Pakistan, for example, the top 25 exporters in the textile and 
clothing industry in 2006 represented 20 percent of its total exports, while in the 
United States only 8 per cent of surviving manufacturing firms diversified into more 
skill- and capital-intensive industries in response to increased low-cost competition 
(Bernard et al, 2006a).3 Empirical studies of international trade have also found that 
exporters tend to be more efficient and that more productive firms actually self-select 
into export markets (Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Aw 
and Hwang, 1995). Further, there is evidence that heterogeneous performance persists 
over time within industries as measured by market share, productivity and 
profitability (see for example, Sutton, 2007a; Dosi, 2007; Klepper and Grady, 1990).
Studies within the industrial organisation literature have examined the factors shaping 
this persistence of firm heterogeneity. The probability of entry, exit and firm 
performance are found to have been associated with characteristics such as firm size, 
age and location which shape production efficiencies and learning effects (Dunne et 
al, 1988; Evans, 1987). Firms are seen to vary in their production efficiencies, ability 
to devise effective organisational structures, and to innovate (see Dosi, 2007 as well 
as Sutton 2007b, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Teece et al, 2002, Argote, 1999;
environment in developing countries. See World Bank Group Private Sector Development Strategy: 
Implementation Progress Report, June 2003 and http://www.ifc.org, Accessed 23 March 2009.
3 Source o f  export data in 2006: Pakistan Federal Board o f  Revenue, own analysis.
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Nelson, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982). There is also evidence that the 
diversification prospects of a firm depend on the scope of these industry-related 
capabilities (Brandt et al, 2008; Sutton 2007c; Teece, 1980). The underlying 
determinants of heterogeneity in firm performance are often hard to observe 
empirically, but pre-founder experience among diversifying firms or new entrants -  
including education, employment experience and industry exposure -  has been shown 
to be an important proxy for the capabilities which shape long-run firm performance 
(Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Thompson, 2005; Klepper, 2002; Burton, 2001; Klepper 
and Simons, 2000).
There have been some applications of this type of industry study to development and 
growth in poorer countries. Heterogeneity in firm productivity has been found within 
several industries in emerging economies (see Verhoogen, 2007, Sutton 2002a and 
2000; Pavcnik, 2002; Tybout, 1996; Roberts & Tybout, 1996). Small and less formal 
firms are often seen to have differential access to factor markets, information and 
policy makers (DFID, 2006; Lall and Rodrigo, 2001; Shadlen, 2004) and by location 
poor education or infrastructure can discourage entrepreneurship and make many 
activities uneconomic (OECD, 2004).4 Access to capital can also differ by firm type 
(such as a business group or less formal firm) (Zia, 2008) or by social ties (Banerjee 
and Munshi, 2004), and the misallocation of capital is an important concern within 
development research and policy (World Bank, 2005). Firms have also been 
recognised to differ in their technological and production capabilities: Amsden and 
Chu (2003) found, for example, that in Taiwan it was new entrants with industry- 
related education and experience that drove the move into higher value segments such 
as electronics; incumbent business groups opted for industries such as retail, real 
estate and services. Further, large business groups are often recognised to have a 
disproportionate impact on the development process due to their dominance in many 
industrial sectors either as ‘paragons or parasites’ (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Morck et 
al, 2005).
4 The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) (2006) argues that small 
firms face constraints in the business environment which affect them more seriously than larger firms 
such as access to finance and policy, the payment o f bribes, unreliable infrastructure and contract 
enforcement. However, the presence o f many small and less formal firms can also often be the result o f  
the structure of industries in which developing countries are active such as textiles and clothing, rather 
than due to any growth constraints per se (see Tybout, 2000 for a discussion).
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However, while academic work has begun to drawn attention to the explanatory 
power of this heterogeneity in understanding economic growth (see Nelson, 2007; 
Sutton, 2007b and 2002b; Nelson and Pack, 1999; Nelson, 1998; Dosi et al, 1994), the 
analysis of firm performance in low-income countries has often been focused on 
‘winners’, the accumulation of capabilities at the level of the representative firm, or 
on industrial change at the aggregate level.5 Instead, there has also been a strong focus 
on the heterogeneity in institutions, investment climate and policy across countries. 
Consequently, there has been a failure to robustly identify which firms drive industry 
growth and diversification, how they accomplish it, and whether aggregate 
diversification into new industries is mostly conducted by incumbents or new 
entrants.
Further, most empirical studies of the relationship between pre-founder experience 
and firm entry and performance have been focused on industries in developed 
economies, typically as a result of the high quality of data available.6 In countries 
such as Pakistan, institutions which collect such data are typically less developed, 
demand for data for policy and planning is weak, much business administration is still 
being done by hand, and written accounts of business history are scarce.7 As a result, 
there has been limited empirical work on how pre-existing capabilities shape the entry 
strategies and design of new firms within low-income countries, and on its 
implications for development theory and policy.
As a result, I offer a case study of Pakistan’s textile industry which exploits an 
external shock which took place during trade liberalisation from 1994 to 2004 in order 
to identify the determinants of heterogeneous firm performance and diversification. In 
particular, I investigate how pre-founder experience — including education,
5 While change in the industrial composition o f a country is clearly associated with aggregate economic 
growth — as in the East Asian economies -  and is a source o f  interest in itself, here I focus on the firm- 
level drivers o f this aggregate industrial transition. I will assess its interaction with institutional context 
in Chapter 8.
6 Firm performance in highly developed economies is recorded at intervals by government agencies or 
private sector institutions and histories can be traced using popular books and widespread media. The 
electronic recording o f  data also creates opportunities to study industry evolution and firm behaviour in 
detail (see Thompson, 2004; Klepper 2002, Klepper and Simons, 2000, Hounshell and Smith, 1988).
7 Pakistan’s Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, still works with a paper system in 
which men are employed to carry thick paper files around the office. The organisation was attempting 
computerisation during my fieldwork, but expected it could be some more years before all the data is 
held on computer. Further, a leading IT entrepreneur in Karachi estimated that 70 per cent o f  
businesses in Pakistan had yet to implement any IT system within their business.
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employment experience and industry exposure -  shaped firms’ entry strategies, initial 
production capabilities and organisational design, and their subsequent ability to 
improve productivity, quality and marketing practices as competition increased. I then 
assess how these capabilities have shaped the diversification prospects and choices of 
firms during this period. Further, in contrast with the composition of the textile 
industry I assess the origins of firms in high growth sectors in Pakistan such as 
pharmaceuticals and information technology (IT), and assess the implications for 
development theory and policy.
Pakistan itself has also been relatively under-researched in comparison with other 
developing countries, yet the particularities of its political, macroeconomic and 
business environment make an interesting case to study in its own right.8 The country 
is young enough, for example, for the history and evolution of industry -  which 
started from a low base at the time of Partition -  to be in living memory. In addition, 
while civil conflict and macroeconomic instability have led to a difficult operating 
environment for business, it is also an opportunity to uncover how firms have often 
prospered in this challenging economic environment.9
The textile and clothing industry has historically played a central role in the economy 
of Pakistan. From 1962 to 2007 the sector grew from 20 per cent to 63 per cent of 
total exports (with a peak at 75 per cent in 1997).10 As late as 1996 it also represented 
23.5 per cent of gross domestic product.51 In fact, the history and evolution of 
Pakistan’s textile industry since the country was created in 1947 tells the story of 
Pakistan’s industrial development itself: most firms which have prospered in other 
economic sectors have at one time been involved in the textile industry, either as a 
‘seed’ firm or as a target of later diversification. Pakistan also relied heavily on the 
quotas in place under the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) and the Agreement on
8 Academic work on Pakistan’s economic and business history is sparse. Publications which address 
these topics directly or indirectly include Siddiqa-Agha (2007), Cohen (2005), Nadvi (1999), Hasan 
(1998), Talbot (1998), Ahmed and Amjad (1996), Khan (1995), Weiss (1991), Lamb (1990), Kochanek 
(1983) and Lewis (1970).
9 This includes high costs in obtaining educated workers, lack o f  reliable energy supplies, and access to 
finance as a result o f  a politically-influenced banking system until the post-2000 period. This will be 
explained in more detail in Chapter 2.
10 Source: United Nations International Trade Merchandise Statistics (UN Comtrade), Standard 
International Trade Classification 1 (S1TC1). Note: Dataset commences in 1962.
n Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Industrial Statistics 2001. 
1996 is the latest year for which such data has been reported from Pakistan.
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Textiles and Clothing (ATC), accounting for 40 per cent of its total textile and 
clothing exports between 2000 and 2004.12 The MFA and ATC regulated global trade 
in textiles and clothing from 1973 to 2004 through a system of bilateral quotas but 
was phased out gradually between January 1994 and December 2004. As a result, 
Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry was subject to increasing external competition 
during this period.
Firm entry in the first few decades of Pakistan’s independence was limited by a 
licensing system which often allocated permission to operate to the best connected 
firms rather than to the most efficient. Liberalisation of firm entry in the late 1980s 
led to a rapid increase in firm formation and greater local competition. However, from 
1973 to 2004, firm composition and performance was also shaped by the ceilings on 
exports in place under the MFA and ATC. While some quotas were openly auctioned, 
many were allocated to firms already operating in the local market (such as the older 
business groups), making quota export more difficult for newcomers. In fact, many of 
Pakistan’s best firms were often limited in their growth as a result of aggregate quota 
ceilings that were in place at the country-level until the end of 2004. Protected firms 
often gained from interactions with international buyers compelled to source from 
Pakistan, while others sharpened their competitive edge by participating in 
unrestricted markets.13 This mix of protection and competition meant that firms in 
Pakistan’s textile industry differed in capability and market access at the time of quota 
abolition, which presented both a challenge and an opportunity in the liberalised 
trading environment after 2004.14
As Sutton (2007b) has outlined, trade liberalisation often leads to an increase in price 
competition and quality competition. Within this framework, firms produce goods
12 Because textiles represented 60 to 65 per cent o f total exports from Pakistan in this period, sales 
under quota were equivalent to one quarter o f Pakistan’s total foreign sales.
13 In principal, a firm could pay up to the equivalent o f  the benefit gained by exporting under the quota. 
As a result, the most efficient firms would be able to pay the most and exporting under quotas would 
still be profitable. Many firms felt the quota premium was too high in some years and chose to target 
non-quota markets such as Australia or less restricted segments such as home textiles instead. 
However, as the MFA was phased out between 1994 and 2004 many firms purchased quota in order to 
develop relationships with key buyers who were compelled to source textiles and clothing through the 
quota system.
14 O f course, additional tariff restrictions were in place between countries both during and after the 
MFA/ATC which benefitted some textile exporting countries over others. This will be discussed further 
in Chapter 3.
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with different combinations of price and quality -  in the case of the textile industry 
cheap, low-quality clothes versus expensive, high quality garments, for example -  and 
consumers purchase the goods with the best price-quality ratio according to their 
income level. However, firms must always operate within a specific ‘window’ in 
which they must meet a minimum level of quality and productivity to remain in the 
market.15 During trade liberalisation, however, the level of price competition increases 
and a greater number of producing firms enter the market. This leads to a rise in the 
lower bound of the window in which firms must operate and a ‘shakeout’ effect in 
which firms that cannot compete on price exit from the industry. This process often 
results in increased concentration as “the relative output levels of more efficient, 
versus less efficient, producers begin to shift” (Sutton, 2002b: 16). Firms must either 
raise capability in order to remain in the market or exit by investing in quality and 
productivity improvements. As a result, “the primary driver of growth is the gradual 
build-up in firms’ capabilities” (Sutton, 2002b:9).
Using original data collected during fieldwork in Pakistan, I examine this effect 
within Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry during trade liberalisation and the 
association between founder experience and firm performance. Firstly, I measure the 
extent of shakeout using five quantitative datasets as measured by firm survival, 
growth and ability to maintain quota exports. These datasets individually contained 
3,610, 791, 724, 194 and 87 firms and represented approximately 62 per cent of 
textile and clothing exports between 2000 and 2004 and 56 per cent of exports in 
2006.16 Secondly, I assess the statistical relationship between founder experience and 
firm performance using a survey of the origins of 210 representative firms. Thirdly, 
using 48 representative interviews I examine how pre-founder experience (PFE)
15 This is the case because when raw materials are independently traded, the cost o f  the raw material 
sets a lower floor to unit cost and price that is independent o f the local wage rate and thus “a floor to 
the firm’s quality level below which it cannot survive even in a very low-wage economy” (Sutton, 
2007:471). In the textile and clothing industry, for example, raw material inputs include cotton, yam 
and cloth, for example. There are transport costs in the international trade o f cotton, yarn and cloth that 
may offer a cost advantage to local producers o f these products (clothing or home textile manufacturers 
in Pakistan, for example, that is a large producer o f  cotton and yam), however, in principle I argue that 
the basic principle applies that firms can source the cheapest yam or cloth on the world market.
16 These datasets include: all exporters under quota (source: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, 
3,610 firms), 2006 export data for quota exporters incorporated with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission o f  Pakistan (SECP) (source: Federal Bureau o f  revenue, 528 firms), knitwear exporters 
(source: Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association, 791 firms), publicly-listed firms (source: Karachi 
Stock Exchange, 194 firms), and unlisted public firms (source: SECP, 87 firms). From 2000-2004, the 
KSE, SECP and TDAP samples represented a share o f  total textile and clothing exports o f 61.6, 64.0, 
63.0,60.6 and 61.7 per cent respectively.
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shapes the firm’s entry strategy, its initial production capabilities and organisational 
design, and how firms subsequently adjusted productivity, quality and marketing 
practices in response to increased competition.
Firstly, I find evidence of a rapid shakeout of firms during the phase-out of the MFA. 
I find that while the industry as a whole manages to maintain its total level of textile 
and clothing exports, at best 86 per cent of individual firms survive two years into the
17liberalisation and one third fail to maintain their pre-liberalisation value of exports. 
Firms also diverge in size between 1994 and 2004 and then more rapidly between 
2004 and 2007, during which time market share is gradually reallocated to better 
performers as weak firms exit. There are also differences in the speed of shakeout in 
local and export markets which I suggest is the result of enduring political and 
personal relationships among domestic firms. Further, firm performance does not 
appear to be related to quota reliance per se given that many firms who purchased 
quotas in order to access North American and European markets subsequently show 
positive sales growth.
Secondly, I find evidence of a strong association between PFE and firm performance 
in which industry-relevant PFE is associated with increasing firm survival during 
liberalisation and firm size (while controlling for age). I classify founder experience 
by industry background including those from Experienced backgrounds (such as 
existing textile units), Textile-related (such as spinoffs of existing firms or those from 
textile trading or cotton ginning sectors), Other manufacturing (such as leather, shoes) 
and Inexperienced. Case studies show that PFE shapes the firm’s entry strategy (such 
as choice of product, market niche and physical capital) and organisational design: 
textile traders, for example, often entered the manufacturing sector having identified
171 have chosen to focus on export performance rather than the domestic segment for several reasons. 
The first is that accurate measurements o f  domestic market size are not available, nor is data on all 
firms selling in the local market. Secondly, while some firms may be able to obtain higher profits in the 
local market, the local market is less subject to the intense competitive pressures o f the export sector. 
There are signs that being a domestic producer has, until recently, offered a form o f protection to less 
efficient producers given the tight social and cultural networks that exist. One interviewee commented, 
for instance, that it was common among families in the industry to be given “a guarantee” that some o f  
their yam would be purchased by a relative. The export sector avoids this problem as multinational 
buyers are only concerned with the price and quality o f the product, creating a stronger selection effect. 
Pakistan also has a large informal textile sector — in powerloom weaving, for example. However, the 
existence o f informal firms is often undocumented — making them also hard to access -  and 
performance data is hard to obtain. As a result, I have also focused on more formal firms in this thesis.
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market opportunities, while existing textile manufacturing units often create new mills 
to develop new, higher-value products requested by their existing buyers. PFE also 
shapes the firm’s initial production and organisational capabilities, which are revealed 
in the firm’s initial size and growth trajectory. I also find that this quality of 
management persists over time and is revealed in the firm’s investments in 
productivity, quality and marketing practices during trade liberalisation. As 
competition is increase, learning occurs through effective recruitment, in-house 
imitation and innovation, and is particularly effective when technical managers have 
the autonomy to innovate and improve shop-floor performance.
Thirdly, I show how trade reform induces diversification across Pakistan’s industrial 
landscape. With the use of additional case studies, I show that while the removal of 
protection spurred attempts to diversify into higher value-added products, most textile 
firms and business groups have only been able to enter local, protected sectors. I 
argue that this is as a result of their underlying capabilities, most of which in this 
context are transferable organisational practices. In contrast, I trace the origins and 
evolution of firms in sectors such as chemicals, pharmaceutical and IT. While it is 
recognised that trade liberalisation can often lead to a redistribution of economic 
activity across sectors and within firms as a result of an increase in competition (see 
Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007; Bernard et al, 2006a, for example), I show that 
new entrants into higher value-added sectors such as pharmaceuticals and information 
technology have more industry-specific education and experience.
Finally, I assess the implications of these findings for development theory and policy. 
I suggest that it is heterogeneity itself which can offer new insights into the 
development process. While institutional and state-led accounts go a long way in 
understanding Pakistan’s limited industrial development to date, the presence of high- 
ability firms formed by experienced founders has allowed upgrading in the textile 
sector into branded products and retail and increasing entry into sectors such as 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals. I therefore suggest that the formation of high-ability 
firms by educated, experience founders can help break the equilibrium of limited 
industrial development in low-income countries. In particular, increased competition 
can break down informal barriers to the accumulation of experience among workers 
and raise the likelihood of new firm formation. This process can also be supported by
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focused policy initiatives to help accumulate this experience through education, 
industrial work experience and mentoring. As a result, I make explicit the role of 
education, founder experience and competition in driving industrial development and 
economic growth in low-income countries.
1.2 Explaining heterogeneity in firm performance: formal 
approaches
The persistence of heterogeneity in firm capabilities and performance
Heterogeneous firm performance as measured by rates of growth and exit has been 
widely observed in the evolution of a number of industries and is usually represented 
by the ‘industry life cycle’ (Klepper, 2008). In the analysis of 46 industries in the 
United States (including automobiles, tires, televisions and penicillin), for example, 
Klepper and Graddy (1990) find that after a build up in the number of firms when the 
industry is established, the number o f producers decline sharply before levelling off, 
with exit as high as 80 per cent in some industries. This shakeout and rise in 
concentration is often driven by changes in technology, competition on the basis of 
product and process innovation, as well as random shocks.
Differences in industry concentration have also been observed across industries and 
are seen to be the result of industry structure, technology and price competition. In 
industries that are research and development- or advertising-intensive, for example, 
incumbents have an incentive to escalate spending on research and development or 
advertising in order to increase their market share, which can lead to tight 
concentration (Sutton, 1998). In contrast, increasing market size in a homogeneous 
product industry can lead to firm entry up until the point that profits of the last entrant 
covers the sunk costs, leading to low firm concentration (Sutton, 1991:8). The 
duration of leadership or dominance of a firm in a sector can also depend on the 
volatility of market shares by industry (Sutton, 2007a) while the distribution of firm 
performance can vary across countries as a consequence of the level of product 
competition (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).
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As a result, there is a tension within the industrial organisation literature over whether 
firm heterogeneity is a “result or cause” of these general economic (or industry) 
differences (Nelson, 1991:72). There is also debate over whether industry leadership 
comes to individual firms by chance (the result of whether consumers adopt one 
product or technology over another, for example) or from purposive activity given 
that firms make decisions faced with uncertainty.
A strong case has been made, however, that heterogeneity in long-run performance 
exists and is associated with persistent differences in firm capabilities. Sutton (2007a), 
for example, has found that dominance in market share in certain industries is not 
random and clearly persists over time. In an overview of empirical literature within 
industrial organisation, Dosi (2007) has also shown persistent differences in 
performance across several industries as measured by growth and profitability. 
Further, as Nelson points out, nobody can ignore the dominance of firms such as IBM, 
General Motors, or Toyota in their respective industries (1991:65). This 
heterogeneous firm performance is seen to be driven by differences in production 
efficiency, organisational capabilities and innovative capabilities, all of which are 
interrelated (Dosi, 2007:172).18
There is much empirical evidence, for instance, that differences in production 
capabilities are associated with performance. In the auto-components industry, Sutton 
(2002a) found that firms in China and India varied in labour productivity, the defect 
rctes of components (quality) and in their ability to move towards higher level 
capabilities such as partnership in design activity, all of which were important 
determinants of performance. In the machine tools industry in India, Japan and 
Taiwan, Sutton (2000) found that firms differed in the quality of their cutting tools (as 
neasure by reliability and post-sale customer service) and were the most important 
frm capabilities shaping performance. According to Teece et al, initial production
18 Capabilities have been defined in a number o f  ways but are summarised by Teece et al as 
competitive advantage which rest on a firm’s “idiosyncratic and difficult to imitate resources” which 
cm include costs, technology or rents from scarce firm-specific resources (2002:334-335). For a 
contrasting definition see Sutton (2007a) and to see how understandings o f capabilities have changed 
o/er time, compare with Nelson and Winter (1982) with Nelson (1991). Classical explanations for this 
h'terogeneity in performance also include the vintage o f  the capital stock, capital-labour ratios, 
inperfect factor markets (by location or scale), and organizational and managerial efficiency (Lall and 
Rjdrigo, 2001). Variations in productivity can also be explained by learning effects that are associated 
vith age and by managerial skill (Tybout, 1996).
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capabilities also shape the likelihood of entry as firms identify the markets where 
these unique resources or assets can earn the highest rents (2002:336).
There is also evidence that firms differ in their organisational capabilities. This 
concept refers to the way tasks are coordinated in the firm, and is closely related to its 
design or ‘structure’: “how a firm is organized and governed, and how decisions are 
made and carried out” (Nelson, 1991:67).19 There is a clear link with performance: in 
a recent cross-country empirical study, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) showed that 
variation in the quality of management practices such as recruitment, incentive 
structures, operational targets, and monitoring was strongly correlated with financial 
performance.
Firms also differ in their capacities to innovate or adopt innovations developed 
elsewhere (Dosi, 2007:172) and this applies to both production and organisational 
practices. Companies can improve productivity and quality, for example, by devoting 
research and development spending to product innovation or process innovation, or 
they can invest in advertising (or more broadly marketing) in order to enhance the 
demand for its product (Sutton, 1991:11) They can also reduce costs through the
transfer of technologies, the transfer of codes and procedures, the movement of
•  20 personnel and the use of consultants (Argote, 1999; Levitt and March, 1988).
Learning itself can lead to persistent heterogeneity in performance: according to Dosi
et al (1994), a general feature of innovative learning is that it involves trials, errors
and sometimes unexpected successes. In turn, this leads to a persistent heterogeneity
among firms, revealed also by wide and persistent differences in input productivities,
product performances, costs and profits. However, Dosi (2007) notes that a small
number of firms are often responsible for “a good deal” of innovation output, while
Argote (1999) has recognised that firms often differ in the speed at which they learn,
reduce their cost curves and improve performance.
19 This idea was made explicit by Nelson and Winter (1982) who revealed that firms are structured by 
routines in which organisational knowledge is embedded.
20 This learning can take place at the level o f individual workers, via coordinated activity within the 
organisation, and by leveraging knowledge accumulated by others (Reagans, Argote and Brooks, 
2005). Sutton has found, for example, that communication directly with foreign buyers can “induce 
major changes in product variety and design” as he says took place in many leading clothes suppliers in 
the 1990s (2007a:484). Sako (2004) also examines how tacit knowledge moved across boundaries 
between a company and its suppliers in automotive supply chains.
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Pre-founder experience and firm perform ance: m ethodology and evidence
The underlying source of this heterogeneity in firm entry and performance within 
industries has often been understood to be either a function of underlying 
unobservables or modelled as a random process. This is because it is very difficult to 
measure the determinants of underlying entrepreneurship or managerial quality, or 
distinguish it from 'natural ability', even if only for methodological rather than 
theoretical reasons.21 Hopenhayn (1992), for example, treats firm productivity as 
being drawn from a distribution that is exogenously determined by a Markov process, 
while Javonovic has argued that selection occurs after firm entry when “firms leam 
about their efficiency as they operate in the industry” (1982:649).
However, a powerful framework has emerged to explain persistent heterogeneity in 
firm capabilities and performance: that of pre-entry or pre-founder experience (PFE). 
PFE can be understood to originate from the founder’s education, previous 
employment experience and industry exposure22 and shapes firm entry and 
performance in several ways including its technical capabilities, organisational 
knowledge and access to markets.23 The analysis of founder experience can also be 
applied to the analysis of the diversifying firms or de novo entrants which typically 
compose an industry. In short, PFE acts as a proxy for accumulated knowledge upon 
formation of the firm.24
Founder experience has been measured and classified in empirical research a number 
of ways. Klepper (2002:42-43), for example, classifies a firm as an experienced 
entrant “if they produced the new product in the same organization (with the same
21 Note that this problem has many similarities with the academic literature on returns to schooling, in 
which it is difficult to separate out the effect o f schooling on future employment performance and 
earnings from underlying student effort or ability, see Angrist and Krueger (1991) for a discussion.
22 With reference to the wine industry in Australia, Roberts, Klepper and Hayward (2006) have shown 
that ‘industry exposure’ (working in a wine firm, for example, rather than managing one) can be an 
important determinant o f  subsequent spinoff performance in terms o f  size and scope. I argue that this 
concept is related to that o f Guiso and Schivardi’s (2005) idea, for example, that entrepreneurial talents 
may be acquired by watching other entrepreneurs in action.
23 This idea is also reflected in the literature on the impact o f management on the long-run performance 
o f a firm: Bertrand and Schoar (2003:1169) find, for example, that a significant extent o f  the 
heterogeneity in investment, financial, and organisational practices o f  firms can be explained by the 
presence o f manager fixed effects.
24 It is important to note that many firms are created by a team o f founders rather than by individuals. 
Further, staff play a central role in building the structure and routines o f  a firm. However, 1 will argue 
that the tone o f  the firm as set by the founders) -  its initial entry strategy and design -  sets the long­
term path for firm performance.
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name) in which they produced other products prior to entry, enabling them to tap into 
the physical, human and organizational capital of their firms”. Thompson (2005) 
classified pre-entry experience by the type of industry the firm was involved in prior 
to entry. Similarly, Klepper and Sleeper (2005) have examined the performance of 
spinoffs which are new entrants founded by employees of firms in the same industry 
which “inherit general technical and market-related knowledge from their parents that 
shapes their nature at birth” (2005:1291).25
Several empirical papers have shown PFE to have a strong relationship with 
subsequent firm entry and performance. In an examination of the evolution o f 46 
industries in the United States mentioned above, Klepper and Grady found that early 
entrants are “typically small and have experience in related technologies” (1990:35) 
while Klepper’s (2002) analysis of the automobile, tire, television and penicillin 
industries also found that experienced entrants entered earlier and had higher survival 
rates to old age. In a study of the 500 fastest growing private enterprises in the United 
States in 1998, Bhide (2000) found that 71 per cent of all founders had chosen an idea 
originating out of previous employment experience. Intra-industry spinoffs have also 
been identified as a particularly important driver of entry where firms are formed by 
employees of incumbent firms in the same industry, bringing technical, organisational 
and market knowledge (Klepper and Thompson, 2007). In short, experience shapes 
the likelihood of firm entry as “firms require a certain expertise to enter an industry, 
which implies that the number of firms that could potentially enter a specific new 
industry is limited” (Klepper and Grady, 1990:36).
PFE also shapes the production capabilities of new firms. Holbrook et al (2000), for 
example, found that differences in firm performance in the early semiconductor 
industry (including Motorola, Fairchild Semiconductor, Shockley Semiconductor and 
Sprague Electric) stemmed from pre-entry and early post-entry experience, including 
the firm’s prior development of technologies, its established information networks, 
and the founder’s management practices. Klepper and Simons (2000) found that more 
experienced radio firms were more likely to enter television manufacturing and that
25 To date the PFE framework has not been applied within the content o f a developing country, hence it 
requires adaptation to the content in which where family-owned business groups have a greater role in 
industry than formal spinoffs. This will be introduced below.
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on average these firms entered earlier, survived longer, and had larger market shares 
than non-radio producers due to more effective product and process innovation 
(2000:998). Walsh et al (1996) also found that firm founders with industry-specific 
experience -  particularly in materials technology -  were more successful in the 
semiconductor silicon industry (using data from Japan, the United States and Europe) 
than founders from other backgrounds.
Founder experience also shapes the organisational structure of new firms. Using a 
dataset of high-technology companies in Silicon Valley, Burton (2001) found that 
one-third of the 154 firms studied relied on an ‘engineering model’ of firm 
organisation that includes peer-group control and selection on task-based abilities 
resembling the organisation of the universities and laboratories from which many of 
the staff were recruited. As a result, she argues that “[i]n starting a company, 
entrepreneurs pursue courses of action that, intentionally or unintentionally, embody 
different assumptions about the nature of work, the nature of people, the appropriate 
bases for attaching people to organizations, and the best methods for controlling and 
coordinating work” (2001:13). Using a dataset of inventions patented by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology between 1980 and 1996, Shane and Kharuna 
argue that career experience helps firm founders overcome challenges of ‘newness’ 
via access to resources that help them start organisations as well as adapt to the role of 
entrepreneurs (2003: 520). Nelson and Winter have also explored how traits and 
routines are established and transmitted over time within a firm, arguing that these 
traits are “heritable in the sense that tomorrow’s organisms generated from today’s 
(for example, by building a new plant) and have many of the same characteristics” 
(1982:14).
Empirical work has started to identify which types of experience were most relevant 
in the new firm. In a study of the United States shipbuilding industry between 1825 
and 1914, where firms entered from the manufacture of iron and steel products, 
wooden vessels, or shipping, Thompson (2005) found that different backgrounds 
offered different advantages: “[manufacturers of iron products were skilled in 
handling and shaping a relatively new industrial material. Builders of wooden vessels 
were experienced in hull design [and] marketing vessels... Entrants from the shipping 
industry had a clear understanding of buyers' needs, extensive contacts in the using
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industry, and in some cases they provided a market for their own output” 
(2005a: 13).26 Using the case of the rigid disk drive industry, Franco and Filson argued 
that spinoffs ‘early-mover know-how’ is a good predictor o f spin-out survival, but that 
technical know-how is not, perhaps because it is often hard to imitate (2006:859). 
Chatterji (2009) also found that in the medical device industry, ventures started by 
employees of incumbent firms perform better than new entrants, but via the ability to 
identify market opportunities rather than by inheritance of technical knowledge.
Some of these themes of the PFE analysis are present in the literature on economic 
development. At the macroeconomic level, for example, the accumulation of human 
capital has been associated with growth in East Asia, and the role of externalities and 
knowledge spillovers in is an increasing area of study (Caselli, 2008; Klenow and 
Bils, 2000; Young, 1995, Romer, 1994). Easterly, for example, cites the case of 
garment spinoffs from Desh Garment Ltd in Bangladesh in the 1980s following a 
collaborative agreement with Korea’s Daewoo Corporation: from 130 workers trained 
by Daewoo, 115 left Desh to set up their own garment firms, a phenomenon Easterly 
describes as a result of leaks of knowledge and human capital externalities (2001:147- 
150). At the microeconomic level, returns to education have been analysed 
empirically as well as the development impacts of poor quality education, and barriers 
to accessing education and poverty traps (Hanushek and WoBmann, 2007; Duflo, 
2001; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Pritchett, 2001; Bardhan and Udry, 1999).
Industry-related development research has also touched on founder experience. 
Schrank’s work on industrial growth in the Dominican Republic, for example, gives 
evidence of textile firms founded by employees as spinoffs from existing textile and 
leather units and finds that successful exporters had often previously worked in the 
needle trade export-oriented (2005:50-54). Lall draws attention to the origins of well 
known Indian industrialists such as Dhirubhai Ambani -  the founder of Reliance 
Industries who started out as a synthetic yam importer (1987:41) -  and to the role of 
joint ventures, consultants and research and development in the rise of firms in sectors 
such as automobiles and engineering. Founder and worker education as well as
26 Thompson also finds that managerial quality has a large and persistent effect on firm survival and 
that “the effects o f pre-entry experience do not decay even over a very long horizon, and they are not 
diminished by controlling for size” (2005:26).
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founder experience have also been used explanatory variables in studies of 
productivity and firm capability, as illustrated in two Pakistan case studies (Burki and 
Terrell, 1998;Romjin, 1997).27
However, to date there has been limited robust empirical work on the impact of 
education and employment experience on heterogeneous firm performance in 
emerging economies. In particular, there is little research on how pre-entry experience 
varies by quality (such as the innovative capabilities of the spawning firm), how it 
shapes the organisational and production capabilities of the new entrant, and how it is 
related to firm learning and growth. As a result, it holds much potential to explain 
industrial development in emerging economies. It is this framework that I will 
develop and apply in order to analyse firm performance in Pakistan’s textile industry 
during liberalisation.
Firm diversification and industrial developm ent
Industrial diversification is widely considered a driver of economic development. In 
the economies of East Asia the movement from textiles and light manufacturing into 
sectors such as electronics, shipbuilding, software and services have been associated 
with rapid economic growth. This process has been named as ‘upgrading’, where 
firms move further up the value chain (see Schmitz, 2004; Amsden and Chu, 2003; 
Gereffi, 1999), as ‘technological leapfrogging’ (see Breznitz, 2007) and as the move 
into a ‘new economy’ (Harriss, 2003). Export diversification in particular is seen to 
contribute to an acceleration of growth through dynamic learning and spillover effects 
(Herzer and Nowak-Lehnmann, 2006). It can also dampen sector-specific shocks in a 
country which is reliant on natural resource endowments (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003). 
Even in developed economies product switching is a driver of development and 
productivity growth: Bernard et al found that nearly one third of the increase in real 
US manufacturing shipments between 1972 and 1997 is the result of net adding and 
dropping of products by continuing firms “a contribution to aggregate growth that 
dwarfs that of firm net entry” (Bernard et al, 2006b:2).
27 Although in these particular studies the sample sets are small and there are a large number o f  
explanatory variables such as founder general education, technical education, industry- and non­
industry specific work experience. The presence o f such variables may affect the coefficients and 
explanatory power and hence limit identification.
31
The distribution of economic activity across industries is shaped by a country’s 
relative capital, labour and skill endowments (which determine the scope of viable 
industries), its market size (which shapes the viability of certain industries) and its 
economic policies. In the presence of trade, the composition over a country’s 
industries is dynamic and continually responding to changes in relative costs of 
production, changes in communication or transport costs and patterns of consumer 
demand. Patterns of specialisation or diversification in the economy can change over 
time as economies accumulate different relative proportions of capital and labour and 
as the outcome of investments in research and development and sector-specific 
learning (Redding, 2002:302).
At the level of the firm, aggregate diversification can be driven either by the entry of 
an existing firm into new product markets or by new firm formation. Pre-existing 
firms can change their product mix through research and development (Brandt et al, 
2008; Klette and Kortum, 2004) and most commonly in developing countries this is 
seen as the result of imitation and learning (Amsden and Chu, 2003). Incumbent firms 
can also expand their range of products through the acquisition of other firms or 
through partnerships (see, for example, Hounshell and Smith, 1988). Similarly, new 
entrants can also enter a sector with a range o f educational and industry experience.
Accumulated capabilities shape the likelihood and direction of diversification within 
incumbent firms.28 It has been recognised, for example, that there are cost advantages 
to firms providing a number of diversified products instead of specialisation (through 
the sharing of inputs), otherwise known as economies of scope (Bailey and 
Friedlaender, 1982:1025). There may also be economies of scope based on 
technology, coordination and information in which those from one industry can be 
easily utilised in another, examples including freight and passenger transport on 
railways or the application of geological expertise to petroleum and geothermal 
energy recovery (ibid). Teece (1980) has also argued that diversified firms emerge
28 The industrial organisation literature has long observed large numbers o f firms active in different 
products and explains the involvement o f firms in multiple products in terms o f  efficiency and 
economies o f scope. In the United States, for example, firms that manufacturing more than one product 
comprise more than 90 per cent o f  total manufacturing shipments, and more than 95 percent o f  total 
exports (Bernard et al, 2006b).
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when accumulated know-how inside a firm (which could be profitably exploited
29outside) cannot take place due to contracting and information problems.
Evidence suggests that this experience shapes the success of diversification into new 
sectors. Klepper notes, for example, that “[f]irms that diversify into new and existing 
industries typically outperform de novo entrants” (2002:645), while Dunne at el found 
that diversifying firms that enter an industry with a new plant are generally initially 
larger than new firms and are less likely to fail than new firms or those switching 
products within an existing plant (1988:513-514). It is also the “underlying know­
how” that determines whether firms are able develop products not currently made and 
that “enhance the firm’s ability to take advantage of new opportunities over time, as 
shifts occur in the underlying pattern of technology and demand which it faces” 
(2008:16). By way of illustration, in a study of industrial development in China, 
Brandt et al find that China’s Haier Group “used its expertise and reputation in 
refrigerators as a springboard to enter markets for air conditioners and televisions” 
(2008:108).
Only a few studies have identified the origins of firms that have driven industrial 
diversification in developing countries. In Korea, for example, Amsden found that 
textile firms did not drive the movement into sectors such as shipping and electronics, 
but instead the business groups that gained learning-intensive experience in heavy 
industries (Amsden, 1992). In India the ‘new economy’ has been driven by a mix of 
established business groups as well as new entrants and international firms where 
education and industry experience have played an important role (Fuller and 
Narasimhan, 2007; Harriss, 2003). Similarly, Amsden and Chu (2003) found that in 
Taiwan it was new entrants with industry-related education and experience that drove 
the move into higher value segments such as electronics; incumbents opted for 
industries such as retail, real estate and services.
29 Diversification can also be seen as the outcome o f  changes in the external environment, such as shifts 
in demand and competition. Johnson and Myatt (2003), for example, suggest that firms selling quality- 
differentiated products alter their product lines in response to both demand and entry o f  competitors 
into the market, citing examples in products such as watches and mobile phones. According to Klepper 
and Thompson (2006), firms expand when they are able to exploit new opportunities that arrive in the 
form o f submarkets, but then contract and exit when the submarkets in which they operate are 
destroyed.
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Within the developing country context, the presence of diversified business groups 
has often been seen as particularly problematic by exhibiting ‘too much 
diversification’. According to Khanna and Yafeh, business groups can be seen as 
either ‘paragons or parasites’ in economic development either through their positive 
role in replacing weak institutions (by internalising risk and creating venture capital) 
or their detrimental impacts on social welfare as a result of rent seeking and monopoly 
power (2007:334).30 Morck et al suggest that “entrusting the governance of huge 
slices of a country’s corporate sector to a tiny elite can bias capital allocation, retard 
capital market development, obstruct entry by outsider entrepreneurs, and retard 
growth” (2005:657), what they call ‘economic entrenchment’.
I draw on the above concepts to analyse industrial diversification in Pakistan over the 
study period from 1994 to 2007. Firstly, I establish wider patterns of industrial 
development in its institutional context and identify recent high-growth sectors which 
include cement, automobiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and IT. I then investigate 
the motivations for diversification among textile and clothing firms into sectors such 
as real estate and cement, and how accumulated capabilities shape the firm’s 
diversification choices. I then contrast these patterns with the origins of new entrants 
in knowledge-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals and IT in order to assess the 
impact of education, employment experience and competition on firm capabilities and 
wider industrial development.
1.3 Research design
Firm shakeout and perform ance
A total of five quantitative datasets were collected in Pakistan during 14 months of 
fieldwork (from 2004-2007) in order to measure firm performance and shakeout 
during the phase-out of the Multifibre Arrangement.31 Together, these firms
30 One particular challenge o f this study is the dominance o f  business groups in Pakistan. According to 
Khan (1995), for example, large business groups had a disproportionate impact on industrial policy in 
Pakistan to the detriment o f  new entrants and smaller firms. There has been an increase in competition 
to these groups since the end o f the 1980s, but they are still present in Pakistan’s economy. An 
advantage o f the research design, however, is that an increase in competition for exporters will separate 
poor from good performers, even among the business groups (regardless o f  status or ‘entrenchment’).
31 Fieldwork took place in December 2004, October 2005-June 2006, and February-April 2007. This 
allowed the research to take place before, during and after the ending o f the ATC.
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represented approximately 62 per cent of total textile and clothing exports from 2000 
to 2004 and 56 per cent of the total in 2006. A survey conducted with the help o f with 
trade associations established pre-founder experience in 353 firms. I also conducted 
48 interviews with a representative sample of firms from these data in order to assess 
firm entry strategies, production capabilities and organisation design, and how firms 
addressed productivity, quality and marketing practices during trade reform. 
Contextual interviews were conducted with other actors in economic institutions and 
business observers in Pakistan in order to provide historical and institutional context.
The first dataset was taken from the annual reports of 194 public companies listed on 
the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). These data represented between 20 and 35 per 
cent of Pakistan’s total textile and clothing exports between 1994 and 2007 -  
including many of Pakistan’s best exporters -  as well as approximately 50 per cent of 
yam exports in the same period. It was the first set of data available for this research 
project and was therefore used as the initial sampling frame for firm interviews. 
Financial data were collected by hand in Karachi with the permission of KSE 
management for all textile firms listed on the KSE between 1994 and 2007 (but dating 
back to 1990) and included information such as local sales, export sales, costs (by 
inputs such as raw materials, salaries, power, and depreciation), capital expenditure 
and production output.33 The KSE sample captures important periods of entry in the 
1960s and 1990s, however, many of the firms listed on the exchange are established 
business groups rather than newer entrants and the sample over-represents yam and 
cloth producers.34 As a result, additional attempts were made to collect firm data from 
unlisted public, private and less formal (sole proprietor and partnership) firms as will 
be discussed below.
32 In this way, a research design was developed which combined the strengths o f  quantitative and 
qualitative approaches common in the industrial organisation literature: a large enough sample as to be 
representative o f the industry, with representative in-depth interviews to draw out the meanings o f  
these shifts and how firms actually acquire capabilities for growth.
33 Annual report data for firms listed on the KSE was not available electronically so individual 
observations for each year and variable were entered into a laptop by hand at the KSE in Karachi and 
the Lahore Stock Exchange. This took four weeks in total.
34 The mean export share o f the KSE has fallen from 30.1 per cent in 1996 to 24.6 per cent in 2007. 
This reflects an important shift in the composition o f the textile export sector from public to privately 
held firms and will be explored further throughout the thesis. For detailed data on this fall by year, and 
the evolving exporting activity o f the KSE’s firms, see Appendix 1-1.
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In order to measure the extent of diverging performance in the industry as quotas were 
removed I analyse the coefficient of variation of sales per firm (1994-2007), revenue 
per employee (1999-2005), and revenue per unit of production capacity of the firms in 
the KSE sample (1994-2007).35 During trade liberalisation I expected firms to diverge 
in performance in terms of size -  showing a rising coefficient of variation -  followed 
by a fall in the coefficient as poorer firms exit the industry and firms converge in 
mean size. Further, I assess the reallocation of market share from poor to better 
performers. I also use gross profit as a measure of performance: a firm can be small 
but still perform well with high gross profit, and given that gross profit in most 
remains inversely correlated with the mean cotton price in Pakistan in any one year 
the ability to outperform mean industry gross profit is an important measure of firm 
performance. I also assess capital expenditure at the firm level to assess how 
companies prepared for the ending of the quota.
The second dataset is a sample of 87 unlisted public firms taken from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), an organisation that monitors the 
accounts of all public limited companies. This sample includes similar information to 
the KSE annual reports and represented up to 7 per cent of export sales between 1999 
and 2006 as well as several leading textile firms. Again, these data were collected 
from paper reports by hand from SECP offices in Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad and 
Multan drawn from the top 100 unlisted public firms by paid-up capital. This sample 
captures a less traditional type of entrant into textile and clothing, however, the data is 
poorer quality than that of the KSE as information on production capacity, employees 
and detailed exports is often omitted (these firms are typically seen as less organised 
than listed firms in terms of financial reporting, as well as quality of corporate offices, 
for example). The sample also does not include many garment manufacturers as these 
firms are typically engaged in yam, cloth and home textile production.
35 The coefficient o f variation is defined as the standard deviation o f  a distribution divided by its mean. 
Brandt et al (2004), for example, use the coefficient o f variation for sales per worker to measure the 
dispersion in productivity o f  270,000 Chinese firms.
36 As in any industry, profitability is a problematic indicator as firms typically misrepresent cost data in 
accounts for tax avoidance purposes. Pakistan is no exception with several interviewees commenting 
on extent o f  double book keeping in the industry and the misrepresentation o f  costs for various reasons. 
However, gross profit is often used by the CEOs o f firms to compare their performance to others as it is 
considered more reliable. Further, in this study I am concerned with the relative performance o f  firms 
to mean gross profit over time assuming that firms would ‘consistently misrepresent’ their cost data 
over time too. Cross checking performance by other measures with gross profit is important to ensure 
that measurement o f firm performance is robust.
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The third sample collected is a database of all 3,610 firms who exported under the 
MFA/ATC between 2000 and 2004 as recorded by the Export Promotion Bureau of 
Pakistan (now renamed the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, TDAP). This 
sample represented 40 per cent of total textile and clothing exports from Pakistan 
between 2000 and 2004.37 It includes the following information: name of exporter, 
product exported (by category), volume (in kg, square metres), value (in nominal 
USD) and the name of the quota market (the EU, USA, Canada and Turkey). In 
contrast to the first two samples above, these firms represented a large percentage of 
garment and home textile exports: 1,237 woven garment and 1,095 knitted garment 
firms made up 64.6 per cent of the total, while the sample as a whole represented 66.5 
per cent of total woven garment exports by value (including non-quota exports), 63.0 
per cent of knitwear, 56.2 percent of home textile exports and 37.8 per cent of towels. 
To find the age and location of firms, the sample’s 724 publicly and privately-held 
exporters (representing 70 per cent of quota exports) were matched with the list of 
SECP-incorporated firms.38 Further, the remaining 30 per cent of exports, which 
covered approximately 2,900 firms, gave an insight into the size and distribution of 
less formal firms (partnerships and sole proprietorships). This dataset was provided 
electronically in 2006 by the TDAP in Karachi, however an initial lack of 
performance data post-quota (not obtained until 2007) meant that it could not be used 
as a sampling frame for interviews in the first period of fieldwork (from September 
2005 to June 2006).
In order to measure the performance of quota exporters, a fourth set of data were 
obtained from Pakistan’s Customs Collectorate through the Federal Bureau of 
Revenue (FBR) in 2007. The FBR was provided with the list of 724 public and 
private quota exporters from which they attempted to locate their export sales in
37 While the dataset held 3,610 firms in total, not all o f these firms exported in each o f  the five years. 
This issue is addressed in the analysis o f firm survival outlined below.
381 chose only those public and private firms that had exported in three out o f  the five years on which I 
have data. This was to ensure reduce the presence o f “opportunist’ exporters in the sample who were 
not manufacturers but rather individuals who obtained a small amount o f quota by chance or who 
purchased quota to make a trading profit. Matching with SECP record was done by cross-checking the 
names o f firms and CEOs with the master list provided by the SECP.
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financial year 2006 in order to obtain outcome data of firm performance.39 Export 
sales for a total of 528 firms were located, representing 56 per cent of Pakistan’s total 
textile and clothing exports in 2006.40 These data are likely to be reliable as it records 
the value of all goods leaving the country. For the response rate in the FBR sample by 
firm size see Appendix 1-2.
The analysis of firm performance using the TDAP and FBR data was limited because 
the TDAP figures were only for quota sales rather than total exports.41 It was therefore 
necessary to develop indicators of performance which measured performance 
accurately in this group of firms. I develop two indicators of performance: ‘survive’ 
and ‘maintain’. ‘Survive’ is measured as the ability of firms to remain in operation as 
exporters in 2006 and is measured using data provided by the CBR, KSE and SECP as 
well as with input on firm survival from trade associations such as the Pakistan 
Textile Exporters Association (PTEA), the All Pakistan Textile Mills Association 
(APTMA) and the three regional offices of the Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers 
Association (PHMA).42 A firm has survived if it has positive exports in 2006 -  in total 
I obtained 610 responses on this measure (equivalent to 84.3 per cent of the 724 firms 
in the TDAP sample). Interview evidence suggests that several firms were able to 
survive in the local market, but I argue that a measure of firm performance is the 
ability to perform in the export market as it requires certain levels of product quality, 
cost and marketing.43
39 Data on only this set o f  firms rather than the entire dataset was requested for brevity. It took nearly 
nine months and until February 2007 to obtain this export data, and only through contact with the head 
o f the FBR provided by a Chief Executive Officer o f  a leading textile company in March 2006.
40 This indicates that some firms have failed to register their exports in 2006, or have exited from the 
export market.
41 If a firm, for example, showed quota exports o f $1 million in 2004, and then $5 million in 2006, this 
will not automatically mean a five-fold increase in size, but could mean that the firm was only reliant 
on quota for 20 per cent o f exports and maintained its exports exactly. Quota reliance in the KSE 
sample, for instance, ranged from 0 per cent to 100 per cent. It is only with data on total exports by 
firm that an analysis o f firm growth is possible, and is conducted instead using the data on public firms 
on the KSE.
42 This added an additional 61 observations to the “survive’" measure. A problem arose occasionally o f  
a firm being identified as a “survivor” even if  they did not have positive exports, or as having exited 
after having only a small amount o f exports in 2006. I always took the trade association as having 
provided the correct survival data due to the dates o f  data collection.
43 One printing firm that I interviewed in Faisalabad, for example, explained that they were no longer 
able to sell in the export market as they did under quota as they could no longer keep up with the 
quality standards demanded by buyers. This performance is confirmed by his classification as an 
“exiter” from the FBR data as it showed no export sales in 2006.
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I also developed a stronger indicator of performance, the “Maintain” indicator. 
“Maintain” is the ability o f a firm to maintain the level of exports it had under quota 
measured firstly as the average yearly export sales under quota (from 2000 to 2004).44 
This measure is valid for all firms on which export data were available in 2006 from 
the FBR, KSE and SECP datasets. Additional observations were obtained from the 
PHMA which listed the individual firm’s hosiery exports in 2006.45 If this was greater 
than the mean or 2004 exports, then the firm could be classed as “maintain”. I analyse 
both ‘survive’ and ‘maintain’ measures while controlling for firm characteristics such 
as age, size, location and formality.
Finally, additional data on the performance of partnerships and sole proprietorships 
(that I name ‘less formal firms’) were obtained from the PHMA. As a result o f a 
Research and Development Support Grant that was put in place by Pakistan’s 
government in woven and knitted garments on 12 April 2005, data on member firm 
exports in 2006 were collected by the association as they processed the applications 
for refund on their behalf.46 The sample included 791 hosiery companies representing 
53 per cent of knitwear exports in 2006, and allows comparison of the performance of 
less formal firms with their more formal counterparts.
Because of the limitations of data quality, I cross reference these five datasets in order 
to explore shakeout in Pakistan’s textile industry. The coverage of these datasets by 
product, location and firm type is illustrated in Table 1-1.
44 I also used firm’s sales in 2004 as the baseline since in many cases the firm was increasing its 
exports over time, but the results remained similar.
45 However, since many firms produce several products o f  which hosiery is one, this analysis could 
only cover those firms who exported 100 per cent hosiery products under the quota.
46 Export data in 2006 included PHMA members who had applied for refund on R&D expenditures, 
both incorporated firms and partnerships/sole proprietorships, and included many o f  Pakistan’s largest 
knitwear exporters. For details o f the order see ‘6% Research and Development Support to the 
Garments Industry’, State Bank o f Pakistan, F.E. Circular No. 6 o f 2005, Accessed 23 March 2009. 
These datasets outlined the performance o f all their Karachi and Faisalabad members in 2006 (Lahore 
PHMA only provided data on incorporated firms). Data was provided by PHMA on its 501 members in 
Karachi in 2006, its 220 members in Faisalabad, and the 70 o f  its Lahore members incorporated as 
public or private firms. This dataset also allows identification o f many firms that were not exporters 
under quota (179 firms in Karachi and 110 units in Faisalabad).
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Table 1-1 Overview of quantitative datasets
DATASET KSE SECP TDAP FBR PHMA
No. of firms 194 85 3,610/724 724 (528) 791
Years 1990-2007 1999-2006 2000-2004 2006 2000-2004/2006
Data available Sales, costs, capital expenditure, Sales, costs, capital Age, location, Exports Exports (knitwear)
exports/local, finance, employees, expenditure, size, product, formality
production capacity exports/local formality
Type Public listed 194 0 cn O'*
Public unlisted 0 85 7 J y j 207
Private 0 0 631 631
Sole prop/partnership 0 0 2,886 0 584Unknown 0 0 0 0
Location Karachi 85 29 - 341 501 (all members)
(HQ) Lahore 73 44 - 205 70 (only plc/pvt)
Faisalabad 12 7 - 111 220 (all members)
Other 24 5 - 67 0
Product Yam 96 53 86 43 0
(main) Cloth 14 13 461 119 0
Yam/Cloth 19 5 - - 0
Home textile 12 5 401 105 0
Woven garment 12 6 1,095 221 0Knit garment  4* 1,237 174 791
Towel Unknown 0 262 42 0
Other (inc mix of 1 3 Unknown 68 20 0above)
Total reliance on quota for 
exports (2000-2004) (per cent) Range: 21-27 Range: 26-33
Varies by 
product - -
Mean share of total textile and Range: 20-30 Range: 3-6 -40 56 53
clothing exports (per cent) (1994-2007) (1999-2006) (2000-2004) (2006) (knitwear in 2006)
NOTE: In FBR column the figure in brackets refer to the data available in 2006 for the ‘maintain’ indicator (response rates) from the list o f  724 exporters in the TDAP sample.
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Founder experience and firm  capabilities
In order to assess firm entry strategies and organisational design, as well as how firms 
improved productivity, quality and marketing practices during liberalisation, I draw on 
representative interviews with 48 firms. Because data on the 194 KSE-listed firms were the 
only sample available at the outset of the research in 2005, it was used as the sampling frame 
for firm interviews in 2006 which resulted in 38 interviews. However, upon receipt of the 
FBR data in 2007 I attempted to contact the top 25 exporters under quota and obtain firm 
backgrounds on others with the help of trade associations. I was able secure an additional 10 
interviews from this strategy.
Given that the trade liberalisation under the Agreement on Textiles was announced in 1994,1 
expected a change in firm behaviour immediately and thus selected interviewees from KSE 
firms that had positive sales in 1994 in order to trace their subsequent performance. However, 
when attempting to contact firms that were active in 1994 (but had since exited), I discovered 
that it was very difficult to trace firms that had exited as late as 2002.1 also established that it 
was highly unlikely that these firms were exiting the KSE due to the liberalisation as they 
were often performing poorly even before 1994,47 As a result, I excluded the 21 firms that 
exited the sample before 1999 in order to improve my chances of tracking the fate of the firm, 
and took only those firms with positive sales in 1999 as my sampling frame for interview.
From a sampling frame of 173 companies I took a random sample of 47, stratified by size 
(see Table 1-2), and every 7th firm alphabetically was selected for interview.48 Firms in each 
category are representative of the wider sample of firms on the KSE by size in 2004, just 
before the abolition of export quotas (see Table 1-3).
47 Interviews suggest that the earliest direct response to the MFA in terms o f  product diversification or capital 
expenditure was in 1997, and this was one o f the market leaders. Most firms responded closer to 2004, as shown 
by general trends in capital expenditure.
48 Because the full dataset could not be collected from Karachi until February 2006, firms were actually selected 
by product rather than by size. However, initial data collected in October 2005 from annual reports held in the 
Lahore Stock Exchange showed that product was correlated with size on 100 o f the 173 firms, and I am 
confident I selected a representative sample by both size and product (see Table 1-3 and Figure 1-1). Mean firm 
size is typically increasing in these categories, as shown in Table 1-3. Firms were coded in categories o f yarn, 
cloth and composite on the KSE.
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Table 1-2 Selection of firms approached for interview, Karachi Stock Exchange sample
Firm type Share of total KSE sales in 2004 (per cent) Number of firms sampled
Yam 43.5 20
Cloth 5.4 4
Yam and cloth 21.9 11
Composite 28.8 12
Total firms 173 47
NOTE: ‘Composite’ is a term that relates to firms that have integrated facilities, most often operating in multiple 
products or the home textile and garment sectors.
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Table 1-3 Average size of respondent by product versus mean (nominal Pak Rs million, 
2004)
Firm type Average size 
(all)
Average size 
(sampled firms)
Number of 
sampled firms
Average size 
(respondents)
Number of 
respondents
Yam 566 677 20 829 13
Cloth 501 471 4 718 3
Yam & cloth 1,387 1,614 11 1,337 5
Composite 1,399 1,501 12 2,732 3
All 765 1,098 47 1,238 24
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
To contact firms for interview, I obtained the names of the Chief Executives or Managing 
Directors and cold called each of them. I did so in order to avoid confusion about my identity, 
the purpose of my research and to show my lack of local connections (to encourage 
openness). This often proved very difficult. Firstly, many firms did not have fully operational 
phone numbers or the CEO was not contactable on the number provided. Secondly, the 
person typically named as the CEO was usually the company founder and was often retired. 
Staff often failed to direct me to the appropriate Director instead. Thirdly, there was often a 
bureaucratic layer in which I had to pass via the secretaries in order to access the Director 
which took time and persistence.
However, as shown in Table 1-3 above, I obtained a total of 24 interviews with firms from 
this sample, equal to a response rate of 51 per cent, and it was larger firms in each product 
category on average that agreed to be interviewed. The response rate rises to 60 per cent 
when firms that had exited prior to my field research are taken into account. An inability to 
contact a firm most often meant it had gone out of business or I had not been able to reach the 
Director directly. The representativeness of this sample by size can be seen in Figure 1-1:
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while larger firms that had the highest response rate, interviews were conducted with firms 
from all size categories, ensuring good coverage o f  the sample.
Figure 1-1 Representativeness of interviewees (by firm size in 2004), Karachi Stock 
Exchange sample
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, firm survey, own analysis
In addition to the interviews w ith these 24 firms, I also conducted additional interviews with 
14 firms listed on the KSE through a pilot study in Decem ber 2004 (12 interviews) and 
through other contacts (2 interview s).49 This gave additional insights into the activities o f 
firms and filled gaps by product and location. With the additional interviews obtained by 
conducting leading privately-owned quota exporters (in M arch-April 2007), in total I was 
able to interview 8 o f the top 25 exporters under quota and 10 o f  the top 25 quota exporters 
post-liberalisation in 2006 (see Appendix 1-3).
I sought to design an interview structure that would uncover how PFE informed the entry 
strategy, organisational structure o f  the new firm and its perform ance during liberalisation. 
As a result, I sought to identify industry specific capabilities by researching production and 
quality practices in the industry. This included seven factory visits in late 2005 and early 
2006 covering two spinning units, two home textile units, one garment unit and two large
49 When I was in Multan, for exam ple, I was dropped o f f  at the offices o f  one o f  the c ity ’s leading textile firms 
by another CEO that was a c lose  friend o f  the owner. W hile this w as unpredicted, I proceeded to conduct the 
interview and gain additional information for the study.
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integrated factories with yam production, knitting, dyeing, printing and stitching of 
garments.50 During these trips I probed Directors and technical managers about how 
productivity and quality were measured, how firms conducted marketing, and how they 
developed new products. I also inquired about the organisation of the workplace: how 
workers were recruited and motivated to perform, and how performance was measured and 
monitored. In order to establish industry best practice in textiles and clothing I also consulted 
many articles in the industry journal ‘Textile World’ and conducted interviews with textile 
and clothing buyers. Finally, I analysed of the cost structure of KSE firms in order to isolate 
the raw material, capital and labour intensity of the industry and confirm the link with firm 
capabilities.51
Three themes were central to the interview structure (see Appendix 1-4). Firstly, I sought to 
establish the firm’s origins -  why the founder entered the textile and clothing industry, the 
first product selected and why, and how the firm secured its first buyer. I also asked about the 
education of the founder, previous employment experience, and previous ‘exposure’ to the 
industry. Secondly, I assessed the organisational design of the firm -  recruitment of new 
staff, motivation of workers, and performance monitoring.52 In order to test the robustness of 
management’s comments about how the firm and manufacturing process was run, I used 
eight factory visits to cross-check what the CEO or Director said with the technical directors 
and other staff. Thirdly, I inquired how firms had either prepared for the ending of the 
MFA/ATC or experienced the liberalisation, and specifically addressed production, 
marketing and organisational practices. I structured the questions in a way that would reveal 
concrete examples of firm responses, such as “Can you give me an example of when you 
have set and reached a target?” rather than more general questions about how firms address 
productivity, for example. Using financial data from the KSE, TDAP, FBR and PHMA I 
match firm performance with the case studies provided by the interviews.53
50 I obtained access for these visits based on contacts I had made during the pilot study in December 2004 and 
when writing an article on the industry for the BBC in 2005.
51 Cost data was collected for 115 KSE firms between 2004 and 2007.
52 Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), for example, asked two different managers in firms for data on incentives, 
performance and monitoring in order to cross check responses and ensure they were robust measures.
3 Throughout the thesis I have been deliberately vague about firm-specifics in an attempt to obscure the identity 
of the firm (for a reader could simply cross check with the annual reports o f  firms in 2007 to match the data). I 
have used real values, for example, to describe sales, and use firm numbers rather than names.
44
In addition, it was necessary to address the family-oriented management structure o f many 
firms in Pakistan which typically involved joint management either between father and sons, 
uncles and nephews, between brothers or occasionally with female relatives. This is 
particularly applicable when a relative is appointed the Director of a new mill. While the 
family may chose the product and overall business direction, the Director often in charge of 
day-to-day operations, hence both the experience of the founder and the Director mattered. I 
term this type of firm a family spinoff and is characterised by varying degrees of ability and 
motivation on the part of the new Director.54 This stands in contrast to conventional spinoffs, 
where the desire to found the new venture is genuine and voluntary, and under which the 
risks and motivations are strong. As a result, I examine the education, experience and 
exposure of both founders and the new Directors who join the management of the mill. In 
particular, I comment on how the quality of this experience is shaped by the previous 
performance of the mill. Incentive structures also change in the family business environment, 
and are discussed frequently throughout this thesis.
In addition to formal interviews, company websites often provided information on the 
histories of companies. Reports filed with SECP also occasionally stated occupations of 
directors. Incorporation dates of related group companies found on the Pakistan Board of 
Investment website also provided additional information.
Given the limited scope of the KSE and SECP sample, and the wider representativeness of 
the TDAP dataset, I also sought to trace the backgrounds of firms in the TDAP/FBR 
dataset.55 Given the difficulty and time required to contact each firm directly, I sought the
54 In many cases, I found that the motivations o f Directors to work in the family business are strong, particularly 
among young directors who saw an opportunity to become important players in the international textile and 
clothing industry. However, the appointment o f Directors in some firms was less voluntary. The Director o f  one 
garment unit for example, had studied finance and wanted to work in banking but was required to manage the 
family business. In another, the son had secured a top graduate job in the United States but was required to 
return home after the attacks o f 9/11. Academic work has recognised the negative impact on firm performance 
of primogeniture -  the appointment o f  the first son -  in particular, in contrast with the appointment o f  the most 
able son (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). The impact has been addressed in an innovative way by Bloom and 
Van Reenen (2007) who use the appointment o f the senior son to management as the random draw, and the 
appointment o f  the most capable son as the comparison group when examining the impact on firm performance.
55 This took place on a final visit to Pakistan in March-April 2007. My research interest was met with a mixed 
response. Two trade associations refused to share with me such information, one on the grounds that it was the 
private information o f the companies, and the same association did not see the point o f the exercise when the 
industry was “struggling”. I was also often told that my task was “impossible” or that “you will not get that kind 
o f information”. However, three trade associations were very helpful and knew many firms personally: the All 
Pakistan Textile Mills Association in Lahore; the Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association in Lahore, 
Karachi and Faisalabad, and the Pakistan Textile Exporters Association in Faisalabad.
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help of trade association to provide information on founder backgrounds. Taking the name of 
the firm, its location, products and the name of the CEO, I matched companies with their 
respective trade association (which were sometimes multiple). I then arranged meetings with 
associations in Lahore, Faisalabad and Karachi and sought the background of the units by 
asking experienced trade association members directly. When meeting with the trade 
association members, I asked two questions: is the firm still in operation at the time of 
interview, and what did the founder do before starting the business? The questions were kept 
deliberately short because it was difficult to secure the participation of trade associations in 
this exercise and to move through the list in the time allocated for the meeting.
There was some difficulty in establishing PFE through this method. While trade associations 
were familiar with firms, they may not have known the specific origins of the firm or the 
backgrounds of the current management. Companies were described, for example, as a 
‘business family’ for generations, but the precise industry or education and experience of the 
Directors was not specified.56 Other companies were described as “inspired” by a boom in the 
sector, “relatives” of existing textile businesses, "old style" in their management practices, or 
that they “started off in knitting” but without precise identification the degree of previous 
industry exposure. In many cases, firms were described by their regional or ‘biradari’ (which 
can be understood as caste or kinship group) such as “Chiniotis” or “Memons”. Often the 
interviewee would know that the management of the firm had experience abroad (in the UK 
or Canada) but not in what profession, or that they had experience in marketing or 
production, but it was not clear if this was in the textile sector or another industry. However, 
in total I was able to obtain backgrounds on a total of 353 firms from all samples and 241 
firms from the TDAP/FBR matched sample.
Finally, I examined firm-level drivers of diversification in the textile industry and contrast 
these cases with the origins of firms driving wider industrial development in Pakistan. To do 
so, I draw on interviews conducted with textile firms that have diversified into sectors such as 
cement and chemicals. I investigate why the founder or Director chose the destination 
industry, how they entered the sector (selection of machinery or staff, for example), as well as 
how they have developed production capabilities in the sector. I then contrast these accounts
56 This description o f business in Pakistan is typical o f the family structure o f  industries, however it means that 
the second generation, who are more likely to have obtained MBA qualifications, be professional textile 
engineers or have external experience will not be picked up using this method.
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with the founder origins of firms in growth sectors such as chemicals, information technology 
and pharmaceuticals for which I draw on interview data collected from eight firms in sectors 
such as IT, chemicals and pharmaceuticals in March and April 2007. I also draw on 
interviews with industry observers, and annual reports and company websites (see Appendix 
1-5). I thus establish firm origins and growth patterns which help to explain Pakistan’s wider 
industrial development.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The analysis of shakeout in the Pakistani textile industry during trade liberalisation offers a 
unique opportunity to understand the process of industrial development in an emerging 
economy. The examination of the role o f firm capabilities as the ultimate driver of firm, and 
thus industrial, growth provides new insights for development theory and policy. The thesis is 
structured as follows.
In Chapter 2 ,1 outline the evolution of Pakistan’s textile industry in historical perspective and 
show how the political and institutional context has shaped the performance of the textile 
sector and Pakistan’s wider industrial development. In particular, I discuss how economic 
policy in Pakistan has shaped firm entry, growth and diversification in textiles through a 
licensing system which restricted firm entry until the 1980s, through to the subsequent 
deregulation of the industry in the 1990s. I also introduce some of the firms in the sector, 
their entry motivations and the operating challenges they have faced. I do so in order to set 
the scene for the rapid changes which took place in the sector between 2004 and 2007 after 
the ending of the Multifibre Arrangement.
In Chapter 3, I examine Pakistan’s textile industry as it was exposed to increased price and 
quality competition from 1994 to 2004 as quotas were gradually removed, and the subsequent 
performance of the industry from 2004 to 2007. I first outline the evolution of global control 
over trade in textile and clothing products since the 1950s, and show how the Multifibre 
Arrangement -  in place from 1974 until 2004 -  shaped firm entry and performance by 
guaranteeing markets for some producers while limiting them for others. I also examine how 
the quota system shaped firm composition and performance in Pakistan by product, size, 
location, firm type and age. I then examine Pakistan’s export performance at an aggregate 
level between 2004 and 2007 in comparison with competitors such as India and China.
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Finally, I assess the performance of Pakistan’s firms in the post-2004 period including the 
ability to maintain their export sales during the liberalisation and gain market share (from 
2004 to 2007).
In Chapter 4 ,1 examine the relationship between founder experience and firm performance. I 
first give an overview of the backgrounds of companies in the textile and clothing industry 
using data from the firm survey and individual interviews. I classify firm backgrounds as 
‘Experienced’, ‘Textile-related’, ‘Other manufacturing’ or ‘Inexperienced’ in order to 
identify the founder’s technical experience in relation to textiles and other manufacturing 
sectors, as well as previous managerial experience. I then test whether this experience is 
associated with firm survival and performance during liberalisation while controlling for 
other firm characteristics such as age, formality and size. Having established this relationship, 
I then examine how pre-founder experience shapes the entry strategies of firms. I show how 
industry-related experience enables firms to identify new market opportunities, leverage 
existing manufacturing capabilities, or exploit options to develop new products at the request 
of buyers.
In Chapter 5, I examine the role of pre-founder experience in shaping the organisational 
structure and production capabilities in new firms. With the use of case studies, I establish the 
productivity, quality and marketing practices that are important in the textile industry and the 
particular importance o f professional management practices. I then show how firms inherit 
production and organisational capabilities that are associated with their pre-entry experience. 
Firms with both managerial and technical experience on average often have better initial 
production and organisational capabilities which are reflected in the firm’s initial size and 
growth trajectory. In contrast, general managerial capabilities can be inherited by 
inexperienced entrants but they often struggle with the industry-specific aspects of 
manufacturing. I show that founder experience persists over time by putting in place learning 
processes which either succeed or fail in adopting practices developed elsewhere or adapting 
practices through in-house trial and error. Poor organisational performance can be changed, 
but case studies illustrate that this is only possible through a radical change of management 
composition or motivation.
In Chapter 6 ,1 examine how firms responded to increase in competition when the MFA was 
finally abolished. I establish how firms made investments to improve productivity, quality
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and marketing practices in the run up to December 2004, and the association between 
accumulated capability and firm performance in the post-quota period. Matching managerial 
and technical interviews with data on firm performance, I show in particular that it is good 
organisational design -  such as effective recruitment procedures and incentives — which 
enables shop-floor workers to improve performance. The best performers have shown the 
ability to move into branding and retail and show sophistication in the local market. 
Constraints to firm growth in Pakistan are also highlighted such as lack of professional 
management, new product design and infrastructural constraints which affect all firms.
In Chapter 7, I map Pakistan’s broader industrial development to date in its institutional 
context and draw attention to high growth sectors such as automobiles, cement, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, IT and services. I analyse the motivations of textile firms in particular for 
diversification into sectors such as cement and services, but contrast these patterns with the 
emergence of firms in the pharmaceutical, chemical and IT sectors. Putting Pakistan’s 
experience within the wider context of the development of other emerging markets since the 
1960s, I evaluate drivers and limitations of diversification in this economy. I conclude that it 
has been difficult to enter into, upgrade within, and diversify from the textile and clothing 
industry, requiring sophisticated managerial and technical capabilities that have often been 
scarce in this particular developing economy.
In Chapter 8, I conclude the thesis with an analysis of the contribution of this study to 
development theory and policy. While institutional and state-led analyses of industrial 
development go a long way to explain Pakistan’s limited industrial development, I also 
suggest that heterogeneity itself offers new insights into the development process. I argue that 
industry-related education and employment experience among founders is at the root of high 
achieving firms and can be the channel through which transition into new industries can 
occur. Increased competition in particular can break down informal barriers to the 
accumulation of experience among workers and raise the likelihood of new firm formation. I 
also argue that this process and can be supported by focused policy initiatives to help 
accumulate this experience through education, industrial work experience, mentoring and 
migration. I conclude that future research could use the framework of diverging firm 
performance to investigate the drivers of industrial diversification and thus offer new 
dimensions to development theory and policy.
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Appendices
Appendix 1-1: Export profile and export reliance of firms listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange
The 194 firms included in the Karachi-Stock Exchange sample represented between 20.0 and 
30.1 per cent of all textile exports from Pakistan between 1996 and 2007 (see Table 1-4). The 
sample also represented between 40 and 64 per cent of revenues in yam exports in the same 
period. Between 88 and 98 per cent of the firms were exporting some of their output in any 
one year, however firms varied in their export reliance from 0 per cent to 100 per cent. KSE 
firms have seen their share of total exports gradually fall over time from 30.0 per cent in 1996 
to 24.6 per cent in 2007.
Table 1-4 Observations in Karachi Stock Exchange sample (1990-2007)
Year Observations Number
of
exporters
Per cent 
exporters
Per cent of total 
Pakistan textile & 
clothing exports
Export reliance of 
total sales in sample
1990 171 - - - -
1991 177 - - - -
1992 181 - - - -
1993 185 - - - -
1994 191 176 92 - 50.2
1995 190 180 95 - 50.3
1996 191 182 95 30.1 49.9
1997 193 183 95 29.8 52.2
1998 194 182 94 27.9 51.6
1999 193 178 92 27.8 51.7
2000 193 176 91 27.7 54.2
2001 193 172 89 26.5 54.2
2002 192 169 88 24.1 50.9
2003 192 171 89 23.2 53.3
2004 191 175 92 25.1 52.5
2005 182 173 95 20.0 54.6
2006 178 174 98 22.9 52.9
2007 137 121 88 24.6 55.5
NOTE: Figures not collected for local or export sales between 1990 and 1993 due to time constraints. 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
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Appendix 1-2: Data availability on founder background, incorporated quota exporters
The availability of 2006 export data and founder backgrounds for 724 quota exporters from 
the TDAP sample is given in Table 1-5 below. Data availability declines as the size of the 
firm declines suggesting a bias in data availability towards better performers throughout the 
study.
Table 1-5 Availability of 2006 export data on 724 quota exporters by firm size
Position in list of quota exporters by 
size (l=Iargest)
Survival
(Observations)
PFE measure 
(Observations)
0-100 91 62
101-200 85 34
201-300 77 34
301-400 76 28
401-500 65 26
501-600 55 30
601-700 67 19
701-724 12 8
Total 724 528 241
Mean response rate (per cent) 72.9 33.3
NOTE: Here survival data refers to numerical data provided by the Federal Bureau o f  Statistics, Karachi Stock 
Exchange and Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association.
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, firm survey, own analysis
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Appendix 1-3: Interviewees by export position under quota (2000-2004) and in 2006
The position of selected firms interviewed by size among all 3,610 quota exporters from 2000 
to 2004 -  and from data on 541 exporters in 2006 -  are given in Table 1-6. Not all 
interviewees exported under quota.
Table 1-6 Firms interviewed from 3,610 quota exporters (2000-2004) and 541 exporters
in (2006)
Position
(2000-2004)
Firm number Total quota exports 
2000-2004 (real USD 
million, 2000)
Position
(2006)
Firm number Exports 2006 
(nominal USD 
million)
1 36 190 2 36 138
5 12 118 5 3 95
6 41 116 6 10 89
7 3 111 8 35 73
10 46 103 9 35 71
12 42 97 12 12 62
13 11 96 14 46 60
22 39 80 17 1 58
26 28 77 23 41 45
27 35 76 25 11 43
31 38 75 31 22 37
36 45 65 32 5 36
43 37 58 41 37 31
52 1 49 52 42 25
60 9 44 53 39 25
61 35 44 59 7 22
76 8 35 62 40 21
99 10 28 69 45 20
111 28 25 84 24 17
146 5 20 104 25 14
232 40 12 105 18 14
263 48 11 106 8 13
265 20 11 107 38 13
269 27 11 114 27 12
311 14 9 115 9 11
324 22 8 116 16 11
386 16 7 120 20 10
534 24 4 131 28 9
555 7 4 169 13 6
627 43 3 172 26 6
682 47 3 183 2 5
702 23 2 201 15 4
889 25 2 223 19 3
1014 26 1 239 14 3
1045 17 1 294 29 2
1055 18 1 379 21 0.7
1210 44 0.8 442 33 0.3
1784 13 0.2 490 23 0.1
3013 19 <0.1
NOTE: Some multiple units o f firms interviewed are included. In 2006, the top exporter had overseas sales o f  
$232m (nominal USD).
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Federal Bureau o f  Revenue, firm survey
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Appendix 1-4: Interview questionnaire (2006-2007)
Company number _________________ Date of interview
Name of interviewee Location
PART I: HISTORY OF FIRM AND MANAGEMENT
Can you tell me about the history o f the firm?
Who set up the firm? What was their educational and employment background?
Why did they set up the firm?
Who were the firm’s first buyers? How did you find them?
What was the first product produced by the firm? What was the next? Why did you move into this 
new product?
How did you obtain finance for the operation?
Why did you choose the location for the mill?
PART II: CAPABILITIES
■ MARKETING
How have you developed your buyer base over the years?
How do you (and the team) keep up to date with market/buyer trends?
Can you give me an example of how you have recently successfully secured a new buyer or 
developed business with an existing buyer?
(Do you have a separate marketing department? What is your and their role? )
(Do you have any overseas marketing offices? How did you set them up?)
■ NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Can you tell me about how your products have evolved over the years?
Why did you decide to develop this new product in particular? How was the product developed? 
(Do you have design abilities/a new product development team?)
■ PHYSICAL CAPITAL AND PROCESS INNOVATION
How do you measure productivity and quality in production?
How do you go about improving the production process on an ongoing basis?
What is the most significant improvement you have made to improve productivity/ reduce costs? 
What is the most important change you have made to raise product quality?
How do you decide which technologies are the best to implement?
(Where did the idea for these changes come from?)
(If there is a weakness in the production procedure, what would you do to ensure it is resolved?)
■ MULTIFIBRE ARRANGEMENT
Can you tell me how you prepared for the ending of the MFA?
What did you consider were your strengths and weaknesses?
(When did you start doing this?)
Can you tell me how the ending of the MFA has affected your business?
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PART III: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
■ STAFF RECRUITMENT
How do you attract good quality staff to the company?
What makes it distinctive to work at your company as opposed to your competitors?
(How would you retain a good staff member if they wanted to leave?)
■ INCENTIVES
How do you encourage staff to work efficiently?/How do you motivate staff?
How do you reward people who perform well?
Can you give me an example how you have developed a staff member with potential?
If a staff member is performing poorly, how would you deal with this?
(What training do you conduct of staff?)
(What is the best thing you did to improve the overall performance of staff?)
■ TARGETS AND MONITORING
What are your performance targets within the company -  for example, in production and marketing? 
How do you measure performance against these targets? e.g. How often do you do this?
How are these targets communicated to workers?
Can you give me an example of a target you have achieved and one you have not?
(What do you do if you are not meeting performance targets?)
(Are staff on the shop-floor aware of these targets?)
Additional question
If there was one piece of information which I could discover from my research which would be useful 
to you in your business, what would it be?
NOTE: These questions were typically used as talking points in the interview, with the aim o f  covering each 
area partially. Questions in brackets were asked if time permitted. Interviews usually lasted 1-1.5 hours.
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Appendix 1-5: Interviewees from other industries and business observers
Table 1-7 Interviewees from other industries and business observers
Interviewee no. Industry/Activity
49 Pharmaceuticals
50 Cement
51 Automobiles
52 Chemicals
53 IT
Others (not IT
specifically Private education
numbered) Real Estate
Large consumer goods company 
Architecture
Other interviewees Saqib Sherani, Economist, Royal Bank of Scotland, Pakistan
(not numbered) Syed Salim Raza, Pakistan Business Council
Mr Sajjad Hassan, former Chairman, Central Board of Revenue
Mr Tariq Saigol, Chairman, Kohinoor Maple Leaf Group
Nasim Qureshi, Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan
Dr Ali Cheema, Lahore University of Management Sciences
Partner, leading Pakistani accountancy firm
Partner, leading Pakistani accountancy firm
Leading international textile buyer
Leading international investor
Employees of several textile mills
Technical consultant, knitwear company in Pakistan
Technical consultants, woven garment company in Pakistan
Members of several textile and clothing trade associations
Members of trade associations from other industries
Several other unnamed investors and businesses people
55
Chapter 2 The emergence of the textile and clothing industry in 
Pakistan
The history and evolution of Pakistan’s textile industry since the country was created in 1947 
tells the story of Pakistan’s industrial development itself. The textile sector has been the 
backbone of the economy over this period and many firms which have prospered in other 
economic sectors have at one time been involved in the textile industry, either as a ‘seed’ 
firm or as a target of later diversification. In this chapter I examine the evolution of 
Pakistan’s textile industry in its historical and institutional context, assessing how political 
change within Pakistan has shaped the performance of the sector as well as wider industrial 
development. I also examine how the composition of the industry at the time of trade 
liberalisation emerged out of this context, exhibiting heterogeneous firm capabilities and 
performance. This sets the scene for the analysis of how trade regulation shaped firm entry 
and performance between 1973 and 2004, and how Pakistan’s textile and clothing firms 
performed when the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing finally came to an end on 1 January 
2005.
Firstly, I examine the physical and human capital endowments of the country after Partition 
in 1947 and how investment and industry growth has been shaped by institutional and 
political events in the six decades since the country’s formation. I show that Pakistan 
inherited a limited industrial base at the time of Partition but rich human capital which 
resulted in early industry growth. However, political instability over time has led to limited 
investment in infrastructure and education and subsequent patchy economic growth in the 
country’s first sixty years.
Secondly, I examine the emergence of Pakistan’s textile industry following Partition and its 
contribution to industrial and export growth between 1947 and 2007. Firms who drove 
expansion after Partition into spinning and weaving were often from backgrounds such as 
leather, cotton ginning, trading and other manufacturing sectors, but firm entry and industry 
performance was often limited by economic policies. Access to finance and licences, for 
example, was often determined through political connections which limited firm entry in the
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early years. In contrast, the deregulation of firm entry at the end of the 1980s led to a rapid 
rise in firm incorporation and competition. I show that there has been a modest shift into 
higher value-added products such as home textiles and garments, while some firms have 
entered the retail sector in the domestic market.
Thirdly, I examine broader patterns of industrial development and the development 
challenges Pakistan has faced in the period of study (1994-2007). I examine the constraints to 
business in the operating environment and the proposition that Pakistan has delivered ‘growth 
without development’. I argue that wider social and economic development has suffered as a 
result of political instability, lack of investment in physical and human capital and rent- 
seeking.
Finally, I examine the composition of Pakistan’s textile industry as it approached trade 
liberalisation from 1994 to 2004. I find that the evolution of the industry in this political 
context has led to variation in firm characteristics by age, location, size, product and firm 
type. I also find evidence of differing firm performance to be examined throughout the thesis. 
The performance and capabilities of firms were evidently mixed at the time of trade reform in 
the textile industry when the sector was exposed to full international competition.
2.1 The foundations of industry growth 
Cotton and textiles in the Asian subcontinent
The cotton textile industry has a long historical tradition in the Indian subcontinent stretching 
from the pre-British period through to the formation of Pakistan in 1947. The discovery of 
samples of cotton materials at Mohenjo-Daro, Sindh, during archaeological excavations, for 
example, has established that the growing and manufacturing of cotton in the Indus Valley 
dates as far back as 3000BC (Sawhney, 1951:66). It was the production of cotton fabrics 
which induced the East India Company to come in search of Indian calico and muslin with a 
Royal Charter (ibid), while textiles were also “a catalyst in Europe’s trade with India in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (Roy, 1996:11).
India had traditionally a large artisanal textile sector spanning many of the country’s regions 
(Roy, 1996; Roy, 1993). However, the first formal textile mill -  the Bombay Spinning and
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Weaving Mill -  was established in 1851 (Sastry, 1951a). By 1900, India had weaving towns 
stretching from Sialkot in Punjab to Dindigul in Tamil Nadu (Roy, 1993:136), and by 1947 
the country had over 400 textile mills producing cloth, yam and garments and exporting yam 
to countries such as Japan and China (Sastry, 1951b). The area that was to become Pakistan 
included “the fertile and irrigated areas of Sind and the West Punjab” (Saraiya, 1951:62) and 
was a supplier of cotton to the textile mills in Bombay, Calcutta and Ahmedabad.
The land mass which became Pakistan in 1947 had also been a centre of trade and commerce 
for centuries. Bamouw describes how before Partition the major city of Hyderabad “was 
home to a community of bankers and merchants” with a “traditional role as bankers of the 
state and financiers of craft products” (1966:30). Markovits described how Shikarpur in 
Sindh was the centre of a financial network which arose in the second half of the eighteenth 
century where “the expertise and capital accumulated by the Shikarpuri bankers allowed them 
to take advantage of a new surge in Indo-Asian trade from the 1840s onwards” (2000:30). 
The northern city of Lahore in West Pakistan also had well developed legal, economic and 
political institutions: Kushwant Singh, the well known Indian writer, describes Government 
College Lahore in the 1930s as “the most sought-after educational institution in northern 
India” (2002:40) as well as a lively legal scene in which the Delhi courts were under the 
jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court.
However, a formal textile industry was relatively underdeveloped in the area to become 
Pakistan in 1947. Out of the 423 textile mills located in undivided India in 1946, only five 
were in West Pakistan and ten were in East Pakistan (Gandhi, 1951). The majority were 
located in Ahmedabad, Madras State, Bombay state, and the city of Bombay itself. Only four 
firms were located in Punjab and only one in Karachi (see Table 2-1).1 Much of the industrial 
activity in British India was instead concentrated in Bombay, Calcutta and Ahmedabad. 
Calcutta, for example, was situated near coal fields while Bombay had an established source 
of hydro electric power and could import coal easily from abroad (Sastry, 1951a).
1 For example, Ahmedabad had 74 mills, Madras State had 72 mills, Bombay state had 70 mills, and the city o f  
Bombay itself had 65 mills.
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Table 2-1 Characteristics of textile mills in West Pakistan versus All India (1947)
Name and location Number of 
spindles
Number of 
looms
Number of 
employees
Daulatram Spinning and Weaving Mills 
(formerly Sind Textile Mills), New Jail 
Country Club Road, Karachi
2,216 60 151
Lyallpur Cotton Mills, Lyallpur (Branch 
of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd)
32,052 994 1,485
Mela Ram Cotton Mills, Lahore2 16,116 148 576
Punjab Textile Mills, P.O. Kot 
Dunichand, Lahore
5,040 0 196
Sutlej Cotton Mills, Okara 22,800 925 2,874
Location Total spindles Total looms Mean number of 
employees by firm
Ahmedabad 1,875,340 42,403 1,052
Bombay Island 2,904,138 60,096 1,843
Bombay State 1,303,938 25,020 956
SOURCE: Gandhi (1951)
However, the sizes of the mills located in West Pakistan in comparison with the India mean 
suggest that at the time production was economically viable (see also Table 2-1). Sutlej 
Textile Mills, for example, had more employees than the mean in the largest textile producing 
areas of Ahmedabad, Bombay State and Bombay Island.3 Lyallpur Cotton Mills also had a 
greater number of employees than the mean in Bombay State and Ahmedabad. The area of 
Pakistan also accounted for approximately 20 percent of total cotton production in British 
India (Saraiya, 1951) and, at the time of Partition, India relied on Pakistan for the supply of 
9.8 lakh bales of cotton (Sawhney, 1951:69).
There was also limited development of wider industry in the landmass that became Pakistan. 
As Zaidi explains, the area constituting Pakistan was the “bread-basket o f India” and a net 
importer of industrial goods and exporter of wheat and jute (2004:86). According to Lewis, 
“[t]he country had virtually no manufacturing capacity, with the exception of an oil refinery 
in West Pakistan, a few cotton textile plants, and some capacity in sugar refining, tea 
processing, and the manufacture of cement” (1970:2). Further, in the view of Kochanek, “the
2 The only other firm whose fate was traceable was Mela Ram Cotton Mills, whose owner died before partition. 
Source: Mr Sajjad Hassan, former Chairman, Central Board o f  Revenue, Pakistan, interview on 18 Apr 2007.
3 Interestingly, Sutlej Textile Mills was founded in 1934 by the late Mr. G.D. Birla who went on to create the 
very successful Birla K.K. Group o f companies in India that now has interests in fertilizers, engineering, IT and 
biotechnology. According to the company’s website in 2007, Sutlej was “set up with a composite textile mill at 
Okara, now in Pakistan, but after the partition in 1947, the factory at Okara was seized by the Government o f  
Pakistan. Sutlej is now also a leading Indian manufacturer o f home textile products. Source: Sutlej Textiles and 
Industries Limited website, http://www.rtmyam.com/sil_profile.htm, accessed 23 March 2009.
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Pakistani areas were socially, economically, and politically among the least developed 
districts in undivided India...ethnically, socially and linguistically diverse, largely illiterate, 
and overwhelmingly rural and agricultural” (Kochanek, 1983:3).
It was this mixed economic tradition which shaped the physical and human capital 
endowments of Pakistan at the time of the country’s creation on the 14th August 1947.4 From 
1949 to 1950 manufacturing and industry represented only 7.8 per cent of gross domestic 
product in Pakistan, with agriculture generating 53.2 per cent and services 39.0 per cent (see 
Table 2-2). This is half the share of industry in the national income of pre-Partition India 
which was 16.4 per cent between 1940 and 1946 (Roy, 2002:117).
Table 2-2 Breakdown of gross domestic product in Pakistan (1949/1950)
Sector 1949/1950 (per cent of total)
Agriculture 53.2
Manufacturing/Industry 7.8
Others (Services, Trade) 39.0
SOURCE: Zaidi (2004)
The violent upheaval which accompanied the Partition of India and Pakistan also shaped the 
distribution of human capital in the new country.5 The political process which led to the 
separation of a quarter of British India into a Muslim majority area led to severe communal 
riots, the mass exit of Hindus and Sikhs from the Pakistani areas, and the migration of many 
Muslims from parts of the subcontinent to Pakistan (Kochanek 1983:17-18).6 Because pre-
4 On the 14th o f August 1947 a new independent Muslim state was created - The Islamic Republic o f  Pakistan - 
following a political struggle for independence in British India against colonial rule. It was located in some o f  
the regions o f British India most populated by Muslims: two separate land masses o f  East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (Sindh, West Punjab, Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province) 
“separated by a thousand miles o f  Indian territory” (Kochanek, 1983: 3). The new state o f  Pakistan had a 
population o f 75 million, receiving 18 per cent o f the total population o f India and 23 per cent o f the landmass 
(Talbot, 1998:95). A majority o f  the population — 54 per cent — was located in the Bengali-speaking eastern 
wing (Khan, 2005:63).
5 Some accounts propose that an independent state to protect India’s Muslims was the outcome o f the All India 
Muslim League’s concern for Muslims in a “Hindu political order” (Cohen, 2005:5). Other accounts see it as the 
result o f the work o f a League created by a ‘Muslim elite’ from the United Provinces o f India who - with the 
support o f the British government -  aspired to counter the influence o f  the Indian National Congress Party 
(Khan, 2005:64). Kochanek, in contrast, saw partition as the outcome o f  “years o f rising communal tension and 
bitterness [which] erupted into severe communal riots” and “eventually led to a mass exodus o f  Hindus and 
Sikhs from the Pakistani areas to India and a Muslim exodus from various parts o f  the subcontinent to Pakistan” 
(Kochanek, 1983:17-18). Nevertheless, its outcome was to have a significant impact on the shape and 
composition o f Pakistan’s economy and society in the post-Partition period.
6 The partition o f India and Pakistan was accompanied by a large and violent upheaval o f  people from on each 
side o f the new borders with approximately 14.5 million people recorded as having migrated within four years 
(Khwaja et al, 2005). An additional 2.2 million ‘missing people’ left their homes but failed to arrive at their
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Partition economic activity was structured along religious lines it had “a devastating effect on 
the Pakistani areas...The departing communities had played an especially dominant role in 
business, trade, commerce and the professions...The middle-class refugees from Uttar 
Pradesh, Delhi, Bombay, and other parts of north and south India could only partially fill the 
gap” (Kochanek 1983:18).7 Yong and Kudaisya note the specific impact of these political 
changes on the city of Lahore: “[t]he economic consequences of partition for the city were 
severe too. Many institutions, banks and corporate organizations relocated from the city. The 
majority of factories closed down and their plants and buildings were destroyed or abandoned 
in the disturbances...Industrial output, in spite of the authorities’ vigorous efforts, stood only 
at one-third of pre-partition levels” (2000:177).
However, this exit was also accompanied by the arrival of new migrants to Pakistan. 
Kochanek describes several ‘castes’ who were Hindu converts from traditional trading castes 
that migrated to Pakistan after Partition and became extremely important in the industrial life 
of the country, including the Bohras, Khoja Ismaelis and Memons of Western India (1983:8). 
In fact, several business groups had been actively involved in the funding of the Muslim 
League and the struggle for independence such as the Adamjees of Calcutta, a Memon family 
that was “very successful in building one of the first Indian-owned Jute Mills in a field
o
largely dominated by Europeans” (Kochanek, 1983:20). Analysis conducted by Khwaja et al 
(2005) also discovered that migrants to Pakistan were more likely to be men, educated and 
choose non-agricultural professions. The districts which received large migratory flows 
experienced substantially higher growth in educational levels as shown in the case of
destinations (Khwaja et al, 2005:8). The state o f Punjab in the north west o f  the Subcontinent was split in half 
and migration patterns driven by religious grouping. The percentage o f  Muslims in districts that were to become 
part o f Indian Punjab dropped from 32 percent in 1931 to 1.8 percent by 1951, and the percentage o f Hindus and 
Sikhs in Pakistani Punjab fell from 22 percent to 0.16 per cent in the same period (Khwaja el al, 2005). Those 
people who arrived in Pakistan were known as Muhajirs, or refugees, and came to make up 20 per cent o f  the 
total population (Kochanek, 1983:18). In West Pakistan, Karachi grew disproportionately to other major 
Pakistani cities, with a population increase o f  176 per cent (a total o f 681,000 people) in comparison to Lahore’s 
increase o f  26 per cent (177,000 people). The next three largest urban destinations for refugees were Faisalabad 
(109,000 people), Hyderabad (107,000 people) and Peshawar (61,000 people). Source: Table 16.12 Growth o f  
Major Cities from 1901 to 1998, Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2008, Federal Bureau o f Statistics, Pakistan, 
own analysis.
7 Kochanek describes, for example, how “[although some Muslims were active in trade and commerce in 
British India, most o f  the trade, industry, and banking was in the hands o f  Hindus, Parsis and Europeans” 
(1983:19). Bamouw also discusses how “Hindus occupied positions as merchants, shopkeepers, money-lenders, 
landowners, teachers and administrators” and that “[t]he mercantile specialization o f  Hindus in Sind was related 
to the Islamic proscription against taking money at interest” (1966:40).
8 The Adamjees played a role in “financing [Muslim] League activities and projects and mobilizing Calcutta 
Memon support for the League” (Kochanek, 1983:21). The Habib family who established the first Muslim- 
owned bank in 1940 in India and then founded Habib Bank in Pakistan were also important contributors, as well 
as the Wazir Ali family who established the successful Packages Limited in Punjab (ibid:20-21).
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Karachi: by 1951 it had received 600,000 refugees and nearly 91 per cent of the total literates 
in Karachi were migrants” (Khwaja et al, 2005:3).9
Pakistan also inherited several small scale industries in the region. There was a sports goods 
sector in Sialkot in Punjab, for example. Described by Weiss as “local craftsmen-tumed- 
industrialists” (1991:120) these firms were cottage based, export-oriented and had a long 
history of manufacturing wood and leather products.10 A local surgical instruments industry 
also emerged from links with ironsmiths, and according to Nadvi (1999) the industry was 
spurred by the presence of a local Mission hospital and the knowledge among local artisans 
of how to forge and shape metal implements to a high degree of precision.11 In the emerging 
steel re-rolling industry, most mill owners were typically from lohari (iron working) 
backgrounds from cities in East Punjab. They had been working in forging workshops, were 
native to Lahore in the retail steel trade or from families whose relatives had worked in the 
industry (Weiss, 1991:112).12
Early firm formation and industrial development
As a result of its limited industrial capacity, there was recognition of the need for industrial 
development immediately after Partition. In the Statement of Industrial Policy of 1948, the 
Government of Pakistan stated that it will “seek, in the first place, to manufacture in its own 
territories, the products of its raw materials, in particular jute, cotton, hides and skins” (cited 
in Zaidi, 2004:85). According to Tariq Saigol, the need for a textile processing industry 
became particularly acute in 1949 following the devaluation of India’s currency along with
9 Note that some o f  the content o f  this paper was later published in Bharadwaj, P., Khwaja, A., Mian, A. (2008) 
The Big March: Migratory Flows after the Partition o f  India, Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 43 No. 35 
August, 2008.
10 Weiss cites several stories surrounding the origins o f  the industry which relate to the local fixing o f  sports 
goods such as tennis rackets and golf clubs during British rule in the late 19th century (1991:121). Initially 
Muslims performed the manufacturing tasks while Sikhs and Hindus arranged for the raw materials and exports, 
after partition Sialkot was located inside Pakistan and many new companies were founded by those previously 
involved in the industry (ibid: 123).
11 Weiss (1991) notes that it was in 1894 when Sialkot’s first surgical instruments unit opened.
12 Iron ore was not traditionally found in areas now in Pakistan with the exception o f hills north o f Peshawar, but 
in the pre-British period Punjabi rural lohars made implements for use inside the home and later safes, chests 
and trunks during the British period based on imported materials (Weiss, 1991:102). Some migrants, such as the 
founder o f  the Pakistan Engineering Company, obtained replacement shops for foundries left behind in India, 
while Ittefaq -  five agriculturalist brothers from Amritsar, the family o f  future Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif -  
began a unit in 1940 and another in Lahore in 1966 (ibid:105). This unit was later nationalised in 1972.
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other members of the Sterling area.13 Pakistan had refused to do so in order to “achieve better 
terms o f trade with India in the sale of raw jute” (Lewis, 1970:4), but as Talbot explains, “[a]s 
the Indian rupee floated downwards against Pakistan’s currency, New Delhi retaliated by 
ceasing all trade and thus ending the common market which had existed between the two 
dominions since August 1947” (1998:137). Under this embargo it thus became necessary for 
Pakistan to import processed cotton from elsewhere despite being a producer of raw cotton.14
According to Mr Saigol, in the late 1940s and early 1950s the government also actively 
sought out entrepreneurs who could establish new industrial projects. There were three 
requirements to obtain a license to create a textile mill: firstly, to be an entrepreneur -  to 
show signs of vigour and business spirit; secondly, to have capital available to invest in new 
industry; and thirdly, to be ‘well connected’ which included knowledge of the industry as 
well as connections with decision makers.15 It was often migrants from British India that 
drove private firm incorporation in the new Pakistan. Dadabhoy Group, for example, a 
Memon commercial family from India, established operations in cotton ginning, housing and 
real estate (and later in cement, papersacks and insurance), while the Dawoods, a Memon 
family previously engaged in the cotton trade in India, entered into textiles, paper, jute and 
later chemicals and engineering (Mahmood, 2003). As shown in Figure 2-1 below, close to 
three-quarters of all new firms in Sindh and Punjab were created in Karachi from 1947 to 
1951.16 Existing residents of Punjab were also among many early entrants to industry. This 
included Packages Limited which emerged in the paper and paperboard manufacturing sector 
(in a joint venture with Akerlund & Rausing of Sweden) and later into printing inks, 
polypropylene films and dairy products with Nestle Milkpak.17 A number of entrants from 
trading backgrounds in India found also themselves in new sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
forming joint ventures with multinational firms (Weiss, 1991).
13 Mr Saigol is the Chairman o f Kohinoor Maple Leaf Group in Pakistan. His family have been well-known 
industrialists since partition and he has been managing the group since 1968. He is well respected in Pakistan’s 
business comipunity and has also been a central advisor to government on textile policy in the past decade. Mr 
Saigol gave two interviews in 2006, one on the performance o f the two textile firms within the business group 
and one on the history o f  Pakistan’s textile industry.
14 Source: Mr Saigol.
15 There was also a central role for the state alongside private initiative. The Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation was established in 1950 and set up several industrial projects which were later transferred into the 
private sector. Several companies remained in state ownership in 2007 -  this will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7. Source: Editorial, ‘Privatisation policy’, Dawn. 19 Feb 2009.
16 The Karachi port was also the major export hub for the new Pakistan, with between 36.5 per cent and 62.7 per 
cent o f Pakistan’s exports between 1947 and 1955 passing through this route. Source: Pakistan Statistical 
Bulletin, 1947-1958, Government o f Pakistan.
17 Sources: Packages Limited, Over the years, http://www.packages.com.pk/overtheyears.htm and Packages 
Limited, Corporate Structure, http://www.packages.com.pk/corporatestructure.htm, accessed 23 March 2009.
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Figure 2-1 New firm incorporations in Karachi and Punjab (1947-1960)
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SOURCE: Ur-Rehman (1997)18
These patterns of firm formation and industry development were also evident in the evolution 
o f the textile sector. Firm 1, for example, was founded by a family that “was the largest 
exporter of raw hide in Indo-Pakistan before partition”, but later split into separate units in 
East and West Pakistan after Partition in which they entered the yam trading business. The 
founder of Kohinoor Textile Mills had “made his fortune” in the shoe and footwear industry 
in Calcutta, but “realised he could not stay if India was partitioned”.19 Some residents of 
West Punjab took over evacuee manufacturing units left behind by Hindus: a Director of 
Firm 7 explained how his grandfather worked on the shop floor of a ginning unit and in 1947 
was given the opportunity to take over the mill. Several mills that were formed in this period 
went on to dominate the textile industry for decades, such as Colony Textile Mills in Multan, 
the Crescent Textile Mills, and Kohinoor Textile Mills. Consequently, the growth of large 
scale industry was deemed impressive in Pakistan’s early years. According to Zaidi, “largest- 
scale manufacturing grew at a phenomenal 23.6 per cent between 1949 and 1954, and 
afterwards, by the still very impressive 9.3 per cent up to 1960” (2004:85). Figure 2-2 below 
shows a growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1950s to a peak in 1960.
18 The inclusion o f  this Ur-Rehman (1997) reference is controversial. It was not formally published and 
frequently includes uncorroborated allegations o f  corruption among well-known business people in Pakistan. I 
have only used formal incorporation data from this document as it was the only source available, but have not 
quoted any arguments from this paper.
19 The Kohinoor Group split in the 1960s, and Kohinoor Textile Mills now belong to Kohinoor Maple Leaf 
Group, http://www.kmlg.com, accessed 23 March 2009.
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Figure 2-2 Growth of gross domestic product in Pakistan (1954-2007)
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2.2 P olitics and industrial developm ent in P akistan  (1947-1988)
The political legacy of Partition
However, policy and politics was to have a negative impact on the industrial developm ent o f  
Pakistan in its first four decades. According to Cohen, “Pakistan was unstable from the 
outset” (2005:54): there was a lack o f  consensus on the ‘idea o f  Pakistan’ and the government 
failed to put a constitution in place until 1956 (ibid:56). Further, the “ fledgling state suffered 
an immediate leadership crisis” following the sudden death o f  M oham m ad Ali Jinnah -  
Pakistan’s first leader -  on 11 Septem ber 1948, and the assassination o f  Pakistan’s first prime 
minister -  Liaquat Ali Khan -  in 1951 (ibid:54). The M uslim  league soon ‘fractured’ as its 
leaders, “newly arrived from India, lacked a political base in the provinces” (ibid:54).
According to Talbot, a “facade o f  a parliamentary system was to last for five more years” but 
real power now lay with the arm y (1998:142). Following divisions between government and 
the army over foreign policy, food shortages, unem ploym ent and inflation after the Korean 
War boom (ibid: 141), in 1958 Pakistan’s President, M ajor General M irza, imposed martial 
law and dism issed the central and provincial governm ents (Cohen, 2005:60). General Ayub 
Khan o f  the Pakistani army was put in place as C hief M arshall Law A dm inistrator and stayed
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in power until 1968. This was to be the start of several periods of military rule within 
Pakistan in its first 60 years.
Each period of rule in Pakistan brought radical changes in governance and had mixed impacts 
on Pakistan’s polity and economy. Cohen describes the Ayub period, for example, as “a 
break from the chaos and disorder that preceded his coup” where “Ayub and his colleagues 
set about creating a Pakistan that was both intellectually coherent and administratively 
effective” (2005:64). However, a number of tensions built up in the 1960s which eventually 
led to the exit o f Ayub Khan from governance. Social unrest over the distribution of wealth in 
Pakistan had also increased following the famous speech in 1968 of Mahbub-Ul-Haq -  
Ayub’s former Chief of Economic Planning -  in which he stated that there were 22 families 
in Pakistan who controlled 66 per cent of all industrial assets, 79 per cent of insurance funds 
and 80 percent of bank assets (Talbot, 1998:181). It was in 1967 that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto -  
Ayub’s western educated foreign minister -  created the Pakistan People’s Party, and began to 
gain support around the country which challenged Ayub’s dominance (Cohen, 2005:73).20
It was the post-Partition evolution of politics and instability that also led to the breakup of 
East and West Pakistan in 1972. Several clashes over language and ethnicity since 1947 had 
left the Bengali population ‘"thoroughly alienated” (Cohen, 2005:75).21 The Pakistani army 
“treated the Bengal movement as a counterinsurgency” (ibid:74) and when the Awami Party 
won a majority in the 1971 elections its leader Rahman was denied power. Following a 
military crackdown in which India to intervene on behalf of East Pakistan, Pakistan went to 
war with India in 1971. The Pakistani army, however, was defeated after only two weeks 
(ibid:8) and Bangladesh gained status as an independent country. At this time the army
20 Following a series o f  disturbances in 1968 and 1969, Ayub resigned from his post and martial law was put in 
place by General Yahya who later attempted to hold Pakistan’s first national elections in December 1970 
(Talbot, 1970).
21 The military and bureaucracy in the new Pakistan was dominated by Muhajirs who had made up the Muslim 
League as well as Punjabis. The army, for example, was composed 60 per cent by Punjabi officers as the state 
had previously the highest share in the Indian army during British rule in India (over 50 per cent) (Khan, 
2005:64). Although Bengalis comprised 54 per cent o f the total Pakistani population in 1948, they had 11 per 
cent share in civil service employment (Khan, 2005:63). Urdu was made the national language o f Pakistan and 
“Bengali legislators were warned that if  they used their own language they would be tried for treason” (Khan, 
2005:66). The “One Unit” scheme created in 1955 was “an effort by the Punjabi-Mohajir establishment to lump 
together the smaller provinces with Punjab to neutralise the Bengali majority” and described by Khan as “one o f  
the many black spots in Pakistan’s history” (2005:21). According to Cohen, the “notion o f a Bengal majority 
was anathema both to the Punjab-Pathan dominated army and to the most prominent West Pakistani politician, 
Bhutto, who wanted the prime ministerial position for him self’ (2005:74).
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instead put in the “most charismatic politician” to unite the country: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
(Cohen, 2005:9).
Bhutto came to power in Pakistan from 1972 to 1977 and Pakistan’s first democratically 
elected leader and put forward his vision of Pakistan as a socialist and Islamic state based 
(Cohen, 2005:79). His presence was to continue the level of upheaval within Pakistan. In 
terms of economic policy, the party’s election manifesto has promised the nationalization of 
“all basic industries and financial institutions” (Zaidi, 2004:99) including sectors such as 
vegetable oil, cotton ginning, rice milling, banks and insurance.22 Bhutto also attempted to 
tackle the concentration of wealth by taking the passports of members of the 22 families and 
arresting those family members who were more politically active (Cohen, 2005:82).23 
However, Bhutto’s moves were often political. According to Lamb, Bhutto’s nationalisation 
of cotton ginning and rice husking mills “were specifically designed to hit political 
opponents, and it was during his rule that economic activity was really replaced by political 
activity” (Lamb, I990:174).24 Further, towards the end of the 1970s, the army “distrusted 
Bhutto’s demagogic political style, resented his attempt to bypass the army, and were 
concerned about the chaos that had engulfed the government following opposition-led 
protests against Bhutto” (Cohen, 2005:84).
The army arrested Bhutto in July 1977 and martial law was introduced by the head of the 
army, General Zia-ul-Haq, who promised elections within 90 days.25 Pakistan under Zia-ul- 
Haq from 1977 to 1988 in the country’s fourth decade was the longest period of military rule 
to date described by Talbot as “authoritarian in political structure” which aspired for Pakistan 
to become an Islamic state (Talbot, 1998:245). Throughout his rule, Zia-ul-Haq was buoyed 
by support from the United States for its role in tackling the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. However, Khan describes the period of his rule as one “marred by public 
hanging, widespread flogging, sexism and the worst kind of religious bigotry” (2005:75) and
22 These included United Bank, Muslim Commercial Bank and Habib Bank and according to Cheema 
nationalisation “extended political control over the entire financial sector” (2002:29).
23 The Sharif family o f future Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and owner o f Ittefaq Group active in steel and 
textiles, for example, moved to the Middle East and, according to Cohen, the head o f the Sharif family “never 
forgave Bhutto and the PPP” (2005:82).
24 Further, while respected as “the outstanding political figure o f his generation” he was also known for the 
“cruelty o f  his feudal background”, ego and someone who “regarded all opposition as illegitimate” (Talbot, 
1998:216).
25 Bhutto was hanged on 4 April 1979 in Rawalpindi after being found guilty o f  conspiracy to commit murder in 
a “dubious trial” (Cohen, 2005:9).
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one which brought sectarian violence, drugs and armed violence to Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq was 
still in power when he was killed in 1988 when his airplane crashed after takeoff at in still 
unexplained circumstances.
Governance and economic development
This instability in politics and governance in the first decades of Pakistan’s existence had a 
direct impact on firm formation and growth as well as Pakistan’s overall economic 
performance. Policies under the rule of Ayub Khan, for example, included rehabilitation of 
refugees, technical assistance to establish agricultural universities, tax holidays for business 
and expanded credit facilities using World Bank loans (through the creation of the Pakistan 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation and Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation) (Talbot, 1998:170). Pakistan’s GDP growth throughout the 1960s was above 5 
per cent in 7 out of 10 years of the 1960s (see Figure 2-2 above) and according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was stimulated by intensive private investment (including 
growth of physical capital stock of 13.1 per cent per year) and improvements in the levels of 
schooling (which resulted in a human capital stock growth of 11.6 per cent per year) (2002:9- 
10). During this time “[c]ountries such as South Korea and Malaysia saw Pakistan as a model 
for export-led growth strategies” (Cohen, 2005:65-66).
In contrast, under Bhutto’s rule new firm listings in the textile sector on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange, for example, came to a standstill (see Figure 2-3). According to Zaidi, 
“industrialists feared lock-outs or outright nationalization. Entrepreneurs were demoralized 
and unwilling to invest. Capital and capitalists had fled overseas” (2004:102). The IMF 
(2002) has noted that growth rates in all factor inputs and GDP fell in the 1970s. Cohen 
describes the six years of Bhutto’s rule as “traumatic” and characterised by economic damage 
and disillusion by business (Cohen, 2005:84).26 Further, the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 led 
to several economic problems such as a shortage of foreign exchange due to the loss of jute 
exports, inflation and shortages of essential goods. According to Talbot “[a] morally bankrupt 
regime was on the verge of economic bankruptcy” (1998:210). The Karachi Stock Exchange
26 However, Zaidi contends that while “Bhutto’s regime has come in for a lot o f criticism for ‘destroying’ the 
economy” the 1970s was a period o f high inflation and international recession from which Pakistan was not 
isolated (2004:98). Further, die IMF (2005) stated that Pakistan’s three growth booms have taken place: 1961, 
1977 and in the post-2000 period. A rise in the investment ratio accompanied the first two booms, including a 
sharp rise in the investment ratio to 19 per cent o f GDP in the two years prior to the 1977 growth acceleration.
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also experienced a total o f  58 firm de-listings in 1972 im m ediately after the breakup o f  the 
country (including several textile mills such Olym pia Textile and Ahmed Bawany Textile), 
the largest num ber delistings in any one year in its history.
Figure 2-3 Textile firm listings on Karachi Stock Exchange (1947-2007)
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Some accounts o f  economic change during the Zia era state that “Pakistan witnessed the 
return o f  high growth rates and an increased role for the private sector” (Zaidi, 2004:105- 
108). This included denationalization o f  several industries such as rice husking, flour milling 
and cotton ginning in 1977 as well as the opening o f  industries such as chemicals and cement 
to the private sector (ibid: 108). Cohen also states that the recovery o f  the 1980s was further 
energized by the economic reforms o f  M ahbub-ul-Haq (2005:250) who introduced policies 
for liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation o f  the econom y when appointed finance 
m inister in 1985. Indeed, a rise in firm formation begins in the early to mid 1980s (see Figure 
2-4), suggesting a move towards a less regulated entry policy.27 However, others contend that 
these shifts “masked a deepening o f  the long-term structural problem ” which included low
'7 Haq was the economist who made the ‘22 families’ speech in the 1960s. However, note that due to protests 
from bureaucracy, landowners and the business class Haq was removed from office after less than a year 
although he was to return in 1998 as finance minister in the caretaker government (Cohen, 2005:250).
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levels o f  saving, a growing fiscal deficit, dependence on textiles for developm ent and 
weakness o f  infrastructure (Hasan, 1998:235). M ahbub-uI-Haq also stated that Pakistan was 
‘bankrupt’: fiscal deficits approached 7-8 per cent o f  GDP (Cohen, 2005:250) and external 
debt rapidly accum ulated in Z ia’s last years.
Figure 2-4 New firm incorporations in Pakistan (1947-2007)
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It was also during the Zia period that ethnic unrest in the city o f  Karachi started to increase. 
The M uhajir com m unity had com e to see itself as victimised as both Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq 
had increased the role for other groups in the elite level o f  the bureaucracy. A party emerged 
to push the M uhajir interests in 1984 -  the M ohajir Quami M ovem ent (now renamed the 
M uttahida Quami M ovement) -  and riots started in Karachi in April 1985 following the death 
o f  a M uhajir schoolgirl in a crash with a Pushtun-driven minibus (Talbot, 1998:265). Soon 
after the unrest commenced, business began to  shift to the calm er areas o f  Punjab. Figure 2-5 
shows that that in the late 1980s new firm incorporations in Punjab exceeded those in Sindh 
for the first time.
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Figure 2-5 Firm incorporation in textile industry by location (1947-2005)
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The industrial policy o f  Pakistan in its first four decades also had a direct impact on firm 
entry, growth and diversification. The main policy instrument adopted by the government to
encourage industrialisation, for example, was “an import tariff which gave substantial
28advantage to dom estic producers o f im port-substituting consum er goods” (Lewis, 1970:4). 
M anufacturers therefore had to obtain a licence in order to obtain foreign exchange to 
purchase m achinery or inputs which could be granted by an official agency or a bank 
(ibid:25).
The system was com plex and administered by a myriad o f  agencies throughout the 1950s and 
1960s and, according to Tariq Saigol, it was in the 1960s that the first signs o f  the licensing 
system being used as a political tool started to show.29 M oney changed hands in order to 
obtain a licence, while some licences were allocated to politicians who were attracted by the 
entitlem ent to foreign exchange. According to Lewis, “ [d]ecisions on investment 
sanctioning...seem  to have been done on a fairly ad hoc basis” (1970:33). M r Sajjad Hassan
28 Follow ing the ‘export boom ' o f  the Korean War between 1950 and 1952, gains from the boom eased and as 
export prices fell rapidly and as a result “the Government realised a foreign exchange crisis was imminent, and 
it chose to m eet the crisis by using direct controls on imports'’ (L ew is, 1970:4).
29 These agencies included the O ffice o f  the C h ief Controller o f  Imports and Exports (L ew is, 1970), the Central 
Perm issions Com m ittee, Central Investment Promotion and Co-ordinating Com m ittee and financing agencies  
such as the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation. Loans provided by organisations such as the 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation and the Pakistan Industrial Credit Corporation were often  
funded by donors such as the W orld Bank (Talbot, 1998:170).
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-  in attendance at several of these committees in the 1960s — confirms that members often 
had little knowledge about the industry or firm they were approving and that that licences 
were often “given to people with no business acumen”. Cohen also contends that in the 1960s 
during General Ayub’s rule, “the industrial licensing system was used to reward regime 
supporters and punish opponents” (Cohen, 2005:67) and Talbot argues that Punjab rose in 
economic dominance during the Zia period because Punjabi industrialists gained 
disproportionate access to loans from government-controlled financial institutions (Talbot, 
1998:254). As a result, entry was made more difficult for those lacking such connections or 
who fell out of favour with the ruling party.
This control over entry of new firms in Pakistan’s early decades is illustrated by firm 
incorporation trends in Figure 2-5 above. Total new firm incorporations were more or less 
constant in the first ten years of Pakistan’s history, and grew only at a very slow pace during 
the late 1950s and 1960s. It was only at the end of the 1980s when firm entry was liberalised 
and there was a rise in firm incorporations.
Firm formation and growth in the textile industry
This politics and policy of Pakistan’s early years are also reflected in the emergence of the 
textile industry. A growth in new firm listings was evident on the KSE in the 1960s (see 
Figure 2-3) and several firms that emerged at this time went on to dominate the industry for 
several decades. Sapphire Group, for example, set up its first spinning unit in Pakistan in 
1966 named Gulistan Spinning and the has since gone on to become a leading producer of 
cloth, garments and home textiles in the post-2000 period. Textile exports also grew 
gradually throughout the 1960s as shown in Figure 2-6.
30 Its companies include Gulistan Textile (1966), Sapphire Textile (1969) Sapphire Fibres (1979), Paramount 
Spinning (1987), Gulshan Spinning (1979) and Reliance Cotton Spinning Mills (1990).
Figure 2-6 Textile and clothing exports from Pakistan (1962-2007)
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However, there were some negative impacts on o f  policies in the Ayub period. Import 
protection, for instance, led to very high profits in the textile sector and “few pressures for 
m oving into areas o f  greater value added such as garments or mixed textiles and even less for 
m oving into intermediate products or capital goods” (Hasan, 1998:54). The use o f  specific 
policy tools such as the ‘Export Bonus Schem e’ from which an com pany received vouchers 
that could be used to import items equivalent to a percentage o f  its export earnings, could 
have led to a focus on volume o f  exports rather than profitable and value-added items.31 In 
fact, the tim ing o f  the bonus scheme also coincides with the ‘bulge’ in textile export market 
share in the 1960s (see Figure 2-7).
31 Several leading textile firms in the 1960s made much use o f  these vouchers and represented up to 18 per cent 
o f  revenues. Source: Annual reports o f  several KSE-listed firms dating back to the period 1959-1972.
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Figure 2-7 Pakistan export market shares in textiles and clothing (1962-2007)
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The breakup o f  Pakistan also led to disruption in the textile industry as several textile firms 
were com pelled to move their operations to W est Pakistan. Firm 14, for example, now a large 
m anufacturer o f  yarn and cloth, had set up a spinning mill in East Pakistan in 1965 following 
Partition, but left in 1973 to create its first mill in W est Pakistan. " Firm 23 had built up a 
brand o f  shoes in East Pakistan between 1956 in 1971 as well as other interests in W est 
Pakistan, but when the war occurred in 1971 m any o f  the family m em bers decided to stay in 
the W est for good.
As in other industries, several firms in the textile sector discussed how they obtained a 
licence to operate. A Director o f  Firm 19, a company now producing yarn for export and the 
dom estic market, described how the firm ’s “first application for a licence in 1952 w as turned 
down as a result o f  foreign exchange controls” but a licence was later granted to open a 
processing mill in rural Punjab.33 Firm 9, now a well-known producer o f  yam , described how 
“a few banker friends helped get a licence” in the late 1960s. As illustrated in Table 2-3, the 
textiles and clothing sector was often the most popular segment for which loans were 
requested. However, some entrants without political connections were able to enter the 
industry despite these obstacles. Indeed, according to M r Hassan “good people did not need
32 Several M uslim  business fam ilies had m oved to East Pakistan follow ing partition because o f  its proxim ity to 
Calcutta.
33 Another individual involved with this firm stated that the later permit was obtained probably because “the 
priority o f  the governm ent w as [textile] finishing” at the time.
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connections” as they could purchase licences from individuals such as politicians. Certainly, 
a Director of Firm 1, now a leading producer of yam, cloth and home textiles, stated that it 
“purchased the sanction from a politician for a premium” in the late 1960s.
Table 2-3 Loans sanctioned by the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (1961- 
1964)
Industry Number of sanctioned loans
Textiles and clothing 393
Food products (e.g. Sugar) 61
Metals and engineering 46
Non-metal lie mineral products 22
Small-scale industry 19
Chemicals 17
Printing and publishing 15
Paper products 12
Miscellaneous manufacturing 11
Wood products 7
Electrical goods 7
Leather goods 6
Rubber goods 3
SOURCE: Lewis (1970)
Many textile firms were badly affected by the nationalisation of Bhutto. Firm 7, for example, 
was a business group previously active in cotton ginning and production of vegetable oils. 
Production in a new unit textile started in 1972, but coincided with the period of 
nationalisation so the expansion was halted. Sales growth stalled throughout the period of 
Bhutto rule (see Figure 2-8 below) and as the family lost confidence in Pakistan’s economy 
they did not invest again until the late 1980s. The company has since gone on to become one 
of the best performers in the production of cloth and yam both during and after the quota 
period, and owned the 19th and 59th largest exporting unit in 2006. Similarly, one of 
Pakistan’s largest exporters, Nishat Mills, also did not start investing again until the end of 
the 1970s (see also Figure 2-8).34
34 Nishat Mills Annual Reports, Karachi Stock Exchange
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Figure 2-8 Sales and capital expenditure in Firm 7 (1972-2007) (left) and Nishat Mills
(1961-2007) (right)
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However, textile exports from Pakistan continued to climb during the rule o f  Bhutto and the 
loss o f  East Pakistan in line with growth in global dem and.35 In particular, it was in the 1970s 
that exports in clothing products began to take off, coinciding with the introduction o f  export 
quotas under the M ultifibre Arrangement in 1974 (see Figure 2-9). Indeed, Firm 1 
com m ented that it received greater market access at this time, partly because quotas were 
allocated to firms in the market based on their previous year’s exports. Interviews with 
garment producers in Karachi also revealed anecdotes o f  innovation from the 1960s onwards 
as informal firms attem pted to reproduce garments demanded by buyers. Further, according 
to a leading accountant in Pakistan, the break-up o f  the banking sector allowed new entrants 
in the textile sector to access finance as previously they were prevented from entering due to 
fear o f  competition on behalf o f  textile firms who also owned banks.
35 In fact Mr Sajjad Hassan, a former Chairman o f  the Central Board o f  Revenue, stated that firms were actually 
growing in that period but few  firms wanted to show they were making profits as a result o f  governm ent policy  
at that time.
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Figure 2-9 Pakistan textile (left), clothing (right) exports vs world imports (1962-2007)
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During the Zia period Pakistan continued to gain market share in textiles and clothing (see 
Figure 2-7 above). There was also a rise in the volum e o f  cotton production which 
contributed to growth in yarn exports (Hasan, 1998) (see Appendix 2-1). Cheem a argues that 
the availability o f  state credit resulted in significant new entry into the spinning sector from 
1981 to 1994 during which time the share o f  incumbent firms in credit allocation fell from 97 
per cent in 1981-1985 to 53 per cent in 1990-1994 (2002:34). Firm incorporations in the 
textile sector also rose from the early 1980s as entry was de-regulated (see Figure 2-10).
Figure 2-10 Firm incorporations in the textile and clothing industry (1947-2005)
1960 1980 2000
NOTE: This chart refers to firms still active in 2006 hence it is subject partly to survival bias. 
SOURCE: Data supplied by Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, own analysis
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2.3 Entry liberalisation and industry development (1988-2007)
M odern industrial policy in Pakistan
The economic policies which shaped industrial development in Pakistan in the 1980s were 
extended by both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif when they came to power between 1988 
and 1999. According to Talbot “[a]s befitted his background in business, Nawaz Sharif 
embraced economic liberalisation more enthusiastically than the PPP had done” (1998:315). 
Hasan describes how Sharif “opened almost all areas o f economic activity to the private 
sector” such as power generation, highway construction, airlines, shipping, and banking 
(1998: 273, 289) and in 1991 ended all controls on foreign currency entering Pakistan in an 
attempt to encourage foreign direct investment (Talbot, 1998:315). Sharif also introduced a 
range of reforms which had a direct impact on the textile industry, such as the phasing out in 
1992 of the export tax on raw cotton production (Hasan, 1998:274), what Mr Saigol had 
described as “a resource transfer to the spinning industry”.36 Hasan also states that what 
Sharif did for the economy was “largely maintained by Benazir Bhutto’s second government” 
(1998:272). Indeed, firm incorporations rose across all textiles and clothing product 
categories (including spinning, weaving, garments and composite) after 1988 to a peak in 
1992.37
The stock exchange also saw a rise in firm listings (as shown in Figure 2-3 above) and market 
share being taken by new entrants. Between 1990 and 1994 new entrants took nearly 20 per 
cent of the share of total textile revenue on the KSE from incumbents (see Figure 2-11).38 
Examination of the top ten performers among these new KSE entrants (by total size at age 
10) shows that seven of them were spinoffs of incumbent firms and two were new entrants, 
while the background of the other is unknown. Nishat Chunian, for example, was a spinoff 
from the leading Nishat Mills, while Kohinoor Maple Leaf Group created a new cloth unit, 
Kohinoor Weaving.39 Privately-held firms also began to take export market share from the 
longer-established public listed firms at this time.
36 Mr Saigol also commented that this removal was inevitable as it had only come under pressure from 
developed countries since the mid-1980s onwards who were restricting market access in response.
37 Source: Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, own analysis.
38 Mean gross profit also declined among KSE-listed firms from a range o f 5-18 per cent in the 1990s to 
between 0 and 5 per cent in the post-2000 period. While it may also be related to global declines in the unit 
value o f  cotton yarn (see section 3.3), it also suggests an increase in competition among firms.
39 Nishat Chunian Ltd, http://www.nishatchunian.com/, accessed 23 March 2009.
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Figure 2-11 Market share of textile sales among new entrants on Karachi Stock 
Exchange (left), share of total exports by firm type (right) (1990-2007)
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, Federal Bureau of Statistics, own analysis
Textile and clothing exports also continued to grow in line with expansion in global trade 
(see Figure 2-9 above). M oves towards higher value-added products and w ider industrial 
diversification were particularly apparent. In 1997, Chenab Limited -  a leading hom e textile 
exporter -  created its first local retail store in Pakistan, Chen One, with the slogan ‘Changing 
Lifestyles’.40 Siddiqsons Denim M ills, established in 1958 and the 41st largest exporter under 
quota, created the first tin plate m anufacturing unit in Pakistan in 1999, Siddiqsons Tin 
P la te 4'
However, Pakistan continued to be plagued by political instability which affected the 
perform ance o f  industry. Firstly, ethnic violence continued to be a part o f  everyday life in 
Karachi and Sindh and common events included kidnappings o f  high-profile Pakistanis, bank 
raids and car theft (Talbot, 1998:323). Bashir Ali M oham m ad, a former chairman o f  the All 
Pakistan Textile M ills Association, stated at the time that its m em bers had paid out m ore than
39 million rupees in a six month period and that in Sindh “ [t]he highways are so unsafe that 
for over a year we have not been able to visit our factories” (Lamb, 1990:184). W hile firm 
incorporation in Karachi began to rebound in the post-2000 period, is has not recovered its 
previous dominance: only 27 per cent o f  new textile firms were incorporated in Karachi 
between 2000 and 2005 in contrast with levels o f  60 per cent in the 1960s.
40 Chen One Stores Limited, http://www.chenone.com.pk/, accessed 23 March 2009.
41 Siddiqsons Tin Plate, http://www.siddiqsonstinplate.com/, accessed 23 March 2009.
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At an aggregate level, the period between 1988 and 1996 was also marked by slowing 
economic growth, recurring foreign exchange crises and the failure to create a stable political 
framework in the country (Hasan, 1998:267). According to the IMF (2002) there was a 
slowdown in physical and human capital accumulation, a decline in inward investment and a 
lack of trade openness. There were also countless accusations of corruption in the 
privatization of several industries: Sharif was accused of allowing business people in Punjab 
to gain control of one of Pakistan’s most important banks, the Muslim Commercial Bank, 
while Bhutto was also accused of corruption in the privatisation of 28 state-owned companies 
between 1993 and 1995 (Cohen, 2005:252).
Despite extensive industrial and financial market deregulation and liberalization between 
1988 and 1992, political influence over banks also continued to shape firm entry and industry 
performance. Lamb describes how “[t]he most common way for politicians to supplement 
incomes or do favours for friends was through bank loans from the nationalized banks” 
(1990:181).42 As a result, bank managers did not take lending decisions on merit and many 
firm founders invested a minimum of their own equity in the venture so entrants were 
“destined to fail” 43 Khwaja and Mian (2005) found that between 1996 and 2002, politically 
connected firms (those with a politician on their board) received differential treatment from 
public banks: they borrowed one and a half times as much as unconnected firms, but had 50 
per cent higher default rates 44 Certainly, many new entrants to the textile sector in this period 
failed to make a rupee in profit and exited the industry soon after. Figure 2-12 gives the 
examples of four new entrants that rapidly went into loss and exited the industry by the end 
of the 1990s.
42 An account by Lamb -  an observer at the time in her role as a journalist -  cites the case o f one elected 
businessman: ‘‘In room 308 at the Holiday Inn in Islamabad, Farid Jaroon’s phone would not stop ringing. Every 
time he picked it up a wheedling voice would offer him a house, a car, a plot o f  land, a ministry. Occasionally 
there would be threats -  to stop the licence for his textile mill or to sack one o f his relatives in government 
service” (1991:50).
43 Source: Tariq Saigol.
44 Private banks, however, did not respond to political connections. They estimate that the economy-wide loss 
due to inefficient lending is up to 1.9 per cent o f GDP a year.
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Figure 2-12 Sales (left) and profit (right) (1991-2001), selected new entrants listed on
Karachi Stock Exchange in the 1990s
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
At the time o f  the coup o f  Pervez M usharraf in 1999 the m ilitary government faced heavy 
debt, a high fiscal deficit, low foreign exchange reserves, suspension o f  bilateral and 
m ultilateral assistance and nuclear sanctions.45 Talbot describes how “Pakistani politics had 
become a zero-sum game in which oppositions denied ruling parties any legitim acy and 
governm ents used selective accountability to harry and intim idate their opponents. Parliam ent 
was at worst a bear-pit, at best the fountainhead o f  patronage politics” (1998:287).
The rule o f  Pervez M usharraf in Pakistan became one o f  the most controversial political 
issues following the attacks on 11 September 2001. However, his government was widely 
praised for bringing economic stability and reform by com m entators abroad and at home. In 
2007, the Asian Development Bank, for example, stated that “ [bjuoyant growth, improved 
m acroeconom ic fundamentals, and strengthened international credit ratings have been the 
economy's hallmarks in recent years” .46 According to the W orld B ank’s ‘Doing Business’ 
report (2005), Pakistan was the top reformer in the region and the tenth top reform er in the 
world due to efforts to make it easier to start a business and register property, as well as 
strengthening o f  corporate governance rules and sim plification o f  the export licensing system.
45 ‘Pakistan's economic horizons, 2003 and beyond’, Closing remarks by Dr Ishrat Husain, Governor o f the 
State Bank of Pakistan, at The Daily Times Seminar on Pakistan Economic Horizons, 2003 and beyond, held at 
Karachi, 31 January 2003, accessed 23 March 2009, http://www.bis.org/review/r030220e.pdf
46 ‘Pakistan’, Asian Development Outlook 2007, Asian Development Bank
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T here is some evidence for the positive impact o f  M u sharraf s rule on Pakistan’s economy. 
L evels o f  GDP per capita begun to rise in 2002 and GDP growth touched previous heights o f  
the 1980s (see Figure 2-2 above). In line with rapid rises globally, foreign direct investm ent 
(FD I) into Pakistan had also increased to its highest level in the country’s history with 
popular sectors including telecommunications, energy and financial services (see Figure 2-13 
for a com parison with FDI trends in India).47 Eighty per cent o f  banking and financial 
businesses w ere moved into the hands o f  the private sector (Aziz, 2003:295) and the level o f  
nonperform ing loans dropped between 2001 and 2006 from 23.4 to 7.7 per cent.48 Exports in 
high technology sectors were also showing signs o f  catch-up, reaching 1.4 per cent o f  exports 
in 2006 from 0.4 per cent in 2000 (although Pakistan still trails India where these products 
m ade up 4.8 per cent o f  manufactured exports in 2005).49 Additional gains include an 
increase in private national saving, a rebound o f  dom estic-led growth (Lorie and Iqbal, 2005) 
and growth o f  large scale manufacturing (IMF, 2005).so
Figure 2-13 High-technology exports as share of manufactured exports (1990-2006) 
(left), net inflows of foreign direct investment (1970-2006) (right), Pakistan and India
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SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, December 2008
47 Telecommunications received half o f all FDI in 2005-6 -  $10.bn o f a total $2.1 bn -  followed by oil, gas and 
power with $304m and financial services with $266m. Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2006, Government of 
Pakistan
48 Source: World Development Indicators, December 2008.
Z ibid50 According to the International Monetary Fund in 2005, large-scale manufacturing production increased, 
cumulatively, by almost 70 percent over the period from 2000 to 2004/05 (2005:54).
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In the textile sector there was a rise in the number o f  new firms following a drop at the end o f 
the 1990s. Clothing as a proportion o f  textile exports from Pakistan also continued to increase 
in this period (see Figure 2-14). Buyers such as JC Penney, N ike and Sears increasingly 
looked to relocate garment production to Pakistan, while home textile retailers such as IKEA, 
Zara and M arks and Spencer began sourcing bedwear, towels and sheeting. There move 
tow ards home textile production was particularly apparent as m any firms diversified from a 
base in yam  and cloth production: from 2000 to 2007 the hom e textile segment showed the 
largest gross rise in exports.31 In 2007, the largest export product was cotton cloth (19.3 per 
cent), followed by bedw ear (18.4 per cent) and knitwear (17.8 per cent) (see Table 2-4).
Figure 2-14 Composition of textile and clothing exports from Pakistan (1962-2007)
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Table 2-4 Product breakdown of Pakistan’s textile and clothing exports (2007)
Product Share o f total textile and cloth ing exports (2007)
Cotton cloth 19.3
Bedwear 19.2
Knitwear 17.8
Ready-made garments 14.1
Cotton yam 13.9
Towels 5.6
NOTE: Figures refer to Jan-Dee 2007. Textile and clothing represented 58.7 per cent o f  Pakistan’s total exports. 
SOURCE: Own analysis o f  Monthly R eview  o f  External Trade Statistics, Federal Bureau o f  Statistics
51 W hile total textile and clothing exports rose by U SD 2.8bn (real U SD , 2000) in this period, household linens 
made up 42 per cent o f  this increase follow ed by w oven cotton fabrics (21 per cent o f  the total) and m en’s 
knitted garments (8 per cent). Source: UN Comtrade S1TC3, for categories S3-65 and S3-84 (textiles and 
clothing categories), S3-6584 (household linens), S3-652 (w oven cotton fabrics) and S3-843.
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Econom ic developm ent challenges
However, a number of weaknesses continue to plague Pakistan’s economy. The first covers 
problems at the macroeconomic and institutional level. According to the IMF (2004), while 
growth has been considerably stronger in Pakistan than in many other low- and middle- 
income countries, and comparable to that of other South Asian countries, it has been below 
the growth rates experienced by countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. There 
is poor provision of physical infrastructure such as roads, rail transport and electricity 
distribution, and it is often provided at high cost: port charges in Karachi are some three 
times higher than Mumbai in India (Nadvi and Robinson, 2003:12). Further, Pakistan lags 
behind India, China, and the Philippines in providing an enabling environment for investors 
which includes poorly enforced property rights, the enforcement of contracts and corruption 
(Lorie and Iqbal, 2005:24).
The second is the lack of wider industrial diversification and development. Textile and 
clothing have continued to dominate industry in Pakistan despite a small drop in its 
contribution towards total exports since 1997, with textiles representing 63.0 per cent of total 
exports in 2007 (see Figure 2-15). Pakistan has only seen significant export growth in two 
sectors since the 1990s, chemicals and fuels.52 In addition, while services made up between 
14 and 26 per cent of total exports between 1980 and 2007, much of this comes from 
government services (40.9 per cent in 2007).53 In contrast, Turkey, for example, has reduced 
its reliance on textiles as a percentage of overall exports from 26.0 per cent of the total in 
1990 to 16.3 per cent in 2006 while India’s reliance has dropped from 14.2 per cent in 1990 
to 9.0 per cent in the same period. Turkey has seen an increasing reliance on machinery in its 
exports while India has seen growth in the service sector and in automobile manufacture.54
52 Source: U N  Com trade SITC1, ow n analysis
53 Source: For yearly data, W orld D evelopm ent Indicators, D ecem ber 2 0 0 8 . For detailed service data from 2005  
to 2007 , see  State Bank o f  Pakistan trade statistics. I understand m uch o f  this often com es from  military officers  
working on U nited N ations projects.
54 Source: U N  Com trade, SITC1
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Figure 2-15 Textiles and clothing as share of exports from Pakistan (1962-2007)
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In term s o f  dom estic GDP, the latest data on dom estic industry com position available from 
1996 show that textiles represented 30.6 per cent o f  total value added in Pakistan, followed 
by food products (20.8 per cent) and other chem icals (6.6 per cent) (UNIDO, 2001). W hile 
industry and manufacturing have grown as a proportion o f  GDP over the years (see Figure 2-
16), the economy remains more dependent on agriculture than many com parison countries in 
2006. In 2006, Pakistan relied on agriculture for 21.6 per cent o f  GDP in contrast to 18.3 per 
cent in India, 12.6 per cent in China and 1.2 per cent in the USA. Further, GDP growth in 
Pakistan remains correlated with global trends (as well as inward aid flows), and the country 
has failed to break out o f  this pattern (see Appendix 2-2). Further, growth in the textile sector 
has remained correlated with rises in global demand: between 1962 and 2006, for each $1 
increase in global imports o f  textile and clothing products (real USD, 2000), Pakistan exports 
in these products increased on average by $0.018.
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Figure 2-16 Composition of gross domestic product in Pakistan by sector (1960-2006)
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SOURCE: W orld D evelopm ent Indicators, W orld Bank, Decem ber 2008
The third challenge to Pakistan’s economic developm ent is the dom inance o f  business groups 
in the economy. Khan has argued, for example, that structural failure in Pakistan in the 1960s 
was the result o f  the inability o f  other sets o f  capitalists to  establish alternative institutions 
and industrial policy (1995:85). Siddiqa-Agha (2007), for example, has also critiqued the 
economic role o f  the military since 1977 and the creation o f  large business groups aligned 
with the army, navy and air force in sectors such as fertiliser, banking and insurance. There is 
continued protection o f  local industry through the tariff system and concerns about local 
cartels in sectors such as banking and sugar.55 Further, Khwaja et al (2008) found that a 
“supernetwork” o f  5,295 firms in Pakistan, which represents around seven per cent o f  all 
corporate firms connected to each other either directly or indirectly through chains o f  inter­
locked boards, obtain two-thirds o f  all formal financing.56
55 See, for exam ple, ‘CCP seeks data o f  cem ent makers from F B R \ 12 Sep 2008 , Business Recorder, and 
T areen  sees banks' cartel behind currency fall, B usiness Recorder. 9 O ct 2008'.
56 O f the total sam ple o f  105,917 firms, alm ost two-thirds (66 ,140) o f  the firms are not linked to any other firm, 
w hile the remaining third belongs to multi-firm networks (2008:8). They found that firm presence in the 
supernetwork leads to a 16.5 per cent increase in a firm’s borrowing and a 9.7 per cent lower probability o f  loan 
default. They also found that 21 per cent o f  total bank financing goes to firms which belonging to networks o f  
between 2 and 85 firms, and the remaining 15 per cent goes to singleton firms. It is not possible to discern the 
econom ic im plications o f  this data, but g ives an interesting insight into the corporate landscape o f  Pakistani 
industry.
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The fourth challenge facing Pakistan is that of human development. In fact, Easterly (2003) 
has described Pakistan’s case as one of ‘growth without development’ as the country 
systematically underperforms on most social and political indicators (such as education, 
health and gender equality) for its level of income. Government spending in Pakistan on 
health and education — both as a ratio to GDP and per capita — is among the lowest levels in 
the world and only five countries out of 177 had lower public spending on health care than 
Pakistan, and in 2004 only five countries had lower public spending on education or health 
(IMF, 2004:13).57 Literacy rates are as low as 22 per cent for women in Balochistan, and 
Pakistan’s workforce often lacks the skills necessary for higher value-added production 
(Lorie and Iqbal, 2005:24).58
Cultural factors have also mattered for development in Pakistan. While the country has a 
similar female labour force participation rate to India (34.3 and 35.9 per cent respectively) 
and it has been increasing in the post-2000 period, it is the lowest among competitors such as 
Bangladesh (55 per cent), China (75.4 per cent) and Thailand (72.2 per cent) (see Figure 2-
17). In contrast, the labour force participation rate of men in Pakistan in 2006 was 85.3 per 
cent. Aside from the human development implications, the absence of women reduces the 
available labour pool for firms, labour force competition and the subsequent growth of 
industry and the economy. Talbot also describes Pakistan’s social structure as one with high 
levels of poverty and a “brutal feudal society of bonded labour” (1998:51). Discrimination 
between ethnic groups is also prominent: Lamb (1991) has provided an account of the 
discrimination faced by a rural Sindhi migrant seeking work in one of Karachi’s textile mills, 
while the IMF notes that there are often caste barriers in accessing schools (2002:29).59
57 The IM F report refers to data from the 200 4  Human D evelopm ent Report o f  the U nited N ations D evelopm ent 
Programme and is m easured as a percentage o f  G D P. A s Easterly points out, this stands in contrast to  the  
country’s w ell educated elite  and diaspora and despite the fact Pakistan w as the third largest recipient o f  o fficia l 
developm ent assistance in the world over 1960-98 (India and Egypt being the first and second) (2003:440).
58 Source for literacy rates: Pakistan E conom ic Survey 2 0 08 , M inistry o f  Finance, G overnm ent o f  Pakistan.
59 A ccording to Lam b’s account, “N  adeem  w as lithe and strong from h is work in the fields and had no doubt he 
could do the work. B ut to h is surprise the foreman, on taking his nam e, pushed him aw ay and said, “W e don’t 
want any lazy Sindhis here” (Lam b, 1991:150).
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Figure 2-17 Female labour force participation rate (1980-2006), selected countries
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Finally, political instability and conflict continue to shape P akistan 's developm ent trajectory. 
In 2007, Islamic groups took control o f  several parts o f  the tourist area o f  Swat, while the 
assassination o f  Benazir Bhutto on 27 D ecem ber 2007 put the country once again into 
political turm oil.60 Following B hutto’s assassination in 2007 the All Pakistan Textile M ills 
Association reported that several textile units in Karachi had been subject to arson attacks or 
dam age and several workers were burned to death in the M axco garment unit in Karachi.61 
During nationwide protests over the removal o f  Pakistan’s C h ief Justice in 2007, widespread 
riots took place in all m ajor cities and it was reported that not a single export consignm ent 
reached the ports during the three days from M ay 12 to M ay 14” .62 Further, according to 
Burki, “Pakistan needs to get o ff the rollercoaster it has been on ever since its birth, with the 
econom y growing at a respectable rate w henever there w ere large flows o f  American 
assistance to the country (in the 1960s, the 1980s, and the early 2000s)” .63 It is these 
challenges that textile firms faced in the post-quota trading environm ent.
60 For an overview  o f  the dramatic changes that took place in Pakistan in 20 0 7  such as the military conflict in 
W aziristan, ‘creeping Talibanization' and em ergency rule see Khan (2008). T he assassination o f  Benazir Bhutto 
took place in Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi, the sam e location in which Pakistan’s first Prime Minister -  Liaquat 
Khan -  was murdered in 1951.
61 Sources: ‘Aptma calls for steps to protect industry’. B usiness Recorder. 1 Jan 2008 and ‘Factory arson victim s 
burden on c ity ’s con sc ien ce’, Dawn, 3 Jan 2008. Note: this firm was Pakistan’s 77th largest exporter o f  textile  
and clothing products in 2006.
62 ‘Strike, violence: textile industry m isses orders worth $70 m illion’, B usiness Recorder. May 17 2007
63 Burki, S.J. (2009) H ow  to fix the econom y, Editorial, D aw n. 17 February 2009
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2.4 Heterogeneity in firm characteristics and performance
It was within this political and institutional context that Pakistan’s textile and clothing 
industry emerged. Between 1962 and 2007, textiles and clothing grew to represent over 60 
per cent of Pakistan’s total exports, peaking at 74.5 per cent in 1997, and making up 30.6 per 
cent o f GDP as late as 1996. The export market is estimated to represent one third of total 
sales in textiles alone.64 However, this context also shaped the composition of the industry at 
the time of trade liberalisation and there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity amongst 
Pakistan’s textile and clothing firms by characteristics such as age, size, product, location and 
formality as well as by firm performance.
Firstly, firms located in Karachi tend to be the oldest with a mean age of 21 years in 2006, 
followed by firms in locations such as Multan, Sialkot and NWFP with an average age of 19 
years. The youngest firms are located in Faisalabad and Lahore with a mean age of 17 years. 
It is yam producers that tend to be oldest on average with an age of 24 years, followed by 
cloth and home textile firms (20 years), and knitwear and woven garment producers (17 
years). The incorporation dates of quota exporters tended to match the profile of all 
incorporated textile firms (outlined in Figure 2-10), peaking in the early 1990s and showing 
new entry in the post-2000 period.
Secondly, there was variation in firm size, with quota exporters exhibiting the typical right 
skewed distribution of firms recognised in most industries (see Figure 2-18).65 Similarly, in 
2004 the sales of KSE firms ranged from Rs2.1m (nominal) to the Rsl4.9bn of Nishat Mills, 
but the mean sales value was Rsl.4bn (see Appendix 2-3).66 Approximately 68 per cent of 
firms sold between Rsl.28bn and Rsl.58bn, some distance from the maximum sales of 
Rsl4.9bn.67 Firms also varied in size by age: among the 724 incorporated quota exporters, 
each year increase in age was associated with an increase in average exports of USD96,058 
(real USD, 2000) (t=5.19, p=0.000).
64 A ccording to data in an IMF report, in the textile industry foreign sales represented 32 .4  per cent o f  the total 
in 2 0 0 1 , 33 .2  per cent in 2002 , and 33.3 cent in 2003 as a percentage o f  total sales (2005:74). It g ives the data 
source as IMF and the State Bank o f  Pakistan.
65 R ecall that the Trade D evelopm ent Authority o f  Pakistan (T D A P) dataset is the best representation o f  the  
entire textile  industry in Pakistan because it includes firm s by firm type, size and product and represented 40  per 
cent o f  all textile  and clothing exports betw een 200 0  and 2004.
66 W hen converting this value to U S D  at an exchange rate o f  R s60 /1U S D , this is a range o f  U S D 3 5 ,0 0 0  to  
U S D 248m . There is  also outlier w ith total sales c lo se  to R s l5 b n  -  N ishat M ills -  a firm  that has b ecom e  
synonym ous w ith the textile  industry that w ill be discussed in more detail below .
67 In U S D , this is the equivalent o fU S D 2 1 .3 m -U S D 2 6 .3 m  (nom inal).
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Figure 2-18 Mean annual quota exports by firm (2000-2004)
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SOURCE: Trade Developm ent Authority o f  Pakistan, own analysis
There was also variation among firms by product, reflecting aggregate patterns o f  export (see 
Table 2-5). O f the 3,610 exporters under quota, the m ajority were woven garment (34.3 per 
cent) and knitted garment (30.3 per cent) producers. Garm ent firms were sm aller on average - 
w oven garment firms, for instance, were one third o f  the size o f  cloth and hom e textile 
producers.68 The data also suggest evidence o f  product specialisation: o f  the 3,610 com panies 
in the sample, 48.2 per cent were reliant on only one product for their sales.
Table 2-5 Sample descriptive statistics by product, quota exporters (2000-2004)
Product N Per cent 
o f firm s
M ean yearly exports 
(2000-4, USD 2000 m illion)
Per cent o f total quota  
exports (2000-4)
Yam 86 2.4 0.803 2.6
Cloth 461 12.8 1.278 21.7
Home textile 401 11.1 1.155 17.1
Woven garment 1,237 34.3 0.435 19.8
Knit garment 1,095 30.3 0.737 29.7
Mixed 48 1.3 1.277 2.3
Towel 262 7.3 0.696 6.7
Other 20 0.6 0.273 0.2
Total 3,610 100 0.752 100
NOTE: A firm is classed by product when more than 50 per cent o f  its exports under quota are in this product. 
SOURCE: Trade Developm ent Authority o f  Pakistan, own analysis
68 This smaller size o f  garment firms is likely to reflect both their business model and performance - there may 
be lower barriers to entry into garments in contrast with the capital required in textile manufacturing.
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The data suggest substantial concentration of market share by firm type. A total of 79 per 
cent of the textile and clothing firms in Pakistan are held in partnership or sole proprietorship 
(‘less formal firms’) in contrast to only 20 per cent of the firms that are incorporated as public 
or private (see Table 2-6). However, firms less formal firms are much smaller on average 
than public or private firms. Privately-held firms are 6.4 times larger than these less formal 
firms and public listed companies 15.6 times as large. As a result, 20 per cent of the firms 
were responsible for 31 per cent of all quota exports, and a tiny 2.6 per cent of the total firms 
(public limited) were responsible for 18.5 per cent of the exports under quota.
Table 2-6 Firm data by firm type, quota exporters (2000-2004)
Type of firm Number of 
observations
Per cent of 
sample
Size (mean exports 
under quota 2000-4)
Percentage of all 
quota exports
Partnership or sole 
proprietorship
2886 79.9 325,105 30.0
Private Limited 632 17.5 2,072,326 51.4
Public Limited 92 2.5 5,079,067 18.5
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan, 
Karachi Stock Exchange
There was also variation in firm location (see Table 2-7). Most companies are located in 
Karachi (47 per cent), followed by Lahore (28 per cent) and Faisalabad (15 per cent). Karachi 
dominates exports by value, endorsing its long-held position as the business hub of Pakistan 
despite the extent of political unrest in Pakistan’s capital since the 1980s. Firms in each 
location are similar in size on average with the exception of ‘Other’ locations, in which small 
garment producers of Sialkot are likely to bias the sample mean downwards.
Table 2-7 Quota exports by location, incorporated firms
Location 
of firm
Number of 
observations
Per cent of 
sample
Mean exports under 
quota 2000-4 
(real USD 2000 million)
Per cent of total exports 
of 724 firms by location 
(2000-4)
Karachi 341 47.1 2.6 49.6
Lahore 205 28.3 2.6 30.1
Faisalabad 111 15.3 2.5 15.9
Other 67 9.3 1.2 4.5
NOTE: The sample o f 724 incorporated firms on which location and age information was available from SECP 
records represented 70 per cent o f quota exports between 2000 and 2004. ‘Other’ locations include Sialkot, 
Multan, Islamabad and Gujranwala.
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan
There is also evidence of persistent differences in performance across firms over time. Gross 
profit, for example, has been continually higher among exporting firms by a margin of 2.6 to
91
21.9 per cent over the period 1994-2007 (see Figure 2-19).69 Similarly, profitability also 
varies by textile product and persists over time. As shown in Table 2-8, gross profit levels 
tend to  be m uch higher sectors such as home textiles and garments rather than for products 
such as yarn and cloth. This suggests that the perform ance o f  a firm rests on its ability to 
m ove into higher value-added textile and clothing products or achieve above average 
perform ance in basic products such as cloth and yarn.
Figure 2-19 Mean gross profit of exporters versus non-exporters, firms listed on 
Karachi Stock Exchange (1994-2007)
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SOURCE: Annual Reports o f firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Table 2-8 Mean gross profit by product, public listed firms (2004 and 2006)
Product Mean gross profit (2004) Mean gross profit (2006)
Yarn 2.9 7.6
Cloth 5.7 6.7
Yarn and cloth 4.0 10.0
Home textiles 12.2 13.8
Garments 6.7 14.0
Garments and home textile 14.6 17.0
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Additionally, there is evidence that differences in profitability persist at the firm level. Firm 
3, for example, a garment exporter, has continually outperform ed the mean gross profit on the
69 Gross profit among KSE exporters ranged from -20 per cent to 30 per cent, while for non-exporters it ranged 
from -20 per cent to 18 per cent (1994-2007). This suggests that profit margins can be as high in the local 
market as for most exporters, but not above 18 per cent. Among KSE firms in 2006, for each percentage point 
increase in export reliance gross profit increased by 0.12 percentage points (t=7.77, p=0.000).
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KSE (see Figure 2-20). Firm 25, a yarn m anufacturer, has perform ed in line with the KSE 
m ean since its inception in 1991. In contrast, Firm 21 -  which m anufactures yarn for the local 
m arket — has m ostly underperform ed the KSE mean since its founding in 1994.70
Figure 2-20 Gross profit of Firm 3,21 and 25 (1990-2007) versus mean KSE
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As a result, Pakistan’s textile industry exhibited much variation in firm characteristics and 
firm performance in the approach to the abolition o f  export quotas on 1 January 2005. It was 
this group o f  firms that would determ ine the industry’s perform ance in the post-quota period.
C onclusion
In conclusion, Pakistan has had a tum ultuous political history with patchy, but ultim ately 
limited, industrial and economic development. Firm entry, growth and diversification in the 
textile sector has been shaped by both governm ent policy and the operating environment. 
Pakistan continues to under-perform in com parison to regional neighbours and com petitors 
particularly in relation to institutional development, governance and developm ent indicators. 
As Bray has com m ented “Pakistan’s problem s in economic m anagem ent reflect the weakness
70 There are some incidences of crossover, when a firm performing well starts to decline in sales and profit. The 
managerial causes o f this change will be explored in Chapter 6.
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of its political structure. The political ‘game’ of patronage, manoeuvres and counter­
manoeuvres has taken priority over long-term policy making” (1997:325).
The evolution of Pakistan’s textile industry has been shaped by these political developments 
in the country’s sixty years since Partition. Nevertheless, Pakistan has surprisingly kept up 
with global demand in textile and clothing, and firms have shown some moves into higher 
value-added products. As export quotas began to be phased out between 1994 and 2004, 
firms varied in characteristics such as age, location, formality and size as well as in 
performance.
Consequently, the composition of Pakistan’s textile industry was mixed as the Multifibre 
Arrangement was gradually removed under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. It is the 
examination of performance among these firms during trade reform that is the focus of this 
thesis. In the next chapter I will now investigate how the design of the Multifibre 
Arrangement shaped firm entry and growth in the sector, and how the industry performed 
when faced with increasing competition between 1994 and 2007.
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Appendices
Appendix 2-1: Cotton production in Pakistan by tonne (1961-2006)
Figure 2-21 Cotton production in Pakistan by tonne (1961-2006)
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SOURCE: Pakistan Economic Survey 2006, Ministry o f Finance, Government of Pakistan
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Appendix 2-2: Growth in gross domestic product in Pakistan versus world (1961-2007)
Growth in Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) has m ostly followed world trends (see 
Figure 2-22). Exceptions include the fall in growth during the break-up o f  the country in 
1971, and a m ore rapid dip after 2005. However, rises in GDP also coincide with growth in 
aid to Pakistan as shown in Figure 2-23, and while the level o f  aid had dropped from 
approxim ately 10 per cent in 2006 to 2 per cent in the post-2000 period, it has continued to be 
relatively higher as a percentage o f  gross national income than neighbouring India whose 
share has fallen from 2 to 0 per cent in the same period. The econom y is still heavily reliant 
on agriculture: the correlation coefficient o f  GDP growth versus growth in agricultural value 
added is 0.499 (p=0.000). A linear regression shows that for every percentage point increase 
in agricultural value added, GDP growth increases by 0.781 (p=0.000) (Source: W orld 
Development Indicators, W orld Bank, 1961-2005).
Figure 2-22 Gross domestic product growth in Pakistan versus world (1961-2007)
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SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, December 2008
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Figure 2-23 Aid as percentage of gross national income in Pakistan and India (1960- 
2006)
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Appendix 2-3: Size distribution of textile and clothing firms listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange
Textile and clothing firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange also showed a typical size 
distribution. This includes a large number o f  small firms sitting alongside a few larger mills 
(see Figure 2-24).
Figure 2-24 Distribution of textile and clothing firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange 
by size (2004)
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange
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Chapter 3 Firm entry, growth and shakeout in Pakistan’s textile 
industry during trade liberalisation
Global trade regulation in textiles and clothing was first introduced in the 1950s and later 
embedded in the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) between 1974 and 2004. The MFA 
regulated global trade through a series of bilateral quotas and often constrained the exports of 
developing countries through quota ceilings. However, the gradual phase-out of the MFA 
between 1994 and 2004 -  and its final abolition on 1 January 2005 -  had a dramatic impact 
on the structure of the global textile and clothing industry.1 It led to a gradual divergence in 
export performance between countries as well as a rapid shakeout among Pakistan’s textile 
firms. In this chapter I examine how the MFA shaped firm entry and performance in 
Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry as well as its aggregate performance following the 
‘big bang’ of the textile universe on 1 January 2005. In particular, I examine patterns of firm 
survival and growth during liberalisation, as well as associations between firm age, size, 
location, product and performance.
Firstly, I examine the evolution of global regulation of trade in textiles and clothing from the 
first agreements in the 1950s through to the introduction of the MFA in 1974. I trace the 
continuation of this agreement until 1994 when its gradual withdrawal was negotiated at the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Using data from interviews 
with trade negotiators from Pakistan, I show that firm entry and growth was shaped by access 
to quotas and that quota ceilings often inhibited the growth of many of Pakistan’s best firms.
Secondly, I trace the reorganisation of export shares across countries in the industry as the 
quota system was phased out. I also assess Pakistan’s aggregate performance relative to 
competitors such as India and China. I find that trade liberalisation has led to an increase in 
global competition which is reflected in a rise in concentration of production in China, as 
well as declining product unit values. I find that Pakistan’s textile industry has maintained its 
level of exports between 2004 and 2007 and performed well in sectors such as home textiles
1 The MFA was actually phased out under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing between 1 January 1994 and
1 January 2005. However, in this thesis I refer to the entire period as being under the MFA as the system was in 
effect still in place during this time.
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and woven garments. However, exports have failed to grow as fast as those from countries 
such as China and India.
Finally, I assess aggregate performance patterns in Pakistan by firm age, size, location and 
firm type. I establish that a large shakeout of firms occurred in which at least 14 per cent 
exited within two years of liberalisation and one third failed to maintain their exports. I find 
that this shakeout is associated with firm characteristics of location, size, product and firm 
type, with small and less formal firms performing better than many policy makers might 
expect. Differences in export and local markets are also apparent: shakeout peaks in the 
export sector in 2003 but later in the domestic market, which I suggest is related to personal 
relationships among local firms. This sets the scene for the analysis of the determinants of 
firm survival and performance in Chapters 4 to 7.
3.1 Trade regulation in textiles and clothing 
Textiles and clothing in economic development
Textiles and clothing have always been important industries for both developed and 
developing countries. Commencing with the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, countries such as Germany, Italy and Russia have all at one time relied 
on textile and clothing products for economic growth and industrial diversification. The 
economies of the United Kingdom and Japan, for example, were “fully transformed by its 
influence” (Famie, 2004:557). In northern England, complementary industries such as the 
engineering of spinning machines, printing and dyeing works, and chemical manufacture 
emerged alongside Lancashire’s textile industry (Famie, 2004). In Japan, the cotton industry 
was a “seed-bed of innovation” in which Japanese firms adopted and then rationalised 
spinning production with new techniques such as vertical integration, later diversifying to 
become the world’s largest producer of rayon in 1936 (Famie, 2004:579). Figure 3-1 below 
shows the dominance of the UK and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the 
global yam trade, later challenged by productivity increases in ‘Other’ countries such as the 
USA, France and Germany (Jeremy, 2004:177).
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Figure 3-1 Percentage of world cotton yarn exports: UK, India, Japan and new entrants
(1870-1938)
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For many developing countries in the period following the Second World War, textile 
products have also featured significantly in export volum es. As illustrated in Figure 3-2, 
textiles and clothing reached 44 per cent o f  exports in Hong Kong in 1964 and 1976, 41.4 per 
cent in South Korea in 1971, and 30 per cent in China in 1992. In South Asia, the proportion 
o f  textile products in India’s total exports peaked at 29 per cent in 1999 and in Pakistan at 
74.5 per cent in 1997, while Bangladesh has yet to peak (see also Figure 3-2). Several textile 
and clothing exporters such as Korea and Taiwan have since gone on to become 
internationally competitive in advanced industrial sectors such as the manufacture o f  
electronics and shipbuilding, while China has been a net m anufacturer o f  textile machinery 
since 1969 (Farnie, 2004:582).
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Figure 3-2 Textiles and clothing as percentage of manufactured exports, selected
countries (1962-2007)
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Textiles products have also continued to play a prominent part in world consum ption and 
growth. As shown in Figure 3-3 below, global textile and clothing exports grew 13 fold 
between 1962 and 2006 (from $34bn to $431 bn, real USD, 2000), broadly in line with world 
trade which grew 19 fold (from $498bn to $9,621 bn) in the same period. This has ensured a 
stable and growing export market for firms in both developed and developing economies. As 
shown in Chapter 2, Pakistan was one o f  the many developing countries able to take 
advantage o f  this growing market since its formation in 1947.
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Figure 3-3 Growth in world and textile and clothing exports (left), proportion of world
trade (right) (1962-2006)
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This increase in textile and clothing exports from developing econom ies in the post-war 
period was accom panied by a buyer-led global reorganisation o f  production in the importing 
countries.2 Bair and Gereffi note, for example, that since the 1970s firms such as W alm art, 
Nike and JC Penney have carried out no production in their country o f  origin (2002:147). 
Influencing factors included the recession o f  the early 1970s which led many m anufacturers 
to seek lower-cost production in countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, as 
well as later oil shocks and inflation (Gereffi and Applebaum, 1994:49). Since the 1980s, 
Pakistan has also become an important sourcing location for com panies such as GAP, Nike, 
Zara, IKEA and several other British and North American retailers. In 2006, the top five 
exporters o f  textile products globally were China, Italy, Germany, Hong Kong and USA, 
while the top five exporters o f  clothing products were China, Hong Kong, Italy, Germ any and 
Turkey (see Table 3-1).3 This shows the continued strong presence o f  both developed and 
developing country producers in the global textile and clothing trade.
2 The shift is illustrated by the sourcing decisions o f  many textile and clothing firms in recent decades. In 1981, 
Pentland Group -  the manufacturer o f  Speedo clothing - m oved much o f  its sourcing to Asia. In 1997, Ikea 
announced its decision to build 20 new manufacturing plants over 5 years in the B altics, Bulgaria, and Romania  
in order to double its production capacity. In 2006, Springs Global -  a leading U S hom e textile firm, founded in 
1887 and previously operated yam  and w eaving plants in Georgia, U SA -  merged with Brazilian hom e textile  
manufacturer, Coteminas. Source: Pentland Group and Ikea profiles, H oovers, 2006; Springs Global Corporate 
W ebsite, http://ww w.springs.com /, accessed 23 March 2009. This shift in global trade patterns has also been  
well docum ented in the developm ent literature, see Gereffi, 1999; Chisolm  et al, 1986, for example.
3 In 2006, Pakistan w as the 9 th largest exporter o f  textiles and the 16th largest exporter o f  clothing. Source: U N  
Comtrade, SITC1.
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Table 3-1 Largest textile and clothing exporters by market share (2006)
Textiles 
(yarn, cloth, bedwear)
Export market 
share
Clothing 
(knitted, woven)
Export market share
1 China 23.1 China 32.8
2 Italy 7.3 Hong Kong 9.8
3 Germany 6.9 Italy 6.8
4 Hong Kong 6.6 Germany 4.8
5 USA 6.0 Turkey 3.9
SOURCE: UN Comtrade SITC1, own analysis
Trade regulation in textiles and clothing
However, the textile and clothing industry has often been as politically controversial as 
economically important. The rise of India as a major textile exporter, for example, was driven 
by the sourcing patterns of its British colonial ruler as well as Britain’s monopolistic access 
to India as a market for its own textile exports.4 As late as 1980, 14 per cent of manufacturing 
employment in developed economies was in the textile and clothing industries (Aggarwal, 
1985:9). This made low-cost imports a controversial issue for workers and politicians in 
importing countries. More recently, the sourcing of textile and clothing products from poor 
countries has brought concern over social conditions for workers (Chisolm et al, 1986; 
WRAP, 2007) and the environmental impact of textile processing industries.5
Following the Second World War, a new set of institutions and agreements were created to 
avert the “disastrous effects of competitive protectionist trade policies in the 1930s” 
(Aggarwal, 1985:5). At the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, proposals to create the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
were put forward as well as a new ‘International Trade Organisation’ to facilitate freedom in 
global trade (ibid). Political disputes in the United States over the extent of liberalisation, 
however, meant that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty, “originally 
designed to be a temporary treaty to establish guidelines for tariff negotiations” (ibid) was all 
that remained to govern international trade.6
4 In 1871, 73 per cent o f all British exports to India in 1871 were in cotton textiles (Singleton, 2004:66).
5 Sources: Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), http://www.wrapapparel.org/, and WWF 
Pakistan’s European Union funded project ‘Promoting Better Environmental Practices in the Textile Processing 
Sector o f Pakistan’, http://www.wwfpak.org/toxics_bettertextileprocessing.php, accessed 23 March 2009.
6 The central principle o f GATT was non-discrimination among states conducting international trade (Khanna, 
1991:22).
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Against the backdrop of changing production relations in developed countries, increased 
competition under GATT and the loss of markets following the independence of colonies, in 
the 1950s there was a rise in the level of protectionism in the textile and clothing industry. In 
the United States, for example, there was growing intra-industry competition from the 
development of synthetic fibres as well as increased unionisation in the North which led firms 
to relocate to the South (Aggarwal, 1985:11). In the United Kingdom, producers had lost 
much of their export market since the early 1900s and faced duty-free imports of cotton 
textiles from India, Pakistan and Hong Kong under the Imperial Preference System
n
(ibid:6;12). Further, countries such as Hong Kong and South Korea had begun to rapidly 
increase the level of exports in textile and clothing products.
This ‘surge’ in textile and clothing imports in developed country markets led to concerns 
among producers located in these countries. In 1953, for example, the American Cotton 
Manufacturers Association “threatened to block trade bills if they did not obtain restriction on 
the imports of textile and apparel products” (ibid: 11). Domestic pressure was particularly 
strong from the main textile regions such as Maine, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi and Massachusetts (Khanna, 1991:22). As early as 1956, the United 
States senate held its first vote to impose quotas on imports of cotton textile products 
“without jeopardising US obligations under GATT” although this vote was lost by two votes 
at the time (ibid).8
This was the beginning of a period in which a series of restrictions on textile and clothing 
imports to developed economies were introduced. In 1956, following pressure from the US 
government, Japan agreed to Voluntary Export Restraints on its export of cotton textile 
products for a five-year period (Aggarwal, 1985:11).9 In the United Kingdom, the
7 Japan, meanwhile, had managed to regain its market share following World War Two to be the largest exporter 
o f cotton textiles in 1951 (Sugihara, 2004:522).
8 To some extent, this concern was misplaced. In the world clothing market in 1962 the only developing country 
(excluding Japan) in the list o f top 10 exporters was Hong Kong which held fourth position with 9.1 per cent o f  
total exports. Japan held 13.9 per cent o f the total clothing exports while eight other developed countries (such 
as France and Italy) held 68 per cent o f the remaining export trade. Italy was the largest clothing exporter from 
1962-1970 until it was overtaken in 1972 by Hong Kong with a market share o f 14.8 per cent. The next 
emerging economy to enter the top 10 export list was the Republic o f  Korea in 1969 with a market share o f 3.4 
per cent. In fact, while the United States tried as early as 1969 to obtain an international agreement to limit 
imports, Europeans resisted it as they saw it as a “ploy to restrain their own exports” (Aggarwal, 1985:13).
9 The evidence o f  the impact o f  these moves on trade flows is apparent: between 1956 and 1961, Japan’s share 
o f US textile imports declined from 54.5 per cent to 34.1 per cent (Aggarwal, 1985 :12). This gap, however, was 
immediately filled by other exporting countries such as Hong Kong, whose share in US textile imports rose 
from 0.5 per cent to 23 per cent between 1956 and 1961 (ibid).
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‘Lancashire Pact’ was established under which several commonwealth countries voluntarily 
agreed to restrain cotton textile exports to the UK (Aggarwal, 1985:12). Following the 
resistance of Hong Kong to a bilateral agreement in 1959 the Under Secretary of State in the 
United States approached GATT to develop a system to deal with ‘low-priced imports’ (ibid) 
and a study conducted by GATT in 1959 led to the introduction in 1961 of the Short-Term 
Arrangement on Cotton Textiles “to function in the interim” (Choi et al, 1985:15). This 
contained procedures governments could follow in the event of ‘market disruption’ from 
imports and according to Francois et al “opened the door for the series of bilaterally 
negotiated quota restrictions” (2000:6). The Short Term Agreement was then followed by the 
Long-Term Agreement (LTA) on Textiles in 1962. The LTA was introduced for a five year 
period and renewed for another five years in 1967 (Chisolm, 1986).
However, over this period consumer preferences changed and producers in developing 
countries “sought to overcome LTA controls by switching to man-made [sic] fibre” (Khanna, 
1991:23). A rise in manufactured exports occurred from the newly industrialising countries 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and Brazil at a rate of 12.2 per cent each year between 
1963 and 1973, and 20 per cent from 1973 to 1976 (Aggarwal, 1985:6). The US 
administration therefore came under pressure to widen the product content of the voluntary 
export restraints to include products such as wool and synthetic textiles (ibid). It was against 
this backdrop that the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was negotiated under GATT in 1973 in 
order to meet the needs of both importers and exporters. The MFA came into force on 1st 
January 1974.10
The MFA included terms which were to benefit both developed and developing countries. 
Article 1 of MFA stated the objective “to eliminate the difficulties faced by the textiles and 
clothing industries in its developed country members” and to provide ‘breathing space’ 
during which industries could adjust to international shifts in comparative advantage (Choi et 
al, 1985:5). Article 1 also stated its intention “to progressively liberalize world trade in textile 
products” and “to promote social and economic development in developing country 
exporters” (ibid). All parties agreed to introduce safeguard measures only in exceptional
10 In 1982, the developing countries that were signatory to the MFA were Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Korea 
(Rep of), Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. China joined in 1984. The developed countries were Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Rep o f  Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA (Choi et al, 1985:3-4).
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circumstances, and only when ‘market disruption’ was occurring (Khanna, 1991:25).,} Under 
Article 3 of the Arrangement, an importing country could create a bilateral agreement with an 
exporting country regarding restraints on a particular product, and indicate the level at which 
it would like to limit the exports (ibid). A six per cent growth in quota was agreed, although 
with some exceptions. A Textile Surveillance Body was created that would examine disputes 
and further negotiations on the MFA were conducted by the Textiles Committee of GATT. 
The MFA was renewed on four occasions, in 1977, 1981, 1986 and 1991 (the timeline of 
these trade agreements can be seen in Appendix 3-1).
Between 1974 and 1990, bilateral agreements between 43 signatories representing 54 
countries were implemented under the MFA and the US alone introduced quotas with 34 
countries (Heron, 2006: 4). By the end of the second MFA in 1981, 80 per cent of textile and 
clothing imports to the United States were under bilateral quota arrangements (Nordas, 
2004:13) and data suggested that from 1993 to 1996 between 54 and 68 per cent of total 
world trade in textile and clothing was restrained under the MFA (Kathuria and Bhardwaj, 
1998:31). As illustrated in Table 3-2, protection was often stronger in the United States (US) 
market: between 92 and 96 per cent of textile and clothing exports to the US were restrained 
between 1993 and 1996, while imports under quota to the European Union (EU) were 
between 58 and 71 per cent. Pakistan itself was reliant on quota for half of its textile and 
clothing exports to the EU and US markets and these destinations made up 96 per cent of all 
Pakistan’s quota sales between 2000 and 2004 (see Table 3-3).
Table 3-2 Percentage of textile and clothing imports covered by Multifibre 
Arrangement
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996
USA 95.6 90.5 92.6 92.1
EU 64.1 58.2 71.3 70.8
Total world trade (including countries outside MFA) 54.4 52.5 58.7 56.4
SOURCE: Kathuria and Bhardwaj (1998:31)
11 This is despite the fact that the MFA was in contravention o f several core principles o f  the GATT such as free 
trade and non-discrimination among signatories.
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Table 3-3 Textile and clothing imports from Pakistan under quota (2000-2004)
Importer Value of quota exports 
from Pakistan 
(real USD million, 2000)
Share of quota 
sales by 
destination 
(per cent)
Share of textile 
exports to these 
countries 
(per cent)
Average unit 
value (real 
USD, 2000)
EU 6,091 48.9 50.6 3.4
USA 5,826 46.8 48.7 2.6
Turkey 331 2.7 55.2 2.5
Canada 213 1.7 26.2 1.8
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, UN Comtrade SITC1, own analysis
There is a lack of clarity in both the academic and policy literature on how quota restrictions 
were allocated by country and by product. In fact, one of the criticisms of the MFA was that 
it lacked transparency: “[ujnlike tariffs or export taxes, export quotas are nontransparent in 
their effects on trade. Without detailed analysis, it is very difficult to know whether the 
quota...was restrictive or not, let alone know whether the whole system of quotas is 
restrictive” (Martin, 2004:5). However, according to Nordas, quotas were allocated on a 
country-by-country and product-by-product basis, leaving some developing countries with 
quotas and others facing none at all (Nordas, 2004:34). The work of Brambilla et al also 
suggest that a ‘base quota’ was negotiated at the start of an agreement term, but that ‘adjusted 
base quotas’ allowed countries to go beyond their base quota in a given period by “borrowing 
unused base quota, up to a specified percentage of the receiving category, across categories 
within a year and across years within a category” (2007:7).
Mr Nasim Qureshi, a civil servant in the Pakistani government who worked in Washington 
DC from 1995 to 2000 when the MFA was being phased out under the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC), explained how the system worked in Pakistan:
When negotiating with the importing country, the quota level was determined by 
exports of the first 12 months of the last 14 month period. But the system for quota 
allocation was ad-hoc: there was no written yardstick on how much could be 
imported...If, for example, if Pakistan exports reached two per cent of the total 
imports in a category, authorities would say it was enough... Importing countries 
called the shots. We would receive a call from the US for quota negotiation every day: 
they would decide when to call a curtain on a category. When a certain point had been 
reached on a basket of categories, further imports would not be allowed. On the
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Pakistani side, we lobbied to obtain as best a quota as possible; we had to fight for 
higher growth rates.12
By textile-exporting country, data on quota restrictions are also scarce. In Pakistan, the share 
of textile and clothing exports which took place under quota between 2000 and 2004 was 
approximately 40 per cent by value.13 Khanna estimates that the proportion of India’s apparel 
exports under quota fluctuated between 67.8 and 81.6 per cent between 1980 and 1988 in 
terms of quantity (1991:43). In China, only one quarter of all textile and clothing exports by 
value were sent to quota markets (Martin, 2004:3). Mlachila and Yang (2004:13) show that 
US imports in 2002 from Bangladesh by value were 69 per cent under quota -  the 
corresponding figure for China was 46 per cent, for Sri Lanka 69 per cent, and for Hong 
Kong 93 per cent.
Not all textile and clothing products were constrained under the quota. The little evidence 
available on administration of quota by product shows that between 1978 and 1982 the top 
three categories in which exporting countries were most restrained to the United States were 
men’s and boy’s shirts (19 countries), knit shirts for women (18 countries), and trousers for 
men (17 countries). The least restrained categories were hosiery, pillowcases and skirts (Choi 
et al, 1985:34-37). In 2000, the USA had imposed quotas on 39 items from Pakistan, while 
the EU had imposed restraints on only 15 items (SMEDA, 2000). Within Pakistan, it was 
garment exports that were most reliant on quota. As illustrated in Table 3-4, 63.0 per cent of 
all knitted garment exports from 2000 to 2004 were under quota, while woven garments 
relied on quota markets for 66.5 per cent of exports in the same period. In contrast, textile 
exports such as yam, cloth and home textiles sold 6.5, 37.8 and 56.2 per cent of exports to 
restricted markets. This had implications for the competitiveness of firms in restricted and 
unrestricted categories, as will be discussed below.
12 Interview conducted on 4 July, 2006, Islamabad. His personal view was that because the USA wrote the 
MFA, they claimed they could interpret it as they wished. Exporting countries had little say and could rarely 
convince importing countries to raise the quota limit on a good. In this chapter I paraphrase from the discussion 
had with Mr Qureshi rather than quote directly.
13 Source: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, own analysis
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Table 3-4 Reliance on quota for export by product from Pakistan (per cent) (2000-2004)
Product/Y ear 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean
Yam 5.4 4.1 6.4 9.5 7.4 6.5
Cloth 34.9 39.6 39.3 41.4 34.8 37.8
Bedwear 64.9 64.1 60.6 46.5 53.8 56.2
Knitted garments 68.2 67.1 71.9 63.4 51.7 63.0
Woven garments 74.0 68.8 64.4 55.5 73.4 66.5
Towels 46.5 42.1 30.3 25.9 26.7 32.3
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Pakistan Federal Bureau o f  Statistics, own analysis
Some textile and clothing exporting countries were also more constrained than others and 
data suggest that quotas were allocated -  and filled -  according to their relative 
competitiveness. As measured by quota fill rates in square metres (which is the percentage of 
quota allocation that was actually used), China and Bangladesh were top with 88 per cent fill 
rates followed by India with 87 per cent, Indonesia and Cambodia with 85 per cent and 
Pakistan with 84 per cent (Brambilla et al, 2007:33). The lowest quota fill rates were 
observed in countries such as Colombia (10 per cent), Poland (13 per cent) and Jamaica (20 
per cent) (Brambilla et al, 2007:33). In contrast, it was often less restricted countries that 
were the beneficiaries of the quota system as exports from the most competitive countries 
were limited. According to Kathuria et al, “the key gainers in terms of restricted market 
access have been relatively large suppliers such as Mexico, Turkey and the Central European 
countries that have benefited from regional preferences granted by the major importers 
(2001:5).
Within developing countries, quotas were administered by specific local organisations. In 
India, the quotas for garments were administered by the Apparel Export Promotion Council 
while quotas for textile products were in the hands of the Cotton Textiles Export Promotion 
Council (Kathuria and Bhardwaj, 1998:5). In Pakistan quotas were issued by the Export 
Promotion Bureau (later renamed the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan) -  a 
department of the Pakistani government’s Ministry of Commerce. Quotas were then 
administered via trade associations such as the Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association 
and Pakistan Readymade Garments Association to whom firms had to be a member in order 
to access the quota.
In countries such as India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Pakistan, quota was 
allocated on past firm performance (SMEDA, 2000). In Indonesia, for example, a firm that
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used 95 per cent or more of its quota in a category would be entitled to 100 per cent of its 
previous quota holdings in the following year (ibid:349). In India, 70 per cent of quota was 
allocated to firms based on past performance (ibid:347). In Pakistan, firms would receive 
quota for the actual quantity exported to restricted countries in the preceding period while the 
remaining allocated quota would be auctioned (ibid:345). In many cases, quotas could also be 
traded on the ‘open market’ (ibid:346) often at the discretion of quota holders. Growth of 
quota was often used as a way to encourage new entrants. In India, for example, in addition to 
the 70 per cent of quota which was allocated on past performance, 15 per cent was set aside 
to registered exporters who invested in a minimum amount of rupees in new machinery or a 
new unit. In Pakistan, growth quota was allocated both through auction and at the discretion 
of the government. From 2001, additional quota was allocated to firms if they had achieved 
higher value exports: if the firm’s unit value was 25 per cent above the average in the 
preceding year, they would receive an additional 5 per cent quota (ibid:345).
3.2 Trade distortions and the path to liberalisation 
Negative impacts on firm and industry performance
Evidence suggests that the quota system directly shaped firm entry and industry performance 
in Pakistan’s textile and clothing sector. Firstly, a number of firms emerged specifically to 
take advantage of quota rents. Indeed, the rise in clothing exports in particular from 1984 
onwards coincides with the entry of many firms who were to go on to become the largest 
clothing exporters under quota. Mr Qureshi explained that Pakistan became the largest quota 
holders for the US in category 338 (men’s knitted shirts) because “a small number of firms -  
such as Ammar Textiles in Lahore -  took the initiative”. Ammar Textiles, founded in Lahore 
in 1984, became reliant on quota for 100 per cent of exports of both woven and knitted 
garments and among the top 20 largest exporters under the MFA.14 Similarly, Comfort 
Knitwears was founded in 1985 in Lahore and became also one of the top 20 exporters under 
quota between 2000 and 2004. Mr Qureshi recognised, however, that this high price for 
certain products “created a distortion locally” where firms with guaranteed market access 
suffered from a lack of competition. According to Mr Qureshi,
14 Sources: Trade and Development Authority o f Pakistan, Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, 
own analysis.
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These firms continued to make the same revenues year on year and were not pushed: 
they pursued little innovation and made no re-investment.
Secondly, the quota also privileged incumbent producers as it was often allocated to firms 
exporting in the previous year. Firm 1, for example -  now a large exporter of cloth and home 
textiles — benefited from the allocation of the quotas in 1974 and 1975 as it was already 
operating in the market. From this starting point it was able to build long term relationships 
with European buyers and gain exposure to their product and customer service needs. In 
contrast, Firm 3 -  now a leading home textile exporter -  considered quota too expensive so 
focused production on other markets. Indeed, according to Mr Qureshi, it was the quota that 
“choked innovation” in the sector. Innovation was taking place elsewhere in a category in 
which there was free entry:
In product category 666 [bedwear and blended fabrics which were not 100 per cent 
cotton], for example, which was not under quota, many firms such as Gul Ahmed 
Textile Mills and Kohinoor Group showed innovation and fantastic growth in this 
category. There was free entry - whoever could establish themselves was able to enter.
Thirdly, firms had to rely on quota in order to access key export markets which often 
constrained their expansion. Of the top 10 exporters by size on the Karachi Stock Exchange 
in 2004 (which represented 11.2 per cent of all textile and clothing exports in that year), 
quota reliance ranged from 11.3 to 72.0 per cent of a firm’s exports (see Table 3-5).15 
Garment exporters were particularly dependent: Crescent Bahuman, a leading manufacturer 
of jeans in Pakistan, relied on quota for 74.7 per cent of its exports from 2000 to 2004, while
thAngora Textile, the 29 largest exporter under the quota and a producer of knitted garments, 
sold 95.2 per cent of its goods through this channel in the same period.16 However, quota 
prices inhibited the expansion of firms in key markets. Mr Tariq Saigol of Kohinoor Textile 
Mills explained that “[t]hose that had the foresight to build up volume in quotas did so”, but 
that quota limitations often prevented entry in sectors such as cloth. Further, the Small and 
Medium Enterprises Authority (SMEDA) of Pakistan argued that the quotas restricted entry
15 91 KSE firms exported under quota between 2000 and 2004 and on average firms relied on quota for between 
22 and 27 per cent exports in these years. In total, the exports o f KSE firms represented between 13 and 18 per 
cent o f quota sales in this period. For an illustration o f quota reliance across the whole KSE sample see 
Appendix 3-2.
16 Source: Trade and Development Authority o f Pakistan, Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan, 
own analysis.
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of new firms, predominantly the growth of the small sized stitching units. According to 
SMEDA, the need to purchase quota either from auction or from the market “renders their 
exports non-competitive in the international markets” (SMEDA, 2000:370).
Table 3-5 Reliance on quota for exports among top ten Karachi Stock Exchange firms
by export sales (2004)
Name Position in top 
quota exporters 
(2000-2004)
Average quota 
reliance for export 
(per cent, 2000-2004)
Products
1 Nishat Mills 2 21.5 Home textiles
2 Fateh Textile 29 19.3 Home textiles
3 Nishat (Chunian) 99 11.3 Home textiles
4 Chenab Limited 7 38.6 Home textiles, garments
5 Sapphire Textile 52 17.1 Yam, cloth, home textile
6 Kohinoor Weaving 61 19.6 Home textiles
7 Crescent Textile 25 29.0 Yam, cloth, towels
8 Gul Ahmed 3 61.2 Home textiles
9 Kohinoor Textile 27 45.4 Home textiles
10 Masood Textile 5 72.0 Knitted garments
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Securities and Exchange 
Commission o f Pakistan, own analysis
Evidence suggests that quota protection under the MFA also had several negative welfare 
impacts on both developed and developing countries. There was a distortion created by the 
rise in product prices, for example, that arose from excess demand. The quota system created 
a ceiling on the volume available for export production which reduced the supply of textiles 
and clothing to importing countries. This pushed up the price for the exported good “given 
the demand and supply situation at a point of time for a particular product” (Kathuria et al, 
2001:7). This higher price was captured in the ‘quota rent’ that was the price of the exported 
good relative to the price in the non-quota market. Certainly, selling under quota was 
attractive for many firms in Pakistan because they could receive a unit value greater than that 
of the average export unit value. Even in the most basic textile product — yam — exports 
earned a premium of between 5 and 42 per cent between 2000 and 2004 (see Figure 3-4 
which outlines the mean unit value for all yam exports versus that gained in quota exports). 
While this quota rent “accrues to the firms or individuals lucky, or skilful, enough to gain 
access to the quotas” (Martin, 2004:2), this distortion raised the cost of goods for consumers, 
leading to a welfare loss on their part.
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Figure 3-4 Revenue per kilogram of yarn under quota versus mean Pakistan export 
value (2000-2006)
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SOURCE: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan; Pakistan Economic Survey 2006, Ministry of Finance, 
Government o f  Pakistan; own analysis
There was also an associated increase in rent-seeking behaviour am ong business and 
government under the quota system which introduced inefficiencies to the economy. While 
the receipt o f  higher prices for goods in relation to production costs could result in “static 
welfare gains” by the exporter through the receipt o f  higher prices (Kathuria et al, 2001:8), in 
many cases there were “resources spent in many countries on lobbying for quota allocations” 
(Martin, 2004:13). M r Tariq Saigol stated, for example, that in Pakistan “quotas were 
inefficiently allocated by bureaucrats” by volume rather than unit value which removed
incentives to upgrade am ongst firm s.17 According to M r Saigol, there was also “huge input by
18vested interests o f  the quota holders” rather than in the interest o f  the sector as a whole.
Quota rents also discouraged firms to move out o f  the textile and clothing sector into higher 
value-added industries. According to Kathuria et al, the presence o f  export quotas “reduces 
the opportunity for developing countries to use the relative ease o f  adopting new technology 
in the clothing sector as a first step on the ladder o f  economic developm ent” (2001:5). 
Further, it means that many economies such as Hong Kong, whose advantage in textile and
17 This is because further quota was allocated not by the quality of the goods, but by sheer volume.
18 In an interview with Firm 28 -  a large producer of cloth and home textiles and the 24th largest exporter under 
quota -  for example, the Director described how he would attend trade policy trips to the United States with 
Ministry of Commerce officials.
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clothing products had declined, continued in production because of the quota rents available 
(ibid).
Finally, the quota ceilings that restricted exports meant that efficient producers were 
restricted in their ability to “use their comparative advantage in textiles and clothing to create 
employment in these sectors” (Martin, 2004:2). Any benefits from increased quota prices 
were set off against the loss of potential employment and productivity growth from industry 
expansion (Kathuria et al, 2001:8). Instead, trade regulation “has led to a pattern of 
specialization where countries with the strongest comparative advantage for textiles and 
clothing, such as China and India, face binding quotas” and an inefficient global allocation of 
textile and clothing production (Nordas, 2004:24, 34).
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (1994-2004)
Talks to liberalise trade in textiles and clothing had broken down in 1991 (Khanna, 1991:21), 
but during the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1994 it was agreed that the MFA would be 
replaced in 1995 by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). The ATC was not an 
extension of the MFA, but rather a “transitory regime between the MFA and the full 
integration of textiles and clothing into the multilateral trading system” (Nordas, 2004:13). It 
required the removal of bilateral quotas over a 10-year period between 1 January 1995 (when 
the World Trade Organization was established) and 31st December 2004 after which time 
trade in textiles and clothing would become subject to the general rules of the GATT 
(Nordas, 2004:1). Mr Nasim Qureshi believed that it was the activities of retailers and 
consumer groups in developed countries that eventually contributed to the ending o f the MFA 
system. Heron and Richardson (2008) also suggest that the negotiations gave more scope for 
developed countries to obtain trade liberalisation in services and intellectual property rights 
and because the MFA/ATC had failed to protect developed country producers.19
The ATC required that the annual increase in quota which had taken place in 1990 should be 
increased by 16 per cent in 1995, 25 per cent in 1998, 27 per cent in 2002, followed by full 
integration in 2005 (see Table 3-6). According to Mr Qureshi, the choice of products to
19 The latter case was due to the proliferation o f non-regulated exports and because volume constraints 
encouraged developing country exporters to maximise quota gains by upgrading into higher-value products 
(Heron and Richardson, 2008:9-10).
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integrate was left to the importing country and there was a tendency to first integrate products 
where quota utilisation was low (Nordas, 2004:14). Table 3-7, for example, shows that it was 
yams, fabrics and made-ups rather than clothing that was integrated in the first two stages of 
the ATC. However, only a few countries actually continued to enforce quotas under the ATC: 
Canada, the EU, Norway and the United States. Eleven other importing countries integrated 
textiles and clothing into GATT immediately (Nordas, 2004:13).
Table 3-6 Integration of textile and clothing products into GATT
Date Minimum volume 
to be integrated 
(per cent)
Accumulated 
volume integrated 
(per cent)
Remaining quota growth 
rate 
(per cent)
1 Jan 1995 16 16 16
1 Jan 1998 17 33 25
1 Jan 2002 18 51 27
1 Jan 2005 49 100 Full integration
SOURCE: Nordas (2004). The third column indicates the rate at which any outstanding quota (that not yet 
integrated) was required to grow.
Table 3-7 Integration of products by country in stages 1 and 2 of ATC (per cent)
Country Yarns Fabrics Made-ups Clothing All
USA 16.5 4.2 8.7 3.9 33.2
EU 16.0 9.5 5.3 2.5 33.3
Canada 10.3 6.4 15.5 2.8 35.0
Norway 10.1 14.3 14.7 4.3 43.3
SOURCE: International Textiles and Clothing Bureau (1999)
Allocation of quota growth was also disproportionately allocated across exporting countries. 
Mlachila and Yang show that countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan received higher 
growth in market access than the average between 1995 and 2004, while China received well 
below the average (see Figure 3-5). Further, substantial protection was in place to the last two 
stages, particularly for the most important products. This has led to a change that some have 
called the ‘big bang’ of the textile universe.
20 ‘India awaits textiles boom’, BBC News Online. 22 December, 2004
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Figure 3-5 Quota growth rates, selected countries (1995-2004)
P ak istanB ang lad esh C hina
SOURCE: Mlachila and Yang (2004)
Exports from Pakistan under the quota increased between 2000 and 2004 (see Table 3-8). 
While it is unclear from the data provided if this was simply a result o f  increased quota usage, 
it does suggest export growth o f  between 2 and 12 per cent between 2000 and 2004).21 As 
shown in Figure 3-6, all firms grew in mean size between 2000 and 2004. Mean firm size 
also increased across all textile and clothing product segments and locations in this period 
(see Appendix 3-3). In the final stages o f  the ATC between 2000 and 2004, Pakistan’s textile 
and clothing exports were reliant on quota for 40 per cent o f  export market access. This 
meant that the equivalent o f  23.5 per cent o f  Pakistan’s total exports would be open to 
com petitors in the new, freer trading environment.
21 Note that in this period textile products accounted for 62.81 per cent of Pakistan’s total exports on average in 
the same period and grew at the same rate as quota export growth.
17
Table 3-8 Pakistan textile exports under quota and quota reliance, 2000-2004 (real USD
millions, 2000)
Importer/Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
US 1,152 1,185 1,139 1,266 1,350
Canada 52 54 50 51 45
EU 959 1,029 1,161 1,443 1,812
Turkey 49 43 66 112 78
Total quota exports 2,213 2,312 2,416 2,872 3,284
Total textile and clothing exports 5,552 5,757 5,780 7,225 8,191
Per cent of total textile and clothing exports 39.9 40.2 41.8 39.8 40.1
Quota growth - 1.02 1.00 1.12 1.04
NOTE: Yearly totals for total textile and clothing exports are based on the July to June financial year except for 
2004 when exports were measured from January to December. This is due to limited data availability. For quota 
growth,. 1.02 represents a growth rate o f 2 per cent.
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, Federal Bureau o f  Statistics, own analysis 
Figure 3-6 Mean exports by firm type under quota (2000-2004)
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SOURCE: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, own analysis
For some industrialists the abolition o f  export quotas was “an opportunity o f  a lifetim e” and 
many firms invested in new machinery in preparation for the new trading environm ent in 
Pakistan and elsewhere.22 At an aggregate level, import data show that import o f  textile 
machinery grew in the period just before the ending o f  the M FA, peaking in 2005 as the ‘big 
bang’ brought its full impact (see Figure 3-7). Sim ilar patterns o f  preparation were witnessed 
in the garment sector, where there was an increase in the value o f  weaving, knitting and 
sewing equipment imported between 1999 and 2005. This pattern o f  investment is also 
reflected in a rise in capital expenditure at the firm level in the run up to quota abolition in
22 For a discussion o f firm responses in India see Tndia waits to pounce as textile quota scheme lapses’, 
Financial Times. 2 April 2004.
2004 (see also Figure 3-7).23 As the end o f  the ten-year ATC approached, analysis o f  the 
degree o f  similarity between Pakistan’s exports and its com petitors (and the likely impact o f  
stronger competition from countries with higher productivity) by the W orld Bank expected 
M FA abolition to be positive on Pakistan’s textile industry as a whole, but negative on 
clothing (M artin, 2004).
Figure 3-7 Total imports of textile and clothing machinery to Pakistan (left), mean
capital expenditure of textile firms on Karachi Stock Exchange (right) (1990-2007)
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O f course trade regulations in textiles and clothing continued to shape global trading patterns. 
Under the European Union’s Generalised System o f  Preferences scheme, eligible countries 
(such as Pakistan) obtained a 20 per cent reduction on tariff rates in the textiles and clothing 
sector, but these rates were removed for India and China between 2006 and 2008 in the 
process known as ‘graduation’.24 The E U ’s ‘Everything But A rm s’ initiative offered duty free
23 The large rise in machinery imports in the early 1990s and post-2000 period also corresponds with the large 
rise in firm entry in these periods illustrated in Chapter 2. Interestingly, this increase in capacity in Pakistan also 
took place in India in the same period (substantial deregulation also occurred in India from the early 1990s), and 
the peaks in investment mirror those o f  Pakistan. This is one o f  many sim ilarities in industrial developm ent 
between India and Pakistan, showing the spillover effect o f  policy activity in the region.
24 The Generalised System o f  Preferences enables exporters in developing countries to benefit from preferential 
tariffs in the markets o f  industrialised countries with the aim o f  generating additional export revenue and 
reducing poverty (Textiles Intelligence, 2008). In Decem ber 2008 , the European Union announced that 16 
countries including Bangladesh and Sri Lanka would benefit from G SP+ between January 1, 2009  and the end 
o f  2011 which will allow duty free access for sensitive textile and clothing products (ibid). Pakistan had 
previously been graduated from the GSP in 2005, but was later ‘degraduated' in 2006 and tariff preferences 
were re-introduced (Textiles Intelligence, 2008:5) but the reasons for this are unclear. H owever, the EU has
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access to the European Market for textile and clothing exporting countries such as 
Bangladesh, Cambodia and Madagascar (Textiles Intelligence, 2008).25 In 2006, Pakistan 
faced duties of 14.5 per cent for its garment exports to the US in contrast with 0.2 per cent in 
Mexico, 1.9 per cent in Honduras and between 0.1 and 0.7 per cent in the beneficiaries of the 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of the United States (such as Kenya, Lesotho and 
Madagascar) (Adhikari and Weeratunge, 2006:124).26 Further, between 1 January 2006 and 
December 2008 the USA had a Memorandum of Understanding in place with China limiting
27the import of certain products such as baby socks and knit-to-shape garments.
Pakistan has also been subject to anti-dumping duty by the EU in the home textile sector. 
Following a complaint in 2002 by the Cotton and Allied Textile Industries of the European 
Commission, a duty of 13.1 per cent was imposed on Pakistani bed linen on 5 March 2004 
(Adhikari and Weeratunge, 2006:127). This was reduced to 5.8 per cent in May 200628 but 
the EU had raised the level of duty on Pakistan’s bedwear exports to 25 per cent at its peak in 
2005 following the reintroduction of 12 per cent customs duty (International Labour 
Organization, 2005). Nevertheless, the ending of the quota system removed the absolute 
ceilings in textile and clothing exports and created a more competitive trading environment.
announced that Pakistan will not benefit from the new GSP+ scheme as its imports amount to more than 1 per 
cent o f total EU imports. Source: European Union (2008) List o f countries considered “vulnerable” in the sense 
o f Article 8 o f the GSP regulation 2009-2011, accessed 5 Mar 2009 from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139963.pdf
25 The EU’s Everything But Arms initiative which was launched in 2001 (Heron and Richardson, 2008) offers 
duty-free and quota-free access to least developed countries for all products except arms and armaments 
(Textiles Intelligence, 2008).
26 The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act “offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their 
efforts to open their economies and build free markets”. Source: http://www.agoa.gov/, accessed 23 March 
2009.
27 This agreement was introduced under the conditions o f  the safeguard restraints which formed part o f  China’s 
Accession Agreement to the World Trade Organization on 11 December, 2001. The European Union also 
entered into an agreement with China in June 2005 to limit imports o f  specific products until 31 December 
2008. Even after this date the outcome is uncertain as the China's accession agreement allows WTO members to 
treat it as a nonmarket economy for another extended period up to 2016 (Asian Development Bank, 2006). 
Sources: U.S.-China MOU Frequently Asked Questions, 24 Feb 2006,
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/textiles_and_quotas/china_mou/china_mou_faq.ctt/china_mou_fa 
q.doc and European Commission, Trade in textile, 29 June 2006
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textiIe/trade_text_en.htm, accessed 23 March 2009.
28 Source: ‘Narrow base hampering export potential’, Dawn. 3 October 2007.
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3.3 A ggregate perform ance o f  P ak istan ’s textile  and clo th ing  industry  
during  trade liberalisation
Global shifts
Trade liberalisation typically leads to an increase in price and quality competition and a 
reallocation o f  market share to more efficient producers. There is evidence that since January 
2005 there has been such a reorganisation in the global textile and clothing industry. As 
Figure 3-8 shows, the C 4  ratio has risen rapidly since 2004 in both textiles and clothing . 2 9  In 
fact, the C4  ratio passed 50 per cent for the first time in 2006 in both textile and clothing 
sectors, albeit from a previous high in the 1960s when the industry was dom inated by Italy, 
Japan, France, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. M uch o f  this recent shift in production 
has been driven by the relocation o f  production to China which has increased its share in the 
global textile trade from 7.0 per cent in 1990 to 26.4 per cent in 2006, and in clothing from
9.3 per cent to 31.4 per cent in the same period. There has also been a continued drop in unit 
value across several products during and immediately after the liberalisation suggesting 
increased price competition. W hile import volum es have risen in the US market, for example, 
unit values have dropped in real terms in products such as household linen, knitted garments 
and woven garments (see also Figure 3-8).
Figure 3-8 C4 ratio in global textile and clothing exports (1962-2007) (left), unit value of 
imports to the United States, selected products (2000-2007) (right)
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^ The C4 concentration ratio measures the proportion o f  total exports located in the top four countries o f  textile  
export. In 2006, the ratio was com posed o f  China, Italy, Germany and Hong K ong in both textiles and clothing.
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There is also evidence that there has been a redistribution o f  m arket share within key import 
markets. In the United States clothing market, for example, which represents approxim ately 
30 per cent o f  the w orld’s clothing imports, C hina’s m arket share rose from 13 to 34 per cent 
between 2000 and 2007.30 Further, countries like Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Indonesia 
have all seen increases their clothing market share (see Figure 3-9).31 In contrast, countries 
like Korea, Hong Kong, Honduras and M exico have lost this m arket share between 2000 and 
2007 — countries often seen as less com petitive under the quota system.
Figure 3-9 Change in share of clothing imports in the United States, selected countries 
(2000-2007)
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These shocks have also been felt at the firm-level in both developed and developing 
countries. W ell-known textile companies in the United States such as W estPoint Stevens, 
Cone Denim, Burlington Industries and Swift Galey went bankrupt before and after 2004. 
Several later emerged from bankruptcy with a focus on higher value-added products such as 
technical textiles and created jo in t ventures with m anufacturers in developing countries.32
30 The share o f  the U SA  in total clothing imports has actually dropped year-on-year from 32 .0  per cent in 2000  
to 27.2 per cent in 2006.
31 Other studies have found similar impacts. W halley (2006) found large changes in the country pattern o f  trade 
in the first year o f  liberalisation including large increases in shipm ents from China to both the U S and the EU  
and large price falls for sales in the U S and selected EU markets. He also finds that market shares o f  other Asian  
suppliers “generally hold up w ell” in the U S market, but that in the EU market the shares o f  all non-Chinese 
Asian suppliers fall with the exception o f  India. The Asian D evelopm ent Bank (2006) and James (2008) also  
found that Asian suppliers have performed well to the detriment o f  former large quota holders and preferential 
suppliers.
32 The new W estPoint Hom e Stories (previously a larger buyer o f  Pakistani textiles) em erged from bankruptcy 
in 2005 after closing six  m ills, and is now  focusing on high-technology textiles. Cone Denim  was eventually
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The organisation of industry in Pakistan also changed in the final years of trade liberalisation. 
Of the top 35 exporters under quota, one Chief Executive counted 12 joint ventures that had 
been established in response to the trade reform. These include a joint venture established in 
2005 by Pakistan’s leading textile exporter, Nishat Mills, with Gulf Baraka Apparel of 
Bahrain to manufacture and sell apparel in the newly created ‘Gulf Nishat Apparel 
Limited’.33 A second is QST Naveena, a joint venture between Naveena Group of Industries 
(Pakistan) and QST Industries of Chicago, United States, in 2003 to supply “innovative 
men's, women's and children's apparel construction components to the international garment 
industry” .34
Export perform ance o f Pakistan in textiles and clothing (2004-2007)
Export data indicate that Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry managed to maintain its 
level of exports in aggregate in the port-quota period. Between 2004 and 2007, textile and 
clothing exports grew in real terms by 18 per cent (see Table 3-9).35 In the first year of 
liberalisation there was a jump in exports of 16 per cent, followed by a growth of 4 per cent 
between 2005 and 2006, but a fall in exports of 3 per cent from 2006 to 2007. Bedwear saw 
strong growth in the first year (46 per cent) and total growth of 31 per cent over the three year 
period (real USD, 2000). Similarly, readymade garments grew by a total of 47 per cent 
between 2004 and 2007 while knitted garments grew 9 per cent. The latter performance was
purchased by another textile group in 2004, and is now focusing on design at its 100-year-old White Oak Plant 
in Greensboro, North Carolina and expanding production in China and Nicaragua. Burlington Industries, a 
former North Carolina-based producer o f cotton, blended fabrics and waterproof synthetics that was the world’s 
largest textile producer in 1980, went into bankruptcy in 2000 and closed several o f its plants in the US and 
Mexico in 2002. In 2005, Swift Galey announced a joint venture with China-based Lucky Textile Group to 
produce and market twill and denim. Sources: WestPoint Home Stores, Company Profile, Cone Denim LLC, 
Company Profile, Burlington Industries, Inc, Company Profile, and Swift Galey, Company Profile, Hoovers, 
2006.
33 Home Textiles Today, Pakistan Suppliers Strive for Expansion, 21 May 2007, 
http://www.hometextilestoday.com/article/CA6445742.html, accessed 23 March 2009.
34 Naveena Group o f Industries website, http://www.naveena.net/qstn.htm, accessed 23 March 2009.
35 The data in this thesis covers the period to the end o f  2007 due to limited data availability at the firm level in 
2008. It is noted that three years is a shorter time period for observation than desirable. As a result, I analysed 
the 2008 data at the aggregate level and annual reports available for 43 firms. From 2007-2008 total exports 
grew 15 per cent while textile and clothing exports fell by 4 per cent (real USD, 2000). This takes the aggregate 
export growth to 40 per cent between 2004 and 2008, but textile and clothing growth to 12 per cent, suggesting 
that rates o f  growth in the textile industry were falling in the years leading away from quota. This is likely to be 
associated with the global economic crisis as well as Pakistan’s worsening internal political situation. The 
implications o f  this shift in 2008 are further discussed in Chapter 8. Sectors that gained most in this four year 
period by gross value were readymade garments (with a growth rate o f 55 per cent), bedwear (22 per cent) and 
synthetic items (70 per cent). Sectors that declined most by gross value were yarn, cloth and knitwear which all 
dropped by 5 per cent. Source: Federal Bureau o f Statistics, Monthly Review o f  External Trade Statistics, own 
analysis. Performance at the firm-level appears mostly consistent in 2008 with evidence from 2004 to 2007 (as 
shown in Appendix 3-4).
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unexpected -  commentators such as Martin (2004) had estimated the impact of trade 
liberalisation to be negative for Pakistan’s clothing sector.
Table 3-9 Pakistan export growth by product (real USD, 2000) (2004-2007)
Segment/Year Mean 96-04 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-7
Total exports 1.03 1.19 1.03 1.02 1.25
Textile and clothing exports 1.03 1.16 1.04 0.97 1.18
Yam 0.95 1.08 1.15 0.94 1.17
Cloth 1.02 1.16 0.96 0.86 0.95
Knitted garments 1.08 0.97 1.12 1.00 1.09
Bedwear 1.14 1.46 1.03 0.87 1.31
Readymade Garments 1.03 1.48 0.98 1.01 1.47
NOTE: Growth rates are given in whole numbers, e.g. 1.03 is a growth rate o f  3 per cent. These data refers to 
performance by calendar year (January-December) rather than financial year (July-June).
SOURCE: Federal Bureau o f Statistics, own analysis
However, Pakistan’s performance when compared with its competitors was moderate (see 
Table 3-10). In comparison with mean export growth of 12 per cent from Pakistan in the 
textile segment from 2004 to 2007, exports from China grew by 55 per cent and from India 
by 27 per cent. In the clothing segment, while Pakistan posted total growth of 17 per cent in 
clothing, China delivered growth of 73 per cent, India of 39 per cent, and Indonesia of 22 per 
cent. The year of 2007 was particularly difficult year for Pakistan’s textile and clothing 
exporters -  with a fall of 3 per cent in textile exports and a fall of 4 per cent in clothing -  
while others continued to grow. While a slowdown was also seen in some other exporters 
such as Indonesia in clothing and China in textiles, it is likely that the dramatic deterioration 
in energy provision and the political environment in 2007 had an impact on the industry in 
Pakistan.
Table 3-10 Pakistan export growth versus competitors (2004-2007)
TEXTILES 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-7
China 1.19 1.15 1.13 1.55
India 1.17 1.03 1.06 1.27
Pakistan 1.12 1.02 0.97 1.12
World imports 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.02
CLOTHING
China 1.16 1.25 1.19 1.73
India 1.35 0.99 1.04 1.39
Indonesia 1.11 1.10 1.00 1.22
Pakistan 1.16 1.05 0.96 1.17
Bangladesh 1.07 1.17 - -
World imports 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.15
NOTE: Data were not available for Bangladesh in 2007 on UN Comtrade as o f  February 2009. 
SOURCE: UN Comtrade, S1TC3
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Recent policy research has proposed possible explanations for Pakistan’s weaker aggregate 
performance. The Asian Development Bank (2008) has highlighted Pakistan’s rising power 
supply deficit as a factor shaping manufacturing performance. This includes ongoing power 
and gas. shortages caused by an aging energy infrastructure subject to chronic 
underinvestment in expansion and maintenance as well as unsustainable pricing regimes. The 
World Bank also found that Pakistan is disadvantaged by longer shipping times and higher 
freight costs relative to China because of its location relative to North American and 
European markets (2006:v). There are also concerns about aggregate productivity: in the 
manufacture of cotton jeans, for example, labour costs in Pakistan are cheaper ($82 per 
month in comparison with $125 in China and $83 in India) but less productive. Further, while 
large mills can make between 20 and 24 pairs of jeans per day in comparison with 24 in 
China and 21 in India, small firms in Pakistan only make 10-12 per day and all firms have an 
estimated rework rate of 10 per cent (ibid:37). There is a general lack of shop-floor 
management and limited training in productivity, design and other product-related skills 
(World Bank, 2006:37).
At the firm-level, Pakistan’s firms are also smaller than those of their foreign competitors. Of 
the top five firms listed on the KSE, the largest -  Nishat Mills -  was only half the size of 
competitors in India, and only one fourteenth the size of a large competitor in Taiwan (see 
Table 3-11). This may constrain the firm’s order size, or ability to take advantage of 
economies of scale. However, in terms of profitability, Pakistan’s firms are often similar to 
their competitors. In 2005, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills, Nishat Mills and Chenab Limited had 
gross profit margins of 16, 19 and 21 per cent in contrast with Arvind Mills which had a 
gross profit margin of 23 per cent and Far Eastern Textiles of 8.8 per cent. Indeed, several 
Pakistani firms consider their ability to deliver higher quality instead of lower cost to be a 
competitive advantage. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry has performed 
worse on average than those of competing countries in the post-quota period.
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Table 3-11 Sales of top five firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange in 2005 versus
selected overseas competitors
Name of firm Country Sales in 2005 
(nominal USD million)
Products
Far Eastern Textile Taiwan 3,636 Yam, fabric, bedwear, garments
Texwinca China 937 Knitted fabric and yam
Fountain Set China 871 Fabric, thread, yam, garments
Luen Thai Hong Kong 548 Knit wear and woven wear
Glorious Sun China 460 Casual apparel
Arvind! Mills India 451 Denim fabric and clothing
Nishat Mills Pakistan 256 Home textiles, cloth
Fateh Textile Pakistan 132 Home textiles, cloth
Gul Ahmed Pakistan 130 Home textiles, cloth
Chenab Limited Pakistan 126 Home textiles, garments
Sapphire Textile Pakistan 121 Yam, cloth, home textiles
NOTE: All deflators and exchange rates in this thesis are sourced from the international Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, December 2008.
SOURCE: Merrill Lynch (2006), Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
3.4 Firm shakeout in Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry during trade 
liberalisation
Evidence suggests that individual firms diverged in performance in the ten year period 
covering the phase out of the export quotas under the ATC. Among the textile and clothing 
firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange, for example, the coefficient of variation for total 
sales also rose continually from the mid-1990s onwards to peak in 2002 before falling off 
until 2007 (see Figure 3-10).36 This suggests diverging performance among firms as poorer 
companies fell in size (and exited) and market share was gained by better performers (leading 
to a upward convergence in mean size). Indeed, while 27 firms have exited between 2000 and 
2007 (and there have been no new entrants -  see Appendix 3-9 for exit patterns per year), the 
mean size of remaining firms has increased in real terms by 51 per cent from Rs860m to 
Rsl.3bn (real Pak Rs, 2000) (see Figure 3-11).37 The average size of exporters has also 
increased by 51 per cent from Rs664m to Rsl.Obn in the same period. This suggests that a 
greater share of total KSE, and export market, sales was gained in this period by those firms 
that had remained in the market.
36 Annual report data available for 43 companies suggests that these trends persisted at the firm level in 2008. 
For a comparison o f firm performance from 2004-2007 and from 2004-2008, see Appendix 3-4.
37 The fate o f an additional 8 firms was unknown in this period to to their failure to submit annual reports, but it 
is likely they have also exited
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Figure 3-10 Diverging performance of KSE-listed textile and clothing firms (1990-2007)
E xport sa le s Local sa le s
NOTE: See Appendix 3-8 for a scatterplot o f the sales among KSE-listed firms to which this figure refers. The 
financial year was changed in 2005, hence the 2005 figures include sales from the first quarter o f 2006 for 
standardisation. Data on export and local sales were not available in 2005 as a result. SOURCE: Karachi Stock 
Exchange, own analysis
Figure 3-11 Mean size of KSE-listed textile and clothing firms (1990-2007)
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NOTE: Firms that no longer have positive sales have been removed from the sample to ensure that they do not 
bias downwards the mean size. SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
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W hile data on revenue per employee are only available between 1999 and 2005, they also 
show a sim ilar pattern and hence purposive activity on the part o f  the firm (see Appendix 3- 
5). This effect also seems to be present in the data on quota exporters where the coefficient o f  
variation am ong firms that remain in the sample between 2000 and 2006 rises until 2004 
before falling in 2006 (see Appendix 3-6). Further, a sim ilar relationship exists with gross 
profit, where divergence rose at the end o f  the 1990s and continued moving upwards after 
2006 (see Appendix 3-7). There was a particularly strong shakeout among spinners and 
analysis o f  revenue per spindle indicates that it was still ongoing in 2007 (see Figure 3-12). 
There was also evidence o f  the shakeout and exit which occurred at the end o f  the 1990s 
among yam  firms, for the reasons given in Chapter 2.
Figure 3-12 Coefficient of variation of real revenue per spindle among yarn producers 
listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (1994-2007)
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
As illustrated in Figure 3-10 above, the peak in divergence occurred much later for the local 
sales (2005 and 2007) than for exports (2002 to 2003). Anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
is the result o f  stronger personal contacts in the local textile market. Firms often sell yarn and 
cloth to other m ills in the same group, for example, or to friends or family also operating in 
the industry. Firm 23, a m anufacturer o f  yarn and cloth listed on the KSE, explained how its 
sales were always guaranteed to be purchased by firms owned by family relations. A series o f  
intermarriages between members o f  different textile firms have also led to business 
relationships: in two consecutive days I visited one o f  Pakistan’s best performing textile units 
as well as one o f  its weakest, run by the brother-in-law o f  the C hief Executive o f  the first. In
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contrast, relationships with exporters are less structured by personal relationships and the 
com petitive pressure is greater. The analysis o f  professional m anagem ent in firms, and such 
relationships, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
Total sales and exports by firms listed on the KSE have also grown between 2000 and 2007 
(see A ppendix 3-10). However, this growth has been driven by a small num ber o f  firms. O f 
the 137 surviving firms in 2007, 58 firms had grown sales in real term s since 200, 23 had 
m aintained their sales, and 56 had seen a drop in sales since 2004.38 The distribution o f  firm 
grow th rates in total sales is shown in Figure 3-13 below. This suggests that less than half o f  
the firm s were driving an increase in mean firm size during the liberalisation. The results also 
imply that 40.9 per cent o f  firms were unable to increase their sales over this three year 
period.
Figure 3-13 Real sales growth of firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (2004-2007)
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NOTE: Sales growth is given in w hole numbers with 1 equal to real sales growth o f  0 per cent. One firm was
dropped from the graph as it had sales growth o f  40 (from very low  initial level).
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Analysis o f  firm survival among quota exporters using data provided by the Trade 
Development Authority o f  Pakistan (TDAP) and Federal Bureau o f  Revenue (FBR) also 
indicates that a large shakeout o f  firms took place between 2004 and 2006 after quota
38 Here, 1 term a firm as having sales growth i f  it w as greater than 5 per cent between 2004 and 2007, as 
'maintain' i f  sales are within a 5 per cent margin above or below  the 2004 figure, and a fall i f  sales fell more
than 5 per cent. This is to take into account any small variations in the level o f  sales.
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abolition- From the data available, I developed measures of firm performance including 
“survive” and “maintain” as outlined in Chapter 1. These measures were as follows: the 
survival rate of those quota exporters on which 2006 export data were available from the 
FBR (named ‘SurviveFBR’, 528 firms); survival of the same firms based on FBR data as well 
as additional observations provided by trade associations (‘SurviveTA’, 610 firms); maintain 
rates based on export values in 2006 provided by FBR (MaintainFBR, 528 firms).39 Survival 
rates tend to decline as more data become available, as witnessed by a lower rate of survival 
using the SurviveTA measure. As a result, ‘MaintainFBR’ and ‘SurviveTA’ should be taken 
as the most accurate indicator of firm performance. Similarly, indicators should be taken as 
either upper or lower bounds for survival or maintenance of sales given that data were 
missing for 124 firms.
Between 2004 and 2006 the survival rate using SurviveTA was 85.7 per cent (see Table 3- 
12). This means that at least 14.3 per cent o f textile and clothing firms in this sample exited 
within the first two years of trade liberalisation. Even if all the firms on which there are no 
data available were to have exited, the survival rate would be 72.2 per cent. Maintain rates, 
however, were much lower: only 67.2 per cent of firms had managed to maintain the mean 
level of exports they had under the quota in 2006. The analysis using value of exports in 2004 
gives similar results: 64.3 per cent of firms were able to exceed their 2004 export sales.40 This 
suggests some degree of rapid exit following quota abolition. There was also a shakeout 
among the largest firms: of the top 25 quota exporters between 2000 and 2004, only 10 of the 
21 firms that could be traced remained in the top 25 in 2006.
39 The SurviveTA measure includes export data provided by PHMA, and ‘yes’ or ‘no' indicators o f survival to 
February/March 2007 provided by other trade associations. This additional insight was useful as if firms did not 
report export data because o f exit was not recorded in FBR records.
40 It would be useful to develop a benchmark o f exit between 2000 and 2004 among quota exporters in order to 
see whether it was the liberalisation per se that led to firm exit. However, the use o f  quota data is problematic 
because firms purchased varying levels o f quota as a percentage o f total exports year-to-year, and firms often 
opted to explore unrestricted markets because o f high quota premiums. Hence using little quota in one year 
would be taken as an exit rather than as a positive exploration o f  unrestricted markets. Baseline analysis 
suggests that o f  the 1,986 firms that exported under quota in 2000 (and taking 40 per cent quota reliance on 
average), 57.4 per cent ‘maintained’ their quota exports in 2002, 54.4 per cent from 2000-2003, and 48.1 per 
cent from 2000-2004 (see Appendix 3-11). However, this could merely be taken as a measure o f  quota usage 
rather than survival.
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Table 3-12 Survive and maintain rates by product, quota exporters (2006)
Product SurviveFBR SurviveTA MaintainFBR
All 91.5 85.7 67.2
Yam 95.2 95.2 90.5
Cloth 89.4 86.5 75.0
Home textiles 89.2 86.5 68.7
Wovents 91.3 84.2 60.9
Knits 93.3 83.3 60.3
Towel 88.2 86.1 61.8
NOTE: SurviveFBR N=528, SurviveTA N =610, MaintainFBR N=528
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Federal Board o f Revenue, Karachi Stock Exchange, 
Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association, trade 
associations
Survive and maintain rates were associated with a number of firm characteristics. By product, 
firm ‘maintain’ rates were highest among yam firms at 90.5 per cent (see also Table 3-12). 
This undoubtedly represents the small reliance on quota that took place among yam firms (at 
6.5 per cent on average, see Table 3-4 above). This was followed by home textile and cloth 
firms of whom 75.0 and 68.7 per cent maintain exports respectively (again, likely to be a part 
function of lower quota reliance). However, firms who specialise in other made-up products 
perform worse on average. At least 39.7 per cent of knitting firms, 39.1 per cent of woven 
garment firms, and 38.2 per cent of towel producers exited in the first two years of quota free 
trade. The ‘maintain’ rate of home textile of 68.7 per cent is surprisingly low given that 
Pakistan’s home textile sector was seen as particularly innovative and less reliant on quota 
than garments.
Both survive and maintain rates tend to increase with age in the TDAP sample (Figure 3-14). 
This provides support for predictions from the theoretical literature that firm performance 
increases with age, partly as a result of firm learning over time as well as the result o f sample 
bias that good performers will have survived longer at the time of quota abolition. Similarly, 
firm survival increases with the mean size of the firm between 2000 and 2004, perhaps due to 
the interest of buyers to source finished products from a ‘one stop shop’. However, size is 
strongly correlated with age -  the determinant of performance outlined above. Under quota, 
for each year increase in age average exports increased by $97,961 (real USD, 2000; 
p=0.023). An interesting finding is that the relationship between size and performance breaks 
down among firms exporting less than $2m between 2000 and 2004, with the smallest firms 
(exporting around $0-$0.5m) performing better than those between $0.5 and $lm exports (see
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also Figure 3-14). This shows that post-quota perform ance may not solely be a function o f  
size, and shows more positive perform ance than might be expected in the policy literature.
Figure 3-14 Survive and maintain rates by firm age (left) and size (right), quota 
exporters
aoo
70
60
40
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41+
Age in years
Maintain
100
c
s
<v
CL
80
re
70crec 60re5
50
40
0.5 1 2 3 4 5 10 10+
M ean exp o rt size (2000-2004) (real USD, 2000)
■Survive Maintain
NOTE: N=528. The size axis is not linear, but used as illustration o f how survive and maintain rates vary by 
size. For sample sizes see Appendix 3-12.
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, Federal Board of Revenue, own analysis
‘M aintain’ rates by location were highest am ong firms in Karachi and Faisalabad with levels 
o f  69.3 and 68.3 per cent respectively (see Table 3-13). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
industry in Faisalabad is gaining m omentum as a result o f  skill accum ulation am ong w orkers 
and a more stable political environm ent than locations in Sindh. Indeed, data on exports 
under quota show that the mean size o f  firms in Faisalabad rapidly caught up with those in 
Lahore and Karachi between 2000 and 2004 (see Appendix 1-4). This is a positive 
development for Pakistan as economic developm ent m oves out o f  the previously dom inant 
commercial hubs. Additionally, the relative perform ance o f  Karachi is positive given the 
negative business clim ate typically associated with the city (outlined in Chapter 2). It 
suggests that firms based in Karachi were m ore resilient to the ending o f  the quota and that a 
business culture persists in the city. Evidence from interviews also suggest that the poorer 
relative performance o f  firms around Lahore is associated with the ‘strategising’ o f  firm s in 
the region in relation to quota and an associated lack o f  com petitiveness. The higher relative 
performance o f  firms in the ‘O ther’ category could be biased upwards by the heavy reliance 
o f  firms in Multan on products such as yarn and cloth (see Table 3-13).
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Table 3-13 Survive and maintain rates by location, quota exporters (2006) (per cent)
Location SurviveFBR SurviveTA MaintainFBR
All 91.5 85.7 67.2
Karachi 99.1 94.6 69.3
Lahore 85.2 75.9 60.6
Faisalabad 84.3 77.1 68.3
Other 88.7 87.9 74.1
NOTE: SurviveFBR N=528, SurviveTA N=610, MaintainFBR N=528
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Federal Board o f Revenue, Pakistan Hosiery 
Manufacturers Association, Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, own 
analysis
Additional evidence on performance among less formal firms obtained from the Pakistan 
Hosiery Manufacturers Association shows that in some cases they have been able to perform 
on a similar level as their more formal counterparts. Analysis of 318 surviving PHMA 
members in Karachi shows that partnerships or sole proprietorships showed a ‘maintain’ rate 
of 66.2 per cent in comparison with 70.8 per cent among public/private firms (see Table 3- 
14). This is a positive result as it indicates that informality per se is not a relative 
disadvantage in this context as is often suggested in the policy literature. Maintain rates were 
lower among surviving firms in Faisalabad, but this could be the result of their younger age 
as outlined in Section 2.4 above. Out of the 37 public and private firms that were still 
operating in Lahore, 20 had maintained their exports, equal to 54 per cent, much lower than 
the firms located in Karachi (70.8 per cent) or Faisalabad (67.5 per cent). This could be for 
reasons of quota dependence as outlined above.
Table 3-14 ‘Maintain’ rates of knitwear companies by firm type
Firm type Number of 
‘maintain’ firms 
(PHMA Karachi)
Obs. Per
cent
Number of 
‘maintain’ firms 
(PHMA Faisalabad)
Obs. Per
cent
Partnerships/SPs 147 222 66.2 37 70 52.9
Public/private 68 96 70.8 27 40 67.5
Total 215 318 67.6 64 110 58.2
NOTE: SPs refers to Sole proprietorships. Analysis refers only to surviving firms as exit data was not available. 
SOURCE: Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association Karachi and Faisalabad, own analysis
However, analysis of KSE data suggest that quota reliance per se was not an important 
determinant of performance after the ending of the MFA. When comparing the level o f quota 
reliance with total sales growth between 2004 and 2007, there was no direct relationship
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between the two factors (see Figure 3-15).41 Firms that had low reliance on quota, for 
exam ple, varied w idely in their post-quota performance. This suggests that while som e firms 
m ight have been protected during the M FA, more com petitive exporters were reliant on quota 
to sim ply access im portant markets.
Figure 3-15 Quota reliance of firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (per cent) (2000- 
2004) versus real sales growth (2004-2007)
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C onclusions
The evolution o f  the global trading environm ent for textiles and clothing in the post-war 
period shaped firm entry and industry perform ance in many o f  the w orld’s leading textile 
exporters. In Pakistan, the M ultifibre Arrangem ent shaped patterns o f  firm entry and growth 
through quota prem ium s and export quota ceilings by privileging incumbent producers and 
limiting the growth o f  others. W hile some firms benefited from technology transfer and quota 
rents, the system also shaped the competitiveness o f  the industry: firms were either protected
41 A s a percentage o f  total quota sales, KSE firms represented between 13 and 18 per cent between 2000  and 
2004 (as illustrated in Appendix 3-2). H owever, only 91 o f  the K SE firms used quota at all during this period, 
and firms did not export under quota in each o f  the years. KSE firms relied much less on quota for export sales 
than the Pakistan average o f  4 0  per cent, inflating their likelihood o f  survival upwards.
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by quotas, or forced to sharpen their competitive edge by seeking out unrestricted markets. 
The presence of the quota also encouraged rent seeking and made moves into higher value- 
added products less attractive. Firms in Pakistan invested heavily in anticipation of the new 
trading environment which presented both a challenge and an opportunity to the industry.
A rapid redistribution of market share between and within countries took place as export 
quotas were gradually abolished under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. At an 
aggregate level, Pakistan managed to maintain its exports and has shown strong growth in 
categories such as home textiles and woven garments. It has also managed to increase its 
share of key markets like the USA and mean firm size among surviving firms has increased 
which indicates a reallocation of market share to better performers. However, Pakistan’s 
textile and clothing exports have performed poorly relative to competitors such as India, 
China and Bangladesh. It has perhaps missed its ‘opportunity of a lifetime’.
At the firm level there was diverging performance between 1994 and 2004 followed by rapid 
shakeout amongst Pakistan’s textile and clothing firms in the post-quota period associated 
with firm characteristics such as product, age, location, size and firm type. Positive trends 
include the strong performance of Karachi despite two decades of political turbulence, and 
the growth of the city of Faisalabad with its increasingly large textile units. Another positive 
outcome is that informal firms have often performed on par with their more formal 
counterparts when faced with increased cost and quality competition. At the firm level, post- 
MFA performance does not appear to have been related to quota reliance per se. However, 
there has been a rapid shakeout of firms, with only two thirds at most able to maintain their 
exports when the MFA was finally abolished. There has also been a particularly high rate of 
exit among garment producers.
This analysis sets the scene for the analysis of the role of pre-founder experience in shaping 
firm capabilities, growth and diversification which will now be explored in Chapters 4 to 7.
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Appendices
Appendix 3-1: Timeline of global trade regulation in textiles and clothing
Table 3-15 Evolution of global trade policy in textiles and clothing (1955-2007)
Date Trade policy
1955 Japan applies for accession to General Agreement on Textiles and Trade 
Japan voluntarily limits export of cotton textile products to USA under the 
Eisenhower Administration
Jul 1961 ‘Short-Term Arrangement’ on Cotton Textiles
1 Oct 1962 ‘Long-term Arrangement’ on Cotton Textiles
1973 Multifibre Arrangement Negotiated
1 Jan 1974 MFA comes into operation until the end of 1977, includes a minimum 6 per cent 
growth rate for items under restraint
14 Dec 1977 MFA extended for another 4 years
Amending protocol: condition imposed by EEC that bilateral agreements could 
include ‘reasonable’ departures (Choi, 1985:18)
1 Jan 1978 MFA-II comes into force
1981 Negotiations for the second renewal of the MFA 
‘Protocol of extension’; Renewed until 31 July 1986
1 August 1986 Protocol extending MFA until July 1991 introduced
1991 Talks to end MFA break down (Khanna, 1991), extended to 1994
1994 Uruguay Round, GATT, agreement to end MFA,
ATC introduced as a transitory agreement (Nordas, 2004)
31 Dec 2004 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ends
June 2005 EU and China Memorandum of Understanding (agreed June 2005) limits imports 
of specific products until 31 Dec 2008
1 Jan 2006 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between USA and China on restraints in 
selected textile exports for a three-year period (agreed 8 November, 2005)
31 Dec 2008 China Textile-Specific Safeguard Clause ends
NOTE: As defined by the European Commission, “The Textile-Specific Safeguard Clause (TSSC) in the 
Chinese Protocol o f Accession to the WTO can be invoked by any WTO member able to show market 
disruption by Chinese textile imports serious enough to “impede the orderly development” o f their textile trade. 
The triggering state must first request consultations with China, asking that it limit its shipments o f the products 
cited to the level o f the first twelve o f the fourteen months prior to the complaint, plus 7.5% (6% for wool 
products)”. These measures can only be applied until the end o f 2008.
SOURCE: Khanna (1991) and Choi et al (1985)
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Appendix 3-2: Export quota reliance of firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange
A total o f  91 firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange exported under quota between 2000 
and 2004. On average they sold between 21 and 27 per cent o f  their exports under the quota 
(see Table 3-16) although firms ranged in their individual reliance on quota from 0.36 per 
cent o f  total exports to 96.0 per cent (see Figure 3-16).
Table 3-16 Quota reliance of firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange and share of 
quota exports (per cent) (2000-2004)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Quota reliance of total KSE-firm exports 21.8 21.0 25.2 26.1 27.2
Observations 64 66 71 66 65
Share of total quota sales 13.6 13.6 15.9 16.6 17.9
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, Trade Developm ent Authority o f  Pakistan, own analysis
Figure 3-16 Average reliance on quota for exports among firms listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange (2000-2004)
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SOURCE: Trade Developm ent Authority o f  Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
There were two clusters in graph o f  firm age versus quota reliance, the first at around age 20 
and one around age 40 (see Figure 3-17). Anecdotal evidence suggests that businesses in 
operation in 1974 (when the MFA was introduced) were privileged in access to quota, while 
those created in the early 1980s were specifically formed to take advantage o f  quota access.
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Figure 3-17 Relationship between firm age and quota reliance, textile and clothing firms 
listed on Karachi Stock Exchange
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Appendix 3-3: Mean firm size by product and location (quota exporters, 2000-2004)
The size o f  quota exporters by product and location from 2000 to 2004 are shown in Figures
3-18 and 3-19. M ean size increased across all locations in this period and in all products with 
the exception o f  yam.
Figure 3-18 Mean firm quota exports by product (3,610 quota exporters, 2000-2004)
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Figure 3-19 Mean firm exports by location (724 quota exporters, 2000-2004)
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Appendix 3-4: Performance of selected textile and clothing firms listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange in 2008
The annual reports of 43 companies in 2008 were available online. Seven firms moved into 
‘maintain’ or ‘grow’ category in 2008, showing show signs of improving performance, while 
only three fell out. This suggests that performance trends witnessed between 2004 and 2007 
have largely continued in 2008.
Table 3-17 Real sales growth 2004-2008: 43 firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange
2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 2004-7 2004-8 Change
0.98 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.87 0.85 -
1.94 0.59 0.94 0.91 1.08 0.98 i
0.95 1.54 1.24 0.92 1.81 1.66 -
1.01 1.20 0.86 1.03 1.04 1.07 -
1.46 0.84 1.10 0.97 1.35 1.31 -
0.93 0.83 1.08 1.41 0.84 1.41 T
0.75 1.18 0.65 1.98 0.58 1.15 T
0.83 0.90 1.03 1.16 0.77 0.90
1.01 0.88 1.00 1.28 0.90 1.15 T
1.04 1.19 1.04 1.31 1.29 1.69
1.01 0.93 0.99 1.02 0.93 0.94 -
0.98 0.77 0.88 0.70 0.66 0.46 -
0.87 0.86 0.75 1.00 0.79 0.79 -
0.84 0.94 1.06 0.99 0.84 0.83 -
1.08 0.94 1.14 1.10 1.16 1.18 -
- - 0.90 0.95 1.07 1.02 -
0.67 0.79 1.06 0.87 0.56 0.49 -
1.36 1.07 0.98 1.04 1.42 1.48 -
1.04 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.92 -
1.47 1.07 1.05 1.01 1.65 1.67 -
1.06 1.01 0.97 0.98 1.04 1.03 -
0.98 1.18 1.12 0.74 1.30 0.96 i
1.12 1.22 1.18 0.86 1.61 1.38 -
0.80 0.89 1.00 1.10 0.72 0.79 -
0.78 1.05 0.78 0.73 0.64 0.47 -
1.01 0.83 1.10 1.11 0.93 1.03 T
0.95 0.97 0.98 1.04 0.91 0.95 -
1.20 1.04 0.94 0.95 1.18 1.13 -
0.86 0.89 1.01 1.01 0.77 0.78 -
0.86 1.11 1.01 1.09 0.97 1.06 T
1.08 1.02 1.11 0.92 1.22 1.13 -
0.93 1.02 1.02 0.95 0.97 0.92 -
1.48 1.15 1.04 1.09 1.75 1.92 -
0.99 0.71 1.92 1.09 1.36 1.47 -
0.96 0.97 1.11 1.12 1.03 1.15 -
0.89 1.00 1.04 1.03 0.93 0.96 -
0.90 1.00 0.89 1.04 0.80 0.83 -
1.00 0.94 0.98 1.14 0.92 1.04 t
0.89 1.11 1.33 0.98 1.31 1.28 -
1.01 1.11 0.98 1.04 1.09 1.14 -
0.96 1.06 1.04 0.93 1.07 0.99 1
1.19 1.26 1.07 0.94 1.61 1.51 -
0.95 0.99 1.06 1.35 0.99 1.34 t
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
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Appendix 3-5: Coefficient of variation: sales per employee
The coefficient o f  variation for sales per employee among firms listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange is shown in Figure 3-20. Due to changes in annual reporting requirements, a 
sm aller num ber o f  observations were available for num ber o f  employees per firm in 1998, 
1999 and 2006. N evertheless, the trend indicates diverging perform ance between 2000 and 
2005.
Figure 3-20 Coefficient of variation: total sales and sales per employee, textile and 
clothing firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (1994-2007)
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Table 3-18 Observations of sales and number of employees by year, textile and clothing
firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange
Y ear 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Sales 191 190 191 193 194 193 193 193 192 192 191 181 178 136
Employees - - - - 49 119 148 156 157 153 154 140 60 -
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange
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Appendix 3-6: Coefficient of variation: quota exporters
W hile export data were only available in 2006 for firms incorporated with the Securities and 
Exchange Com mission o f  Pakistan, there was evidence o f  sim ilar trends in diverging 
perform ance am ong less formal firms from quota data. Figure 3-21 outlines the coefficient o f  
variation for the following groups o f  firms
• formal firms exporting in each individual quota year on which data are available and 
in 2006 (2000-2004) (EPBALL724)
• formal firms exporting in the same period (EPB5yr724)
• all formal and less-formal firms exporting in each individual quota year (2000-2004) 
(EPB3610)
• all formal and less formal firms exporting in each o f  the five years (EPB5yr, 1,033 
firm s).
All exhibited increasing variation in the run up to quota abolition in 2004.
Figure 3-21 Coefficient of variation, quota exporters by firm type (2000-2006)
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SOURCE: Trade Developm ent Authority o f  Pakistan, Federal Board o f  Revenue, own analysis
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Appendix 3-7: Coefficient of variation: gross profit
At an aggregate level, firms within the KSE sample have diverged in gross profit a num ber o f  
times over the 17 year period from 1990 to 2007. The coefficient o f  variation for gross profit 
appears to move in line with the divergence in mean export sales, suggesting differences 
between firms are increasing in a similar pattern.
Figure 3-22 Coefficient of variation: gross profit among textile and clothing firms listed 
on the Karachi Stock Exchange (1990-2007)
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Appendix 3-8: Scatterplot of KSE sales data (1990-2007)
The scatterplot o f  KSE-listed firm sales on which the coefficient o f  variation analysis is based 
is illustrated in Figure 3-23. W hen dom inant outlier in the sample — Nishat M ills -  was 
removed, sim ilar results were found, as can be seen in Figure 3-24.
Figure 3-23 Scatterplot of KSE firm sales (1990-2007)
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Figure 3-24 Coefficient of variation: KSE sales without outlier ‘Nishat Mills’
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Appendix 3-9: Exit o f textile and clothing firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange by 
year (1999-2007)
By 2000 -  the first year after the last entrant in the sample of Karachi Stock Exchange-listed 
firms -  22 of the firms that were in the sample between 1994 and 1999 had already exited. 
The number of firm exits between 2000 and 2007 are outlined in Table 3-19.
Table 3-19 Exit and missing data, textile and clothing firms listed on the Karachi Stock
Exchange (1994-2007)
Year Active firms Exits Cumulative
exits
Missing Total
2000 171 - 22 1 194
2001 167 4 26 1 194
2002 165 1 27 2 194
2003 160 4 31 3 194
2004 155 5 36 3 194
2005 146 0 36 12 194
2006 142 0 36 16 194
2007 137 13 49 8 194
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
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Appendix 3-10: Local, export and total sales among firms listed on the Karachi Stock
Exchange (1990-2007)
Figure 3-25 Local, export and total sales by firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange, 
1990-2007 (real Pak Rs, 2000)
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Appendix 3-11: Exit rate benchmarking of quota exporters (TDAP sample)
For firms that were exporters under quota in 2000, failure to maintain 40 per cent of exports 
in the years from 2001 to 2004 is illustrated in Table 3-20. Firm presence in the sample 
declines as time passes. The two-year performance of the full sample of 1,986 firms will be 
the most accurate measure of survival rates when compared with firm survival between 2004 
and 2006 as it includes all firms regardless of quota reliance (e.g. by product). Survival 
appears higher among public firms as they were less reliant on exports. However, the 40 per 
cent benchmark underestimates firm survival given that quota exports represent only a 
fraction of firm exports in any one year and that firms often chose not to export under quota if 
more profitable opportunities could be found in unconstrained markets.
Table 3-20 Benchmark of survival among quota exporters (TDAP sample, 3,610 firms)
Firm type 2000 2000-2001 2000-2002 2000-2003 2000-2004
All
(% still in sample)
1,986 1,314
(66.2%)
1,140
(57.4%)
1,080
(54.4%)
956
(48.1%)
Partnership/Sole 
Proprietorship 
(% still in sample)
1,371 772
(56.3%)
637
(46.5%)
586
(42.7%)
509
(37.1%)
Private
(% still in sample)
539 479
(88.9%)
439
(68.9%)
430
(79.8%)
387
(72.0%)
Public
(% still in sample)
76 63
(82.9%)
64
(84.2%)
62
(81.6%)
60
(78.9%)
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, own analysis
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Appendix 3-12: Sample size for analysis of maintain rates by age and size
Tables 3-21 to 3-22 illustrate how sample sizes become smaller as firm size and age increases
-  this reduces the accuracy of survive and maintain rates in the analysis.
Table 3-21 Observations for ‘maintain’ by firm size
Firm size (real USD, 
million, mean 2000-4)
Maintain
Yes
Maintain
No
Total
observations
Maintain
rate
0-0.5m 124 53 176 69.9
0.5-1m 48 52 100 48.0
l-2m 51 26 77 66.2
2-3 m 40 13 53 75.5
3-4m 19 7 26 73.1
4-5 m 9 6 15 60.0
5-10m 33 8 41 80.5
10m+ 32 8 40 80.0
Total 355 173 528 67.2
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange 
Commission o f  Pakistan, Trade Associations
Table 3-22 Observations for ‘maintain’ by firm age
Firm age (years) Maintain
Yes
Maintain
No
Total
observations
Maintain
rate
0-10 45 27 72 62.5
11-20 196 95 291 67.4
21-30 61 33 94 64.9
31-40 33 9 42 78.6
41+ 20 9 29 69.0
Total 355 173 528 67.2
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange 
Commission o f  Pakistan, Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturing Association
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Chapter 4 Founder experience, entry strategy and firm 
performance during trade liberalisation
The textile and clothing industry of Pakistan exhibits much heterogeneity by firm size, age, 
location, type and product and performance. Most importantly, firms also differ by pre­
founder experience. In this chapter I introduce the origins of firms operating in this industry 
in Pakistan and classify their backgrounds as ‘Experienced’, ‘Textile-related’, ‘Other 
manufacturing’ or ‘Inexperienced’. I then assess whether this pre-founder experience is 
statistically associated with firm performance following the abolition of export quotas. 
Performance is measured both by firm size and the firm’s ability to maintain its level of 
exports in the post-quota period, while controlling for other firm characteristics. Finally, I 
examine how founder experience shapes the firm’s entry strategy. In particular, I identify 
how prior knowledge shapes product choice as well as marketing strategy.
I find that pre-founder experience is associated with firm performance among quota exporters 
and firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange, even when controlling for firm age. 
Experienced firms and those from Textile-related backgrounds are larger than Inexperienced 
firms and they show greater ability to survive and maintain exports during trade 
liberalisation. Through the use of case studies, I show that PFE shapes the firm’s initial entry 
strategy. Experience typically allows firms to identify product niches or marketing 
opportunities, for example, which are hidden from less experienced firms. In contrast, I find a 
more ambiguous relationship between founder experience and performance among firms 
from Other manufacturing backgrounds. While the entry strategies of such firms tend to 
exhibit a more commercial edge than Inexperienced firms, they often struggle with the 
industry-specific knowledge required for entry.
This sets the context for the analysis in Chapter 5 of how pre-entry experience shapes 
production capabilities and organisational structure in the new firm, as well as its initial size 
and subsequent growth trajectory.
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4.1 Firm origins and pre-founder experience
Firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) include some of the earliest entrants to the 
textile and clothing industry in Pakistan. Indeed, some firms listed on the KSE in 2007 were 
incorporated as early as the 1940s. Interviews with firms listed on the KSE and a survey of 
trade associations revealed the backgrounds of 140 of the 194 firms still in operation between 
1994 and 2007 (see Appendix 4-1 for a full list of firm origins).
Firm formation in the six decades since Pakistan’s formation in 1947 was often shaped by the 
economic and political conditions of the time. In the 1950s, for example, new firms listed on 
the KSE came from origins such as the leather industry in India, the trading of goods and 
clothing through the port at Karachi, as well as backgrounds in retail or production of 
consumer goods in pre-Partition India. As Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry evolved in 
the 1960s, listings were also driven by founders involved in cotton and yam trading, as well 
as industrial sectors such as sugar, steel and shoes. However, it was at this time that 
inexperienced founders also gained access to the sector as a result of the politicised nature of 
licence allocation: entrants in this period also included several politicians and a member of 
the Pakistani army. In line with Pakistan’s endowments of cotton and its economic policies, 
most firms entered either yam or cloth production in contrast with mills in East Asia which 
began producing garments at this time. From the 1960s onwards established firms begin 
adding new units to the business group, while in the late 1960s and early 1970s several 
founders with previous businesses in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) listed new mills on the 
KSE sample following the breakup of the country.
New firm listings in the 1970s and 1980s were dominated by the formation of new units by 
existing textile firms. However, some new entrants came from backgrounds in shipping, 
transportation, tobacco, car dealing and chartered accountancy as well as more common 
origins in leather, textile trading and consumer goods. New firm formation by politicians also 
continued to be evident throughout the 1980s. The deregulation of the industry at the end of 
the decade led to a spurt in new firm listings between 1987 and 1991 (as previously shown in 
Figure 2-3).
Several new entrants revealed in interviews that at the time of deregulation they took the 
opportunity to enter the sector as it was previously hard to access due to the licence system.
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Origins of these firms include cosmetics, construction, agriculture, medicine, accountancy, 
cement and garments. Incumbents also took the opportunity to add new mills at this time. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that new mills were created from the desire to set up a 
greenfield project from scratch (with new machinery and staff), as the consequence of tax 
breaks or loans for new units, and because extensive family structures in Pakistan that have 
encouraged family spinoffs. Many of these later entrants moved into the manufacture of 
products in the home textile and garment sector, although 75 firms out of the total have 
remained in the spinning sector since inception. There are few entrants in the post-2000 
period in this sample because the rate of new stock exchange listings has been poor.
The KSE sample is also dominated by the large family business groups that have had a high- 
profile presence in the industry over several decades. The Sapphire and Gulistan Groups (part 
of the same family), for example, have seven listed mills between them: Gulistan Textile 
Mills (listed in 1968), Sapphire Textile Mills (listed in 1971), Gulshan Spinning Mills (listed 
in 1989), Sapphire Fibres (listed in 1990), Paramount Spinning Mills (listed in 1991), 
Reliance Cotton Spinning Mills and Gulistan Spinning Mills (listed in 1994). The Karachi- 
based Dewan Mushtaq Group has four textile units on the exchange: Dewan Mushtaq Textile 
Mills (listed 1971), Dewan Textile Mills (listed 1971), Dewan Khalid Textile Mills (listed 
1979), and Dewan Farooque Spinning Mills (listed 2005). Other groups include the Punjab- 
based Sargodha Group, the Nagina Group (3 mills), the Tata Group (3 mills), as well as 
others such as Kohinoor Maple Leaf Group and the Ayesha Group of Companies that have 
two units listed.
The backgrounds of unlisted public firms incorporated with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan were provided by trade associations and showed some differences 
from the listed public firms (see Appendix 4-2). In this sample, a total of 57 backgrounds 
were found from a list of 87 unlisted public firms whose entry dates range from 1975 to 2002. 
Early entrants tended to mirror the origins of KSE firms and included textile traders, 
politicians, sugar producers, and established textile groups. However, from the 1990s 
onwards the sample includes a greater variety of backgrounds such as financial specialists, 
mattress makers, overseas investors, the civil service and firms engaged in food processing, 
oil, glass and agriculture. A possible explanation for this variety is that the reporting and 
capital requirements for unlisted public firms were less demanding than for listed companies.
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Privately-held firms exhibit more diverse backgrounds than those described above. The 
origins of 75 firms producing knitted garments, whose dates of entry range from 1964 to 
2005, were located with the help of trade associations (see Appendix 4-3).1 In contrast to the 
dominance of the large business groups in yam and cloth among public firms, many lower- 
profile entrants were building the garment industry from the 1960s onwards. In the 1960s and 
1970s, for example, new entrants came from backgrounds as buying agents, knitwear 
importers, general trading, glove manufacturing and financial services. In the 1970s and 
1980s, backgrounds including sweet making, the civil service, employment in textile 
manufacturing units, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, engineering and traditional sectors such as 
yam and cloth trading were represented. From the 1990s onward this diversity continued, 
adding firms from football manufacturing, marketing, paper manufacturing and carpets. This 
diversity is perhaps as a result of transferable skills as well as the lower capital requirements 
and the lower barriers to entry typically associated with the garment industry, in contrast with 
the capital-intensive textile sector (see Table 4-1). Anecdotal evidence from trade 
associations also suggests that many entrants were ‘inspired’ by the rapid growth of the 
knitwear sector, particularly among relatives.
Table 4-1 Paid-up capital among new entrants by product, three selected years (nominal 
Pak Rs million)
Year 2000 2004 2005
Spinning 77.9 11.3 9.6
Weaving 4.1 15.9 0.2
Composite 11.4 16.5 5.3
Garments 5.8 11.9 0.5
Textile - Allied 35.0 12.5 3.5
NOTE: Three years were selected at random to illustrate capital requirements in the post-2000 period. In 2000, 
N=58, in 2004, N=80, in 2005, N=234.
SOURCE: Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, own analysis
Similarly, the origins of firms that entered the home textile, woven garment and towel 
segments are more varied than those of the KSE and SECP sample (see Appendix 4-4).2 A 
total of 80 backgrounds were found with the help of trade associations and founding dates 
ranged from 1965 to 2005. Again, these firms emerged behind the scenes in the 1960s and 
1970s following experience in army uniform manufacture, textile processing (dyeing,
1 The firms mentioned here in knitwear, home textiles and woven garments are all privately-held and were all 
taken from the list o f  724 incorporated companies exporting under quota (TDAP sample).
2 Unfortunately, the backgrounds o f woven garment groups are underrepresented in this analysis due to the 
decision o f the relevant trade associations not to be interviewed for the research. The reasons for this refusal 
were outlined in Chapter 1.
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printing) and commercial importing. From the 1980s onwards, new entrants also came from 
sports goods manufacturing, gloves, engineering, jewellery and from employment in textile 
mills. There is a greater presence of established textile businesses in this sample perhaps as a 
result o f the greater capital expenditure required to set up a home textile unit (which typically 
involves integrated fabric production).
These firms can be classified into one of four categories of founder background: 
‘Experienced’, ‘Textile-related’, ‘Other manufacturing’ and ‘Inexperienced’. These
classifications are designed to capture the prior degree of industry experience and are defined
•>
in Table 4-2 within the Pakistani context. Experienced firms are those founded by 
individuals who have previous experience of managing a mill within the textile and clothing 
sector. Those from ‘Textile-related’ backgrounds are those with industry experience in 
textile trading, former employees of textile mills, or family spinoffs where the new Director 
has industry exposure but no direct experience of mill management or production. ‘Other 
manufacturing’ covers firm backgrounds in other industrial sectors such as leather or sports 
goods, while ‘Inexperienced’ includes those with no direct experience of manufacturing 
(although some entrants may have other business experience in finance or marketing, for 
example).
Table 4-2 Classification of founder experience by background
Founder background Classification
1. Experienced Established textile spinning, weaving, home textile or garment firms.
2. Textile-related Cotton ginners, textile traders, tent manufacturers, spinoffs, family spinoffs. 
Includes established textile firms setting up units for relatives, where 
educated founders often received exposure and advice from experienced 
family members but who did not have direct experience of running own 
unit. Also includes firms created by textile engineers or other professionals 
with no experience of creating and running their own unit.
3. Other 
manufacturing
Leather, vegetable oil, sports goods, consumer goods manufacturing.
4. Inexperienced Retail, construction, service industries, finance, politics, agriculture, 
shipping, law. Other business backgrounds which lack manufacturing 
experience. Some founder bring transferrable skills like management 
practices, knowledge of marketing, transportation and logistics.
3 In some cases the firm was founded by an individual with industry-related experience while the current 
management o f the unit was undertaken by the son or nephew with different education and experience. 
However, both shaped management practices. Often the founder would choose the product and machinery, but 
the younger, current management was responsible for productivity, quality and marketing. In other instances 
firms were also often created by multiple founders with different backgrounds, such as one firm founded by two 
individuals with backgrounds in marketing and production. In these cases PFE categorisation was allocated 
according to the dominant experience within the particular case.
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Across these four groups of firms outlined above, the most numerous firms are from 
‘Experienced’ backgrounds and account for 35 per cent of all firms in the samples (see Table
4-3). This is partly accounted for by the ease of locating the backgrounds of experienced 
firms (they are more likely to have other firms reported in their names, for example) and 
because of survivor bias given that more experienced firms may have had a greater 
probability of survival.4 Indeed, as the entry date increases, there are a greater number of less 
experienced firms in the sample (see Appendix 4-5). The second most important category of 
firm background was Textile-related, representing approximately 29 per cent of all firms on 
average. Again, this may be a function of survivor bias as well as experience. The third 
largest group was Inexperienced, accounting for approximately 23 per cent of firms. Finally, 
13 per cent of firms originate from ‘Other manufacturing’ sectors.
Table 4-3 Firm background by founder experience (per cent of total in brackets)
Type of background All
(KSE plus TDAP)
KSE Other
Total % Total % Total %
Experienced 124 35.2 60 42.6 64 30.2
Textile-related 103 29.3 35 24.8 69 32.5
Other manufacturing 46 13.1 18 12.8 29 13.7
Inexperienced 78 22.6 28 19.9 50 23.6
TOTAL 353 141 212
NOTE: Other includes backgrounds o f unlisted public firms as well as quota exporters.
SOURCE: Firm survey, list o f firms provided by Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Karachi Stock 
Exchange, Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, own analysis
Among quota exporters -  which form the basis for the analysis of firm survival during trade 
liberalisation -  similar patterns are observed: 37.3 per cent of firms were experienced, 31.5 
per cent were from textile-related backgrounds, 12.9 per cent were from other manufacturing 
backgrounds, and 18.3 per cent were inexperienced (see Appendix 4-6). Firms from all 
backgrounds are spread across product categories (see Table 4-4). However, firms from both 
Inexperienced and Other manufacturing origins have tended to enter the yam and garment 
segments, while Experienced firms and those from Textile-related sectors are more evenly 
spread across products and are over-represented in cloth and home textile production.
4 Note: I have not been able to trace the origins o f  all firms in the industry in Pakistan since inception due to a 
lack of data. The KSE sample is the only one in which I can analyse the role o f PFE in shaping initial firm size 
and performance.
154
Table 4-4 Analysis of founder experience by product (2004)
Type of background Yarn Cloth (incl. 
Yarn & cloth)
Home
textiles
Garments Exits by 2004
Experienced 23 32 12 30 7
Textile-related 27 23 18 30 4
Other manufacturing 15 6 5 17 3
Inexperienced 24 8 3 40 3
Total 89 69 38 117 17
NOTE: N=353
SOURCE: Firm survey, list o f firms provided by Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Karachi Stock 
Exchange, Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, own analysis
4.2 Founder experience and firm performance
The theory outlined in Chapter 1 predicts that pre-founder experience will be a positive and 
significant determinant of firm performance. Using the data on the backgrounds of 241 quota 
exporters I now test whether there is a statistical association between pre-founder experience 
and firm performance, while controlling for firm age. PFE will be analysed as a determinant 
of survival during the trade reform conditional on having survived so far (a probability 
heightened by protection under the MFA, for example). I also examine the performance of 
firms in the KSE sample in more detail using measures such as size, sales growth, exports 
and gross profit.
The first analysis shows that quota exporters from each of the four backgrounds were no 
different in size between 2000 and 2004 (see Table 4-5). While founders from Other 
Manufacturing sectors were larger on average than other firms — with mean annual quota 
exports of $6.2 million (real USD, 2000) -  when controlling for age none of the firms 
differed in size (see Model 1 in Table 4-5).5 Age itself was a significant determinant of size — 
for each year in existence average firm size increased by $97,961 (p=0.023) -  highlighting 
the presence of some of the older business groups from other manufacturing backgrounds and 
the allocation of quotas historically by firm age. This analysis suggests that there was no 
relationship between PFE and export performance under the quota system.
5 All measures in this chapter are presented in real terms, in this case real USD with the year 2000 as the 
baseline deflator used, Source: IMF.
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Table 4-5 Size of quota exporters by founder experience (in 2004 and 2006)
Type of 
background
Mean exports 2000-2004 
(real USD million, 2000)
Model 1 Mean exports 2006 
(real USD million, 2000)
Model 2
Constant - 1.4
(1.15)
- -6.0
(-1.59)
Age - 0.1*
(2.29)
- 0.5
(3.89)
Experienced 3.8 0.5
(0.41)
17.2 12.0*
(3.50)
Textile-related 3.8 0.4
(0.35)
12.2 8.1*
(2.15)
Other
manufacturing
6.2 2.6
(1.76)
18.6 13.2*
(2.77)
Inexperienced 3.2 - 3.1 -
NOTE: In 2004, N=241. In 2006, N=202. This means there were no data in 2006 for 39 o f the original firms. 
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange 
Commission o f  Pakistan, Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association, t-statistics in brackets, *significant at 5 
per cent level
However, this pattern changes after the abolition of the quota system. By 2006, the revealed 
performance of firms with some type of prior industry experience (Experienced, Textile- 
related and Other manufacturing) is on average significantly different from Inexperienced, 
offering an advantage of $12.0, $8.1 and $13.2 million from inexperienced firms respectively 
when controlling for age (see Model 2 in Table 4-5). While experience in the textile sector or 
another manufacturing industry was not associated with quota access or export size in the 
protected market, it was a determinant of performance in the open textile market.6 Age 
remains a significant determinant of performance, with each year of experience leading to 
increased export size of $510,000 (p<0.001).
Firms with greater experience also have a higher chance of survival and of maintaining their 
export sales during trade reform (see Table 4-6). Firms created by founders from Experienced 
and Textile-related origins have the highest rates of survival (at 91.9 per cent and 88.9 per 
cent respectively for the SurviveTA indicator) and ability to maintain sales (83.1 per cent and 
82.3 per cent respectively). Survival rates are approximately 10-15 points higher for 
Experienced and Textile-related firms than those from other backgrounds, and 20 points 
higher for ‘maintain’, suggesting that experience translates into better performance. However, 
even ‘maintain’ rates of 62 per cent bode well for new entrants with little experience -  they 
show a positive likelihood of survival.
6 Additional analysis showed that none o f  the experienced categories in this sample were significantly different 
from one other.
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Table 4-6 Performance o f quota exporters by founder background (Survive/Maintain)
Type of background SurviveFBR SurviveTA MaintainFBR
Experienced 92.8 91.9 83.1
Textile-related 91.9 88.9 82.3
Other manufacturing 88.9 77.4 63.0
Inexperienced 89.2 72.7 62.2
NOTE: SurviveFBR N=210, SurviveTA N=234, MaintainFBR N=210. Survival data in 2006 were not available 
for all 241 firms on which PFE data was available. For the 210 firms in MaintainFBR, 83 were experienced, 62 
were from textile-related backgrounds, 27 were from other manufacturing sectors, and 37 were inexperienced.
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Federal Board o f Revenue, trade associations, own 
analysis
The performance of Experienced firms and those with Textile-related PFE are statistically 
different from that of Inexperienced firms in the SurviveTA and Maintain measures when 
controlling for age (see Table 4-7).7 On average, the odds that an Experienced firm will 
maintain sales is 3.1 times that of an Inexperienced unit (p=0.01) when controlling for age, 
and firms with Textile-related experience are 2.9 times more likely to maintain sales 
(p=0.023).8 However, Other manufacturing experience leads to no advantage over 
inexperienced units (p=0.974). This analysis thus suggests that Experienced and Textile- 
related founders have a clear advantage over firms who lack prior exposure to the textile 
sector. Age is only significant for the SurviveTA measure suggesting it plays a smaller role in 
this measure of performance, where every year of experience the odds of surviving increase 
by 6.3 per cent (p=0.022).
Table 4-7 Logistic regression coefficients for survive and maintain, quota exporters
Type of background SurviveFBR SurviveTA MaintainFBR
Constant 2.10 -0.16 0.04
(2.68) (0.78) (0.08)
Age 0.02 0.06* 0.02
(0.69) (2.29) (1.15)
Experienced 0.07 1.47* 1.14*
(0.09) (2.84) (2.58)
Textile-related -0.06 1.16* 1.07*
(0.763) (2.28) (2.28)
Other manufacturing -0.45 0.17 0.02
(-0.520) (0.3) (0.03)
Inexperienced - - -
NOTE: SurviveFBR N=210, SurviveTA N -234, MaintainFBR N=210, t-statistics in brackets, *significant at 5 
per cent level
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Federal Board o f Revenue, Karachi Stock Exchange, 
Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association, own analysis
7 Experience is likely not to be significant for the ‘SurviveFBR’ measure because it includes so few exits.
8 This coefficient is raised to the exponential to find the odds ratio, for example exp (1.144) = 3.14.
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Controlling for other firm characteristics such as size and firm type, the relationship between 
PFE and firm performance continues to hold (see Table 4-8). Size (in 2000) was not a 
significant determinant of performance (p=0.07), suggesting other factors (than previous 
quota holding, for example) were responsible for post-quota performance. Firm type (public 
or private) also makes no difference to survival prospects (p=0.917) and PFE remains 
significant for ‘Experienced’ and ‘Textile-related’ firm backgrounds.9
Table 4-8 Logistic regression coefficients for maintain with controls, quota exporters
Type of background MaintainFBR MaintainFBR MaintainFBR
Constant 0.04 -0.18 -0.19
(0.08) (-0.35) (-0.36)
Age 0.02 0.02 0.02
(1.15) (0.93) (0.92)
Size in 2000 (real USD - 0.08 0.08
million, 2000) (1.83) (1.81)
Mean size (2000-2004) - 0.07* 0.08*
(USD million, 2000) (2.00) (2.00)
Formality (Public - - 0.07
versus private) (0.10)
Experienced textile 1.14* 0.95* 0.95*
(2.58) (2.04) (2.04)
Textile-related 1.07* 1.07* 1.07*
(2.28) (2.14) (2.15)
Other manufacturing 0.02 -0.43 -0.42
(0.03) (-0.74) (-0.74)
Inexperienced - -
NOTE: N=210, t-statistics in brackets, *significant at 5 per cent level
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Federal Board o f Revenue, Karachi Stock Exchange, 
Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, Pakistan Hosiery Manufacturers Association, own analysis
Data from the KSE sample also show that PFE has a positive and significant impact on firm 
performance during trade liberalisation. A comparison of the mean size of firms by PFE in 
2007, for example, shows that when controlling for age only firms created by founders from 
Experienced or Textile-related backgrounds are significantly different from the Inexperienced 
firms at the 5 per cent level (see Table 4-9). This suggests, as before, that greater firm 
experience does offer an advantage in terms of firm size. When age is included in the model 
it is positive and significant with each year bringing Rs25m greater sales on average 
(p=0.013). This suggests that PFE is interacting with firm experience to deliver a 
performance advantage in these firms (an interaction which will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 5). Other manufacturing PFE is significant at the 10 per cent level (p=0.059),
9 There is not enough variation in the data to control for product category — when dividing the sample into 
textile and garment products, four o f the eight observations o f  PFE are very small (4, 13,22 and 22 firms).
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implying that the impact of this type of experience on firm performance is more ambiguous. 
When the 49 observations from of unlisted public firms the SECP sample (covering 
performance from 1999-2006) were included, similar results were obtained.
Table 4-9 Size of firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange by founder background
Type of background Mean sales 2007 
(real Rs million, 2000)
Model 1 Model 2
Constant - 446 -253
(1.40) (-0.61)
Age - - 25*
(2.52)
Experienced 1,470 1,030* 1,060*
(2.78) (2.94)
Textile-related 1,550 1,110* 1,030*
(2.69) (2.57)
Other manufacturing 1,360 915 866
(1.97) (1.91)
Inexperienced 446 - -
NOTE: N =112, t-statistics in brackets, ^significant at 5 per cent level 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
These findings are also valid for new entrants and can be illustrated visually (see Figure 4-1). 
Using a sample of 91 new entrants listed on the KSE between 1987 and 1999, PFE was 
identified among 71 firms (see Appendix 4-7). When controlling for age, Experienced firms 
outperform all others from the outset (see Appendix 4-8 for details of size by background). 
Experienced firms are initially larger and the relationship persists to the ages of 5, 10 and 15 
(see Appendix 4-9). However, in this sample entrants from Textile-related and Other 
manufacturing backgrounds perform no differently on average from Inexperienced firms, 
(although this could be the result of the small sample size). Variation within these categories 
will be explored further in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Figure 4-1 Sales of post-1987 entrants on Karachi Stock Exchange by founder 
background, controlling for age
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, firm survey, own analysis
I conducted the same analysis using gross profit as a perform ance measure. I found that in 
2007, only gross profit in Experienced units was significantly different from less experience 
firm s with a mean level o f  10.5 per cent versus 8 percent for Textile-related and O ther 
m anufacturing firms and -4.4 per cent for Inexperienced firms. Age is not significant in any 
o f  the regressions, which contradicts earlier results. However this could be explained by the 
presence in this particular sample o f some younger spinoffs entrants with higher profitability 
(in segments such as jeans) than older firms in large but less profitable segm ents (such as 
yarn and unfinished, greige cloth).
In summary, analysis o f  performance among quota exporters and publicly-held firms 
following the ending o f  the MFA showed that industry-related experience was associated 
w ith firm size and survival when controlling for age. Inexperienced firms performed the most 
poorly and had the lowest size and rates o f  survival following trade reform. However, 
analysis o f  survival am ong founders with O ther M anufacturing experience shows that this 
background has a more ambiguous link with firm performance than the other categories o f  
founder experience.
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4.3 Founder experience and entry strategy
As outlined in Chapter 1, theory predicts that pre-founder experience will shape the decision 
of founders to enter certain industries in order to exploit existing capabilities as well as the 
shape long-run firm performance. Drawing on interviews with 48 firms, here I examine the 
entry strategy and product choice of each firm classified by background as Inexperienced, 
Other manufacturing, Textile-related and Experienced (see Table 4-10). For the purposes of 
reference throughout the thesis, I have included a list of the backgrounds by firms in 
Appendix 4-10, their current products, and their total sales growth between 2004 and 2007 
where available.
Table 4-10 Founder backgrounds of interviewed firms
Type of background No. of firms Examples
Experienced 16 Spinning, weaving, processing.
Textile-related 14 Cotton growing, ginning, yam and cloth trading, former 
employee of textile unit, textile engineer.
Other manufacturing 11 Consumer goods, paper manufacturing, tin manufacturing, 
transportation/logistics, leather, footwear, plastics, 
engineering, tents.
Inexperienced 7 Politics, shipping, car dealing, travel business, 
construction.
TOTAL 48
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, firm survey, own analysis
Inexperienced firms
Most inexperienced firms lack direct production experience in the textile industry, contacts 
with buyers and other industry-related knowledge. As a result, inexperienced firms tend to 
enter the sector with a lack of awareness of product or marketing opportunities, or a focused 
entry strategy. Several themes ran through their decision to enter textiles and clothing 
production and the initial product choice. These included the perceived opportunities in the 
textile industry of Pakistan due to the country’s vast cotton production, the licensing system, 
or the high profile of the industry more generally in the Pakistani economy.
The founder of Firm 19 -  set up in the late 1950s -  for example, was the first family member 
to enter the business sector and had previously been engaged in wholesale trading. Because 
there was very little manufacturing capacity in Pakistan after Partition he saw the opportunity 
to enter the textile sector. His application for a licence in 1952 was turned down due to the 
restrictions on foreign exchange, but in 1963 the founder -  along with three friends —
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obtained a licence to set up a spinning unit. The mill was created in 1963 and the firm 
continues to operate in 2007 with two spinning mills. Similarly, Firm 30 is a spinning unit 
located in Punjab. Originally from East Punjab, the founder was not from a business family, 
but in the 1950s had “the idea” to enter the private sector and founded the unit after a period 
in government service. Originally he set up a processing unit in 1950s in partnership with two 
brothers and a friend who was already in the handloom business. They used their own money 
to start up and managed to obtain a permit “probably because the first priority [of the 
government] was for finished goods which generate more profit”. Later he set up a spinning 
unit in the 1960s, and the current mill is a new unit established in the 1980s following a 
family separation. Likewise, the founder of Firm 9 was originally a clothing trader who used 
to import second sweaters and coats from the US and Europe and other consumer goods. It 
was his sons who had “more ideas” and when the founder died in 1968 they entered textiles 
because for one son it was “his dream to work in a textile mill”. The sons applied for -  and 
obtained -  the sanction for the textile mill through contacts in 1969.
Several inexperienced firms perceived textile manufacturing -  in particular spinning -  as 
“easy” to run and highly profitable. This included politicians who entered with little 
experience as well as founders with experience in business sectors unrelated to 
manufacturing. Firm 29, for example, is a spinning mill set up by a founder who completed 
his education in the 1960s and started out with a small business selling spare parts for 
vehicles. He later moved on to form a motor car dealership in 1982, followed by a decision to 
enter the textile industry in 1988. The founder took the latter decision because 4tthere was a 
profit boom at the time” and a friend who is also in the auto industry “suggested textiles”. At 
the time, there was also a cotton subsidy meaning that it was a “good business” to get into. 
They selected spinning rather than any other textile product because it was the “easiest to 
run”, and “if you have the raw materials you will never go bust”. Similarly, Firm 4 is a 
spinning unit located in Punjab founded in 1989 by two brothers -  a doctor and a politician. 
The motivation given for entering the sector was that the founders “had heart that the textile 
industry was good in Pakistan so wanted to get into it”. However, with little experience the 
firm first went out of business at the end of the 1990s, and again in 2005.
A third theme among inexperienced entrants was the desire to diversify into manufacturing 
from another business segment. The family of the founder of Firm 8, for example, was 
originally in the construction industry in a joint venture with a friend. The construction
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business was first set up by an engineer who worked for the government and then left to set 
up his own firm. The motivation for entering textiles was that the family wanted to diversify 
and it was “a normal business to be in” because of the availability of raw material. Further, at 
the time the rupee was slowly devaluing, and in relation to exports they “couldn’t go wrong”. 
The son studied commerce and entered the construction sector soon after, but as the only son 
he was selected to manage the new textile venture. The founder choose to go into weaving 
because there was a lot of spinning mills at the time and having talked to a number o f friends 
he decided that the spinning sector was saturated. Further, weaving had just started in 
Pakistan -  it was not known as a centre for the product, hence they saw a lot of opportunities. 
The firm was created as a standalone weaving unit in 1989.
However, in general many entrants from inexperienced backgrounds demonstrated a lack of 
detailed knowledge of the market in their decision to enter. Market research was rarely 
conducted and firms made large investment decisions on the basis of the advice of friends or 
through assumptions about the industry.
O ther m anufacturing
In line with many inexperienced firms, founders with experience in other manufacturing 
sectors chose to create textile units following Partition. However, in contrast with 
inexperienced firms, founders from other manufacturing backgrounds often brought an entry 
strategy which had a more commercial edge.
One example is the foundation of Kohinoor Industries in 1949, one of the first textile mills 
created after Partition. It was founded by the father of Mr Tariq Saigol, the current Chairman 
of Kohinoor Group, in Faisalabad in 1949. The founder ‘had made his fortune’ in the shoe 
and footwear industry in Calcutta, similar to many Muslims. He retained a rubber shoe 
making factory in Calcutta until 1958, but “could not stay if India was partitioned”. Given 
that there were few textile mills in West Pakistan, following migration to Pakistan the 
founder ‘saw the need’ given the large production of cotton but small processing industry. 
Similarly, Firm 22 was founded by a family originally involved in the leather tanning 
industry in both India and Pakistan. In the 1970s the family “looked at the mill owners such 
as Sapphire” and developed a “vision for the family” to enter the textile sector. It was in the
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late 1970s that they acquired a ‘sick unit’ from a larger business group.10 Likewise, the 
founder of Firm 17, part of a group involved in spinning, weaving and manufacture of made- 
ups, also arrived from India after Partition with previous experience in the leather industry. 
Its first venture was established in Faisalabad in textile manufacturing and the firm went on 
to be involved in the trading of all cotton-related products.
In more recent decades entry decisions were more often made in direct response to market 
opportunities and market research. In particular, experience in other manufacturing sectors 
often shaped the product chosen and early decisions regarding machinery and location. 
Founders also often discovered market opportunities through exposure in a manufacturing 
role.
Firm 2, for example, is a weaving unit established by a firm with a background in consumer 
goods and the trading of vehicles such as tractors and cars. The family decided to enter 
weaving in the 1990s because “textiles is the main industry in Pakistan”, although they 
admitted that they entered “a bit late” as their other businesses were doing well in the 1980s. 
However, the firm showed a very strategic approach to product choice and entry to the sector. 
They recognised that the weaving sector in Pakistan was not producing good quality fabrics 
and thus the founders decided to produce “difficult quality” fabric from the beginning, 
choosing the niche product after examining its market potential. They also hired a consultant 
to create a feasibility plan and advise on machinery. The company was export-oriented from 
the beginning, targeting specialised markets for 120 count yam and high count bed linen 
(such as the US market). However, the firm’s background did result in some constraints: the 
focus remained on local customers because Pakistan was not well-known for weaving 
products at the time and quotas were held by existing exporters and had to be purchased.
Likewise, Firm 38 is a producer of knitted garments such as shirts, coats, trousers and jerseys 
and was set up in 1987 by a founder who had worked in the civil service for a number of 
years and whose education included a bachelors and masters in economics. He left the civil 
service to join the management of a business group which was involved in tin can production 
and spinning, and following executive education in 1978 decided to leave in 1988 to set up 
“something of his own” in knitted garments. He stated that at that time in Pakistan “people
10 A ‘sick unit’ is a term used in South Asia to refer to a business that has not been performing well.
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were not familiar with knitwear”, with only 5 or 6 units in Karachi and 2 or 3 in Lahore. 
Although there was no market in Pakistan for the product he realised that “if you can 
manufacture the product, you can export”. The founder obtained a loan for RslOm to 
establish 18,000 square foot unit with 36 staff producing knitted t-shirts and later expanded in 
both production and number of employees.
Similar to firms in non-manufacturing business sectors, founders also entered textiles and 
clothing from other manufacturing origins as a strategy to diversify. Firm 25, for example, is 
a spinner located in Punjab. The Director responsible for the day-to-day running of the firm 
was studying commerce when the board of his existing family leather business decided to set 
up the mill in the late 1980s (although he admits that members of the family were split on the 
attractiveness of the industry for entry). The firm established a unit in 1991 for which they 
hired a machinery and financial consultant to advise them on purchase of machinery and the 
public listing -  a more strategic approach to industry entry than many inexperienced 
founders. Instead of producing only simple yam, his philosophy is that “to make money you 
have to produce something new”. As a result he studied all the new fibres that were coming 
into the market and, when a friend (who worked in a knitting factory) showed him how yam 
could be dyed, he decided to enter this segment of the market. This commercial strategy and 
new product choice stood in contrast to those of less experienced entrants.
However, direct manufacturing experience did not always result in informed decisions to 
enter the sector. Firms often had only basic knowledge of the textile industry itself and were 
hit with sudden shocks when the operating environment changed suddenly. Firm 21, for 
example, is a spinning unit created in 1991 by a firm involved in plastic manufacturing and 
the leather business. The group chose to enter the yam segment because they perceived 
spinning as an “easy business” with the low cotton price. They also entered the segment 
because it was possible to buy cotton for the whole year and a professional arrangement can 
run the operation, in contrast to leather where “you have to work each day” and the industry 
is not professionally run. Because it was a business group finance was “not a problem” and 
the bank sanctioned a loan to set up two textiles mills. Before setting up the unit they also 
hired a consultant who advised on the cost of machinery and for recruitment of staff they 
aimed to “bring one man and his team”. However, there was sudden increase in the cotton 
price and the firm was losing profit -  so they decided not to set up the second mill.
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Similarly, Firm 24 is a spinning and weaving unit set up at the beginning of the 1990s by a 
founder involved in the shipping business in Abu Dhabi. His rational for entering the industry 
was that he “always wanted to do something in Pakistan” so established three textile units 
simultaneously close to Lahore. However, the current Director -  a textile engineer -  now 
admits that the decision to set up three units within the first 18 months was a mistake. The 
industry was about to enter into the cotton crisis in 1992 (when the cotton price rose from 
Rsl,100 per maud to Rs2,600), leading to the exit of many firms.11 For this company itself, 
the first ten years of operation were described as “stagnant”.
Overall firms with experience in other manufacturing sectors often showed a more 
sophisticated approach to market entry and product choice compared to inexperienced firms. 
However, the protected status of the industry, family management and only limited industry 
knowledge were continuing factors shaping entry decisions.
Textile-related
Because of the exposure to the textile manufacturing industry gained through participation in 
related sectors such as textile trading and ginning, many founders from this background had 
existing contacts which facilitated their entry into the sector. Firms also often exhibited 
greater awareness of production techniques, marketing opportunities and potential firm 
profitability than interviewees in less experienced groups. This prior exposure often revealed 
opportunities to develop new products or target new markets.
In one unique case, it was experience in a sector related to textile manufacturing just before 
Partition that resulted in the creation of Firm 7 in the 1950s. In this case, the grandfather of 
the current Director was the manager in a Hindu ginning factory in the 1930s. After Partition, 
when many Hindu families left Pakistan, the assets were given to him to manage. In the 
1950s, the grandfather set up a spinning unit with two other families. The business then 
moved into weaving and then dyeing with units still remaining to the present day.
n This interviewee explained the sudden cotton price rise as a result o f increased information available to 
fanners. Where previously (in the 1980s) farmers had accepted a local price offered to them for cotton, they 
became aware o f prices on the New York Cotton Exchange in the early 1990s which prompted them to raise 
prices for their produce.
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Among textile traders it was often relationships with yam importers (in Japan in particular) 
that often led to firm entry into spinning.12 Firm 46 is a home textile producer that grew out 
of a weaving unit. The family business was originally involved in cotton trading after 
migrating from India during Partition. Between 1949 and 1950 the firm was “talking to 
Japanese companies they were buying from” and decided to put up a spinning mill as a result 
of this interaction. They sold their assets to finance the unit and the family later went on to 
expand production and send family members for textile education. These relationships with 
yam buyers continued into the 1980s. Firm 18 was created in 1989 following a split from a 
prior venture with another family with a unit of 12,000 spindles and credit provided by a 
Japanese equipment supplier. However, when the unit was formed the Director realised that 
with only 12,000 spindles they would no longer be able to compete in the international 
market. Instead, the company decided to focus on value addition and in 2000 installed 
weaving capacity of 60 airjet looms.
Established business relationships in related sectors also led to requests from buyers to 
develop new textile and clothing products. Firm 48, for example, is a manufacturer of knitted 
shirts, blouses and coats based in Faisalabad. In the 1970s, the founder of the business was 
engaged in tent and tarpaulin manufacturing, but in 1975 received an order for a polo shirt 
which led to its “unplanned” entry into the industry. The firm rose to be the 263rd largest
I
exporter under quota and among the top 300 exporters in 2006. Similarly, a trade 
association that works with woven garment producers explained how many manufacturers of 
sports goods (such as footballs) in Sialkot were approached by buyers to start manufacturing 
martial arts outfits (many of whom show up in the PFE data given in Appendix 4-3).
However, in more recent years the industry has also seen the formation of several true 
spinoffs, where former employees of textile and clothing units discovered entry strategies 
through employment experience. One of the founders of Firm 20, for example, was working 
as a marketing employee in a leading textile mill when he left to set up a cloth exporting 
business with a friend from business school. It was this experience that later led to entry into 
textile manufacturing. While working as a cloth exporter at the end of the 1990s, the founder
12 In the 1990s, for example, Japanese suppliers often provided credit for machinery in exchange for yarn 
imports. A trade association involved with many spinners and weavers also commented that many traders knew 
the profit margins o f  textile manufacturing and the demand in the market which shaped their decision and ability 
to enter the sector.
13 The ranking in 2006 refers to the 528 firms on which I have data. Source: Federal Bureau o f Revenue, 
Karachi Stock Exchange.
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often met with buyers in the USA and saw that the sites of large mills in the USA were 
“turning into ghost towns”. He felt that these firms were “juggernauts, inflexible with vested 
interests” and because they had been embedded in local communities for three generations 
they were reluctant to close the mill down. He felt that the future of the manufacturing sector 
was going to be in Asia instead and it was this observation that spurred him to enter fabric 
manufacturing.
Similarly, the founder of Firm 33, a manufacturer of clothing accessories, was working as a 
Chartered Accountant in a textile unit when he began looking for a gap in the market to enter 
industry independently. He identified an opportunity to produce particular type of cloth used 
in clothing accessories and took out a loan to start his own unit. Manufacturing commenced 
in 1995 and although the founder initially had difficulties with production, and after two 
years the unit was running satisfactorily. The firm is now being jointly run with the daughter 
of the founder -  one of the very few female interviewees in this study -  who studied 
economics in the United Kingdom.
In other cases, sons, nephews and female relatives in textile families who were educated in 
business or other subjects established and managed mills with the support o f family, what I 
term family spinoffs. At times, the product choice showed their lacked of experience, while at 
others the fresh approach brought by formal education resulted in more interesting product 
choices. Firm 27, for example, is a spinning unit created in the late 1970s. The father of the 
current Director was involved in yam trading, the uncle was engaged in textile 
manufacturing, and the two Directors were both business graduates. The uncle “wanted to get 
his nephews into textiles” so he sponsored their entry by providing finance for a new unit. 
Together, they chose spinning because it was the “simplest” section of the textile industry to 
enter. They recognised profitability was low, but it “was easy to run”. The firm set up their 
first plant in Sindh, but subsequently installed the second two units in Punjab as a result of 
disturbances in the south of the country. In contrast, Firm 47 is a commercial dye house in 
Karachi which finishes grey cloth for use in garment production. It was established in 1990 as 
a family spinoff from an existing spinning and weaving firm. It was the son -  educated 
abroad in civil engineering -  that started this unit “brand new” when there was “not a single 
unit of this magnitude and technology” in Pakistan. He choose the segment following the 
identification of “a gap” in the market with the use of a consultant The firm has since gone on 
to perform well in the post-quota period.
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Additionally, general industry exposure obtained through family and friends often provided 
knowledge of how to enter. The family of the founder of Firm 3, now a leading home textile 
producer, were farmers from a rural town in Punjab and involved in the growing and ginning 
of cotton. As a young man, the founder lived in the city of Faisalabad and graduated from 
college in the 1970s where he studied accounting. He worked in his father’s business after 
graduation, but began to think about starting his own venture shortly after. Through contact 
with a friend who was the son of a textile business owner, he researched how he could start a 
similar business. As a result, the founder developed an insightful entry strategy: given the 
extent of spinning in the market, the founder expected there would be increased demand for 
cloth and the dying of cloth in the future. He also viewed textile processing as a particularly 
“challenging” part of the industry to enter, and consequently this segment was chosen. 
Although he would have preferred an integrated unit including spinning, much less capital 
was required to invest in the bleaching unit (as he did not have plentiful capital available). 
This bolder product choice and strategy was to prove successful in the long run given the 
structural changes in the global textile and clothing industry.
Experienced
It was within experienced firms that decisions about new firm formation and entry strategy 
were most tightly made. Often this was in response to demands from buyers, opportunities 
observed in the market, or simply the next stage of the long-term vision of the firm. Several 
companies were particularly exposed to the global reorganisation of production that the 
textile and clothing industry has experienced in the past two decades.
Firms were often approached directly by buyers looking to outsource production. In 
particular, vertical integration has been a recent response of many firms in order to create a 
‘one-stop-shop’ for global buyers in the post-quota period, spurring new mill creation. The 
family running Firm 28, for example, has been in business since before Partition when it was 
involved in the leather business in India. Following migration to Pakistan, the family first 
entered the cotton ginning business in 1948 and then the production of cotton yam in the mid 
1950s. Cloth production began in the 1970s and later yam production when the then- 
President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto nationalised the ginning units. However, when spinning and 
weaving units in countries in Europe began to close, buyers wanted finished fabric instead of 
just greige cloth. According to a current Director, environmental problems caused by these
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industries also began to be problematic in western major cities. As a result, large discount 
retailers such as Walmart directly approached Firm 28 to produce finished cloth. From the 
firm’s perspective, they chose to move into home textile production rather than garments 
because it was “slightly easier” as the Director finds garments “a very different industry”. 
Similarly, they have recently been approached by a buyer of fabric that has links with a 
hospital supplier to produce patient gowns.
Firm 16 is part of a spinning and weaving group originally founded by two brothers in the 
early 1980s, one a yam exporter and the other with experience in finance. They started off 
with spinning because it was profitable at that time and also because it is “the core business 
of Pakistan”. While in this business, the current Directors became aware that companies such 
as Westpoint Stephens in the United States -  to whom they used to export for final weaving, 
dying and stitching -  were closing. They also observed greater volumes of direct buying from 
companies such as Walmart and JC Penney, that these buyers were opening their own buying 
offices in Pakistan, and that “it will be difficult to sell yam post-2005 as buyers want the final 
product, a one-stop solution”. Consequently, the group started weaving to add value in the 
years running up to the abolition of export quotas. Regarding product choice, they felt that 
China did not “have the looms” to compete in this particular segment, and saw China as a 
threat only in garments. At the time of the interview the group had 334 airjet looms and
100,000 spindles, and 140 more looms were planned in order to move into fabric production 
for home textiles. For the future, the current Directors also felt that there would be a 
particular gap in processing as a result of the reorganisation of production, but were not 
pursuing it yet for “internal reasons”. According to the Directors, because weaving is still a 
new product they first want to consolidate and explore full integration at a later date.
Many incumbents in the industry also had knowledge of general product developments that 
shaped their own product choice. Often these founders were able to identify market 
opportunities not apparent to less experienced or less prepared new entrants. Firm 10, for 
example, is a home textile producer first created in 1990 as a spinoff from an existing 
integrated textile mill. The owner of the original unit wanted to increase its production 
capacity, and the nephew of the CEO -  a recent MBA graduate -  was chosen to ran it 
because his own children were too young at the time. The choice of product and machinery 
and product was made by the original founder while the day-to-day management was put in 
the hands of the nephew. Spinning of good quality, coarse yarn was chosen as the first
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product because there were few companies at the time producing this yam in Pakistan. Over 
time the firm attempted to leam from buyers about new products of interest to them, and it 
attempted to develop other products not being made in Pakistan such as stretch slub yams. 
Likewise, in Firm 7, when engaged in spinning in the year 2000, the Directors “saw the 
market expanding for yam and fabrics, but not many firms going into weaving”. In order to 
meet the needs of buyers, from the outset the firm aimed to be “a marketing focused 
company” and one that did not cut costs in production but focused on quality and the 
production of a “premium product”. It was the business educated son of the founder who 
decided to make these changes in the group.
In addition, some units were established simply to manufacture new products as a result of 
bold strategy among existing firms. Firm 11, for instance, chose to enter the garment sector 
following a longstanding presence in spinning and weaving. Even though other direct family 
members disagreed with this strategy and chose instead to focus on becoming “the best” in 
spinning and weaving, this firm wanted to be ahead of the market. In 1992, the founder went 
looking for joint venture partners in the EU and USA in order to establish “a marketing front” 
to take advantage of the company’s strength in production. An initial partnership was 
unsuccessful, so later the firm entered garment manufacturing and marketing operation 
independently. Another example is Kohinoor Maple Leaf Group. Originally, the only textile 
unit in the group -  Kohinoor Textile Mills -  was mainly a producer of yarn (until 2002). 
However, in 1987 Kohinoor Weaving was established and engaged only in weaving from the 
outset. In 2003, dyeing facilities were put in place in 2003, in 2004 144 a total of knitting 
machines were introduced, in 2006 480 stitching machines started production, and in 2007 
the number of looms had grown to 256. Both Kohinoor firms were among in the top ten 
textile and clothing exporters from Pakistan in 2006.
O ther determinants o f  entry
There were several other determinants of entry which cut across firm backgrounds. These 
findings highlight the role of factors unrelated to founder experience in shaping firm entry 
strategies and success.
For example, personal connections and chance were often important drivers of new product 
ideas, marketing outlets and new firm formation. The founder of Firm 41, for example, was
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an employee of a large paper manufacturing group when he retired to “do something 
different”. He initially aimed to move overseas, but had friends in Stockholm and the United 
States who wanted to import garments. As a result, he set up a small garment unit in 1983 
which had installed 40 stitching machines by 1984. Following this arrangement, the firm 
received its first major order for cotton trousers from Cone Denim (a large US importer at the 
time) and later for men’s and women’s denim clothing from buyers in Canada. Today the 
company is run by the son of the founder and has 1200 sewing machines, 3 factories and
6,000 employees.
The founder o f Firm 6 was originally a trader of fibre, involved particularly in the import of 
yam from abroad. He was educated in commerce to masters level and the previous three 
generations of his family were traders. The oldest mill currently in the group was constructed 
in 1968 and it had three previous owners. In 1968, he was a supplier of raw synthetic fibre to 
textile mill whose owner was “affected by political changes” and required to sell the unit. The 
founder of Firm 6 was given the option to purchase the mill in order to settle a debt with the 
owner. He took the unit on as a challenge rather than as an attractive proposal because so 
many units were ‘sick’ at the time.
The decision of family was also important in the reasons given for entry into the textile 
industry. However, this push from family to enter the sector often led to a lack of commercial 
entry strategy and poor product choice. The founder of Firm 23, a yam and cloth 
manufacturer who had a background in textile trading, entered manufacturing at the 
suggestion of his wife who came from a family involved in textile manufacture. According to 
the current director “all their friends were rich and were in spinning” which was an additional 
impetus to enter the sector. One of the founders of Firm 44, a privately-held textile printing 
unit in Faisalabad, finished a diploma in textile engineering in 1972 and worked for two years 
in established textile units. His father was a textile trader, so after this period he joined the 
family business. They started off with a small bleaching plant for cloth from which they 
outsourced printing, but slowly built up their own printing plant. In Firm 17, it was the father 
of the current Director who created the mill, and then himself who was brought in to manage 
it when the father lost interest.
The role of quota also shaped the decisions of firms on entry and the direction of product 
development. In Firm 38, for example, the founder stated that from 2000 onwards the firm
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was “strategising in relation to the quota” in which they focused on the upper niche where 
there was “no competition with local suppliers” (only producers in India and China). 
Similarly, Firm 37 entered home textile production from a background in cloth 
manufacturing in the early 1990s because they got the quota “for free” as an existing 
producer in the market. Firm 30 also stated that hosiery yam production developed in the unit 
picked up as a result of the quota because they obtained better prices.
It was also prior activity in industry which shaped access to finance for the new unit, as 
several firms had accumulated finance which they used to invest the new venture. Tariq 
Saigol, for example, described his family as “liquid” from its previous business in Calcutta 
when it established Kohinoor Industries. Similarly, Firm 28 had “made good money” in 
ginning and pursued their expansion into yam spinning gradually so had “no finance 
problems”. In Firm 29, founded by a car dealer and a friend with textile experience, 40 per 
cent of the original equity was provided by the founder and his partners, while the other 60 
per cent was provided by the banks. In many cases, business groups also took advantage of 
existing contacts or their established business presence to access new finance. In Firm 8, for 
example, the group’s existing status helped access start-up funding: according to the founder, 
commercial banks had “confidence in him” personally and believed he could “meet 
commitments”. Likewise, in Firm 9, “a few banker friends helped get the licence” and the 
unit was financed one of the industrial development banks in the 1960s.
In contrast, new entrants -  even with some industry experience -  had to work hard to 
demonstrate their performance over time in order to access finance. Firm 20, for instance, is a 
cloth unit — a conventional spinoff -  founded by a former textile trading firm. Because the 
founders did not have any credit history with banks one founder “took credit on everything he 
could”. He built a credit rating on car finance, kept proper books and produced accounts 
every month. At first he could not afford a colour monitor for his computer but gradually 
built up the business. As a result, the firm was able to make “a good presentation” to the 
banks in order to gain financial support, and in 2001 they purchased ‘a sick’ unit that had 
gone out of business. Similarly, a spinning mill was founded in the early 1990s by a textile 
engineer who had worked as a general manager in several spinning units. In his previous role 
he was responsible for all the operations of the mill -  including the relationship with the 
banks -  and over the years came to be known as a reliable manager of the various operations.
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The outcome was that this individual was able to use his connections and reputation in order 
to obtain finance to set up his own spinning unit.14
As a result, while there is evidence of an association between PFE and firm entry strategy, 
firm formation in Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry has also been shaped by non­
commercial factors often related to the structure of family firms, personal connections, 
chance and the operating environment.
C on clu sion
In this chapter I have showed how pre-founder experience shapes entry strategy in the new 
firm and demonstrated the association between PFE and firm performance during trade 
liberalisation. I have established that firms in Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry came 
from a variety of backgrounds, but that those with industry related pre-founder experience 
have tended to outperform less experienced competitors. I have also established that founder 
experience shapes a firm’s knowledge of production and market opportunities, and therefore 
the firm’s entry strategy directly. Three central findings stand out from the analysis.
Firstly, firms with prior industry experience in textiles and related sectors dominate the 
composition of Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry. They are followed by inexperienced 
firms and founders from other manufacturing sectors. Business groups are overrepresented in 
the yam and cloth segments (among public firms in particular), but a wider variety of 
backgrounds have been witnessed in segments such as home textiles and garments. In 
addition, there is evidence of some conventional spinoffs emerging in the industry in recent 
years founded by experienced individuals with no family connections.
Secondly, there is evidence of a statistical association between pre-founder experience and 
firm performance during trade reform when controlling for the age of the firm. In particular, 
firms from Experienced and Textile-related backgrounds are relatively larger than 
Inexperienced firms, and they have showed greater rates of survival. Further, among new 
publicly-held entrants, Experienced firms are larger at the outset and this size advantage 
persists to age 15. In contrast, there is a more ambiguous relationship between firms from
14 This anecdote was given to me during an interview with a leading Chartered Accountant in Pakistan.
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Other manufacturing backgrounds and performance, suggesting a mixed legacy of such 
backgrounds.
Thirdly, this pre-entry experience is manifested concretely in the firm’s entry strategy. 
Experienced founders exhibit more detailed knowledge of the product and marketing 
opportunities in the industry and take a more strategic approach to the creation of new units. 
Firms from textile-related backgrounds are also more likely to be exposed to new market 
opportunities, often driven by the requests of buyers. As a result, many Pakistani textile firms 
have entered higher value segments like finished fabric or home textiles as global production 
chains have been reorganised. In contrast, less experienced firms tend to have limited 
knowledge of production practices and markets and industry exposure. Other factors such as 
family decisions and chance have often shaped entry strategies across firm backgrounds 
regardless of founder experience. This can often lead to poor product choice or a lack of 
strategy when creating the new unit.
This analysis has established the validity of the relationship between founder experience and 
firm performance during trade liberalisation, with particular reference to entry strategies. In 
Chapter 5 I will now address how founder experience shapes the initial production 
capabilities and organisational structure in the new firms. With the use of representative case 
studies I will show how pre-founder experience is revealed in the firm’s size upon entry, its 
initial profitability and its subsequent growth trajectory.
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Appendices
Appendix 4-1: Backgrounds of textile and clothing firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange
Table 4-11 Backgrounds of textile and clothing firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange
Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1940s-50s Cotton ginning Yarn 2
Leather/shoes Yarn 3
Leather Home textiles 3
Retail Yarn/Cloth 4
Addition to existing textile unit N/A 1
Textile trading Home textiles 2
Addition to existing textile unit Garments 1
Trading, shipping, ginning Yarn/Cloth 3
Yam trading Yam 2
Trading/other business Yarn 3
Addition to existing textile unit Yarn 1
Cotton/yam traders Yarn 2
1960s Army Yarn 4
Politician Yarn 4
Splinter from established industrial group Yam 3
Trading in commodities, textiles, garments Yam 2
Yarn trading Garments 2
Textile traders Home textile/garments 2
Cotton ginning/spinning Yarn 1
Sugar Yam 4
Trading Home textiles 2
Cotton trading Yarn 2
Yam trading Yam 2
Steel N/A 3
Politician/Agriculture N/A 4
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1960s Colton ginning/trading N/A 2
Yam trading Yarn/Cloth 2
Leather, shoes Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 1
Politician Yarn 4
Politician Yam 4
Splinter from established textile group Home textiles 1
Cotton trading Yarn 2
Politician Yarn 4
Addition to established textile group Home textiles 1
1970s Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Cotton ginning Yarn/Cloth 2
Addition to established textile group Yam 1
Leather Yarn/Cloth 3
Consumer goods Yarn 3
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Former employee o f textile firm Yarn 2
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Shipping Home textiles/garments 4
Spinning firm Yarn/Cloth 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Founders business educated, family in textiles Yarn 2
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
1980s Chartered Accountant Yarn 4
Textile trading Yarn 2
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 1
Addition to established textile group N/A 1
Processing and spinning Yarn 1
Transportation/logistics, external business experience Garments 3
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 1
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1980s Addition to existing spinning unit Yarn 1
Offshoot o f established textile group Yam 1
Retail Yarn 4
Addition to established textile group Home textiles 1
Cotton ginning, current management business educated Home textiles/garments 2
Construction Yam/Cloth 4
Yarn trading Yarn 2
Politician Yarn 2
Former employee o f  textile unit/technician Yarn 2
Landlord/agriculturalist, former employee o f textile unit Yam/Cloth 2
Yam trading Yarn 2
Leather manufacturing/trading Yarn 3
Cotton trading Yarn 2
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Politician Yarn/Cloth 4
Trading, weaving unit Yarn/Cloth 1
Addition to established textile group N/A 1
Tobacco/newspapers Yarn 4
Steel trading, ship breaking, auto spare parts Yarn 4
Addition to established textile group Home textiles/garments 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Leather Yarn 3
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 1
Addition to established textile group N/A 1
Addition to established textile group N/A 1
Splinter from existing industrial group N/A 3
Consumer goods Unknown 3
Trading N/A 2
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1980s Trading N/A 2
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 1
Car dealer Yarn 4
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Politician Yarn 4
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 1
Splinter from existing textile firm Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Yam 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Yam 1
Engineering/ceramics manufacture Cloth 3
Construction Cloth 4
Splinter from existing textile firm Yarn/Cloth 1
Shipping Yam/Cloth 4
Construction Yam/Cloth 4
Addition to established textile group 1
Leather/plastic Yarn 3
Politician/cotton ginning Yarn 2
1990s-2000s Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Footwear Yarn 3
Cosmetics Yarn/Cloth 3
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Former employee o f electricity company Yam 4
Addition to existing textile unit Yarn 1
Consumer goods manufacture and retail Cloth 3
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 1
Offshoot o f established textile group Home textiles 2
Construction Cloth 4
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Addition to established textile group Cloth 1
Chartered Accountant Yarn 4
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Yam trading N/A 2
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1990s-2000s Firm bought by employees Yarn 2
Chartered Accountant Yarn 4
Tents Yam 2
Cement, construction Yarn/Cloth 4
Agriculturalist N/A 4
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Former employee o f textile firm Yarn 2
Chartered Accountant Yam 4
Former employee o f textile firm Other 2
Doctor N/A 4
Addition to established textile group Yarn/Cloth 2
Addition to established textile group N/A 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Former employee o f textile firms, textile trading Cloth 2
Addition to established textile group Garments 1
Addition to established textile group Yarn 1
Addition to established apparel firm Yarn 1
NOTE: A dot represents missing data, N/A indicates firm was no longer operating in 2004, 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, firm survey, trade associations, own analysis
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Appendix 4-2: Backgrounds of unlisted public firms (SECP sample)
Table 4-12 Backgrounds of unlisted public firms (SECP sample)
Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1975 Established textile group, formerly in East Pakistan Yarn 1
1975 Landlords Yarn 4
1975 Accountant Yarn 4
1980 Established spinning group, other consumer goods Yarn 1
1980 Established spinning group Yam 1
1981 Existing spinning unit established in 1975, joint venture with overseas investor Yarn and cloth 1
1984 Established cloth group Cloth 1
1985 Local yarn traders, textile manufacturers Home textiles 1
1986 Grower/politician Yarn 4
1986 Addition to textile group Cloth 1
1986 Addition to textile group Yarn 1
1987 Civil servant/tin manufacture Garments 3
1987 Yam trader Yarn 2
1987 Two units set up by a Sugar Mill producer Yarn 3
1987 Politician Yarn 4
1987 Established spinning group Yam 1
1987 Trader, son now running Yarn 2
1988 2 units created by established spinning group 1 yarn, 1 cloth 1
1988 Established spinning and weaving group Yarn and cloth 1
1989 Established spinning group Yam 1
1989 Established spinning and weaving group Cloth 1
1989 Established spinning group and other consumer goods Yarn and cloth 1
1989 Yam traders Yarn 2
1989 Politician/Glass industry Yam 3
1990 Grower/politician, established one mill in 1986 Yarn 1
1990 Established spinning group Yarn 1
1990 Landlord/bureaucrat Yarn 4
1990 Sugar mill/oil business Yarn 3
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1990 Local cloth traders Home textiles 2
1991 Established spinning group Yam 1
1991 Growers/ginners Yarn (later cloth) 2
1991 Established garment firm Garments 1
1991 Politician Yarn 4
1991 Established spinning group Yarn 1
1991 F inance/Garments Garments 4
1991 Traders/glass industry Yarn 3
1991 Former General Manager o f textile mill, bought unit Yarn 2
1991 Yam traders Yarn 2
1991 Founder in import/export, son set up cloth unit in 1980s Home textiles 1
1991 Consumer goods manufacturing and retail Yam 3
1991 Cotton grower Yarn 4
1991 Experience in textiles in USA Yarn 1
1992 Chartered Accountant Yarn 4
1992 Manufacturer o f mattresses Cloth 3
1992 Established spinning and weaving group Garments 4
1992 Yam trader Yarn and cloth 2
1993 Established spinning and weaving group Garments 1
1994 Yarn traders, bought unit Yarn 2
1998 Established spinning group Cloth 1
2000 Oil business, bought sick unit Yarn 3
2000 Established spinning and weaving group Yam and cloth 1
2000 Construction/food processing, two units Yam 3
2001 Existing spinning unit Yarn 1
2002 Yam trading Yarn 2
2002 Established spinning and weaving group Cloth 1
SOURCE; Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan, firm survey, trade associations, own analysis
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Appendix 4-3: Backgrounds of knitwear firms, quota exporters (TDAP sample) 
Table 4-13 Backgrounds of knitwear firms, quota exporters (TDAP sample)
Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1964 Minister in government Knitted garments 4
1965 Buying agent Knitted garments 2
1969 Importer o f knitwear Knitted garments 2
1972 General trading Knitted garments 2
1972 Textile trading Knitted garments 2
1973 Banking Knitted garments 4
1973 Gloves Knitted garments 2
1975 Financial services Knitted garments 4
1980 Existing spinning business Knitted garments 1
1981 Carpets Knitted garments 3
1982 Existing cloth manufacturer Knitted garments 1
1983 Doctor, family sweet makers Knitted garments 3
1984 Cotton ginning/oil trading Knitted garments 2
1985 Socks Knitted garments 1
1985 Civil servant Knitted garments 4
1985 Former employee o f textile firm Knitted garments 2
1986 Diversified industrial group with textiles Knitted garments 1
1987 Construction Knitted garments 4
1988 Banker Knitted garments 4
1988 Politics Knitted garments 4
1988 Inexperienced, grandfather in textile industry Knitted garments 4
1988 Carpets Knitted garments 3
1989 Addition to cloth firm setup in 1966 Knitted garments 1
1990 Pharmaceuticals Knitted garments 3
1990 Carpet manufacturer and exporter Knitted garments 3
1990 Agriculturalist and lawyer Knitted garments 4
1990 Carpet exporter Knitted garments 3
1990 Agriculturalist Knitted garments 4
1990 Agricultural trade, engineering Knitted garments 3
1990 Doctor, father yam broker Knitted garments 2
1991 Perfumery and overseas textile business Knitted garments 1
1991 Addition to existing knitting unit setup in 1985 Knitted garments 1
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1991 Construction/engineering Knitted garments 4
1991 Banking, existing hosiery business Knitted garments 1
1991 Rice, trading, real estate Knitted garments 3
1991 Inexperienced, relatives in hosiery Knitted garments 4
1991 Son o f an army general, inexperienced Knitted garments 4
1991 Former civil servant, son a doctor Knitted garments 4
1991 Import/export o f machinery parts Knitted garments 4
1991 Bankers Knitted garments 4
1991 Retired civil servant Knitted garments 4
1991 Inexperienced. Knitted garments 4
1991 Paper, packaging Knitted garments 3
1991 Agriculturalist Knitted garments 4
1991 Car retail Knitted garments 4
1992 Engineering contractors Knitted garments 4
1992 Banker Knitted garments 4
1992 Doctor Knitted garments 4
1992 Established textile group Knitted garments 1
1992 Car retail Knitted garments 4
1992 Carpets Knitted garments 3
1992 Finance Knitted garments 4
1992 Paper manufacturing Knitted garments 3
1992 Former dyeing master, returned from abroad Knitted garments 2
1992 Addition to existing home textile firm setup in 1991 Knitted garments 1
1993 Addition to existing knitting unit incorporated in 1969 Knitted garments 1
1993 Doctor Knitted garments 4
1994 Carpet Knitted garments 3
1994 Textile engineer Knitted garments 2
1995 Marketing Knitted garments 2
1995 Established textile group Knitted garments 1
1998 Merchandiser o f knitwear/former stitching manager Knitted garments 2
1998 Gloves Knitted garments 2
1998 Footballs Knitted garments 2
1999 Car dealer Knitted garments 4
1999 Marketing Knitted garments 3
2000 One founder a former general manager o f mill, other no experience Knitted garments 2
2000 Former production manager o f knitwear firm Knitted garments 2
2000 Agriculturalist Knitted garments 4
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
2001 Family in spinning/weaving, son civil engineer founder and running unit Knitted garments 1
2001 Addition to existing knitted garment unit Knitted garments 1
2001 Existing textile processing firm Knitted garments 1
2002 Trading Knitted garments 2
2005 Fabric trading Knitted garments 2
2005 Inexperienced, learned 'on the job' Knitted garments 4
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, firm survey, trade associations, own analysis
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Appendix 4-4: Backgrounds of firms in home textiles, towels and woven garments, quota exporters (TDAP sample)
Table 4-14 Backgrounds of firms in home textiles, towels and woven garments, quota exporters (TDAP sample)
Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1965 Textile traders Cloth (printing) 2
1965 Manufacturer o f uniforms for Pakistani army Cloth 1
1966 Leather industry Cloth 2
1969 Textile traders, existing weaving unit Home textile 1
1972 Textile processing Cloth 1
1972 Footballs Woven garments 2
1973 Shipping Mix o f products 3
1974 Textile engineer, experience in another mill Home textile 2
1976 Commercial importers Home textile 3
1980 Father had textile unit, son set up own Woven garments 2
1981 Laundry business, bleaching fabrics Home textile 2
1981 Oil traders/fuel stations Home textile 4
1982 Textile traders Home textile 2
1982 Government employee Towel 4
1982 Oil business Towels 3
1983 Silk manufacturing Woven garments 2
1983 Trading in local market/cloth manufacturing Home textiles 1
1983 Gloves Woven garments 2
1984 Former employee o f large textile group Home textiles 2
1984 Textile engineer, two years external experience, family business Cloth 2
1984 Former employee o f  paper manufacturing group Woven garments 3
1984 Sports goods Woven garments 2
1985 Local yarn traders Cloth 2
1985 Textile engineer/family in textile industry Cloth 2
1985 Established textile group Yam 1
1985 Transportation o f goods Home textiles 3
1985 Sports newspaper reporter Woven garments 4
1986 Commercial exporters Home textiles 2
1986 Spinning Woven garments 1
1986 Former technician/employee o f many mills Cloth 2
1987 Ginning, yam trading, textile manufacturing Home textiles 1
1987 Retired from air force Woven garments 4
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1987 Doctor Towel 4
1988 Established textile group Woven garments 1
1989 Cotton ginning, yarn trading and cloth manufacturing Home textiles 1
1990 Textile engineer Woven garments 2
1990 Commercial exporters Cloth 2
1990 Yarn trading Cloth 2
1990 Addition to existing home textile unit Home textile 1
1990 Local cloth traders (for dresses) Cloth 2
1991 Agriculturalist Woven garments 4
1991 Cloth trading Cloth 2
1991 Overseas experience in textile industry Yam 1
1991 Grey cloth dealer Home textiles 2
1991 Father textile trader, son bank manager Home textiles 2
1991 Addition to existing cloth printing unit set up in 1976 Cloth 1
1991 Textile traders Cloth 2
1991 Addition to existing cloth unit set up in 1978 Cloth 1
1992 Army Woven garments 4
1992 Politics Woven garments 4
1992 Looms engineering, then trading Cloth 2
1992 Cotton trading/silk weaving Cloth 2
1992 Textile exporters Cloth 2
1992 Textile trading Home textiles 2
1992 Footballs Woven garments 2
1993 Textile processing Cloth 1
1993 Jewellery Home textiles 3
1994 Established knitted garments firm Woven garments 1
1994 Split from existing knitting firm, CEO inexperienced Cloth 2
1994 Established textile group Cloth 1
1994 Addition to existing home textile unit Cloth 1
1994 Cloth trading Cloth 2
1994 Landowner/agriculture, fabric trading Cloth 2
1994 Addition to cloth unit Cloth 1
1995 Established textile group Home textiles 1
1995 Textile traders Home textiles 2
1995 Import/export, wholesale Woven garments 3
1996 Commercial exporters Towel 2
1996 Addition to spinning unit Cloth 1
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Date of 
incorporation
Founder experience Product (in 2004) PFE Code
1996 Addition to knitting and home textile units Woven garments 1
1996 Footballs Woven garments 2
1996 Leather Woven garments 3
1997 Addition to cloth unit set up in 1985 Cloth 1
1997 Politics Woven garments 4
1997 Addition to existing printed cloth/home textile unit Home textile 1
1998 Textile trading Home textile 2
1999 Addition to existing spinning/weaving group Cloth 1
1999 Footballs Woven garments 2
1999 Former employee o f woven garment firm Woven garments 2
2001 Former employee o f integrated home textile mill Home textile 2
2001 Cotton/yarn trader Yam 2
2005 Fabric trading Woven garments 2
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, firm survey, trade associations, own analysis
188
Appendix 4-5: Firm backgrounds by entry date
As illustrated in Table 4-15, the number of inexperienced firms across the three samples as 
the entry date becomes more recent. This could be the result of either the opening of entry 
liberalisation at the end of the 1980s or poor survival to older ages.
Table 4-15 Analysis of founder experience by decade
Type of background 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000s
Experienced 3 7 12 53 40 9
Textile-related 4 13 8 28 42 9
Other manufacturing 4 2 4 15 20 2
Inexperienced 1 8 5 24 38 2
Total 12 30 29 120 140 22
NOTE: N=352
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan, Trade and Development 
Authority o f Pakistan, trade associations, firm survey, own analysis
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Appendix 4-6: Founder backgrounds of unlisted public firms and quota exporters
Table 4-16 Founder backgrounds of unlisted public firms and quota exporters
Type of background Public, unlisted 
(SECP)
Quota exporters 
(TDAP)
Total Per cent Total Per cent
Experienced 29 49.2 90 37.3
Textile-related 10 17.0 76 30.7
Other manufacturing 10 17.0 31 12.9
Inexperienced 10 17.0 44 18.3
TOTAL 59 241
NOTE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan sample includes some public listed and unlisted firms 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan, Trade Development 
Authority o f Pakistan, firm survey, trade associations, own analysis
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Appendix 4-7: Founder experience among post-1987 entrants on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange
Table 4-17 gives the founder experience classification among post-1987 entrants onto the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (1987-1999). Founder background was identified for a total of 71 
firms. There are 20 missing values.
Table 4-17 Founder backgrounds of post-1987 entrants on the Karachi Stock Exchange
Background of firm Number of observations
Experienced 33
Textile-related 13
Other manufacturing 10
Inexperienced 15
Missing 20
Total 91
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, firm survey, trade associations, own analysis
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Appendix 4-8: Post-1987 entrants on the Karachi Stock Exchange: size by founder background
Table 4-18 Post-1987 entrants on Karachi Stock Exchange: size by founder background (real Pak Rs, 2000)
Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
ALL 273 434 431 493 490 501 509 513 525 545 544 551 563 591 606
Obs 64 71 90 89 91 91 90 91 90 90 89 87 86 84 77
Exits 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 2 3 3 0 2 1 3
PFE
1 351 537 555 636 634 639
Size (real Pak Rs, 2000)
651 739 775 840 886 915 978 1040 1050
2 241 387 384 419 451 512 512 524 410 390 385 380 335 463 450
3 228 414 452 509 566 579 603 610 641 584 497 520 510 468 539
4 226 407 360 418 453 461 414 342 365 381 377 372 369 317 216
Obs 54 57 71 71 71 71 71 71 70 70 69 68 67 65 59
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 1 0 2 1 2
NOTE: Pre-founder experience: l=Experience, 2=Textile-related, 3=Other manufacturing, 4=Inexperienced 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
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Appendix 4-9: Firm size/exports by background at age 5 ,10  and 15
Table 4-19 Firm size by founder background of post-1987 entrants on Karachi
Stock Exchange at Age 5,10 and 15 (real Pak Rs million, 2000)
KSE Firms Age 5 Age 10 Age 15
Experienced 634 840 1,050
Textile-related 451 390 450
Other manufacturing 566 584 539
Inexperienced 453 381 216
Observations 71 70 60
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, firm survey, own analysis
Table 4-20 Linear regression analysis of firm size by founder background of 
post-1987 entrants on Karachi Stock Exchange at Age 5 ,10  and 15 (real Pak Rs
million, 2000)
KSE Firms Age 5 Age 10 Age 15
Constant 416* 391* 301
(4.60) (2.57) (1.08)
Experienced 218* 449* 753*
(2.00) (2.45) (2.29)
Textile-related 35 -0.5 149
(0.27) (0.00) (0.35)
Other manufacturing 151 193 238
(1.05) (0.80) (0.54)
Inexperienced - - -
Observations 71 70 60
NOTE: t-statistics in brackets. * Statistically significant at 5 per cent level 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, firm survey, own analysis
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Appendix 4-10: Founder backgrounds and performance of interview sample
Table 4-21 Founder backgrounds of interview sample and firm performance
during trade liberalisation
Firm Founder experience Product PFE
Code
Growth
Firm 1 Addition to established textile group HT 1 1.22
Firm 2 Consumer goods manufacture and retail Cloth 3 1.24
Firm 3 Cotton ginning, Directors business educated HT/G 1 1.35
Firm 4 Politician Yam 4 Exit 2006
Firm 5 Cotton ginning YC 2 0.91
Firm 6 Cotton trading Y 2 1.36
Firm 7 Established spinning group, other consumer goods Y/C 1 1.10(2004-6)
Firm 8 Construction Cloth 4 0.86
Firm 9 Addition to established textile group Yam 1 0.90
Firm 10 Offshoot o f  established textile group/MBA educated HT 2 0.93
Firm 11 Established spinning and weaving group G 1 1.09 (2004-6)
Firm 12 Transportation/logistics, external bus. experience G 3 1.40
Firm 13 Cotton trading Y 2 0.53
Firm 14 Spinning firm Y/C 1 0.98
Firm 15 Footwear Y 3 0.94
Firm 16 Textile trading Y 2 1.81
Firm 17 Addition to established textile group Y 1 1.10
Firm 18 Splinter from existing spinning firm YC 1 0.93
Firm 19 Trading/other business Y 3 0.87
Firm 20 Former employee o f textile firms, textile trading C 2 2.70
Firm 21 Leather/plastic Y 3 0.48
Firm 22 Leather YC 3 0.97
Firm 23 Trading, weaving unit YC 1 Exit 2007
Firm 24 Shipping YC 4 1.05
Firm 25 Leather Y 3 1.29
Firm 26 Leather, shoes Y 1 0.72
Firm 27 Founders business educated, family in textiles Y 2 1.36
Firm 28 Addition to established textile group YC 1 0.92
Firm 29 Car dealer Y 4 0.77
Firm 30 Processing and spinning Y 1 1.95 (2004-6)
Firm 31 Politician/cotton ginning Y 2 1.12
Firm 32 Politician Y 4 1.32
Firm 33 Former management employee o f textile firm Other 2 2.55
Firm 34 Construction C 4 Exit
Firm 35 Splinter from established textile group HT 1 1.30
Firm 36 Addition to existing spinning/weaving group C 1 0.79
Firm 37 Politician/textile HT 1 Maintain
Firm 38 Civil servant/tin manufacture G 3 Exit 2006
Firm 39 Agricultural trade, engineering G 3 Maintain
Firm 40 Landowner/agriculture, fabric trading HT 2 Maintain
Firm 41 Former employee o f paper manufacturing group G 3 Maintain
Firm 42 Addition to cloth firm setup in 1966 G 1 Maintain
Firm 43 Marketing/production employees o f  textile firm G 2 Not maintain
Firm 44 Textile engineer, 2yr external experience, family bus. HT 2 Not maintain
Firm 45 Inexperienced, grandfather in textile industry G 4 Maintain
Firm 46 Textile engineer, business family HT 2 Maintain
Firm 47 Civil engineer, family in spinning/weaving C 2 Maintain
Firm 48 Tents G 3 Maintain
NOTE: Y=Yam, C=Cloth, Y/C=Yarn and cloth, HT=Home textile, G=Garments. Product in 2004- 
2007. Figures refer to real sales growth (Pak Rs, 2000) from 2004 to 2007, given in whole numbers 
( 1.03 = 3 per cent). Otherwise it is indicated whether firms maintained quota exports or exited.
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Chapter 5 Founder experience and the accumulation of firm 
capabilities
Firms in Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry exhibit heterogeneity in both firm 
capabilities and performance during the first phase of trade liberalisation. In this 
chapter I aim to explain the gradual divergence in firm performance between 1994 
and 2004 with an analysis of the relationship between pre-founder experience and the 
accumulation of firm organisational and production capabilities. I explore how 
founder experience shapes initial production and organisational capabilities, the rate 
of capability accumulation over time, and its impact on firm performance as measured 
by initial size, relative profitability and the firm’s growth trajectory. Given the 
established association between pre-entry experience and firm age, I specifically 
examine how the firm’s production and organisational capabilities are shaped over 
time through in-house trial and error, and how learning in the firm occurs. This 
analysis establishes the heterogeneity in capabilities among Pakistan’s textile and 
clothing firms in the run up to the abolition of export quotas on 1 January 2005. It also 
sets the context for an examination in Chapter 6 of how firms performed in response 
to increasing competition in the post-quota period.
Firstly, I establish the determinants of performance in the textile and clothing 
industry. Drawing on a series of plant visits, I examine good practice in productivity, 
quality and marketing, and define organisational capabilities to include recruitment, 
incentives and general professional management practices. This provides a framework 
within which to benchmark the capabilities of individual firms. Secondly, using 
representative case studies, I assess the distribution of capabilities across firms and 
analyse the relationship between firm background and the quality of production 
capabilities. I also examine the quality of organisational capabilities — or general 
management practices -  in the new unit which are considered particularly challenging 
for Pakistani firms by investors and business observers. Thirdly, I assess the 
association between these capabilities and firm performance, matching interviews 
conducted with Directors and technical managers with company financial data. I also
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take into consideration the potential skewing of firm performance between 1994 and 
2004 as a result of quota access.
I find strong evidence of heterogeneity in production and organisational capabilities 
across firms and an association with performance. The findings suggest that pre­
founder experience shapes the quality of these capabilities upon entry and is revealed 
in the initial size of the firm, as well as its early profitability and growth trajectory 
(although performance is partly skewed by firm reliance on quota in this period). 
Firms with more industry-related experience show strength in production capabilities, 
while those from Other manufacturing and Inexperienced backgrounds often bring 
transferable organisational practices. However, a continued weakness across all 
backgrounds is the lack of professional management associated with family 
ownership which has hampered firm growth.
Over the study period, firms have accumulated capabilities through in-house trial and 
error as well as the transfer of tacit knowledge via recruitment and the use of 
consultants. However, performance is ultimately shaped by the design of the firm at 
the outset where professional management allows technical managers to deliver shop- 
floor improvements. It was only a radical change of management or motivation on the 
part of the Directors which changed the direction of firm performance. Thus suggests 
that pre-founder experience is a persistent determinant of the accumulation of firm 
capabilities and performance over time.
5.1 Production and organisational capabilities in textiles and clothing
The textile and clothing production chain stretches from cotton growing to cotton 
ginning, yam spinning, cloth weaving or knitting, textile bleaching, dyeing and 
printing, and the cutting and stitching of ‘made-up’ goods such as home textiles or 
garments. However, the cost structure of production and the determinants of firm 
productivity, quality and performance are often similar at different parts of the chain. 
As illustrated in Table 5-1, the industry is raw material and energy intensive. On 
average, the most important cost is raw materials (75.8 per cent), followed by fuel and 
power (9.8 per cent), salaries (5.9 per cent) and machinery as measured by 
depreciation (3.9 per cent). Costs such as insurance, packing and transportation make
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up the remainder. Taking the cost of salaries and depreciation alone, this is the 
equivalent of 39.8 per cent capital intensity and 61.2 per cent labour intensity on 
average across the industry. There are some variations by product. Salaries as a 
percentage of total costs, for example, are typically highest in garment firms at 7.0 per 
cent. Weaving is the least labour intensive segment, where labour costs represent only 
3.7 per cent of the total on average.1
Table 5-1 Textile and clothing production costs by product, firms listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (2006)
Cost (as percentage of 
total production)
Mean Yarn Cloth Yarn & 
cloth
Home
textiles
Garments
Raw materials 75.8 75.2 81.2 76.5 79.4 70.6
Fuel and power 9.8 10.8 6.0 9.3 6.8 8.1
Salaries 5.9 6.3 3.6 5.2 4.5 7.0
Depreciation 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.3 3.7 4.0
Other (insurance, 
packaging)
4.6 6.5 5.2 4.7 5.6 10.3
NOTE: Cost data were only available for 116 firms. Included here are the 75 comparable observations. 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
As a result of this cost structure, the first important determinant of quality and 
productivity in the mill is the ability to secure good quality raw materials. 
Contaminated cotton, for example -  which has a high waste content, such as hair, jute 
or rubbish -can break the yam on the spindles and lead to stoppages (and a reduction 
in both productivity and quality). Similarly, contamination of yam subsequently can 
affect the quality of white-coloured garments.2 Basic measures taken by firms to 
ensure the quality of raw materials include the employment of a cotton selection team, 
the payment of premiums to producers, and the overseas sourcing of higher quality 
cotton or yam. More sophisticated approaches include integration into cotton ginning
1 It should be noted that the KSE sample includes many large, integrated mills. Consequently, the 
capital intensity will be much higher than the average garment unit in Pakistan or other countries.
2 Typically these materials are sourced from within Pakistan as it is the world’s fourth largest producers 
o f  cotton. One spinning manager estimated that 95 per cent o f  Pakistan’s cotton is used within the 
country. However, a concern o f many manufacturers was often the poor quality o f  cotton in Pakistan. 
Cotton is stored in jute instead o f cotton bags which raises the waste content. One spinning manager 
explained why jute bags continue to be used in cotton picking rather than cotton bags which reduce 
contamination: “If you give them cotton bags for the yam, due to poverty people will [cut garments 
and] wear the bags. So you need to take them out o f poverty first”. This problem has led to several 
initiatives to raise the quality o f cotton produced such as the Pakistani government’s Clean Cotton 
Programme. See: Siegmann, K A . (2006) Cotton Pickers After the Quota Expiry: Bitter Harvest, 
Sustainable Development Policy Institute Research and News Bulletin. Vol. 13, No. 1, Jan-Feb 2006; 
Clean Cotton Programme 2006-2007. Ministry o f Textile Industry, Government o f Pakistan
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or spinning in order to control the level o f  quality, as well as a competitive, in-house 
free m arket environm ent where a unit further dow nstream  -  such as cloth -  is not 
required to purchase yam  in-house but can source instead from the open market.
As a result o f  this heavy reliance on raw material profitability o f  the industry is also 
very dependent on the price o f cotton in the market. A s cotton price increases, 
typically the profitability o f  textile firms tends to drop. Figure 5-1 below, for example, 
shows a m irror image (from 1994 onwards) in the relationship between mean gross 
profit o f  the textile firms listed on the KSE and mean cotton price.3 Between 1994 and 
2006, for every thousand rupees increase in the price o f  cotton per metric tonne the 
mean gross profit o f  KSE firms fell by 0.135 per cent (p=0.015). Even in the best 
perform ing firms -  typically garment or home textile m anufacturers -  gross profit 
remains correlated with mean industry levels. Therefore the ability to escape this 
dependence on cotton in term s o f  profitability is an accurate m easure o f  perform ance.4
Figure 5-1 Mean gross profit of public firms versus mean cotton price (1990- 
2006) (left), maximum firm gross profit attained (1990-2007) (right)
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange; Pakistan Economic Survey 2006, Ministry of Finance, 
Government of Pakistan; own analysis
3 There was a shift in economic policy in 1994 in which the export duty on cotton was removed, hence 
cotton producers were able to seek higher market prices for their cotton abroad. If a cotton harvest has 
been poor, then cotton will be scarce in any one year and thus in greater demand. We would thus 
expect its export price to be higher.
4 As illustrated in Chapter 2, the unit value o f yam products has been on continual decline for a number 
of years. This correlation o f gross profit with cotton price thus reinforces the argument o f Sutton 
(2007b) outlined in Chapter 1 that in order to improve remain in the trade ‘window’, firms must 
improve either their quality or lower their costs in order to escape lower returns in the market.
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The second largest production cost is power. Certainly, the productivity and quality of 
yam, cloth and finished fabric depends on the provision of continuous electricity as 
power interruptions can lead to broken yam, cloth defects, broken embroidery stitches 
or colour variation in finished fabrics. However, the supply of electricity in Pakistan 
can be erratic due to weaknesses in Pakistan’s energy infrastructure. Many units have 
installed their own gas generators in order to escape dependence on the state-owned 
grid and deliver cheaper in-house energy costs. Olympia Textile Mills, for example, 
states that it can save Rsl5m per year by installing own gas generators instead of 
sourcing from WAPDA (the local power company).5 Several have even gone as far as 
to create electricity production companies from which they sell energy onto the 
national grid.6 However, this entails a minimum scale required for installation and can 
relatively disadvantage small firms. Political connections to energy suppliers also 
become important in ensuring continuous provision for those without in-house 
generation. Further, even for those units with gas generators, frequent attacks on gas 
pipelines in the Sui Gas areas in Pakistan’s Balochistan province can also hamper 
energy provision.7
The third important determinant of cost is the performance manufacturing staff. As 
shown above, the industry is labour intensive, and as a result recruitment, human
» f t  •  •resource management and incentives are of central importance. Basic practices m 
firms in Pakistan include the regular payment of salaries, the provision of good 
quality food and accommodation (many mills tend to be remote and recruit specialist 
workers from outside of the area), and fair treatment of workers. Advanced practices 
include professional human resource practices, performance monitoring and 
evaluation, performance-linked pay, and proactive measures to recruit women into the 
workforce. Organisational practices on the shop floor are also a crucial determinants
5 Annual Report 2007, Olympia Textile Mills, Karachi Stock Exchange.
6 Leading textile firms in Pakistan have set up independent power production in firms such as Gul 
Ahmed Energy, Kohinoor Energy and Liberty Power, and other firms such as Nishat Chunian and 
Sapphire Textile were in the process o f doing so during the period o f  research. Source: Pakistan Board 
o f Investment, ‘Pakistan Power Sector’, date unknown but approximately 2005, 
http://www.pakboi.gov.pk, accessed 23 March 2009.
7 Problems with gas supplies to textile units occur frequently, see for example ‘Textile workers and 
owners protest against closure o f units’, Business Recorder. 1 February 2008.
8 On the shop-floor o f  a textile and clothing unit the most junior positions include helpers, sweepers, 
packers, assistants and quality observers, followed by machine operators, inline and final inspectors. 
Beyond this are skilled workers and supervisors, a manager in charge o f  the shop floor in functions 
such as spinning, weaving or processing, and above this the General Manager (GM) o f  the entire mill.
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of performance: in stitching, for example, the production process is divided into 
manual versus automated operations, with handling time making up 70-80 per cent of 
the production process.9 However, human resource management has proven 
particularly challenging for many firms from traditional capital-intensive spinning and 
weaving backgrounds. They often decided to produce home textiles instead of 
garments, for example, because the stitching techniques were ‘less complicated’.10
The fourth most important determinant of performance is the technology used in 
production. In spinning, for example, quality is affected by the number of machinery 
faults, while in garment cutting automation can increase consistency and reduce 
mistakes in production. In recent years technological change along the textile and 
clothing chain has been rapid. This includes the shift from sulzer to airjet looms which 
deliver revolutions per minute and a greater output of cloth, and the use of computer 
aided design in garment production. As a result, modernisation of technology is a key 
determinant of productivity and quality. Basic practices in firms also include 
preventative maintenance and the holding of stores and spares on the premises in case 
of breakage. Further, physical and human capital are complementary: skilled staff 
bring knowledge to the firm and determine everyday routines of technology adoption, 
learning and improvement, while machinery suppliers play an important role in the 
training of workers on new machines.
Productivity can be improved through the introduction of economies of scale in 
production. With an increasing number of spindles spinning firms can reduce average 
costs by spreading overheads (such as air conditioning which controls the moisture 
content of the yarn) and increase the output per employee. On average, surviving 
firms on the KSE show an increase in the average number of spindles over time as 
illustrated in Figure 5-2 below. There was also a minimum efficient scale often 
required for the production of items such as yam and cloth.11 For some firms
9 ‘Improving garment manufacturing efficiency through GSD’, Express Textile. 17 June 2004, 
http://www.expresstextile.com/20040617/textiletech01.shtml, accessed 23 March 2009.
10 The stitching o f a pillow case, for example, typically involves the cutting o f  rectangular or square 
fabric pieces and only 3-5 operations, rather than 100 operations for a shirt or pair o f jeans.
11 In 2004, for example, a year o f low mean gross profit, in order to break even at the level o f  profit 
before tax 49,101 spindles were required. In 2006, this figure was only 30,388 in a year in which mean 
gross profit was higher. However, many firms that have fewer spindles than the minimum efficient 
level and are at risk o f long-run exit if competition continues to increase. In the KSE sample an 
increasing number o f spindles are also associated with higher gross profit (see Appendix 5-1).
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production size also gave an advantage in marketing: Firm 8 can produce runs o f 
1000m o f  cloth rather than 300m, meeting the requirem ents o f  larger buyers.
Figure 5-2 Mean spindles and revenue per spindle, firms listed on the Karachi
Stock Exchange (1994-2007)
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Additional operating costs include marketing, administration, insurance and 
packaging. M arketing in particular plays a keys role in attracting new buyers to source 
from Pakistan (and often overcom ing their reluctance to do so) and in the selling o f  
new products such as anti-allergy or anti-dust fabrics. M arketing is conducted both 
through agents and in-house although in Pakistan agents tend to be more involved in 
lower value-added products such as yam  with the exception o f  garment quality 
assurance processes.12 Basic practices include the attendance o f  Directors and 
m arketing team s at leading international trade fayres, and in some cases buyers came 
directly to the Pakistani firms as a result o f  word-of-m outh. A strategy amongst some 
o f  Pakistan’s best producers was to establish relationships with marketing brands. In 
2007, Artistic Denim M ills -  a producer o f  denim fabric -  stated that it had succeeded 
in establishing new relationships with global jeans brands and planned to extend these 
relationships with the opening o f  overseas offices.13 This was accompanied by a
12 Example o f agents in Pakistan are Texcraft, see http://www.tex-craft.com/, and Vigour Impex, 
http://www.vigour-impex.com/, accessed 23 March 2009. Both are engaged in sourcing all types of 
products for buyers as well as inspection and reporting services.
Ij Source: Artistic Denim Mills, Annual Report 2007.
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growth in local manufacturing capacity in Pakistan. Several top performers have also 
moved into the local retail space. Gul Ahmed Textile Mills has established branded 
retail outlets across Pakistan, while Chenab Limited opened several branches of its 
Chen One home furnishing and clothing store across Pakistan and the Middle East.14
Investment in production and marketing capabilities was an important route through 
which firms improved their production capabilities and performance. Expenditure was 
targeted towards new product development, skills and training, IT and professional 
consultancy, market research and participation in exhibitions. Firms also learned 
about methods to improve productivity and quality from in-house trial and error, 
through interactions with buyers, as well as through contacts with other producers in 
the market. Successes within the industry have included the development and 
marketing of high count cloth and bed linen marketed to high end consumers, as well 
as the move among some spinning units into rope-dyed yam for the production of 
denim.15 However, a lack of research and development was often identified as a 
weakness in Pakistan’s textile and clothing sector by industry observers. According to 
one private sector investor, “traditions die hard” with firms “always doing what they 
have done in the past”. According to this interviewee Pakistan producers chase rather 
than create markets and only recently has the industry seen a big improvement in the 
cutting, design and on-time delivery of garments.
As in any industry, professional management practices such as recruitment, 
incentives, targets and monitoring were also important. One important buyer of home 
textile products from Pakistan said that when selecting suppliers they look at the 
background and experience of firms, and in particular “competence of core 
workers...trust in co-workers”. According to the buyer, they “don’t want managers 
jumping into business deals”. The firm need not be large, have the right machinery or 
be already exporting, but must have these basic capabilities and be committed to 
developing into a supplier for this particular buyer.
14 Source: Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd, http://www.gulahmed.com/, Chenab Limited, 
http://www.chenabgroup.com/, accessed 23 March 2009.
15 The measurement o f yam size is on the basis o f mass to length. The larger the number the thinner the 
yam. This is referred to as the ‘yarn count’. Counts o f  over 100 are used in high quality shirts, and 
counts o f  up to 500 can be used in ‘luxury’ bed sheets. Source: "yarn units", in Fenna. D. (2002) (ed) A 
Dictionary o f Weights, Measures, and Units, Oxford University Press
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However, the lack o f  professional m anagem ent in Pakistan was identified as a key 
w eakness by both investors and buyers. One leading private equity investor bemoaned 
the “ lack o f  discipline” where families “sit around the dinner table” to take decisions. 
This prevents a role for third party investors, for example, to provide finance in order 
to invest in econom ies o f  scale. They also expressed frustration in the m anagem ent o f 
firms where “there is only one person in the com pany you can talk to” . Indeed, across 
all the textile firms listed on the KSE, family held on average 38 per cent o f  the total 
shares and at most 97 per cent (see Figure 5-3).16 On average foreign investors held 
less than 1 per cent o f  shares, and in only a handful o f  cases held more than this.
Figure 5-3 Percentage of shares held by family in public listed firms (2005)
Family holding of shares (per cent)
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
5.2 F o u n d e r  experience an d  the accu m u la tio n  o f firm  capab ilities
In addition to entry strategy and product choice, pre-founder experience also shaped 
the initial production and organisational capabilities o f  firms. These capabilities are 
revealed in the firm ’s initial entry size and profitability as well as in its long-term 
growth trajectory. This initial endowment particularly affected the rate o f  learning 
over time through its influence on organisational design, recruitm ent and incentives. 
This direct link between founder experience, capabilities and firm growth is illustrated
16 From data in annual reports I term ‘ family' to refer to the line o f  entry representing the shareholding  
o f  “Directors, C h ief Executive O fficer, their spouses and minor children”.
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by several case studies of firms from Inexperienced, Other manufacturing, Textile- 
related and Experienced backgrounds.17 Group-level size and growth trends were 
previously illustrated in Figure 4-1. In addition, the clustering of performance of 
interviewed firms by founder background is also presented below.
Inexperienced firm s
Founders or Directors of inexperienced firms often struggled with the management of 
production in the textile and clothing industry. Firms often faced the relative 
disadvantage of entering small in an increasingly scale-intensive industry, as well as 
an inability to overcome challenges in the operating environment. Firm 34, for 
example, was founded in the early 1990s by an importer of construction goods.18 The 
founder had no direct experience in the textile industry but established a standalone 
weaving unit in Lahore. However, according to the founder the firm “couldn’t grow” 
because “as soon as it started it faced collapse” due to recession in the cotton sector 
from 1992 to 1993. There had been problems understanding the technology involved 
in the machines, fixing broken equipment and dealing with the high operating costs in 
a small unit with only 48 looms. The founder also faced problems with infrastructure: 
it took two to three days for the product to reach Karachi and the Director found the 
cost of the electricity tariff was “too high”. The firm was initially smaller than the 
average entrant and profit was in decline from the second year of operation (see 
Figure 5-4). Sales fell to zero in 2000 from a peak in the third year of operation, and 
at the time of the interview in December 2004 the founder had just put his unit up for 
sale.
17 Given the time constraints involved in conducting the interviews for each case study it was not 
possible to capture each management practice in detail. Instead, each case study gives a sense o f the 
general quality o f management practices as well as highlighting the most important drivers o f  
performance. Interview content is presented in the own words o f  the Director as often as possible so the 
reader is able to reflect independently on the quality o f management practices alongside my own 
interpretations.
18 This was a difficult interview as the owner was reluctant to talk about the production practices o f the 
firm, understandably when it was performing poorly. The owner was keener to attribute difficulties to 
the operating environment, but I tried to get an idea o f some o f the difficulties the owner had faced in 
running the unit.
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Figure 5-4 Size (left) and gross profit (right) versus mean, Inexperienced
Mean KSE 
■ Firnr*8
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• Firm4 Mean KSE 
Firm 8
- Firm 34 
■Firm 29
NOTE: Data was not available for Firm 8 between 1990 and 1994. 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Similarly, Firm 4 was a spinning mill set up in Punjab in the early 1990s by a doctor 
and politician. The firm began to falter in its fourth year o f  operation and defaulted at 
age 8 when it was taken over by the son o f  one o f  the founders (see Figure 5-4). 
Although the son had recently completed business education in the United States and 
“knew that it w asn’t properly run”, he admittedly had no plan for the unit and instead 
“jum ped in”, spending the first six months on the shop-floor learning about 
production and quality. The Director was able to identify priorities in the mill: he 
recognised that quality o f  the product was important, attempted to diversify the 
custom er base, introduced basic m aintenance practices, and em ployed a ginning 
selector to ensure cotton quality. However, problems continued despite his arrival. 
Profitability depended on a shortage o f  yarn in the m arket when they “will get a better 
price” , there was no m arketing team because if you em ploy som eone “he will 
blackmail you and take buyers to other firms” . Further, when I inquired about training 
that was in place for staff, the Director replied (in English) "God help them". W hile 
the Director managed to increase sales in his first few years, the firm relied 100 per 
cent on local sales and had below the mean profitability o f  the KSE. The firm 
submitted no annual report after 2005 and is likely to have exited.
At times, however, inexperienced firms were able to introduce organisational 
practices that had been acquired through previous experience. Firm 8, for example, is 
a producer o f  industrial cloth and plain sheeting located in Punjab whose founder was
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engaged in the large-scale construction sector. In establishing the new firm, the 
strategy of the founder was to hire the “best professionals” both in management and 
on the shop floor where he employed “educated technical people”. There was also a 
degree of customer orientation: the founder travelled abroad in order to look at which 
products were in demand, and recognised the importance of quality in finding new 
buyers. A human resources department was also established to oversee recruitment, an 
idea he first got from interacting with foreign buyers.
As the mill evolved, it was the commercial focus and organisational structure that 
allowed the improvement of production practices. One the production side, in order to 
keep ahead he kept on “adding capacity, hiring the best people”, and implementing 
“systems that were not being done in Pakistan”. Shop-floor staff were made 
responsible for the identification of new technologies and in one instance there was a 
focus on the folding department in order to reduce quality defects: “nobody thought 
much about them” and they were poorly paid, but staff trained workers in the section 
to detect faults and built a team (several of the workers have now been promoted to 
other sections). Further, the firm began to manufacture higher-value industrial fabrics 
following an approach by European and American buyers who, according to the 
Director, are always keeping an eye on new mills that were coming up and “Pakistan 
is on their radar”. From this base “the word spread” to other buyers and the upgrading 
was welcomed by the firm as they saw grey fabric as a commodity product with small 
margins.19
By Age 5, the firm was larger than other new entrants and was exporting 85 per cent 
of its production. The focus on higher value-added textiles also meant that gross profit 
remained above the KSE average between 1994 and 2007 (see Figure 5-4). The firm 
continued to grow in its first decade and crossed the KSE mean sales level for the first 
time in its seventh year. Of course production challenges remained. The firm had only 
just introduced practices to address underperforming staff and its revenue growth was 
correlated with mean export unit value of cloth. Further, export sales were 
increasingly reliant on quota, rising from 15.0 per cent in 2000 to 87.1 per cent in
19 The founder of this firm was particularly well connected, however. I understand that a close family 
member through marriage was a leading textile producer in Pakistan which may have assisted in the 
firm's progress. The firm has also established its own power plant.
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2004. Nevertheless, despite direct knowledge of textile production, the founder 
established a well-performing mill with devolved production, quality and marketing 
functions.
Similarly, Firm 29 — founded by a car dealer -  also showed commercial focus from 
the outset. A consultant was employed by the business partner in order to decide on 
the location of the mill, and a feasibility study was also conducted to choose the best 
yam to produce for the market. Lack of direct knowledge of the sector meant that sale 
of yarn was initially conducted directly through brokers, and the company produced 
“simple yarn at first”. However, this firm improved performance over time by 
learning how the market worked. At first, yam was sold mainly in Faisalabad, but the 
firm discovered that the market was focused only on low-quality yam, so began 
selling directly to weavers in Lahore and Karachi. The firm added new machinery to 
produce combed and hosiery yam in response to customer demand. A marketing team 
was also put in place to assess demand and approach buyers directly, and a specific 
team w^s appointed during the cotton season to balance requirements of cost, quality 
and timing of purchase. In terms of general management practices, the GM had 
autonomy to recruit staff independently with just the final permission to be obtained 
from the head office. The firm does promote people if they show good performance 
and a supervisor, for example, was one of three staff members recently promoted.
However, the unit continues to use only basic production and organisational practices 
and fails to take a more strategic approach to mill development. It detects problems 
with quality, for example, only if there is “a complaint” from a customer in which 
case the issue is raised with the GM as his ultimate responsibility. If they fail to meet 
a target the Chief Executive (CEO) stated that “if it is the fault of market conditions, 
then they can’t do anything about it”. Turnover of staff is not seen as a problem 
because “there are so many workers there, if  one leaves you can get another”. Finally, 
the CEO admitted that even though a person who does not perform well is initially 
penalised with a warning and then sometimes fired, they may also be transferred to 
another division if they continue to under-perform. As a result, the firm has performed 
only just above the average new entrant in terms of sales and failed to catch up with 
the KSE mean firm size. It has, however, achieved slightly higher relative profitability 
than the KSE mean since shortly after inception (see Figure 5-4).
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As a result, firms from inexperienced backgrounds often experienced difficulties in 
managing production in the new unit. However, variation within the inexperienced 
category in initial size and profitability can be explained by the application of 
acquired organisational capabilities in the new firm.
O ther m anufacturing
In contrast, textile and clothing companies that were created by firms from other 
manufacturing sectors often brought a legacy of production experience to textiles. 
Firm 25, for example, was founded by a well-established leather manufacturing 
company and is currently managed by a business-educated son. Decisions on the mill 
were made jointly by the senior family members and the Director and several 
elements of this prior experience and education came through in the practices 
established in the mill. In terms of product strategy, for example, the firm chose to 
enter into the higher value-added, dyed-yam segment following research by the 
Director, and standards and targets were also introduced following analysis of other 
units of how productivity was measured. The firm also followed a bold marketing 
strategy from the outset: when looking for buyers for the first time the Director 
approached the agent of a large textile firm who is still the company’s agent today. 
Further, the firm has an ambitious product development strategy: the Director studies 
all the new fibres that come into the market and believes that “to make money you 
have to produce something new”. If everyone else “jumps in”, the response is that it is 
necessary to become more efficient.20
It was this push at the outset that shaped the firm’s evolution. Production practices 
were improved over time in a joint effort between management and shop floor staff. 
The Director attempts to understand what is going on in the factory by “getting 
involved” and discussions with the GM and technical team are held frequently to 
address quality issues or the need for spare parts. Several strengths also came through 
in the firm’s general management practices. The firm ensures, for example, that good 
staff are coming into the firm and that they are people “who want to learn something
20 This approach to the business was described as coming from the firm’s background in the leather 
sector which is described as “very tough”, particularly on the production side which involves the need 
to handle large amounts o f  chemicals.
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new ” . They have a graduate recruitment system in place in which each year they take 
three to four new graduates. A system m onitors targets daily -  such as the reduction 
o f  electricity costs or sales in weaving and knitting segments. Finally, the Director 
also attem pts to introduce a positive working environm ent into the firm, citing a 
dislike o f  the ‘M ian Sahib’ culture.21
Firm 25 was larger than most other new entrants in its first year o f  operation (in 1990) 
and has since grown larger than the KSE mean and outperform ed in terms o f  gross 
profit in each year (see Figure 5-5). Exports have accounted for between one third and 
three quarter o f  revenue since inception. The com pany has also maintained higher 
levels o f  profitability than the KSE mean in all years o f operation.
Figure 5-5 Size (left) and gross profit (right) versus mean, Other manufacturing
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Experience in m anufacturing also shaped the initial production and organisational 
capabilities in Firm 2, a weaving unit established by a com pany previously involved 
in the production o f  consum er goods. After using consultants to fill knowledge gaps 
on machinery and conducted their own research o f  product niches, the firm put in 
place standard operating procedures on the shop-floor. In term s o f  m onitoring for 
example, the s taff are required to supply reports to m anagem ent each day on the 
output o f  the m achines and procedures are in place to m onitor the revenue per loom
21 The "Mian Sahib’ culture is one in which the owner is treated as ‘king’ within the m ill, and typically 
refers to a lack o f  professional management. My understanding is that this practice is related to the 
feudal relations still prominent in much o f  Pakistani society.
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per day. The firm has quality monitoring in each department and staff visit other 
factories every two weeks to observe external practices. As a target they also attempt 
to reach foreign inspection standards. When faced with production challenges, for 
example, the firm is also innovative: when attempting to outsource dyeing they found 
“a big problem in quality control in Pakistan” and as a result they inserted quality 
parameters in sales contracts and have found that “people started sticking to it”.
There was also evidence of an ability to implement effective organisational practices. 
Staff are pushed to continually innovate despite resistance and a key approach was 
that they “gave people in the mill a challenge, set the target high” with adequate 
resources and equipment. For instance they introduce “more and more difficult 
products and put them onto the technical team” and even though “staff keep saying 
they can't do it...then they do”. The role of managerial coordination was key: when 
starting out, the firm invested months in developing new products, studying market 
trends and talking to buyers. They saw that “thread count was important” and thus 
decided that most effort needed to be put into “processes such as consistency”.
The firm did struggle with some aspects of production specific to the industry. One 
example given was that when a shift finishes, “staff on the previous shift do not tell 
the next shift what they had done”. The founder also admitted that on the cost side 
they are “not great” and have a “lot of overheads they can do without”. Up until the 
time of the interview they were also not selective on staff rewards for performance -  
if the company does well they give each person the same compensation. However, the 
higher relative production and organisational capabilities were apparent in the firm’s 
operating performance. The unit started out as approximately the same size as other 
new entrants, but rapidly overtook competitors in year 9 of its operations and showed 
above average gross profit (see Figure 5-5). The increase in growth also coincides 
with the arrival in the business of the MBA-educated son of the founder (see Chapter 
6).
Older firms from other manufacturing backgrounds have also become important 
actors in the textile and clothing industry over time. Firm 22, for example, is a 
spinning and weaving unit founded by a family business in the 1970s originally
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involved in leather tanning.22 Learning was gradual: it started off producing carded 
yarn in counts of 20s and 30s for the local market because the machinery they had 
purchased could not producer finer yam counts. They then acted as brokers in the 
local economy, exporting their first container in 1982. It was in 1985 when they had a 
“breakthrough” in the purchase of the land next to the existing unit, importing 14,000 
spindles from Japan and China and designing the unit themselves specifically for 
export.
A major source of learning about the new industry was from employees. According to 
the Director “staff taught them a lot” and they put their performance down to “the 
right technical people and management”. The best thing the owners state they have 
done, for example, is to give managers power to make decisions if a Director is not 
available. Benefits from the leather business also spilled over into textiles: in 
marketing, the firm already had relationships and experience with leading importers in 
western countries in handbags and leather jackets.
The accumulation of experience also fed into the planning process for further new 
product development and to its likelihood of success. When Firm 22 decided to 
introduce weaving into the spinning operation in 2000, before commencing with the 
venture a technical manager was recruited. According to the Director, even though he 
was more expensive he brought experience and it was better in the long-term. They 
also employed marketing managers prior to the construction of the unit so they would 
identify markets with two to three years of planning and build up market knowledge. 
On the production side, two looms were dedicated to sample making, even though it 
meant foregoing some production, and the firm now aims to produce a sample within 
a week. During this time a customer will send a pattern which will be put this on the 
computer using appropriate software, the fabric will then be produced in the mill, and 
then a sample shown to the buyer.
The accumulation of capabilities and use of professional management practices has 
enabled the firm to emerge as a leading producer in the industry. It was among the top
22 The firm is now managed by a younger generation o f  family members included a grandson — a 
graduate in economics and finance whom I interviewed -  and another brother qualified in marketing.
211
40 exporters in 2006 and the firm has continued to stay just above the KSE mean in 
gross profit (see Figure 5-5).
However, a lack of direct knowledge of the textile and clothing industry itself often 
presented tough production and marketing challenges to entrants from other 
manufacturing backgrounds. Firm 38, for example, was a producer of knitted 
garments set up at the end of the 1980s by a founder with experience in tin can 
production. He started off with a very basic production setup which included 36 staff 
producing knitted t-shirts and initially had a buyer in the UK which delivered “good 
business”. However, the firm entered bankruptcy soon after formation, followed by a 
series of intermittent single buyers and a second collapse in the business when buyers 
quit the firm. It was only in 1991 that the firm began to focus on production of 
“upscale, value-added, brands”, but the founder had to teach himself the business 
from scratch through trial and error. Firm 38 rapidly overtook other new entrants in 
mean firm size (see Figure 5-5) but the founder admitted that from 2000/2001 
onwards the firm was “strategising in relation to the quota” and had a “monopoly” in 
the export of these garments. As illustrated in Table 5-2, this company was reliant on 
quota for 96 per cent of exports on average from 2000 to 2004.
Table 5-2 Reliance on quota for exports in Firm 38 (2000-2004)
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean
Quota exports (real USDm, 2000) 
Total exports (real USDm, 2000)
14.5
13.6
15.8
14.9
12.3
14.8
15.3
17.0
16.7
17.2
Quota reliance (per cent) 106.5 106.2 82.3 90.2 96.9 96.5
NOTE: In some cases reliance on quota in a single year exceeded 100 per cent because the quota ran 
from January to December while the financial reporting year runs from July to June.
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
A lack of professional management can also hamper the evolution of firms even with 
experience in other manufacturing sectors. Firm 21, for example, was a family spinoff 
from a group with experience in leather tanning (following a family split). The 
commerce-educated Director has been able to implement some production and 
marketing practices such as new product development (including kite yam), 
attendance of staff at “fancy yarn” exhibitions to get new ideas, visits of technical 
staff to machinery exhibitions to research new technologies, and an active search for 
feedback from buyers on quality issues. However, the firm clearly struggled in several
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areas from the outset. For marketing, they “took details from customs on popular 
destinations” and went to agents to introduce their new product, rather than building 
on known opportunities. At first they produced knitting yam for buyers in Korea, but 
moved to supply weaving yam to China due to problems with quality. Further, there 
were clearly uncomfortable relationships between the Directors and staff: the Director 
said that he has to “show people everything, push them to do things, like a five year 
old child”. On a visit to this factory in 2006, most of the ginning staff has failed to 
turn up for work and there was direct interference on the shop-floor by the Director. 
While the firm started out the mean size of a new entrant, its performance deteriorated 
at Age 2 and then again at Age 8 (see Figure 5-5). It has since failed to invest in 
production since 1994.
As a result, firms from backgrounds in other manufacturing sectors often performed 
differently according to prior organisational and production experience and the 
challenges of the new operating environment. This heterogeneity in performance can 
help understand the ambiguous relationship between founder experience and firm 
performance established in section 4.2.
Textile-related
New textile and clothing firms that were created by founders from textile-related 
sectors often came from backgrounds such as textile trading or cotton ginning. In 
addition to the knowledge of product gaps and market niches, many of these firms 
also had production and marketing capabilities related to their prior experience. 
Textile traders, for instance, often had existing relationships with buyers and thus 
knowledge of marketing techniques, while ginners had experience of running an 
industrial unit and knowledge of cotton sourcing and quality. Some firms brought 
transferrable organisational capabilities to the new unit and there is evidence of some 
conventional spinoffs emerging from prior employment in the sector. However, the 
family structure o f many units continued to negatively influence the quality of 
management practices within new firms.
Firm 20, for example, is a cloth unit founded by a former textile trading firm set up by 
two partners after previous careers in finance and textile marketing. At first, they
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made money through trading in which they would buy greige cloth, outsource the 
finishing in Pakistan, and then export the cloth to manufacturers in both local and 
export markets. After five years, however, the firm entered cloth manufacturing, 
choosing to produce fabrics from coarse count cotton as it suited the cotton available 
locally. Immediately, the firm introduced professional management: they hired 
business graduates and accountants and aimed to design a business that could “run 
without them” and to whom they could “delegate responsibility”. The founders also 
introduced standard marketing practices including visits to major trade fayres such as 
Heintex and visits to local and foreign buyers with production samples. The firm’s 
efforts were successful: customers include Spanish and Portuguese manufacturers, 
wholesalers and well-known British buyers such as Marks & Spencer and BHS.
The firm struggled more on the production side as a result o f the lack of direct 
manufacturing experience. One Director recognised that they needed to be “better in 
the running of the plant, be tighter” and had brought in a training manager to do so. 
The Director also recognised the need to reduce wastage, work with the staff to 
improve the productivity of the machines, and was travelling every second day to the 
mill to do so. The firm had failed to become a supplier when IKEA last looked for 
new partners in the Pakistan, despite being keen to become a partner since they “teach
23you the business” (such as how to ensure consistent quality) and “get you going”. 
They were also struggling with a shortage of skilled labour in the unit. However, the 
firm has managed to make some improvements in performance over time such as 
increased capacity utilisation, and invested in some product development such as the 
manufacture of specialised towels (see Figure 5-6).
2j The Director also said that IKEA teaches suppliers how to prototype, do sampling, trial runs, labels 
and packing and additional “know-how” such as lead times, suggesting a lack o f  knowledge in this 
area.
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Figure 5-6 Installed capacity (2003-2007) (left) and capacity utilisation (2004- 
2007) (right), Firm 20
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Alongside some other more experienced entrants, Firm 20 rapidly overtook the KSE 
mean in term s o f  size and gross profit soon after formation (see Figure 5-X).
Figure 5-7 Sales (left) and gross profit (right) (1990-2007) versus mean, Textile- 
related
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.0
0.5
-100.0
-15
-20
Year Year
Mean KSE FirmS Mean KSE Firm 20 FirmS
Firm 23  Firm 17 Firm 23  Firm 17
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
One new entrant into garments, Firm 43, used an innovative way to overcome its lack 
o f  independent m anufacturing experience. The two founders had previously worked in 
production and m arketing in textile mills when they established their own knitting 
unit in the 1990s. They first hired an existing unit that had “experienced people” in
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order to learn how to manage production on their own (and through this route they 
were also able to start out with their own finance). They then gradually increased 
capacity: in the first year they installed 75-80 sewing m achines but then expanded to 
400 machines, alongside knitting and dyeing facilities. The firm also gradually built 
up the buyer base. Their first product was a ladies legging followed by w om en’s tops. 
From this initial production they took samples that the marketing team showed to 
other buyers. By 2007, they were producing m en’s fleece sweatshirts for which they 
have paid particular attention to the quality o f  the order and the procedures required 
for inspection. Ongoing challenges include rapid departure o f  s ta ff without notice and 
poor com m unication with managers. In its 5th and 10th years, the firm was smaller 
than the average quota exporter, but its garments had gradually obtained higher unit 
value (see Figure 5-8).
Figure 5-8 Exports (left), unit value (right) (2000-2006) versus mean, Firm 43
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NOTE: Export data 2000-2004 is under quota. In 2006 it refers to unrestricted exports. 
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2006
Older firms that had entered textile m anufacturing from backgrounds in related 
industries had often shown the accumulation o f  capabilities over time. Firm 5, for 
example, was originally in the leather tanning sector in the 1930s but gradually 
expanded into the textile industry over the following decades via ginning, textile 
trading, spinning, weaving and then finished cloth. The firm is currently managed 
both by the older generation -  in senior roles such as C hief Financial O fficer and 
C hief Executive -  and the younger Directors w ho are responsible for functions such 
as marketing. This family group, however, has placed em phasis on the technical and
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business education o f  family members -  including a lot o f  time on the shop floor -  
leading to sharp knowledge o f  both the commercial and operational sides o f  
production. The young directors also brought enthusiasm and new ideas: in the 
expansion o f  the European side o f  the business, a D irector started from scratch in 
Portugal and Spain, collaborating with 1-2 buying houses that set up m eetings with 
European buyers. In production, their motto is: “quality, service, relationship” . 
Investm ent in this unit has continued well into the 1990s including three new m ills 
(see Figure 5-9). One o f the firm ’s units has also m aintained its position as one o f  the 
Karachi Stock Exchange’s largest producers (see Figure 5-7).
Figure 5-9 Capital expenditure (1990-2007) (left) and production capacity (1994- 
2007) (right), Firm 5
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However, even with knowledge o f  the textile industry itself, it was a lack o f  
professional management -  often related to the family structure o f  the business -  that 
often had a detrimental impact on performance. Firm 23, for example, had a family 
history o f  leather production and experience in yarn trading before entering textile 
spinning and weaving at the “suggestion o f  a relative” . The current m anager o f  the 
firm was qualified as an MBA and there were some positive actions being taken by 
the firm such as com m itm ent to a good organisational culture.24 However, the
24 The MBA-educated Director had attempted to introduce a more professional structure in last few 
years. The Director tries to motivate staff himself and gives direct access to employees in order to 
demonstrate that the firm does not have a 'Saithi' culture (similar to the ‘Mian Sahib’ culture previously 
described). Management and technical managers attend fayres and machinery suppliers do training on 
new machines for two senior staff who then train others on the shop floor. Staff are retained through
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management of the firm was weak. The Director admitted that they failed to deal with 
problems in the business because were embarrassed to show weakness to friends who 
were “big” in textiles. In one unit managed by a family member the interviewee 
admitted that “nobody looked after weaving” so it closed down. The Director also 
admitted that in the past the firm relied on connections of family and friends for sales, 
and a family separation in 1998 was described as “disastrous”. The firm had made no 
investment in machinery since 1994 and finally exited the market in the post-2004 
period (see Figure 5-7).
There were a few cases in which a change of management -  and the arrival of a 
motivated or experienced Director -  led to a change in firm performance. Firm 17 was 
originally purchased in the 1960s by a large business group and managed by a family 
member, engaging in yam, cloth and processing. The firm had “good niches to start 
off with”, exporting high quality yam to Japan, but the son -  educated in finance with 
experience in one of the higher value textile units of the group -  started running the 
mill in 2000 after the founder lost interest. During this period in the 1990s, the 
Director admitted that there had been a big “leap” in the industry and “this company 
got left behind”. As a result, the director engaged in radical restructuring of the unit. 
He kept only spinning in the business and “got rid of everything else”, cutting the 
staff from 1,200 to 600 and reorganising the operating divisions of the mill. He 
introduced a new product strategy, targeting smaller buyers who could not afford a 
container of yam and if they received a complaint they had a “100 per cent return 
policy” with “no questions asked”. Further, he also re-designed the staffing and 
organisational structure. He recruited a well-qualified spinning manager and 
concentrated on keeping good people in the business to whom he gave direct 
responsibility and the financial incentives to perform well. As illustrated in Figure 5-7 
above, the radical drop in sales has been stabilised and profitability has been increased 
from its trough in 1999.
It is firms from textile-related industries that show some of the most exciting 
developments in Pakistani industry. Conventional spinoffs are being created by
salary increases and entry-level employees have been promoted to senior positions -  he was able to 
give several examples. However, he admitted that they attracted a lot o f people through firm reputation 
and had “no systems” in place regarding human resources. As a result, any positive measures were to 
be overwhelmed by the challenges facing the firm.
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employees with industry-specific employment experience applying innovative ways 
to overcome entry barriers. This has often resulted in positive growth. Similarly, some 
have accumulated experience over time to become important actors in the industry. 
However, a lack of professional management continued to hamper firms from more 
textile-related backgrounds, often leading to rapid declines in performance and even 
exit.
Experienced
Managerial quality was highest among firms with a history of operating in the textile 
and clothing sector. This prior experience informed choice of product, machinery and 
marketing strategy. In particular, among these firms there was a direct link between 
organisational design, shop floor practices and subsequent firm performance. Case 
studies of experienced firms also show how capabilities were accumulated over time 
through trial and error, learning and the optimal use of human resources. An educated 
and motivated new generation of Directors also brought ideas from formal education 
and a fresh approach to doing business.
Firm 10 was created in 1990 as a family spinoff from an existing firm engaged in 
home textile production. The nephew of the owner of the first mill was chosen to set 
up the unit -  he was MBA-educated, but with no work experience. As a result, the 
existing mill owner “did everything because he didn’t know” including the choice of 
machinery and product.25 The production of good quality, coarse yam was chosen as 
the first product of the new venture (a first phase of production that lasted from 1990- 
1997) as there was little capacity for its production in Pakistan at the time. The buyers 
in the first two years were the same traders as used in the spawning company, during 
the first two years of operation marketing was conducted out of the same office. In its 
first year of operation, the mill had overtaken the KSE mean in size and showed 
higher profitability (see Figure 5-12). The day to day management of the mill put in 
the hands of the Director and after three years Firm 10 was set up independently in a 
separate office.26
25 The interview with the current Director and a factory visit took place in early 2006.
26 Even though the owners are relatives, both units now consider themselves competitors.
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Figure 5-10 Sales (left) and gross profit (right) (1990-2007) versus mean, 
Experienced
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NOTE: Firm 11 was established in the early 1990s but annual reports were only available after 1999. 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
However, over time the Director and shop-floor staff accum ulated capabilities which 
contributed to the long-run growth o f  the firm. The firm learned from buyers, for 
example, about new items o f  interest and products that were not being made in 
Pakistan. The founder introduced a num ber o f  new m anagem ent practices drawn from 
his MBA education: an industrial engineering departm ent was created for example to 
apply mathematical m odelling to optimise production. Over time, a full m arketing 
team was also developed and a m arketing office created in the USA and China. The 
expansion into China in particular came out o f  existing contacts in the region and the 
firm ’s knowledge o f  its growing market for textile products. Exposure in the sector 
also influenced product development. In 1997, the Director decided to diversify into 
weaving with 128 looms, but focused on wide-width production for home textiles as 
they felt that the knitting sector in Pakistan lacked efficiency.27 The Director has 
focused on implementing professional m anagement practices: he identified an 
important driver o f productivity as “hiring the best people, listening to them, and 
m otivating them ”. A key driver o f  product developm ent is also that s ta ff were willing 
“to take risks” . The firm has employed engineers in the m arketing team in order to 
draw on m arket knowledge in the development o f  new yam s, for example.
27 According to the Director, banks were “happy to lend” to finance the new unit because the firm had 
no existing debt and had been making good profits for the preceding years, and they were one of the 
first firms to obtain long-run loans from banks. Initially, the firm introduced some looms for apparel 
fabric, but the later focus on home textiles has meant that “volumes have skyrocketed” to their benefit.
220
Of course, challenges remain. A target that the firm failed to meet was the 
construction of its finishing unit which was delayed by three months. In this instance, 
aspects of the construction were both under and over cost, showing admitted failures 
in the planning process. The CEO also admitted that targets in the firm lack formality, 
but they are making attempts to formalise these procedures. However, as shown 
above, the combination of the firm’s heritage, the Director’s education and the 
accumulation of capabilities over time had led to the rapid growth of the firm, 
particularly in export markets. By age 15, the firm’s total revenue was 4.4 times larger 
than the KSE mean, with reliance on quota for only 11 per cent of exports between 
2000 and 2004.
A second example of a firm that was spun off from an established textile group to be 
managed by a younger relative is Firm 11. The current CEO was educated in a leading 
US business school and the firm’s founding heritage has resulted in an ambitious 
product development strategy and an emphasis on professional management practices, 
particularly in human resource development. There were a number of strategic 
elements to the way the firm approached the new venture, for example. For 
production they chose an isolated, undeveloped location to establish the unit so as to 
“not inherit bad practices”. The unit was set up as an integrated mill from scratch with 
yam spinning, fabric production, finishing and stitching, and the layout was designed 
to optimise production between functions. They employed a specialist international 
company to train workers in sewing and processing and to run the unit. For marketing, 
the firm also “hired the best marketing team in Europe they could”, using a head­
hunter to build a team which started taking orders from overseas. The firm describes 
itself as 95 per cent professionally managed: the CEO takes no active role in sales or 
marketing and only engages in relationship management or “exception management”, 
seeing his role instead as to optimise resources.
The firm gradually accumulated production capabilities over time. In product 
development, they started with one style and one wash, and then moved into multiple 
styles of garment. More recently, the firm has established a design centre which 
buyers can visit, and they have also developed their own innovative capabilities 
through the recruitment of a top Italian designer. Six sigma planning was introduced 
in order to increase efficiency and quality, and in order to meet the environmental
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needs of leading international buyers a water treatment plant was constructed for 
chemical effluent. With a team of foreign production and marketing staff, they have 
also introduced the latest production techniques on the shop floor such as a machine 
that blows garments inside out, advanced ironing machines and contemporary design 
techniques such as printing with brushes and sandblasting.
Challenges remain for the firm even with such experience. The CEO admitted that it 
was an ambitious project and that the target was to grow sales and run a “tighter” 
operation. Indeed, sales growth of 9 per cent in some years would be considered as 
poor in comparison with aggregate gains made in competitor countries. The firm was 
also heavily reliant on quota for up to 100 per cent of exports between 2000 and 2004 
when it was among the top 15 exporters (see Table 5-3). However, the management 
practices in the firm stood out from competitors and have contributed to the rapid 
growth of the firm (see Figure 5-12). At Age 10 the company was larger than the KSE 
mean, and after the initial break from its joint venture partner it became more 
profitable than the KSE mean by 10-15 percentage points.
Table 5-3 Export reliance under quota (2000-2004) in Firm 11
Measure/year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean
Quota exports (real USDm, 2000) 
Total exports (real USDm, 2000)
10.9
15.8
18.7
24.6
23.6
32.0
18.4
24.2
31.3
29.9
Quota reliance (per cent) 69.1 76.1 73.7 76.1 104.6 79.9
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Securities and Exchange Commission o f  
Pakistan, own analysis
As established in Chapter 4, it was often older, experienced firms that were the best 
performers in the industry. In these cases it was the interaction of founder experience 
and learning over time which led to the accumulation of production and organisational 
capabilities. Firm 3, for example, was established in the 1970s as a small bleaching 
plant by a commerce-educated founder from a family of cotton growers and ginners. 
Over time the company has integrated vertically through the introduction of weaving, 
spinning and the manufacture of made-ups and now sells to leading brands in the 
United States and United Kingdom. The founder is still involved in the running of the 
business, but in recent years all his sons have been educated in business professions 
and are closely involved in the management of individual business functions such as
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garments, home textiles and processing.28 However, production is professionally 
organised on the shop-floor.
The gradual accumulation of experience over time was apparent. The first two years 
of production were described as “lean and maintained”, but after two years the firm 
was able to expand the processing of cloth, the bleaching o f wider width fabrics and 
finally into cloth weaving itself with the “latest, modem set-up” in 1985. The firm has 
been through what the founder described as a series of “continual improvements”. 
One of the reasons they chose to internalise spinning, for example, was because the 
quality of raw materials received from external suppliers was often poor and not 
delivered on time. The firm has also focused on obtaining the best technology 
available in the market in its machinery and installed its own power generation as 
power from the main grid was often interrupted. Over time the firm has developed 
best practice quality systems: products need to be approved before being passed on to 
the next stage of production and monitoring is conducted on a 24 hour basis.
Marketing efforts were initially targeted at local buyers and the first clients of the firm 
were indirect exporters. The founder described how he learned a lot from this 
interaction: “which market to sell to, how they were working”. The firm shifted its 
sights to the international market after 10 years, when the founder made his own 
arrangements to contact buyers and travel to the Far East, Australia, New Zealand and 
Europe. In 1986, the first small orders for fabric came from France, Netherlands and 
the UK and in 1995 the firm received its first order from a large department store in 
the United States which later became the firm’s most important customer. Quota was 
required for export sales to clients in the US market (see Table 5-4), although this 
dependence was less than competitors outlined above.
Table 5-4 Export reliance under quota (2000-2004) in Firm 3
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean
Quota exports (real USDm, 2000) 21.1 20.4 23.6 21.9 31.4
Total exports (real USDm, 2000) 56.7 51.9 66.8 60.5 64.6
Quota reliance (per cent) 37.3 39.3 35.4 36.3 48.7 39.4
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f  Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
281 interviewed the founder o f the firm, a Director, as well as a number o f  staff members during a visit 
to its factory in April 2006.
Organisational capabilities have also evolved over time and professional standards of 
management stand in contrast to many other family-held businesses. The firm is 
structured so that “professional people run the different units” and the founder 
describes the relationship with the owners as one of “planning by consent”. Targets 
set include the achievement of reprocessing levels less than 0.1 per cent and reduction 
of chemical costs. Technical managers and Directors work together to set and monitor 
these targets and all data on performance are stored online in the firm’s Enterprise 
Resource Planning system. Further, the skills of staff are optimised: when introducing 
new machines, the firm selects the best staff that who operating the old machines and 
applies their skills in learning the new techniques.30 The standards of the business are 
also reflected in the progressive policies towards employing women: on the shop 
floor, parents are invited to the unit so they can see where their daughters would be 
living and working. This has a resulted in the recruitment of large numbers of female 
employees and a positive attitude towards women on the shop floor.
The business is not without challenges. Recurring problems include the 
implementation of a “proper system of diagnosis, corrective action and prevention”. 
The human resources system was also described as informal. Further, while the firm 
clearly increased capacity in the run-up to the ending of quotas, it still faced 
challenges in improving capacity utilisation across products. However, this firm has 
made rapid progress to become one of Pakistan’s best exporters. It has grown rapidly 
and remained insulated from cyclical fluctuations in the cotton cycle -  its gross profit 
has persisted above average in all years during which data were collected (see Figure
5-12).
Among experienced firms, the education and employment experience of younger 
Directors also mattered. When Firm 12 was created the original business included a 
consumer goods franchise, an oil mill, and involvement in the goods transportation 
sector. Initially, they entered the spinning sector as a result of the allocation of
29 In fact, the founder breaks the analysis o f  performance into the short-run in which the main obstacles 
are “operational problems” and the long-run when improvements can be made by investing in new 
machinery and technically strong employees.
30 The founder himself believes that “people are hungry for opportunity” and claims that it has a 
turnover o f staff o f less than four per cent. He also believed in close contact with workers and good 
communication through all channels as it is “more human”. This is in sharp contrast to many owners 
who describe shop floor workers as ‘uneducated’ or just interested in money.
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licences, but later thought “if spinning, why not further”.31 However, the particular 
transition into garments in 1993 was driven by the arrival of the two sons to the 
business, one in the 1990s and one in the post-2000 period.32 The first son was 
educated abroad and had completed an MBA before joining the business, while the 
second did an undergraduate degree in production management before working for a 
leading consultancy company in the United States “fixing companies” in the textile 
and banking sector. The interaction of the firm’s business heritage, professional 
management and access to the quota drove the rapid growth of this firm (see Figure 5- 
12)33
A number of good quality production practices were introduced in addition to 
standard methods present in other firms. One innovative practice was the opening of a 
manufacturing unit in the United States in order to respond to urgent orders from 
buyers. They also opened up a unit in Dubai after 9/11 to ensure that if a similar event 
happened again they would be able to rely on this base and prevent buyers pulling out 
from Pakistan. The firm also has its own product development centre with textile 
engineers who focus on research and development at each stage of production. New 
products under development included reflective material and employees are given 
freedom to develop new ideas on the shop floor. One particular advantage is the 
integrated facilities offered by the firm: a buyer can request the fabric and the type of 
yarn they wish, and the firm can then make this sample in-house.
For quality, they have an independent assurance team that conducts inline audits and 
the checking of final goods. They have a “back tracking system” in place which aims 
to put a “sense of responsibility and accountability in each person checking the 
garments”. The role of western buyers in implementing quality standards was 
identified as key. Four years prior to the interview the firm had introduced a visual 
quality system and at this time leading western retailers had visited the plant “more 
than 50 times” and spent two to three days each time. They gave seminars to the 
supervisors on quality checking, who then gave training to the operators of the 
machines. The founders also created several foreign marketing offices. To establish
31 They also had relatives in textiles who went on to develop a successful home textile business.
32 Sadly the father died in 1993.
331 spent one day in the factory interviewing technical managers, and conducting two interviews with 
one o f the Directors (one in 2006 and one in 2007).
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these new operations two of the most “dynamic people” were sent abroad for six 
months to recruit staff for the operation.
It was therefore the arrival of motivated and experienced family members which 
shaped growth strategy and capability accumulation in this firm. However, the 
reliance of exports on quota was 72 per cent on average in the run up to quota 
abolition in 2005 (see Table 5-5). This left the firm exposed to a rapid increase in 
competition in the post-quota period, a shift that will now be explored in Chapter 6.
Table 5-5 Export reliance under quota (2000-2004) in Firm 12
Firm/Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean
Quota exports (nominal USDm) 
Total exports (nominal USDm)
12.9
21.0
17.2
28.3
21.6
26.8
38.4
51.6
44.8
54.3
Quota reliance (per cent) 61.8 60.7 80.7 74.4 82.5 72.0
SOURCE: Trade Development Authority o f Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Conclusion
This chapter established the heterogeneity in capabilities and performance across 
firms in Pakistan’s textile industry. In particular, it illustrated how pre-founder 
experienced shaped the initial production and organisational capabilities of the new 
firm, and how this base shaped the rate at which further capabilities were accumulated 
over time. There is evidence that founder experience persists in the firm’s ability to 
improve production, quality and marketing over time, and that only radical changes of 
management can bring a shift in performance. The family structure of firms, however, 
had often prevented the introduction of professional management practices regardless 
of background and shaped firm performance.
The case studies showed that less experienced firms who lack production knowledge 
can often perform poorly after entry due to a lack of prior experience of shop-floor 
production. However, those founders that are able to apply general business 
experience such as commercial awareness, marketing and organisational design have 
performed better. This finding offers an insight into the capabilities which matter in 
the new firm environment, and the observed variation in performance within 
experience categories as established in Chapter 4. It was from textile-related
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backgrounds that true spinoffs were emerging in the industry, often introducing 
professional management from the outset. Older firms from related backgrounds had 
also accumulated production and marketing capabilities over time in order to become 
leading manufacturers in the industry. Within experienced firms, product and 
machinery choice was influenced by deep industry knowledge and marketing routes 
offered through existing relationships with buyers. The arrival of new, younger 
Directors often energised firms -  bringing insights from formal education and 
employment experience -  and built on the existing capabilities contributed by the 
founder.
The analysis has also shown how firms improved performance in this period. New 
entrants used innovative approaches to overcome knowledge gaps and enable gradual 
learning such as the leasing of existing units. Experienced firms often established new 
units in order to engage in production design from the outset and to avoid inheritance 
of bad practices. Firms engaged in organisational innovation, mixing production and 
marketing teams to improve new product development. While interaction with 
consultants and outside organisations helped introduce new practices, the pace of 
learning was shaped by the initial organisational framework put in place by the 
founders.
Finally, data in this chapter have also indicated that although there was some 
divergence in performance between 1994 and 2004, access to quota did contribute to 
the rapid growth of several firms in the sample (and hence skewed the performance 
data). This left these companies -  and the industry as a whole — exposed to a rapid 
increase in competition in the post-2004 period. It is to this external shift and the 
subsequent performance of these heterogeneous firms that I now turn in Chapter 6.
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A ppend ices
Appendix 5-1: Number of spindles and gross profit
In the KSE sam ple gross profit tends to increase with the num ber o f  spindles in the 
unit as illustrated in Figure 5-22. For each increase in 10,000 spindles, gross profit 
increases on average by 0.71 percentage points (t=4.23, p=0.000).
Figure 5-11 Gross profit by number of spindles (2006)
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Chapter 6 The determinants of firm performance during 
trade liberalisation: productivity, quality and marketing
In the final years of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, firms in Pakistan’s 
textile and clothing industry invested heavily in preparation for the new trading 
environment. This involved the addition of new production capacity, the 
modernisation of existing machinery, and diversification into higher value-added 
textile and clothing products. However, trade liberalisation led to an increase in cost 
and quality competition and rapid shakeout in the post-quota period. In this chapter I 
analyse how companies performed in response to these external changes and explain 
heterogeneity in performance. Specifically I examine how -  from their level of 
capability in 2004 -  firms improved productivity, quality and marketing practices.
I find that following the abolition of export quotas on 1 January 2005, buyers 
increasingly demanded higher quality and more cost effective production as they 
reorganised their supply chains in the new trading order. Case studies illustrate how 
some firms were able to rapidly improve performance and expand sales in response, 
while others saw a rapid deterioration in sales and profits. Several themes shape how 
firms learned how to improve productivity, quality and marketing practices: in-house 
trial and error, the recruitment of innovative staff, the use of consultants, and 
innovative approaches to organisational structure. However, at the core of good 
performance was a focused, high-incentive environment which encouraged worker 
autonomy and the delivery of production and quality improvements on the shop floor. 
Those that had failed to take such actions prior to trade reform were often left behind. 
The direct link between pre-founder experience, production and organisational 
capabilities, and firm performance during increased competition is thus made explicit.
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6.1 Increasing competition during trade liberalisation
Investment and response
Competition in the global textile and clothing industry increased between 1994 and 
2004 as the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing gradually lifted ceilings on exports 
from developing countries. During this period firms in Pakistan had acquired 
capabilities and become subject to an increasingly competitive environment. It was 
also in the five years approaching full quota removal in 2005 that many firms 
increased investment in production capacity, product development and marketing. As 
previously illustrated in Figure 3-7, this capital expenditure peaked in 2005 both at the 
aggregate level and among Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-listed companies.
Firms were motivated to add or modernise production capacity for several reasons. 
Firm 46 expanded in an attempt to take advantage of economies of scale in the new 
quota-free environment. Firm 24 replaced old machinery with new technology in an 
attempt to “make themselves more viable” as well as to bring savings on labour and 
electricity costs. Several mills were also motivated to integrate vertically in order to 
deliver a one stop shop for large western buyers. When observing that foreign retailers 
such as H&M and Walmart were opening buying houses in Pakistan, for example, 
Firm 40 did “not expect a future in weaving” and as a result purchased a processing 
unit to move further into the home textile segment.
Among companies listed on the KSE, however, large investments were concentrated 
among a small number of firms. Between 2000 and 2004, among 130 firms on which 
data were available only 32 firms made capital expenditure of more than 10 per cent 
of sales and 73 made investments of greater than 5 per cent of sales. The majority — 
116 firms -  made investments greater than 1 per cent of sales (much lower than the 
mean share of depreciation in costs of 3.9 per cent in 2004). Among the top 32 largest 
investors, the well-known Umer Group increased capital expenditure in each of its 
three KSE-listed spinning and weaving units, raising the total number of spindles 
from 83,000 in 2000 to 143,000 in 2007 and looms from 0 to 514 in the same period 
(see Figure 6-1). Similarly, Azgard9 -  a leading exporter of denim garments -  
invested heavily in new spinning, weaving and stitching capacity, taking the total 
number of spindles to over 54,000 in 2007 and sewing machines to over 1,800 (see
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also Figure 6-1). Investment levels were also associated with firm performance prior 
to the abolition o f  quotas. Those investing more than 10 per cent o f  sales had mean 
gross profit o f  10.6 per cent in 2004, while those investing more than 1 per cent had 
mean gross profit o f  5.9 per cent.
Figure 6-1 Capital expenditure in Umer Group (1990-2007) (left) and production 
capacity in Azgard9 (2002-2007) (right)
2 ,500 60 ,0 0 00.7
C
o
50 ,0 0 0■5 2,000m
0.5 4 0 ,0 0 0  c
.£ 1 ,500
0.4 3 0 ,0 0 0  o
1,0000.3
20,000 £
0.2 500 10,000
0.1
2002  2003 2 004  2 005  2 0 0 6  2007MOQ.n U3 O
Year
Year
— Rotors Looms
B lessed — Faisal Mean KSEBhanero SpindlesSewing machines
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Com panies also invested in product developm ent in the run up to the abolition o f 
export quotas. Firm 3, a garment and home textile exporter, developed its own brands 
in Pakistan as the m anagem ent recognised that they would be exposed if  foreign 
products w ere to be imported into the local market. Firm 27, a yarn manufacturer, 
anticipated that the large holding o f  quota among knitw ear producers would lead to 
“stiff com petition” in this sector locally, hence it started to withdraw from the knitting 
sector and produce yarns for towels and home textiles instead.
M arketing efforts were also increased in preparation for the new trading environment. 
The philosophy o f  Firm 37, a home textile m anufacturer, was to focus on increasing 
turnover in the longer term through an expanded m arketing team  and m anagerial 
com m itm ent, even if  it meant tying up finance in production for a few m onths or 
sacrificing short-term profit. In preparation for the ending o f  quotas Firm 26 started 
building relationships with end product manufacturers in Pakistan rather than abroad 
as local prices were improving. Further, as the location o f  garment production shifted 
over time -  from Korea and Hong Kong to China and Bangladesh -  Firm 27 began
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exporting yam to these countries, as well as developing relationships with niche cloth 
producers in the Pakistani market in the provision of speciality yam.
The purchase of additional quota was also a practice among firms keen to develop 
relationships with garment and home textile buyers before quota abolition in 2005. 
Firm 36, a yam and cloth producer, went on several trips to the United States in order 
to convince new, high-profile buyers to source its home textile products through its 
quota allocation. Mr Saigol of Kohinoor Textile Mills explained that from 2001 
onwards the company changed their product mix to higher count bed sheets and relied 
more on imported cotton, purchasing quota in order to gain market access.
Firms also invested in their organisational capabilities. A Director of Firm 40, a 
manufacturer of bed-sets, explained that they had introduced in a factory wide IT 
system which allowed business resource planning and effective monitoring of all 
stages of production. In relation to the monitoring of grey fabric coming into the mill, 
Firm 37 “didn’t want a system before because it was working OK”, but has since put 
in place an IT system to generate reports on the stock lots in order to reduce losses.
When the quota system was finally abolished on 1 January 2005 firms had thus 
accumulated heterogeneous capabilities within the textile and clothing industry. At the 
time of an interview in December 2004, “orders were flooding into Pakistan” for Firm 
14, a yam and cloth unit, and they had received requests to ship products on 1st 
January 2005. Similarly, during an interview with Firm 40 at the same time, exports 
of bedsets were already booked up for 2005.
Increasing com petition and shakeout
A number of changes were witnessed immediately in the post-quota period at the firm 
level. Firstly, there was increasing external and internal competition as buyers 
demanded lower cost, higher quality products. Firm 26, a yam and cloth 
manufacturer, explained that it had seen a drop in unit price in the first year (see 
Figure 6-2), found that it was “no longer able to compete with China”, and was losing 
customers in the Far East as a result. According to Kohinoor Textile Mills, “[t]he 
changing global market environment created several new challenges. Severe
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com petition from rival manufacturers who undercut prices made sales difficult” .1 
Similarly, in Firm 39, a knitted garment exporter, buyers “put their foot dow n” in 
terms o f  price and were aware o f  their weaknesses.
Certainly, unit values o f  both yarn and home textile exports continued to drop in the 
post-quota period (see also Figure 6-2). Further, although the unit values o f  cloth 
stabilised after rapid falls from the late 1990s, there was price instability in both 
woven and knitted garments immediately after the quotas ended (see Appendix 6-1). 
Firms were also faced with marketing challenges as the location o f  buyers rapidly 
changed. According to the Director o f  Firm 26, one by one, buyers in Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, and more recently in Sri Lanka, Guatemala, M auritius and the Caribbean were 
“going extinct” as Chinese garment m akers began to dominate.
Figure 6-2 Unit value of yarn, Firm 26 and Pakistan mean export (1994-2007) 
(left), and home textile exports (May 2003-December 2007) (right)
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The second impact o f  quota removal am ong firms in Pakistan’s textile and clothing 
industry was the knock-on effect o f  the shakeout which occurred in the local industry 
following the global reorganisation o f  production. Since the ending o f  the quota, Firm 
25, a spinner, “got a hit from knitwear” and alm ost went bankrupt in that segment. As 
a result, the Directors were taking a more aggressive approach to marketing and 
targeting new m arkets such as Portugal. As some local firms grew many yam  and
1 Kohinoor Textile Mills, Annual Report 2007, p. 7
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cloth producers turned their attentions to the domestic market. Firm 7, for example, 
expected growth in Pakistan in the demand for value-added products and that the 
customer base of the firm would shift from export to within Pakistan. This did occur 
in Firm 7 in 2006 when local sales overtook exports, climbing by 57 per cent in real 
terms as exports fell by 16 per cent.
Thirdly, there were a number of changes in the local cost environment in this period. 
As illustrated by Table 6-1, while the mean real cost growth among KSE firms from 
2004 to 2007 was 1 per cent, salary costs grew by 29 per cent and energy costs by 8 
per cent. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that there was increasing competition 
for staff as the industry became more competitive. There were also continual 
government increases in the minimum wage.2 The cost of repaying borrowed finance 
grew in this period as interest rates rose from 6.9 to 11.3 per cent, presenting 
additional local challenges for firms.3 According to Ghazi Fabrics International, for 
example, in addition to tough competition from traditional rivals China, Bangladesh 
and India “[o]ther factors hurting our margins are the consistent rise in all input costs 
such as a hike in cotton price, furnace oil, gas, labour and financial costs”.4
Table 6-1 Growth of costs, selected textile and clothing firms listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (2004-2007) (real Pak Rs, 2000)
Cost Number 
of obs.
Sales
growth
(mean)
Cost
growth
(mean)
Raw
material
Salaries Fuel Deprec
iation
All firms 
(difference from 
mean in brackets)
115 1.07 1.01 1.02
(+0.01)
1.29
(+0.28)
1.08
(+0.07)
1.29
(+.28)
‘Bust’ firms 77 0.89 0.87 0.85
(-0.02)
1.19
(+0.32)
0.99
(+0.12)
1.29
(+0.42)
‘Boom’ firms 38 1.41 1.29 1.34
(+0.05)
1.48
(+0.19)
1.27
(-0.02)
1.30
(0-01)
NOTE: Growth rates are provided in whole numbers, where 1.02 is a growth rate o f 2 per cent. 
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
2 According to the 2007 Annual Report o f Kohinoor Textile Mills, “The government raised minimum 
wages with effect from July 01, 2006 leading to an across the board increase in worker’s wages and 
other charges by approximately 35 per cent. Cost o f financing was substantially higher due to increase 
in rates o f mark up and additional borrowing for fixed assets” (2007:7). It is unclear, however, to what 
extent this increase was accounted for by the high rate o f  inflation at the time.
3 Source: State Bank o f Pakistan, Lending and deposit rates (All banks, lending rates), 5 Mar 2009, 
http://www.sbp.gov.pk/ecodata/index2.asp, accessed 23 March 2009.
4 Ghazi Fabrics International, Annual Report, 2007.
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There is evidence that control of core costs was associated with performance during 
trade reform.5 Among firms that were able to increase sales from 2004 to 2007 while 
keeping cost growth below sales growth (“boom firms”), the increase in salary costs 
was only 19 percentage points above cost growth (see also Table 6-1). This stands in 
contrast with firms that failed to do so (“bust firms”) where salary costs were 32 
percentage points above cost growth. Similarly, energy cost growth was 2 per cent 
less than mean cost growth in ‘boom’ firms, in comparison with 12 percentage points 
above in bust firms. In both sets of companies, the increase in raw material costs -  an 
input less under the control of firm owners -  were within a similar margin of the mean 
cost growth. ‘Boom’ firms were perhaps reducing staff or using existing staff more 
efficiently while fuel costs could have been kept down through greater efficiency of 
energy use, or through the use of in-house generation plants. Depreciation has also 
grown more as a proportion of costs in ‘Bust’ than in ‘Boom’ firms, showing the 
increasing contribution of this new machinery towards total costs.6
There was also the need to absorb rapid increases in capacity in the post-quota period. 
Firm 46, for instance, admitted that one of the difficulties in rapid expansion is that 
they “lose control of cost and management”. At present he stated that they were trying 
to control this by investing in systems, new technology and reducing the rejection 
rate, but that it was a challenge. Similarly, Firm 12 increased its production of fabric, 
finished cloth and garments from 2002 onwards, but has failed to use all capacity in 
dyeing and garments in the post-quota period (see Figure 6-3).
5 In order to examine how good performers controlled costs, cost data was obtained on 115 o f the 
surviving 137 firms in 2007. 1 divided the sample into firms that were able to grow their sales from 
2004 to 2007 while not seeing a faster rise in their costs (‘boom’ firms, i.e. where firms maintained 
gross profit) and those that did not (‘bust’ firms).
6 Some o f  this analysis is problematic. For example, if  firms invested more in staff development 
proportionately in order to enter the garment sector or to improve profitability this would show up as a 
rise in costs, but would actually be an investment in a similar way to capital expenditure (and would 
require a longer period o f  analysis). As a result, these costs are given more as a rough indication o f the 
cost structure o f  the industry and is particularly useful for testing whether firm concerns about raw 
material prices, salaries and energy are relevant across all firms rather than just poor performers.
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Figure 6-3 Installed capacity (left) and utilisation (right) (1994-2007), Firm 12
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SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Fourthly, the extent o f  the shakeout was also emphasised by the failure o f  some high 
profile business groups to maintain their exports following the removal o f  export 
quotas. Nishat Mills, for example, the biggest exporter o f  textile products on the KSE 
(listed since 1961), failed to maintain exports between 2004 and 2007, seeing a real 
drop in total sales o f  9 per cent (see Table 6-2). Similarly, three o f  the textile units o f  
Dewan Group -  also involved in autom obile assembly and cement -  saw a decline in 
total sales in the period from 2004 to 2007 o f  between 10 and 42 per cent (see Table
6-3). If  business groups performed well as a result o f  political connections and reach 
before trade reform, they were no longer effective in the post-2004 period.
Table 6-2 Sales growth (real Pak Rs, 2000) in Nishat Mills (2004-2007)
Sales/Year 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-6 2004-7
Total sales 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.93 0.91
Export sales - - 0.96 0.81 0.78
Local sales - - 0.97 0.95 0.92
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Table 6-3 Sales growth (real Pak Rs, 2000) in textile units of Dewan Group 
(2004-2007)
Unit/Year 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-6 2004-7
Dewan Mushtaq (listed 1971) 1.01 0.88 1.00 0.89 0.90
Dewan Textile (listed 1971) 0.83 0.90 1.03 0.75 0.77
Dewan Khalid (listed 1979) 0.75 1.18 0.65 0.89 0.58
Dewan Farooque (listed 2005) - - 2.72 - -
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
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Finally, the ending o f  the quota also created new opportunities for many exporters. 
A ccording to Firm 12, instead o f  asking how much quota they have buyers now they 
ask how much capacity they have. The firm has not taken on any new buyers since the 
ending o f  the M FA/ATC, and has instead focused on consolidating relationships with 
existing custom ers. According to the Director o f  Firm 22 -  a yam  and cloth producer 
-  there has been an increase in orders from the European Union and United States as 
they have been able to access markets which they “couldn’t enter before”. He added 
that it has been necessary had expand production to do so because “com panies such as 
JC Penney and W almart would only have one supplier for a one million metre order” . 
Certainly, some firms have grown rapidly in the post-quota period. Azgard9 -  the 
denim garm ent producer that grew out o f a spinning and weaving group — invested 
heavily in capacity expansion in the run up to liberalisation and has seen 159 per cent 
growth in exports in real terms between 2004 and 2007. The firm has also posted a 
rise in gross profit from 23 to 30 per cent in the sam e period (see Figure 6-4), despite 
mean quota reliance o f 74 per cent between 2000 and 2004.
Figure 6-4 Capital expenditure (left), sales growth (right) (1995-2007) in Azgard9
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Persistence in firm capability and perform ance
Evidence suggests that firm growth in the post-quota period was strongly associated 
with past firm performance. A firm ’s gross profit in 2004, for example, was positively 
correlated with sales growth from 2004-2007 (see Figure 6-5). For firms with greater
2 3 7
than zero gross profit in 2004, every percentage increase in gross profit brought a rise 
in the growth rate o f  0.02 percentage points (p=0.003, 123 firms). Firms that invested 
m ore in the final five years o f  the MFA also perform ed better in the post-quota period 
(see Table 6-4). C om panies that invested more than 10 per cent o f  sales between 2000 
and 2004 saw a mean growth rate o f  22 per cent versus a mean o f  2 per cent in those 
w ho did not (p=0.05). Sim ilar results are obtained for levels o f  investment above 5 
and 1 per cent o f  sales. W hile m achinery age is as a source o f  relative efficiency (as 
expected in conventional economic theory) performance is also endogenous: firms 
with industry-related PFE also invested more as a percentage o f  sales between 2000 
and 2004 (see also Table 6-4). Further, m arket share remained highly concentrated 
am ong a small num ber o f  firms. The top 25 exporters in 2006 were responsible for
21.4 per cent o f  total exports -  only a slight fall from the share o f  quota exports o f  the 
top 25 quota exporters o f  22.7 per cent (for all quota exports, 2000-2004). Case 
studies from 12 o f  the top 25 exporters in 2006 are included in the examples below
Figure 6-5 Relationship between gross profit (per cent, 2004) and real sales 
growth (percentage points, 2004-2007), textile firms on Karachi Stock Exchange
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Table 6-4 Sales growth (2004-2007) by capital expenditure and mean investment 
as a share o f sales (2000-2004) by pre-founder experience
Mean capital expenditure Yes No p value PFE Mean I/S
(2000-2004) (per cent)
>1 per cent of sales 1.10 0.82 0.05 Experienced 7.8
>5 per cent of sales 1.15 0.96 0.03 Textile-related 6.7
>10 per cent of sales 1.22 1.02 0.05 Other manufacturing 5.6
Inexperienced 5.4
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
The rapid changes in the external environment were felt across firms of all 
backgrounds and capabilities and there was diverging performance among the 48 
firms interviewed. Among the 35 quota exporters interviewed, 31 managed to 
maintain their average value of quota exports from 2000 to 2004. However, of the 33 
KSE firms interviewed that were still active in 2004 (out of a total of 34 as the annual 
report for one firm was not available), only 13 managed to maintain sales between 
2004 and 2007 and only 9 managed to maintain exports (most firms that managed 
both were the same). Only 10 of these 33 firms saw real sales growth of more than 10 
per cent, while 11 firms saw a fall in sales of greater than 10 per cent. Firm-level 
accounts suggest that the capabilities accumulated among firms by background in the 
period prior to quota abolition -  as witnessed in Chapter 5 -  largely shaped 
performance in the post-quota period.
Several experienced firms with sophisticated organisational and production 
capabilities, for example, saw a rapid rise in sales immediately after the quota was 
abolished. Despite reliance on quota for 49 per cent of exports in 2004, Firm 3, a 
home textile and garment manufacturer, saw a rise in sales of 46 per cent in the first 
year, and a total rise of 35 per cent between 2004 and 2007 (including 31 per cent 
export growth) (see Table 6-5). Before the ending of the quota, the firm specifically 
invested to expand production capacity -  specifically in a new polyester plant for ball 
fibres (for embroidery machines) -  and after an initial fall the firm was able to take 
advantage of this capacity in 2007 (see Figure 6-6). Prior to 2004 the firm had also 
opened offices in the US, Netherlands and Germany where they were doing market 
research and trying to “bring buyers to Pakistan”. There was also innovative product 
and design upgrading. When the announcement of the ending of the MFA was made 
in 1995, the firm decided to enter the textile retail sector and incorporated a new,
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separate company as its retail wing in 1997. It also trained its own designers by 
sending them abroad to learn from leading fashion firms such as Tom m y H ilfiger (in 
order to overcome local shortages o f  designers trained for mass production).
Table 6-5 Sales growth (real Pak Rs, 2000) in Firm 3 (2004-2007)
Sales/Y ear 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-6 2004-7
Total sales 1.46 0.84 1.10 1.23 1.35
Local sales - - 1.09 25.32 27.72
Export sales - - 1.10 1.18 1.31
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Figure 6-6 Capital expenditure (1990-2007) (left) and capacity utilisation (2004- 
2007) (right) in Firm 3
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Experienced firms also further improved processes and products in response to the 
rapid increase in quality and cost competition. According to Firm 12, an experienced 
garm ent exporter, buyers no longer want basic garments but value-added products for 
the same price such as garments that have a ‘soil release’ finish. Order sizes have 
also got bigger since the “buyer wants one com pany” and in term s o f  quality they 
have been under pressure to address shrinkage in the garments from four to two per 
cent. Consequently, the firm ’s strategy has been to exploit economies o f  scale and 
follow a process o f  trial and error on the shop-floor. There are efforts to raise 
productivity by reducing the standard minute time o f  garment production, chemical
7 T hese finishes “facilitate removal o f  waterborne and oil stains from fabrics” . Source: Encyclopaedia  
Brittanica, 'Textile, Soil R elease’, http://original.britannica.com /eb/article-15929/textile, accessed 23 
March 2009.
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consumption in processing, and staff numbers by 25 per cent. According to the 
Director, they have had to “decide which customers to keep and let some others go in 
order to pay more attention to individual customers”. Finally, they were working to 
have the size to deliver very large orders and were focusing on “better products with 
more finishing”. In short, the focus now was on the “company’s survival”. Following 
positive sales growth of 116 per cent between 2000 and 2004, and quota reliance of 
over 40 per cent, since the ending of the MFA, the firm has managed to increase its 
total sales by 40 per cent, with exports driving growth at 39 per cent (see Table 6-6).
Table 6-6 Sales growth (real Pak Rs, 2000) in Firm 12 (2004-2007)
Sales/Y ear 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-6 2004-7
Total sales 1.19 1.03 1.14 1.22 1.40
Local sales - - 1.60 0.73 1.17
Export sales - - 1.12 1.25 1.39
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
Accumulated capabilities also helped firms respond to the increasingly challenging 
trading environment. Firm 41, a producer of jeans created by a former employee of a 
paper manufacturing group, described how during the quota they “had a secure 
business”, but that in the post-quota period they “had to fight for every order”. While 
they had credibility and a reputation for delivery on time, they received “several 
comments about their quality and productivity”. To meet these demands they 
increased production by between 5 per cent and 12 per cent per month and allocated 
Rs3bn to capital expenditure. However, it was not enough to just increase capacity, 
they also needed to increase the value of the products: they changed the fashion 
designs every three to six months in order to keep up with changing demands. They 
also attempted to increase quality, focusing not on “adding machines” but on 
“innovation and quality” which is appreciated in the EU and US market. The firm also 
had to adapt its product development activities. Now staff approach buyers to research 
requirements and provide samples to buyers who “come back with remarks and teach 
them how to improve”. According to the founder, important contributions were made 
by the MBA-educated son who focused on development of the sample room and the 
application o f new designs and colour combinations. Further, although these new 
products they take more time to manufacture, also received a higher price up to $9.50 
per item (versus less than $7 under the quota -  see Figure 6-7).
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How ever, w eaknesses continue in the firm, reflecting the limitations o f  many o f  
Pakistan’s textile and clothing exporters. The founder admits to spending “several 
m illions [o f rupees] on air freight” and their internal rejection rate is high. M argins 
have fallen from 10 to 8 per cent and they need to work harder to reduce costs. The 
firm has also fallen from being among the top 10 exporters under quota to within the 
top 25. N evertheless, buyers have remained and include mostly European retailers 
such as N ew  Look, H&M  and Esprit who have placed “large orders” with the firm. 
They also found new  buyers in the UK and Germ any were interested in quality. The 
firm ’s ability to maintain export sales between 2000 and 2006 and focus on increasing 
unit value is illustrated in Figure 6-7.
Figure 6-7 Exports (left) and unit value (right) versus mean (2000-2006), Firm 41
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For some firms with less developed capabilities, however, quota abolition was the 
final nail in the coffin. For Firm 38 in particular, a rapid increase in com petition and 
withdrawal o f  buyers showed up the lack o f  good production and organisational 
practices. On the shop floor garment defect rates were admitted to be approxim ately 7 
per cent and fabric reprocessing rates as high as 40 per cent. One western consultant 
stated that in the processing section there w ere no standard operating procedures in 
place and that workers entered their own recipe [o f salt and chemicals] for dyeing. 
Over-reliance on one buyer led to lumpy production and a reliance on outsourcing for 
a sudden rise in orders. Indeed, the founder adm itted that since 2005 there has been 
“problem s” in the industry regarding productivity relative to China and Bangladesh. 
The exit o f  this firm from the m arket was dramatic, as illustrated in Figure 6-8. From
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a position among the top 40 exporters under quota, it had had fallen to below 100 in 
2006 and exited soon after.
Figure 6-8 Sales (left) and gross profit versus mean (1990-2006), Firm 38
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Increasing com petitiveness in Pakistan also put pressure on less experienced and 
younger firms. W hile Firm 8 had managed to improve its organisational capabilities 
and added loom capacity, the founder still felt that he was “up against giants” . He 
stated that while the firm can address competition from India and China, they “can’t 
com pete with M ultan” (referring to the large and experienced firms in the city with 
operations in cotton ginning and spinning as well as weaving). In particular, the 
founder felt that their own production was too small-scale and too expensive. He also 
admitted that it was experiencing high staff turnover at the lower levels and although 
they have tried to control it by offering more incentives there is “nothing you can do, 
it is not about m oney” . Indeed, examination o f  the cost structure o f the firm shows 
that between 2004 and 2007 the firm was able to keep a hold on fuel costs (perhaps as 
a result o f  in-house energy generation), but was experiencing a rise in salary costs o f  
17 per cent versus a fall in costs o f  15 per cent (see Table 6-7).
Table 6-7 Cost growth in Firm 8 by input (2004-2007)
C osts Sales Costs Raw m aterial Salaries Fuel D epreciation
Growth 0.862 0.850 0.831 1.165 0.577 0.882
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
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Between 2004 and 2007, the firm performed poorly. While the mean size of firms on 
the KSE rose, it saw a fall in total sales of 14 per cent in this period and a drop in 
exports o f 41 per cent (see Table 6-8). When interviewed in 2006, the founder felt that 
they needed an outsider to tell them where they were going wrong and while they 
were trying to be different the returns had not started coming in yet, describing the 
situation as a “nightmare”.
Table 6-8 Sales growth (real Pak Rs, 2000) in Firm 8 (2004-2007)
Sales/Year 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-6 2004-7
Total sales 1.01 0.87 0.98 0.88 0.86
Local sales - - 1.00 1.96 1.97
Export sales - - 0.97 0.61 0.59
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
For other less experienced firms, the new environment was also the final straw. The 
owner of Firm 21 stated that he was making more money from the import and retail of 
second hand cars than from yam spinning. Firm 29 regretted ever having entered the 
spinning sector, and had chosen instead to focus on the development of the chemical 
business set up by his BSc-educated son. While textiles was still considered important 
for Firm 25 and it had performed well, the Director was now more interested in 
trading, property and the stock market.
6.2 Upgrading and growth: productivity, quality and marketing
There were several common channels through which firms were able to improve their 
productivity, quality, and marketing practices — and performance — as competition 
rapidly increased after the abolition of export quotas. Case studies outlined below 
show that the performance of firms in the post-quota period was associated with the 
production and organisational capabilities that the firms had accumulated by 2004. 
What becomes explicit is how the design of the firm, as associated with pre-founder 
experience, becomes the central factor that enables technical managers to deliver 
improvements in productivity and quality on the shop floor in response to increased 
competition. Each firm’s performance by number and founder experience can be seen 
in Table 4-21.
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Productivity and quality
There were several routes through which firms acquired new knowledge into the firm 
in order to improve productivity and quality. These included recruitment, the use of 
consultants, interactions with buyers, the adoption of innovative organisational 
practice, and changes in top management. Often, firms found particularly innovative 
ways to address the operating challenges within Pakistan.
Firstly, an important strategy for reaching best practice production standards was the 
appointment of good staff in key shop-floor roles. Technical managers often 
introduced practices they had learned in other companies or used contacts from 
university to learn about new technology and introduce it into the mill. The spinning 
manager in Firm 10, for example, visited some of the top mills in Punjab being 
managed by “class fellows” to understand the strengths and weaknesses of different 
types of compact spinning machines before installing them in his own plant. On the 
shop-floor, technical managers were also instrumental to the setting and achieving of 
targets. The spinning manager in Firm 15, for example, set a specific target to reach
11.4 kilograms of yam per spindle. He insisted that he “would not rest until the target 
was reached” as he wanted to “prove to owner the team is good”. He also stressed the 
importance of developing a strong team alongside him to do so. In contrast, Firm 39 
admitted that there were weaknesses among technical people and middle 
management. This founder felt that the company had “missed the boat” in the post­
quota period and had fallen several places in the list of top exporters.
Secondly, consultants were often used to acquire new production knowledge. In Firm 
11, a jeans manufacturer, international consultants were recruited to address faults in 
dyeing and to give feedback to the company on improving performance. Firm 3 
employed a consultant to train the local management team and to conduct a “gap 
analysis” of their existing quality system where they found, for example, that a staff 
member at one stage was not making the required report. On the shop-floor, Firm 3 
also hired a former professor in the National Textile University to oversee all systems. 
In the opinion of the CEO his appointment brought reduced wastage, more delegation 
and stronger communication. In Firm 8, a cloth manufacturer, the technical director of
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a weaving unit explained what happened in the mill when the general manager (GM) 
changed:
The previous GM was not educated, and had a feudal approach with no 
systems or management. Efficiency was 90 per cent and rejection was 4 per 
cent. However, when the new GM arrived he hired good foremen as well as 
educated technical people. He started corrective and preventative maintenance.
He introduced an award system in which the target was 93 per cent efficiency 
and agreed to give 10 per cent salary bonus if they reduced the rejection rate to 
1 per cent.
Buyers often also played a key role in exposing firms to best practices in quality 
management. When Firm 12 attempted to introduce a visual quality system in garment 
checking, western retailers gave seminars to the supervisors on quality checking who 
then transferred the knowledge to operators of the machines. Likewise, Firm 39 is an 
exporter of knitted garments. According to the Director “whatever we are in terms of 
quality it’s because of the buyers” as they have specified the standards required in the 
measurement of quality, the introduction of computerised machinery, and the in-line 
inspection of quality (even when employing staff with a minimum of high school 
education).8
Thirdly, innovative organisational approaches often led to quality improvements in- 
house. Firm 1, for example, is an integrated producer of home textiles, but even 
though it manufactures a large amount of yam in-house the weaving units are not 
obliged to purchase this yarn. This, in effect, places the spinning units in competition 
with the best external suppliers, with the aim of improving their performance and 
ensuring the weaving unit obtains the best inputs. In-house sourcing can also increase 
productivity. In Firm 18, yam for cloth production is sourced faster in-house, while 
vertical integration in Firm 12 means that it can make yam, fabrics and finished 
garments as per the buyer’s specifications from start to finish. The absence of such 
practice often led to declines in quality: a technical manager of the processing unit in
8 This includes AQL Standards which refer to ‘Acceptable quality levels” for garments which are 
measured as nonconforming items per 100 items.
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Firm 40 cited poor communication with the weaving manager (who was located 40 
kilometres away) as a constraint to improving the quality of incoming cloth.
Organisational change on the shop floor also kept many firms ahead when faced with 
increased competition. One example is the increased use of professional IT systems. 
Firm 42, for example, cited the introduction of an IT system as the “keystone” of its 
joint venture with a major US retailer in the supply of garments. Every single store of 
the buyer is linked to their computers in Pakistan which “shapes their manufacturing 
volumes” and requirements to produce more of particular size of garment. Locally 
there also were gains in efficiency. The CEO states that “Now you don’t have to go to 
the plants -  all staff in key positions have laptops. Orders were previously done 
verbally, but now they are documented by email”. This IT capability was developed 
in-house using skills of two sons who had been educated abroad and because there is 
“lot of capacity in staff to create systems”. Similarly, Firm 12 attempted to produce 
zero per cent defects in fabric production and minimise wastage through the use of 
automated cutting technology, one of the only firms in Pakistan to do so.
Firms have also developed innovative ways to address the challenging operating 
environment in Pakistan. According to a Director o f Firm 22, most of the time targets 
are achieved as “external factors are already taken care o f’. In response to Pakistan’s 
volatile operating environment, for example, accommodation is provided during a 
strike, a two month stock of spare parts is held if they “anticipate political unrest”, and 
they have a generator in case there is a power breakdown. As mentioned above, Firm 
12 -  a garment producer -  also opened a stitching environment in the Middle East in 
order to overcome any temporary halt in production in Pakistan.
Finally, changes at the managerial level also brought improvements in performance. 
In Firm 30, for example, which was set up as a spinning unit in the 1980s, the 
Director admits that they made “mistakes in management” such as in the buying and 
selling of cotton yam. The family used to entirely “rely on the technical team” for 
production rather than understanding the business themselves which caused a “huge 
loss”. As a result, he started to learn “what spinning was” and this exposure formed 
the “basis of the future business plan”. He became aware of the need for consistency 
in quality which is “what the market wants”, and the need to “identify the market” for
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which he focused on finer yam  because o f  its higher value addition. The Director now 
“doesn’t give orders” and believes in encouraging new ideas, learning from mistakes 
and in the education o f  workers. In his own actions he tries not to get “bogged down 
in small issues” so that he has “time to think, to get new ideas, see w hat’s com ing” . 
Despite being engaged in the lower profit yarn segment, this firm has dramatically 
improved perform ance since the late 1990s (see Figure 6-9).
Figure 6-9 Sales (left) and gross profit (right) (1990-2006) versus mean, Firm 30
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New product development
New product developm ent was often a com plem entary capability to the management 
o f productivity and quality. N iche product developm ent has also been at the heart o f  
the ability o f  Firm 46, for example, to differentiate itself from competitors. It has 
specialised in yarn dyeing, for example, a “huge business” which allows them to 
compete on quality and price. Likewise, Firm 37 chose the niche market o f  medical 
clothing. Others such as Firm 10 and Kohinoor Group moved out o f  apparel fabric 
production and into home textiles early, anticipating a shift in the market. Firm 8 
welcomed the demand for industrial fabrics from buyers because it brought higher 
margins and clients did not change suppliers often. In addition, Firm 8 chose “batched 
production” in which they, unlike competitors, could do production runs o f  up to 1km 
o f  cloth.
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Three strategies were common among firms entering a new product segment. Firstly, 
firms outsourced a product in order to test its success among buyers (before investing 
in production facilities in-house). Secondly, firms interacted with buyers in order to 
explore product design and costs. Thirdly, firms granted of autonomy to shop floor 
workers to apply their knowledge and encourage innovation in production. These 
strategies often enabled companies to acquire product knowledge and eventually 
upgrade.
Firstly, Firm 5 was previously selling greige cloth to leading European apparel 
manufacturer and retailer when the buyer asked the firm to provide semi-finished 
fabric instead (which the buyer would then dye and stitch in Western Europe).9 In 
order to meet this requirement, they outsourced finishing from a local mill but 
introduced in-house inspectors who look after the quality of the outsourced 
production. The firm used this technique as a way to test production before investing 
in dyeing and finishing facilities given the large capital expenditure required. Further, 
it is “a big risk, unknown” and first they want to secure demand (an each container 
they also made a profit of five per cent). But in the words of the Director, this move 
into finished products and the experienced gained puts them “one step ahead than 
others”. Similarly, Firm 14 did not have a dyeing facility so outsourced processing of 
fabric in 4 or 5 colours, while keeping cloth production and stitching in-house. 
Originally a manufacturer of yam and greige cloth for apparel, the owners decided to 
move into finishing as margins were declining in cloth.
Secondly, existing business relationships often allowed suppliers and buyers to 
explore new product costs together. Firm 7, for example, a producer of yarn and cloth, 
was already doing business with a work-wear company in Italy, but the yams used in 
a particular fabric were not produced in Pakistan. He obtained an agreement with the 
company in which Firm 7 would agree to invest in technology for the yam while the 
buyer would send a technical person to Pakistan. As a result, Firm 7 is able to “know 
the cost of the product and whether it is a profitable activity”. They also discover any 
production problems, and whether they need extra workers or machines. In Firm 3,
9 Separate research showed that this particular buyer adopts this sourcing pattern as a business strategy 
in order to be able to respond quickly to shifts in local demand.
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the in-house garment designers also learn from pre-designed orders supplied by 
leading fashion firms.
Market research on customer needs also often accompanied successful product 
development. In preparation for entry into retail, for example, Firm 3 opened a trading 
section in Dubai in order to do local research and conduct a survey on the appropriate 
product mix for the region. The firm then opened one store in order to “get to know 
customers”. They chose the location for their first unit where a friend was working, 
but also developed close relationships with a company which was opening a new mall 
in a city in the United Arab Emirates. At the time of the interview they had successes 
in establishing stores both in Pakistan and the Middle East.
Thirdly, the expertise of technical staff was also crucial in introducing new products 
to the shop floor. A technical manager in Firm 8 explained that when introducing a 
new product they first test four cones of yam on looms and develop the back process 
for the yam. They then try out 25-50 bags on one or two beams, do trial testing and 
monitor settings on the loom to ensure the quality of the fabric is satisfactory. The 
first 3-4 days are “sensitive”, but then after the production is under control and the 
fabric can be put it into mass production. Some Directors also made an important 
effort during periods of development. In one successful cloth firm, Firm 7 the CEO 
explained how during new product development he tries to create an atmosphere of 
trust, “understand that mistakes will happen” and be “patient with an open mind”. His 
behaviour encourages an atmosphere of new product development and in his words 
“people get used to it over the years and know the CEO is behind it”. Technical 
managers also built on established contacts to expand marketing opportunities. In 
Firm 8, a technical manager who used to work in the textile sector in Bahrain 
“approached old customers and tried to give better quality, price and service”.
Similarly, allowing autonomy to staff to implement new products and processes was a 
key role in successful new product development. This autonomy given to staff is 
illustrated in two cases from the shop floor in Firm 10. In the new processing unit, a 
printing manager was recruited to “design it all from scratch”. Building on previous 
experience in leading processing units in both Karachi and Punjab, he introduced a 
target to install production capacity of 3.5 million metres per month, and a particular
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process that used “ less machines, but was more productive” . To implement this 
project he recruited eight engineers from the textile university. In his words, he “saw 
them as assets and concentrated on them ”, and cited the importance o f  constructing “a 
less traditional environm ent than others” . It was im portant to “build a culture” in 
which the systems were designed using information technology, for example. On the 
technical side, he planned a single line bleaching process where he could run three 
production lines. This was important in obtaining production targets and for 
consistency o f  the fabric as if  you “do it twice, you get variation” .
To construct the new stitching unit an experienced stitching m anager was also 
recruited in Firm 10 to implement new production systems. He arrived with five years 
experience in stitching, including three and a half years at one o f  Pakistan’s best 
known textile firms -  following a career in the m arketing o f  knitwear he had “no 
further opportunities so changed field” . The stitching m anager designed all o f  the 
processes from scratch from the design o f  the building to the software used to m onitor 
production. M ost o f  the workers recruited had prior experience in textiles, but they 
chose to do their own in-house training with the use o f  industrial engineers. The 
engineers introduce new operations through the training o f  20 or 30 “good operators” 
who then work on that particular task. At the time o f  the interview in 2006 stitching 
was running at 40 per cent capacity and the m anager w as working to introduce a 
minute value system for garment monitoring. By 2007 they had reached 80 per cent 
capacity use in dyeing and 60 per cent in stitching (see Figure 6-10).
Figure 6-10 Installed capacity (left) and utilisation (right) (1994-2007), Firm 10
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Marketing
Alongside new product development, there were several marketing channels through 
which firms secured new buyers. These included innovative strategies to attract new 
clients, the integration of marketing and new product development functions, the 
appointment of key staff in marketing roles, and the establishment of overseas 
marketing offices.
Innovative approaches to marketing were often the hallmark of firms who were able 
to secure now buyers either at home or abroad. One spinoff that has shown strength in 
product choice and marketing is Firm 33, a small Lahore-based manufacturer of 
specialised cloth. The firm engages in fabric production for clothing accessories, a 
specialised market with only five or six big dealers and 100 small dealers in Pakistan. 
Initially, 100 per cent of the products were sold locally in Lahore and Karachi and the 
firm used a network of agents as well as two people in a marketing team to approach 
retailers and other buyers. However, in more recent years the firm started exporting a 
small amount of cloth to the Middle East and North Africa through contact with 
agents in Egypt and Dubai.
In order to break into this market, he took a container of goods to give to trimming 
companies in Dubai. He visited lots of wholesalers to “see what management [he] 
like[d]”, agents who then distributed the products to clients in the region (although the 
process can take between two and three years). He also wanted to open the company’s 
own office in Dubai to increase sales and exports and used retained earnings to fund 
this. To build up the business he tried to find a “good person” to run the local office, 
but due to problems finding someone he usually goes independently to the region. He 
was also attempting to export directly from Lahore but found difficulties breaking into 
the market: “EU buyers tend to stick to suppliers”. The strategy and energy of this 
firm has resulted in some success in both sales growth and profitability (see Figure 6- 
11). While sales stalled after the firm was first set up, it has experienced rapid growth 
in both local and export sales from 2003 onwards. Further, since inception the firm 
has outperformed the KSE mean in terms of gross profit and it has managed to grow 
its total sales by 155 per cent between 2004 and 2007.
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Figure 6-11 Sales (left) and gross profit (right) versus mean, Firm 33
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M arketing strategy was also at the heart o f  its rapid growth in Firm 2 and introduced 
by the M BA-educated son when he joined the firm. His interest was expanding in the 
US market from the exposure he gained during his studies there, feeling that they “had 
the m anufacturing base” to do so. In particular, he set out to offer goods to customers 
that were already cleared o f  custom duty because- according to him -  “ logistics was a 
big thing” for US buyers. To do so, he found “good agents in the USA who can clear 
the goods on tim e” and developed the business by sending samples directly to 
custom ers. They established a marketing com pany based in Dubai, while at home the 
Director ensured that production quality was good. They needed working capital for 
four m onths while they were “waiting for delivery and getting paid”, so took finance 
from the manufacturing side o f  the business.
This approach “opened up a lot o f  buyers” for the firm. The Director explained that 
because it is an old industry many potential clients have existing suppliers, hence they 
can only “get buyers from showing new products” . Further, by having many o f  the 
operational s taff in Pakistan they were also able to save costs. The ending o f  the MFA 
was particularly welcomed because they would be able to target new markets as they 
did not hold much quota before. Indeed, the firm only exported twice under quota in 
2002 and 2004 to the EU and USA when it represented 26.6 and 136.7 per cent o f  
exports respectively in products such as cotton twill and sateen cloth. Since 2004, the 
firm has managed to increase its total sales by 24 per cent. In particular its export
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sales increased eight fold (see Table 6-9), albeit from a small base (where exports 
have increased from 3.8 to 35.3 per cent of sales in the same period).
Table 6-9 Sales growth (real Pak Rs, 2000) in Firm 2 (2004-2007)
Sales/Y ear 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2004-6 2004-7
Total sales 1.17 1.01 1.05 1.18 1.24
Local sales - - 1.04 0.84 0.87
Export sales - - 1.08 7.33 7.93
SOURCE: Karachi Stock Exchange, own analysis
In Firm 10, an overseas marketing office in China was chosen because it is a growing 
market for textile products and a source of many important chemicals and dyes. The 
office was established by an existing contact in the region who had recently left 
another textile company, Additional local recruitment was conducted via a human 
resource company in China, and the founding staff member (who speaks German and 
Chinese) trained the new team within two months. In terms of impact, the office had 
recently obtained a new buyer which was a German company operating in China. The 
client is now in direct contact with the Pakistan office who organise production. An 
additional strength in this company’s marketing structure is the relationship between 
the marketing and production team. Both teams are in constant contact about key 
issues such as machinery, while the production team gives technical classes to the 
marketing team on topics such as the impact of dyeing techniques on product quality. 
Appointment of key staff in marketing functions was also a theme in the expansion of 
Firm 3: when the office in the United State was created they “sent a good 
management team” who understand the company, training them in Pakistan before 
their departure.
In-house techniques to improve the effectiveness of marketing efforts were also 
important. Firm 37, a home textiles manufacturer which was the 43rd largest exporter 
under quota and the 41st largest in 2006, increased the number of staff in the 
marketing team as a specific strategy to capture market share. The firm was also 
targeting markets such as Russia with healthcare clothing. The integration of 
marketing teams in new product development was also effective. Firm 26, originally a 
spinner, focused its new weaving unit on fabrics for the garment industry such as 
heavier weight cloths. The firm made this decision following a study conducted by the
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firm ’s m arketing team to identify which products were most in dem and in the market. 
Similarly, Firm 39, a knitwear exporter, em ployed a team o f  two “trend forecasters” 
as part o f  its new product developm ent strategy.
Persistence and creativity in dealing with the challenges o f  operating in Pakistan also 
paid o ff  for some firms in attracting new custom ers. In the case o f  Firm 7, the CEO 
described his attendance at an exhibition in Paris where many dyeing companies were 
exhibiting. He saw a buyer with whom he wanted to start a business relationship in a 
meeting with a Pakistani competitor. He contacted the buyer on several occasions but 
had “no luck” in getting any business: he did not want to travel to the mill as it was far 
away from the main city he was staying in. However, the CEO wanted to show the 
buyer that he was “serious”, so as a result he hired a propeller aircraft and flew the 
buyer from the city to the mill. The com pany now has bulk business from this buyer 
and -  em ploying equally strong production and general m anagem ent practices -  has 
been one o f  the fastest growing larger Pakistani firms in recent years (see Figure 6- 
12).
Figure 6-12 Sales (left) and gross profit (right) (2000-2006) versus mean, Firm 7
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The establishm ent o f  jo in t ventures was also a route to securing new buyers and 
market access among Pakistan’s largest firms. According to interviewees, after the 
ending o f  the quota there were several jo in t ventures established between Pakistani 
manufacturers and overseas buyers. Indus Dyeing and M anufacturing, for example, a
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home textile manufacturer, entered a joint venture with WestPoint USA, a former 
manufacturer and now importer of home textiles. Its towel manufacturing project 
started production in January 2005.10 Nishat Mills, Pakistan’s largest textile exporter 
(mainly involved in home textile production) created a venture with one of the largest 
garment exporters under quota, Style Textile, to establish Gulf Nishat Apparel. In 
2007, Azgard9, a leading jeans exporters from Pakistan, announced that it had 
obtained permission from the State Bank of Pakistan to remit €23.8 million for an 
“offshore acquisition of branded denim and garment business”, Farital AB, which has 
100 percent ownership of Montebello, “a specialist in the global denim space.11
Branding was also a strategy for several textile manufacturers. Nishat Mills, for 
example, has its own chain of retail stores, Nishat Linen, which sell fabrics, kitchen 
items and curtains.12 Afroze Textile, an exporter of home textile products, has opened
13its own retail store ‘Bed and Bath’ in Karachi, Lahore, Hyderabad and Islamabad. 
Likewise, Chenab Limited, a large exporter of home textiles and apparel, has a set of 
retail stories, ‘Chen One’ selling branded goods across Pakistan. The company’s 
slogan is ‘Changing Lifestyles’ and stories are located in the main Pakistani cities as 
well as Peshawar, Multan, Sialkot, Faisalabad, Gujrat, Rahim Yar Khan and 
Abbotabad.14
The founder of Firm 45 gave an account of how it acquired the franchise of a leading 
clothes brand. The firm was originally involved in the travel business but entered into 
the production of knitted garments through a contact (the founder’s grandfather was 
also involved in textile importing). The founder had witnessed the entry of a global 
clothing brand into the Indian market, so contacted the firm’s office in Hong Kong to 
propose entry into the Pakistani market as well. He felt that his background in the 
textile industry and network of local contacts gave credibility to the proposal and the 
clothing firm agreed that if the founder could locate three units then they would 
proceed with the partnership. The founder explained that this was probably a test of
10 Source: What’s new, Indus Group, October 2006, http://www.indus-group.com/web/whatsnew.htm, 
accessed 23 March 2009.
11 Source: Azgard Nine Limited - Analysis o f Financial Statements, Business Recorder. 18 Sep 2008.
12 Nishat Linen, http://www.nishatmillsltd.com/nishat/linen.php, accessed 23 March 2009.
13 Bed and Bath — Dressing homes!’, The Saturday Post. Accessed 23 March 2009, 
http://www.thesaturdaypost.com/alm_26_l.html
14 ChenOne, http://www.chenone.com.pk/, accessed 23 March 2009.
256
his abilities set by the partner firm, but he was able to locate the units and later 
learned much from the partner such as how to manage a retail outlet, establish a 
distribution network and run a warehousing operation. The firm had sales of 
approximately $8m in 2006 and is a well known set of stories across Pakistan. Its 
manufacturing unit also managed to maintain exports between 2004 and 2006.
G eneral m anagem ent practices
It was often innovative approaches to general management practices such as 
recruitment, the provision of incentives and performance monitoring that were 
associated with firm growth and upgrading.
Some of the best firms, for example, were those that had developed progressive 
policies in relation to recruitment of women. Firm 10, for example, provides a day­
care centre for children of female staff in the head office which has allowed one 
particularly valued female staff member to take responsibility for the marketing team. 
Further, even though female textile engineering graduates are few, many -  as in Firm 
12 -  were managing the shop floor on my visits to spinning units.15 In Firm 41, a 
garment unit in Karachi, management has made a specific effort to recruit women 
onto the shop floor to deal with “a very serious problem” in the lack of skill of 
workers. According to the Director, this is “an advantage of Karachi over other parts 
of Pakistan” where women are not so free to work in factories. Finally, in order to 
recruit more female workers, Firm 11 created a special transport service for women 
and a female section in the family colony. They also make efforts to “convince 
parents that women can stay there” and hold leisure activities such as badminton 
tournaments. In contrast, in one poor performer that had exited, female staff were 
subject to harassment and even attack.
Similarly, strong human resource procedures were also a hallmark of good 
performers. The strongest human resource practices were found in Firm 11. It was one 
of the only firms that had appointed a Vice President (Human Resources) and
15 However, it is still difficult for female textile engineers to join some textile units if  they are required 
to live on site because their husbands cannot join them.
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according to the CEO, they were “competing against themselves” for talent.16 
Recruitment procedures were formal: for shop floor workers recruitment started at the 
factory gate. Individuals submit curriculum vitaes and testimonial letters followed by 
a preliminary interview on the gate in order to reduce the short list by 40 to 45 per 
cent. They conduct tests for “relevant areas” such as hand, mind and eye co­
ordination, and assess the individual’s potential, after which the person is then taken 
to the department for a final interview with a representative of the department and a 
representative of human resources. Training includes an initial orientation, three 
weeks training in a section such as stitching or machine operation, and then between 
three and nine months probation.
In day-to-day operations, the Vice President had also introduced a number of 
measures to improve the operations of the mill. He was trying to raise the quality of 
staff by, for example, by treating supervisors as managers, and had created a 
supervisory training programme which contained a number of modules. They 
continually push workers to improve and a full study was conducted to understand 
why people leave. He has also developed a code of conduct in order to resolve 
conflicts, a system which he had implemented in his previous firm. Further, the 
manager tries to develop people with potential. Informally, he gives small projects to 
people he identifies and has “discussion and critique with them”, as well as running a 
formal management training programme.
A particular strength of many firms was the presence of an internal culture that 
enabled staff to develop and be promoted. This appears to be a strength of many firms 
in Pakistan as most interviewees were able to give good examples of the internal 
progression of entry-level staff into senior roles. In Firm 7, the CEO explained how a 
marketing manager for weaving who had been referred to the company by a technical 
person used to give him new ideas all the time and displayed a good ability to handle 
customers. As a result, the CEO put this person in direct contact with customers and 
within five years the salary of the individual had been raised from Rs 18,000 per year
16 The staff member in human resources (HR) was in the army for 29 years and taught at a national 
military college. But he took early retirement in 1993 and started a private sector career. He said that 
“his own skill was to lead and manage people”. His first job was in HR at a leading hotel where he 
established a hotel training school and educated himself in HR through executive development courses 
at the local business school and other universities. In an interview he gave an overview o f formal 
recruitment procedures in place at the firm.
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to R sl50,000 due to good performance. It was also described as a “pivotal time” in 
the development of the firm as the CEO no longer had to handle all the sales inquiries.
It was the general attitude of management that also shaped shop-floor performance. 
One technical manager in Firm 8 said that in contrast to his previous employers who 
were “very aggressive”, the owner of this mill was “someone stable who I could work 
with”. In addition, some units, such as Firm 26, had even introduced a system to deal 
with poorly performing family members in which they would be removed and put in 
another role.
6.3 Management challenges for Pakistan 
Production and operations
Despite some advances in the quality of management practices in response to 
increased competition, firms in Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry faced a 
number of challenges. Firstly, there were many weaknesses in general firm 
operations. In production, for example, it was clear that on the shop-floor many firms 
were unable to meet basic standards. In one leading woven garment unit I visited there 
was a challenge to match the stripes on the sleeve and main body of a striped shirt. 
The foreign stitching manager also had to watch over stitching staff constantly in 
order to embed good practices. In Firm 9, the approach to production is reactive: 
instead of taking preventative measures, “when complaints come” they forward the 
comments to the technical people. When I inquired how production targets were set 
and monitored, the Director replied “it doesn’t work like that”. The Director of one 
weaving unit even admitted that they just put damaged fabric along with the good 
quality fabric, justifying the practice with the argument that buyers expect there to be 
some faults in the fabric.
Many firms are also unable to keep up with basic quality standards. In Firm 44, a 
textile processing unit managed by a textile engineer, the unit is no longer exporting 
finished cloth because that they are not able to meet the quality standards of 
international buyers. In other units, basic practices related to quality were not in place. 
In Firm 38, there were no testing facilities for colour blindness in the male-dominated
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workplace. As a result, colour matching o f fabrics as per the requirem ents o f buyers 
was a problem. Few firms engaged in designing o f  new products either. In Firm 28, 
buyers com e with their own designs -  either in com puterised or raw form -  but the 
firm has not yet created any o f  its own designs.
In marketing, firms also often exhibited an over-reliance on a small num ber o f  buyers. 
One stark example is Nakshbandi Industries, a weaving unit that experienced a 
w ithdraw al o f  orders from one large customer. As illustrated in Figure 6-13, it has 
been unable to maintain its export -  and hence total -  sales after 2004, dropping to 
below its 2002 level in real terms. Further, the firm only used 60 per cent o f  its 
production capacity in 2007, and has been unable to achieve positive gross profit for 
the first time since 1990. There was also evidence o f  dependence on local contacts for 
sales. One firm informed me that brokers and agents who were family friends all 
“helped with com m itm ents to sell fabric” .
Figure 6-13 Sales (left) and gross profit (1990-2007) versus mean, Nakshbandi 
Industries
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There is also a lack o f  risk taking and new product developm ent among even the 
largest firms in the industry. M any have remained within the yarn or cloth segments, 
while textile experienced groups such as Firm 26 have attempted to move into 
garments but have failed to do so. Some observers believe that the greater capital 
intensity o f  the yarn and fabric sectors means that owners do not have the skills to 
manage a labour-intensive industry. Indeed, a technical m anager at a leading knitw ear
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firm explained how he tried for five years to encourage his former employer -  a well 
known manufacturer of cloth and home textiles -  to move into garments, but they 
didn’t want to. Managers would visit the plant each month “but a stitching unit 
requires constant attention on a daily basis”. In contrast, in his current mill (Firm 12, 
which has performed well since 2004), they were considering introduction of 24-hour 
stitching. These cases show that challenges remain in the industry with respect to 
diversification and development even with experience.
Professional m anagem ent
In many cases standard management practices in relation to recruitment, incentives, 
targets and monitoring were not in place. Firm 6, for example -  a spinner -  has 
introduced the daily monitoring of productivity and quality, and they even set human 
resource targets, however the CEO admitted that “we never try to follow it” and that it 
will take them 5 to 10 years to reach international standards of management. 
Similarly, Firm 37 has not shown its machines to buyers as there are “a lot of systems 
that still need to be implemented”.
Human resources practices were often weak. Firm 42, a large woven garment 
manufacturer, admitted that he cannot bring himself to fire staff if they do not reach 
targets “because there is no social security system in Pakistan” and often feels guilty 
if staff have to take their children out of school as a result. In Firm 26, a Director 
admitted that he has never been able to bring himself to fire poor performers, instead 
preferring to reassign them to less key roles. Many firms also complained about a lack 
of skills in the clothing industry. However, few firms had implemented training 
programmes beyond the basic operating requirements. Firm 18 admitted to not doing 
any training because “workers are usually trained by other companies...this is how 
industry works in Pakistan”. Firm 39 also admitted that they put “zero money into 
HR” and that it was their biggest problem.
The current structure of family ownership is also problematic. The technical director 
of one processing unit stated that the biggest weaknesses of the previous companies 
he worked for was “owner interference, not letting you do your job, thinking they 
know dyeing better”. The founder of Firm 20 wanted to start a business on his own
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because he felt there was a ‘marble ceiling’ in most textile firms for non-family 
members. There was also a lack of autonomy for some workers: in Firm 15, it took 
six months for the general manager of a spinning mill to convince the owner to install 
a particular piece of machinery that would reduce labour costs. During an interview in 
2006, the owner finally admitted that he wished they had increased capacity by 50 per 
cent three years earlier.
There were also macroeconomic factors which shaped the general level of firm 
performance. During fieldwork I found no units directly owned or operated by a 
multinational company, unlike in many other countries. This is likely to reduce the 
level of skill transfer induced by higher quality management practices as well as the 
number of (potentially high-quality) spinoffs that could arise from such a unit. The 
state of the infrastructure also reduces competitiveness and capabilities across firms. 
Even firms that perform well struggle with political upheaval and energy 
interruptions, including those with installed generators.
The security situation in Pakistan also means that many companies struggle to recruit 
foreign consultants. Firm 41, for example, required Italian designers for its denim 
business in Karachi, but at the time of the interview they were “in two minds whether 
to come or not”. The Chief Executive of Firm 46 — which has performed very well in 
the post-quota period -finds that buyers prefer to travel to India. In addition, he 
personally “cannot travel enough to the USA” and feels that the firm is losing out in 
the apparel segment because large buyers such as Macy’s are hesitant to send their 
teams to Pakistan (and hence cannot see new colours of products, for example). Firm 
48, which has maintained its exports in the post-quota period, was also having 
difficulty getting overseas consultants to come and visit the factory in order to gain 
ideas for productivity improvements.
Conclusion
In the approach to the final abolition of export quotas on 1 January 2005 under the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing many firms in Pakistan made significant 
investments in production capacity, new product development and organisational 
capabilities. The rapid increase in cost and quality competition which occurred in the
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post-quota period demanded rapid improvements in productivity, quality and 
marketing at the firm-level. A large shakeout occurred and evidence in this chapter 
has suggested that it was correlated with accumulated capabilities and firm 
performance in the first stage of trade reform between 1994 and 2004.
Indeed, it was this base of accumulated capability that shaped the firm’s ability to 
survive and grow in the new trading environment and there were several common 
themes through which enabled firms to upgrade products and processes. These 
included the appointment of key staff in marketing and shop-floor roles, investments 
in new technologies, the accumulation of knowledge through strategic relationships 
with buyers, and innovative problem solving in-house. It was also the presence of a 
high-incentive, autonomous working environment that enabled workers to deliver 
these improvements. In particular, innovative organisational changes brought in by 
Directors and professional managers -  such as the creation of internal free market 
environment and the formalisation of human resource procedures — were often the 
hallmark of good performance. However, there are widespread weaknesses in 
Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry, most particularly in the lack of professional 
management. Lack and innovation in marketing or new product development was also 
linked to company-specific managerial weaknesses.
As a result, evidence in this chapter has made explicit that firm performance remained 
associated with pre-founder experience. Founder experience determined initial 
production capabilities, organisational design and the incentive structures that shaped 
long-run learning and growth, even when faced with rapid rises in external 
competition. It also showed that entry into -  and growth and upgrading within -  the 
textile and clothing sector is a very challenging activity in itself, requiring 
sophisticated technical and managerial competencies.
I now go on in Chapter 7 to critically discuss the role of the textile sector in broad 
industrial development in Pakistan. In particular, I examine whether these capabilities 
have been able to play a role in industrial diversification.
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A ppendices
Appendix 6-1: Unit values of cloth and garment exports
Following a long-term decline in cloth export unit value between 1971 and 2007, 
monthly export data indicate signs o f  a rise in the post-quota period (see Figure 6-14). 
Garment prices were unstable in the six months before and after the abolition o f  
quotas on 1 January 2005, but have since fallen in knitwear and risen in woven (or 
‘readym ade’) garments (see Figure 6-15).
Figure 6-14 Unit value of cloth exports from Pakistan, 1994-2007 (left) and May 
2003-December 2007 (right)
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Figure 6-15 Unit value of woven and knitted garment exports from Pakistan 
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Chapter 7 Industrial diversification and economic 
development in Pakistan
Industrial diversification is widely considered a driver of economic development. In 
the economies of East Asia the move from textiles and light manufacturing into 
electronics, shipbuilding and services have been associated with rapid economic 
growth. Diversification can be driven by incumbent firms based on underlying 
capability or by new entrants. In this chapter I investigate aggregate patterns of 
industrial development in Pakistan in both local and export markets and identify the 
drivers of diversification at the firm level. In particular, I examine how capabilities 
within textile and clothing producers shaped diversification choice in comparison with 
the backgrounds of firms in higher value-added sectors such as chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and information technology.
Firstly, I identify high-growth sectors in Pakistan since the 1990s such as cement, 
automobiles, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Secondly, I assess the role Pakistan’s 
textile and clothing firms have played in the growth of these sectors and critically 
analyse the contribution of the industry to industrial development. Specifically, I 
investigate the determinants of industry choice and how accumulated capabilities 
shaped entry strategies in the new sector. Finally, I contrast these trends with the 
origins and emergence of firms in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and information 
technology. With the use of case studies, I identify how the pre-founder experience of 
firms in Pakistan’s ‘new economy’ differed from those o f textiles, and how this 
experience shaped the firm capabilities and performance of these new entrants.
At the aggregate level, I find that local industry diversified from its agricultural base 
immediately after Partition as a result of tariff protection and industrial policy. Wider 
diversification has also taken place since the late 1980s through the expansion of 
business groups and the entry of new firms. Diversification in export markets, 
however, has remained poor with little movement out of agricultural and low value- 
added products. Basic manufactures such as textiles, surgical instruments and sports
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goods continue to dominate overseas sales. While some textile firms have been able to 
diversify into products such as cement, energy production and real estate, the sectors 
o f choice are most often protected domestic industries and enabled by the transfer of 
organisational capabilities and general management practices. In contrast, the 
backgrounds of new entrants into ‘modern’ sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and IT show advanced industry-related education and work experience. 
These findings highlight the roots of recent industrial development in Pakistan in both 
production and organisational capabilities, and how they interact with the policy 
environment.
Using historical evidence from economies in East Asia I show that determinants of 
diversification in Pakistan echo those of other economies. I find that at the firm-level 
diversification is prompted by falling profit margins in existing industries and a 
growth in demand in certain product areas. Among incumbents, I also find drivers of 
diversification to include a change in the education of a family member, a ‘vision’ for 
the business, or personal connections in other industries. Given that firms tend to 
diversify based on falling profitability, I argue that the quota system may have held 
back industrial diversification in Pakistan, most importantly among the most capable 
firms.
7.1 Industrial diversification and economic development
Industrial diversification is widely seen by policy makers and scholars of development 
studies as a desirable route towards economic growth.1 This process typically 
involves a move out of agricultural and low value-added manufactured goods into 
higher value-added goods and service, often as exporters. This process has been 
named as ‘upgrading’, where firms move further up the value chain (see Schmitz, 
2004; Amsden and Chu, 2003; Gereffi, 1999), as ‘technological leapfrogging’ 
(Breznitz, 2007) and as the move into a ‘new economy’ (Harriss, 2003). Industrial 
diversification is reflected in the distribution of economic activity across industries
1 Diversification can take place into services as well as into the manufacturing sector. However, due to 
space constraints I introduce only broad trends in Pakistan’s service sector here and focus instead on 
determinants o f  industrial diversification at the firm level.
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and is shaped by a country’s relative capital, labour and skill endowments, its m arket 
size, its economic policies, and its engagement in trade.
D iversification into higher value-added products has been associated with economic 
growth in Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, China and India. South 
Korea, for example, has seen a shift in the distribution o f  economic activities from 
textiles and light engineering to electronics, shipbuilding and iron and steel (Am sden, 
1992). Following the influx o f entrepreneurs from the Chinese M ainland after 1948 
into sectors bicycle and machine tool production (Amsden & Chu, 2003:17), Taiwan 
has seen “spectacular growth” o f  its computer hardware industry (Breznitz, 2007:9) 
and the em ergence o f  a vibrant service sector (Amsden & Chu, 2003). Singapore and 
Hong K ong’s success has been associated with the m ove from plastics to electronics, 
and then into banking and financial services (Young, 1992:14). The export o f 
m anufactured products such as televisions and refrigerators have been success stories 
in China (Brandt et al, 2008) while software and pharmaceuticals have been 
highlighted as areas o f  strength in India (Basant, 2007; Arora and Gamberdelli, 2004). 
Many o f  these countries were previously large exporters o f  textile and clothing 
products, and peaked in their exports just as diversification com m enced into sectors 
such as machinery and transport products (see Figure 7-1).
Figure 7-1 Textiles and clothing (left) and machinery (right) as share of total 
exports (1962-2007), Republic of Korea, China, Hong Kong, Turkey
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The contrasting lack o f  industrial diversification in exports from South Asian 
countries such as Pakistan, India and Bangladesh is illustrated in Figure 7-2. In India 
and Pakistan only a small proportion o f  exports are represented in machinery and 
transport products -  11 per cent and 4 per cent respectively in 2007 -  in contrast to 47 
per cent in China and 58 per cent in Korea. Indeed, both Korea and C hina’s top 
exports by value between 2002 and 2007 were electrical machinery and equipm ent 
(27.4 per cent and 22.9 per cent respectively) versus cotton in Pakistan (21.0 per cent) 
and precious stones in India (14.6 per cent).2 Further, in textile and clothing exports 
India only peaked in 1992 and Pakistan 1997 respectively, while Bangladesh had not 
yet peaked as o f  2006.3
Figure 7-2 Textile and clothing (left) and machinery (right) as share of total 
exports (1962-2007), Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
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At the firm level, diversification can be driven by incumbents or by new entrants and 
evidence suggests that underlying capabilities in product, organisation and innovation 
have driven firm entry and performance in emerging economies. In Korea, for 
example, Amsden (1992) argues that business groups which arose from the early 
import-substituting industries such as sugar, construction, cement, fertilizer and oil
2 Source: UN Comtrade, HS2002.
3 The peak o f textiles and clothing as a percentage o f total exports for countries such as Hong Kong and 
Korea may be lower in comparison with Pakistan and Bangladesh because the latter countries are more 
able to take advantage o f their comparative advantage, in contrast with trade barriers earlier put up 
against the former. Thanks to David Hounshell for pointing out this possible relationship.
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refining drove industrial diversification.4 What distinguished groups that diversified 
was their capital- and skill-intensity, greater reliance on salaried managers and 
emergence from a more taxing learning process than in lighter industries (1992:246). 
Learning through joint ventures was also important. As early as 1969 Korea was 
considering electronics as an area for growth and when joint ventures were allowed 
“most of the major business groups in the computer field — Hyundai, Daewoo, Lucky- 
Goldstar, and Samsung -  formed them” (1992:83).
In contrast, Amsden argues that “cotton textiles firms did not become the agents of 
further industrialization” (Amsden, 1992:20). There were almost no links between 
textiles and clothing and new industries and none of the textile firms of the 1950s and 
1960s became the leading chaebols of the 1970s and 1980s (although many chaebols 
did have textile arms within the business). Amsden explains that “unchanging skill 
base of the textiles industry made it difficult to ‘upscale’ and all but impossible to act 
as agent of further industrialization through diversification into new industries” 
(ibid:257). In contrast, heavy industries such as cement were learning-intensive: 
foreign technical assistance (such as overseas training and in-house process training 
using software) was higher than in textiles, and the capital intensive structure 
demanded capabilities in technology, scale and process automation (Amsden 
1992:265).
In Japan, it was invention and innovation that drove the formation and diversification 
of many of the country’s leading firms of the twentieth century. Education and the 
development o f underlying, transferable capabilities is also a characteristic of these 
firms. The founder of Hitachi, for example, was an employee o f a Japanese mining 
firm when he started building electric motors in the company’s engineering and repair 
shop. The firm went on to manufacture generators and expanded to be a major 
manufacturer of electrical equipment and machinery through acquisitions and growth 
in the 1920s.5 Matsushita Electric was founded by a school drop-out and his brother- 
in-law who started off making electric plugs, who then went on to manufacture lamps,
4 As for the initial origins o f these companies, most founders were “educated and rich” (Amsden, 
1992:266). Although Hyundai started as a construction firm serving US military before obtaining a 
licence to make cement from the government (ibid:267), but the backgrounds o f other firms are 
unclear. According to Amsden (1992:168) top management was typically recruited heavily from 
government, financial institutions and public enterprise.
5 Hitachi, Hoovers profile, http://www.hoovers.com, accessed October 2006.
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batteries and radios in the 1920s and 1930s.6 The Toyoda group of companies in 
Japan -  founded by a carpenter who developed an early wooden loom -  invented and 
manufactured spinning and weaving machinery for the textile industry in the late 19th 
and early 20th century before moving into auto manufacturing.7
Many of Japan’s textile firms diversified into other product markets when they faced 
industry maturity and macroeconomic turbulence. According to Colpan and Hikino 
(2005), ‘technology-driven diversifies’ had specialist knowledge in rayon fibre 
manufacturing from which knowledge of organic polymer chemistry and fibre 
engineering assisted moves into products such as plastics, chemicals, membranes, 
medical devices and optical disks. ‘Market-led diversifiers’ used marketing and 
financial capabilities to diversify into growing product markets such as colour 
imaging, pharmaceuticals, food, housing and construction. In contrast, ‘textile 
adherents’ made little investments in R&D which lead to lock-in and ‘core rigidities’. 
Diversification among this group of firms was thus limited to small range of 
engineering plastics and reagents.
In India, the export-oriented information and pharmaceutical industries have gained 
prominence as the centre of India’s ‘new economy’. Industry growth has been driven 
by a mix of established business groups, new entrants and international firms in which 
education and industry experience has played an important role.8 HCL, for example -  
one if India’s largest software firms -  was founded in 1976 by Shiv Nadar, a former 
employee of the calculator division of Delhi Cloth Mills. He left the company with 
five other colleagues to found a unit making calculators and later personal computers
6 Matsushita Electric, Hoovers profile, http://www.hoovers.com, accessed October 2006.
7 The son o f the founder, Kiichiro, was a mechanical engineer who worked to improve the looms. 
When the firm licensed technology to a US firm, Platt Bros, it devoted the proceeds to automobile- 
related research and development. In 1930, Kiichiro organised a group o f  engineers and started to 
research gasoline engines within the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works which developed the company's 
capabilities in precision machining and mass production methods, and in 1933 led to a prototype o f  an 
engine and the establishment o f  an Automobile department within the firm (Mass and Robertson, 
1996). The role o f overseas consultants, however, was also important in the transfer o f production 
knowledge.
8 Fuller and Narsimhan (2007) identify the largest software companies by export revenue in 2004 as 
Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys Technologies, Wipro Technologies, Satyam Computer Services, 
Cognizant Technology Solutions, and HCL Technologies. Lalitha (2002) cites the top five Indian firms 
making patent applications as Panacea Biotec, Ranbaxy Laboratories, Lupin Laboratories, Cipla and 
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries.
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(at a time when multinational firms such as IBM were asked to leave India)9. Another 
large software house, Wipro, was formed in 1945 as West India Vegetable Products 
Ltd. The firm later diversified into cooking oils, soaps, and hydraulics and has been 
managed since 1966 by Azim H. Premji, a graduate in Electrical Engineering from 
Stanford University, USA.10 In the pharmaceutical industry, Cipla was founded by a 
chemistry Ph.D graduate Khwaja Abdul Hamied in 1935, and the founder’s son also 
earned a doctorate in chemistry and joined the firm in 1961 (he remained the 
Chairman and Managing Director in 2007).*1 Lupin Laboratories which started its 
business in 1968 was founded by Dr. Desh Bandhu who had a masters degree in 
chemistry and an early career as an Associate Professor at Birla Institute of Science
17and Technology.
Some Indian textile firms have managed to diversify into new sectors. Tata Group, the 
large industrial conglomerate in India, was founded as a textile trading company in 
1868 and is now engaged in seven main business sectors of chemicals, 
communications, consumer products, energy, engineering, materials, and IT services 
(including the above mentioned Tata Consultancy Services).13 Suzlon Energy — a 
more recent entrant — has gained prominence as a leading manufacturer of wind 
turbines and grew out of the family textile business of Suzlon’s founder, Tulsi R. 
Tanti, a mechanical engineer by training.14
In Taiwan, Amsden and Chu (2003) argue that the impetus for growth of sectors such 
as calculators and personal computers was the emergence of a ‘new engineering elite’ 
as well as spinoffs from government research labs and science parks. While many first 
generation electronics firms were created using finance from the “old economy”, 
nearly all of these firms soon became defunct (although many of the founders of 
future top producers of calculators and notebooks in Taiwan once worked for these
9 ‘The amazing story o f  the birth o f HCL’, Moneycontrol.com, 9 Jun, 2007, reprinted on ReDifflndia, 
http://www.rediff.com/money/2007/jun/09bspecl.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
10 Sources: ‘From seeds to ASICs: Wipro's journey typical o f India's design industry’, Electrical 
Engineering Times, 24 Mar 2008, and Azim H. Premji, Wipro Profile,
http://www.wipro.com/aboutus/azim_profile.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
11 Cipla History, http://www.cipla.com/corporateprofile/history.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
12 Lupin Limited, http://www.lupinworld.com, accessed 25 March 2009.
13 Tata Group, Hoovers profile, http://www.hoovers.com, Accessed October 2006.
14 ‘Mastering the wind’, Businessworld, date unknown, accessed 25 March 2009, 
http://www.businessworld.in/index.php/Energy-Power/Mastering-The-Wind.html
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now defunct firms). Stan Shih, for example -  an electrical engineering graduate -  first 
worked in first generation calculator producers (Unitron and Qualitron) founded by a 
textile company (Amsden and Chu, 2003:31) and later founded Acer, the laptop 
manufacturer.15
In contrast, Taiwan’s old business -  and textile -  groups diversified into services. 
Amsden and Chu argue that these groups did so because of the types of skills they had 
acquired in the old economy (2003: 119). Ruentex, for example, was formed as a 
textile firm in 1953 with American aid and also entered land development from which 
it diversified into construction in 1977 (Amsden and Chu, 2003). Later the a new 
company was formed to develop shopping complexes, as well as interior design, 
building maintenance and international distribution and warehousing units. Later it 
formed a securities firm which represented 30 per cent of profits in the year 2000 
(ibid).
Evidence therefore suggests that it is actions at the firm level that have played an 
important role in driving aggregate industrial development. In particular, prior 
education, experience and accumulated capabilities have prompted new firm 
formation in several emerging economies. Diversification has been driven both by 
incumbents as well as new entrants and the education and experience of founders and 
Directors -  even within business groups -  has been an important driver of product 
choice. However, the textile sector has historically had an ambiguous relationship 
with industrial development. The ability to diversify into either services or 
manufacturing has often been highly dependent on the firm-specific case.
7.2 T he in d u str ia l lan d scap e o f  P ak istan  
Aggregate patterns o f  industrial diversification
As outlined in Chapter 2, Pakistan had a very low industrial base at the time of 
independence. Agriculture comprised 53.2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), 
services and trade 39.0 per cent, and industry only 7.8 per cent. However, as
15 Stan Shih had a BA and MSc degree in electrical engineering from Taiwan. He was a designer and 
developer in Unitron, and led the team that designed the first pen watch in Qualitron. Biography o f  
Stan Shih, Acer, accessed 23 March 2009, http://global.acer.com/about/biographical.htm
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Pakistan’s GDP per capita grew in real terms from $188 in 1960 to $660 in 2007, the 
composition of Pakistan’s economy also evolved.16 Between 1960 and 2007 
agriculture fell as a share of total GDP from 46 per cent to 19 per cent while industry 
increased from 16 to 27 per cent in the same period (see Figure 2-16 above). The 
share of services in GDP has also risen from 38 per cent in 1960 to 53 per cent in 
2007. Data on the industrial composition of Pakistan’s domestic GDP are poor, but 
the figures available suggest that by 1981 Pakistan had developed some capability in 
the manufacture of machinery, metal products, iron and steel, chemicals and transport
17equipment (although textiles and food products dominated) (see Table 7-1). This 
reflects early government policy objectives of self reliance in domestic industry as 
well as the entry by entrepreneurs after Partition into sectors such and iron and steel.
Table 7-1 Composition of industry in Pakistan (1981 and 1996)
Year 1981 (percent of total value added) 1996 (percent o f total value added)
1 Textiles 30.8 Textiles 30.6
2 Food products 12.9 Food products 20.8
3 Machinery, not electric 7.2 Other chemicals 6.6
4 Fabricated metal products 7.1 Machinery, not electric 4.3
5 Other chemicals 6.6 Machinery, electric 4.1
6 Iron and steel 5.2 Fabricated metal products 3.8
7 Machinery, electric 4.8 Iron and steel 3.0
8 Printing and publishing 3.6 Wearing apparel, not footwear 2.9
9 Transport equipment 3.2 Transport equipment 2.7
10 Industrial chemicals 2.1 Industrial chemicals 2.6
SOURCE: UNIDO 2001, UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database
In more recent years there has been rapid growth in some industrial segments. 
Between 1988 and 2001 the fastest growing industrial sectors included ‘modem’ 
products such as industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals and the manufacture of 
transport equipment (see Table 7-1 and Table 7-2).18 Further, the quantum index of 
large scale manufacturing of Pakistan’s Federal Bureau of Statistics (with a baseline 
of 100 in 2000) shows that overall manufacturing rose to the level of 205 in 2007 and 
that some sectors were particularly responsible for this growth including automobiles
16 Source: World Development Indicators, December 2008, constant USD (2000).
17 For example, statistics provided by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation are only 
as recent as 1996 and Pakistan’s own national account data is sparse on industry composition, having 
produced its last census o f  manufacturing in 2001.
18 This is the period o f data available from the Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2007, Pakistan Federal 
Bureau o f Statistics.
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(which rose to 445), cement (which grew to 244) and fertilisers (which increased to 
180).19
Table 7-2 Fastest growing sectors by total value added (1988-2001)
 Sector________________________________________ Growth rate (per cent)
All 32
1 Textile 112
2 Petroleum and coal 1670
3 Industrial chemicals 65
4 Food manufacturing 15
5 Apparel 146
6 Drugs and pharmaceuticals 65
7 Paper and paper products 95
8 Ginning of fibre 23
9 Manufacture of transport equipment 24
10 Beverage industries 74
NOTE: Sectors are ranked by the total increase in real value added, but only growth rates are listed. 
SOURCE: Table 13.5 Value o f  production by major industry groups, Statistical Yearbook 2008, 
Federal Bureau o f Statistics, own analysis
Data on growth in the service sector are scarce. Evidence from firm histories indicates 
that in the post-partition period there was entry of business groups into banking, 
insurance and leasing. More recent data show rapid growth of several service sectors. 
The finance and insurance industry, for example, has shown particularly rapid growth 
between 1999 and 2008, rising from 3.7 to 6.5 per cent of GDP (see Table 7-3). From 
2005 to 2006, when services grew by 8.8 per cent expansion was concentrated in 
construction, banking, and transport, storage and communication.20 From 2007 to 
2008, the wholesale and retail trade dominated with 17.1 per cent of GDP, followed 
by social and community services, and transport, storage and communications (see 
also Table 7-3).
19 Source: Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2008, Section 13-1 Quantum index o f  large-scale 
manufacturing industries.
20 This is in contrast with negative growth in the agricultural sector and 9 per cent growth in 
manufacturing in the same period. Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2006, Ministry o f Finance, 
Government o f  Pakistan.
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Table 7-3 Share of services in gross domestic product of Pakistan (2000-2008)
Segment Share of GDP (per cent) 
(1999-2000)
Share of GDP (per cent) 
(2007-2008)
Wholesale and retail trade 17.5 17.1
Transport, storage, communications 11.3 10.0
Social and community services 9.0 10.4
Public administration, defence 6.2 6.5
Finance and Insurance 3.7 6.5
Ownership of dwellings 3.1 2.6
Total services 50.7 53.2
SOURCE: Federal Bureau o f Statistics, 2008 National Accounts
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Pakistan has targeted both manufacturing and 
service sectors. From 2005 to 2006, telecoms, energy (oil, gas and power), financial 
services, trade, construction, chemicals, food and personal services have been the 
major recipients, accounting for almost 94 percent or $2.1 billion (nominal USD) of 
FDI.22 The telecom sector has been the single largest recipient of FDI ($1.0 billion) 
followed by the energy sector ($304 million) and financial services ($266 million). 
However, labour force data show that the majority o f employment growth between 
1998 and 2007 has taken place in the manufacturing sector (see Table 7-4). This 
suggests that service growth is not delivering employment growth, although it may be 
leading to rising productivity, as observed in India by Kochar et al (2006).
Table 7-4 Employment by segment (1998-2007)
Segment Share of total employment 
(per cent) (1998)
Share of total employment 
(per cent) (2007)
Agriculture 47.3 43.6
Manufacturing 10.0 13.5
Commerce 13.9 14.4
Services 15.4 14.4
Construction 6.3 6.6
SOURCE: Pakistan Labour Force Survey 2007-2008, Federal Bureau o f Statistics
However, in contrast with other economies such as Korea and China, Pakistan has 
shown relatively little diversification into higher value-added products. By 2001, 
textiles still accounted for 28.0 per cent of total industry value added, food
21 Table 13: Sectoral share in gross domestic product (at constant factor cost o f 1999-2000), accessed 
23 March 2009, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/national_accounts/tablel3.pdf
22 Pakistan Economic Survey 2006, Ministry o f Finance, Government o f Pakistan, p. xiii
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manufacturing for 16.5 per cent, and industrial chemicals for 6.2 per cent.23 In 
contrast, the top three manufactured products in Korea in 2001 were apparel, metal 
products and special purpose machinery.24 In the same year in Japan, the top three 
manufactured products were food, metal products and special purpose machinery. 
Even in India machinery products made it into the top three in 2001, ranked by food, 
textiles and non-electrical machinery.
Pakistan has also shown limited upgrading in its export products when compared with 
other countries. While agricultural exports have fallen in Pakistan from 60 per cent in 
1962 to 1.49 per cent in 2005 (see Figure 7-3), manufactured exports (representing 
approximately 85 per cent of the total) have continued to be dominated by traditional 
segments such as leather and surgical instruments as well as textiles (see Table 7-5). 
In fact, between 2003 and 2007 the fastest growing export products in gross value 
were cotton (up 36 per cent), other made-up textile articles (up 35 per cent), mineral 
fuels (up 264 per cent), cereals (up 87 per cent) and knitted apparel (up 42 per cent). 
An anomalous rise in transport equipment in 2007 was only the result of only a spike 
in the export of ship and boat structures. Further, some traditional sectors have 
suffered in recent years. Football stitching declined after the withdrawal of Nike 
(Pakistan’s largest buyer of hand-stitched footballs) in 2006 following concerns over 
labour conditions and the alleged presence of child workers in the industry (Nadvi, 
2008).26 Other sports goods such as tennis rackets have also experienced rising 
competition from mechanised production in Taiwan and Korea (Weiss, 1991:125).
23 Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2007, Federal Bureau o f  Statistics. Petroleum and coal is actually the 
third largest industrial sector in 2001 with 8.2 per cent o f  the total. However, petroleum is not included 
in the UNIDO data as a manufactured product hence it is not included here for the purposes o f  
comparison.
24 Source for Korea, Japan and India data here is UNIDO, Revision 2 (INDSTAT3) which is not 
available in Pakistan beyond 1996, hence the use o f data for Pakistan from the Statistical Year Book.
25 Source: UN Comtrade, HS 2002
26 ‘Nike to resume football production in Pakistan’, Financial Times. 26 May 2007
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Figure 7-3 Composition of Pakistan merchandised exports (1962-2006)
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SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, December 2008
Table 7-5 Top exports from Pakistan in 1962 and 2007 (share by percentage)
1962 % 2007 %
1 Textile fibres, not manufactured 56.8 Textile yam, fabrics, made up articles 39.0
2 Textile yam, fabrics, made up 
articles
20.1 Clothing 24.1
3 Cereals and cereal preparations 6.3 Cereals and cereal preparations 7.6
4 Fish and fish preparations 5.2 Petroleum and petroleum products 5.4
5 Hides, skins and fur skins 3.1 Transport equipment 2.9
6 Misc manufactured articles 1.1 Misc manufactured articles 2.5
7 Crude animal, vegetable materials 1.0 Leather/leather manufactures 2.3
8 Leather/leather manufactures 0.9 Non metallic mineral manufactures 1.6
9 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices & 
manufactures
0.9 Scientific & control instruments, 
photographic goods, clocks
1.3
10 Feed, stuff for animals 0.9 Fruit and vegetables 1.2
SOURCE: UN Comtrade SITC1, own analysis
There has only been growth in a few exports segments. Drugs and chemicals, for 
example, have risen from 0.3 per cent o f  total exports in the early 1990s to 
approximately 2.5 per cent between 2004 and 2007.27 Petroleum rose from 1.6 per 
cent o f  total goods exports in 1990 to 5.0 per cent in 2007.28 Sales o f  cement abroad
27 Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, Statistical Supplement 2006, Ministry o f Finance, Government 
of Pakistan, and Statistical Year Book 2008, Federal Bureau of Statistics.
28 ibid
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have also increased from 0 per cent of total exports in 1996 to 0.6 per cent in 2007.29 
In contrast, the top sectors of growth in India in the same period were mineral fuels, 
pearls, ores, organic chemicals and machinery and mechanical appliances. In China, 
the top five sectors of growth were electrical machinery and equipment, mechanised
30machinery, knitted garments, iron and steel and optical/photographic products. 
Further, Pakistan registered only five patents between 2001 and 2005 with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office.31 India registered 1,222 patents in the same 
period.
Further, while manufactured exports from Pakistan grew 13 fold between 1976 and 
2005, the export of services grew only five fold. In contrast, service exports from 
India grew in India to make up 37.9 per cent of the total in 2006 in contrast with 17.1 
per cent in Pakistan.32 The bulk of service exports from Pakistan are dominated by a 
few, non-commercial sectors such as government services, including remittances 
received by foreign missions, military units and agencies (see Table 7-6). 
Transportation is also likely to represent much of the earnings of the state-owned 
national airline, Pakistan International Airways (which made a loss before tax each 
year from 2005 to 2008).33 On a positive note, the fastest service growing exports 
from 2005 to 2007 were construction services (showing growth of 246 per cent and 
making up 1.8 per cent of the total in 2007), royalties/licence fees (with growth of 133 
per cent, taking it to 1 per cent of the total) and computer and information services 
(with growth of 102 per cent, making up 3.4 per cent of the total).
Table 7-6 Service exports from Pakistan (2007)
Service Share of total service exports
1 Government 40.9
2 Transportation 28.5
3 Other business 11.0
4 Travel 7.3
=5 Communication 3.4
Computer & Information Services 3.4
NOTE: This data were only available from the State Bank o f Pakistan from January 2005 onwards.
SOURCE: State Bank o f Pakistan, own analysis
29 ibid
30 Source: UN Comtrade, SITC1
31 Source: US Patent Office, http://www.uspto.gov
32 Source: World Development Indicators, December 2008
33 Source: Pakistan International Airways, Annual Reports, own analysis. This is my own estimation 
since detailed data on service exports are not available.
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Firm incorporation data match trends in the growth of local and export sectors. In 
2007, the largest number of firms in any one sector was in textiles, followed by 
general services, tourism, trading, and communications (see Table 7-7). However, 
there has been a rise in firm entry since the late 1980s into ‘modem’ sectors such 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals and information technology (see Figure 7-4) and between 
1999 and 2007 the most popular sectors for entry were communications, services, 
chemicals and textiles (see Table 7-8).34 Further, the data also show the concentration 
of certain sectors among small numbers of companies. There are only a total of 177 
registered sugar mills, for example, 72 cement firms, and 19 companies in steel and 
allied products. The small numbers of firms in the carpet, footwear and sports goods 
sectors (22, 24 and 53 respectively) confirms that many of the firms in these segments 
will be partnerships, sole proprietorships or unregistered.
Table 7-7 Distribution of all firms incorporated in Pakistan (2007) 
____________________Sector______________________ Percentage of total firms______
1 Other 37.7
2 Textile 8.5
3 Services 7.6
4 Tourism 4.8
5 Trading 4.6
6 Communications 4.3
7 IT 3.6
8 Engineering 3.2
9 Food & Beverages 3.2
10 Construction 2.9
SOURCE: Securities and Exchange Commission o f Pakistan, Annual Report 2007
34 This incorporation data, however, should be treated with caution. This rise can also be because SECP 
has been encouraging firms to formalise their firms (as outlined in SECP Annual Report, 2005). It is 
also unclear what activities firms are involved in -  in the pharmaceutical sector, for example — and 
firms may self-register into categories. However, given the close relationship with Pakistan’s economic 
stability, such as the coup in 1999, and global economic performance suggests that economic 
confidence was also an important determinant o f  firm incorporation.
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Figure 7-4 Incorporation trends among high-tech sectors in Pakistan (1990-2006)
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Table 7-8 Firm incorporation trends by sector in Pakistan (new firms per year)
1999-2000 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2005-2007
Other(888) Other (529) O ther(685) Other (353) -
1 Comms. Comms. Comms. Services Services
(140) (187) (272) (426) (2,546)
2 Chemical & Textile Textile Trading Tourism
Pharma. (109) (89) (130) (326) (2,235)
3 Textile Chemical & Chemical & Comms. Trading
(96) Pharma. (82) Pharma. (94) (234) (1,469)
4 Food & Finance & Food & Real Estate Devt. Textile
Beverage (85) Banking (62) Beverage (52) (225) (615)
5 Transport Food & Fuel & Energy Textile Comms.
(52) Beverage (51) (46) (221) (474)
NOTE: Categories changes in 2004-2005 included previously defined ‘Other' sectors such as services, 
IT, tourism and trading, and reflects the introduction o f  these categories into the top 5 in 2005. 
‘Com m s.’ refers to ‘Com m unications'.
SOURCE: Securities and Exchange Com m ission o f  Pakistan
The composition of industry by firm type
The composition o f  the industrial sectors outlined above varies by firm type and 
includes local firms, state-run units, army-run establishm ents and foreign firms. 
Among the top 40 publicly-listed companies, for example, governm ent and domestic 
private sector ownership are estimated to account for 34 and 53 percent respectively, 
while foreign ownership accounts for the remaining 13 percent (IMF, 2005:55). 
Composition by industry sector has been shaped both by econom ic policy and firm-
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level capabilities, however the distribution of firms by type within sectors reveals the 
extent to which barriers to entry still remain across industries.35 In particular, entry 
patterns show dynamism within some sectors but the continued role of patronage in 
others.
Traditional industry sectors, for example, have typically remained dominated by 
established private sector business groups. Sugar production, for instance, comprises 
1.9 per cent of GDP (and Pakistan is the world’s fifth largest sugarcane producer), but 
of the 71 mills classed as operational many of them belong to well-known business 
families.36 Shahtaj Sugar Mills, for example, is part of the Shahnawaz Group, also 
involved in textiles and retail of food and drink.37 Noon Sugar Mills is part of the
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Noon Group, also involved in milk powder, cement and textiles. Brother Sugar 
Mills and Ittefaq Sugar Mills belong to the family of former Prime Minister, Nawaz 
Sharif, while the Pakistani army is also involved with the ownership of Fauji Sugar 
Mills. It is protective economic policy which has particularly shaped entry into the 
sector (as well as influenced founder motivations). The owner of Firm 51, an auto 
component manufacturer, commented that sugar sector was previously easy to enter 
because you could make a “contribution to get a licence”. There were only eleven new 
incorporations in the sector between 2004 and 2007, and in 2008 the industry was still 
protected with import tariffs of 25 per cent.39 As a result, the industry remains 
stagnant and in 2008 it was under investigation for cartel activity.40
The army also continues to play an important role in several traditional industries. 
Siddiqa-Agha (2007) shows, for example, that there are four main economic 
subsidiaries to the Ministry of Defence: the Fauji [Soldier] Foundation, the Army 
Welfare Trust, the Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation. The Fauji 
Foundation was established in 1954 to address the welfare of ex-servicemen, but
35 Industry in Pakistan is comprised o f local firms, state-run units, army-run establishments and foreign 
firms. Government and domestic private sector ownership are estimated to account for 34 and 53 
percent o f the top 40 listed companies respectively, while foreign ownership accounts for the remaining 
13 percent (IMF, 2005).
36 Pakistan Board o f Investment, ‘An introduction to Pakistan’s sugar industry’, date unknown but 
approximately 2006, http://www.pakboi.gov.pk
37 Shahnawaz Group Companies, http://www.shahnawazltd.com/about.html, accessed 25 March 2009.
38 Noon Group, profile, http://www.noonsugar.com/groupprofile.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
39 Beet and cane sugar are subject to import duties o f  25 per cent, Source: Pakistan Customs Tariffs 
2008-2009, http://www.fbr.gov.pk/newcu/TARIFF/Tarrif20082009.asp [sic].
40 ‘CCP seeks data o f cement makers from FBR’, Business Recorder. 12 September 2008,
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money provided for capital investment was also used to create industrial units 
(2007:119). The Army Welfare Trust was set up in 1971 to generate employment and 
profit-making opportunities, the Shaheen Foundation by the air force in 1977, and the 
Bahria Trust by the navy in 1982 with similar welfare goals. Between them, they are 
involved in sectors such as construction, real estate, goods transportation, finance, 
cement, fertilizer, oil and gas, sugar, rice, and cereal production. They have even 
engaged in joint ventures with overseas firms, such as Fauji Cereals, incorporated in 
1954 in collaboration with Quaker Oats England.41 Siddiqa-Agha argues, however, 
that the economic efficiency of the units is questionable. The Army Welfare Trust, for 
example, received a bail out from the government in 1997 in response for agreements 
to improve management practices (2007:221).
However, there has been a gradual retreat of the state since the end of the 1990s. 
While the state was dominant in the early years in sectors such as sugar, jute, fertilizer 
and pharmaceuticals, by 2007 it had completed privatisation of all units of chemical, 
textile, cement, rice and light engineering, as well as 98 per cent of automobiles, 96 
per cent of ghee, 83 per cent of phosphate fertiliser, and all units of nitrogen 
fertiliser.42 Some units do remain in state hands, such as the national airline, PIA, 
Pakistan State Oil (listed for privatisation in 2007), and Pakistan Steel Mills 
(completed in 1985).43
There are also a number of fresh faces in the service sector in recent years including 
both local and foreign firms, showing positive developments in firm entry. The 
deregulation of the telecoms sector in 2004 led to the entry of Telenor, a Norwegian 
Telecom firm, which in 2008 announced its purchase of Tameer Microfinance Bank 
in order to expand its market.44 Firms such as Siemens, Alcatel, and Ericsson have 
also set up telecom manufacturing facilities in Pakistan.45 At the time of my third field 
visit to Pakistan in 2007, International clothes chain Next had set up a new store in
41 Fauji Cereals, http://www.faujicereals.com.pk/nutritions.html, accessed 25 March 2009.
42 Pakistan Economic Survey, 2007-2008, p55-56, Ministry o f Finance, Government o f  Pakistan.
43 Sources: Privatization Commission, Government o f Pakistan. Pakistan State Oil Company, 
http://www.privatisation.gov.pk/oilgas/pso.htm and Pakistan Steel Mills, History, 
http://www.paksteel.com.pk/organ_our_history.html, accessed 25 March 2009.
44 Sources: ‘IT & Telecom: Sector overview’, Pakistan Board o f  Investment, accessed 25 March 2009 
from http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/pdf7IT%20&%20Telecom.pdf and ‘Telenor to acquire Tameer 
Microfinance Bank’, Business Recorder. 19 November 2008.
45 ‘IT & Telecom: Sector overview’, Pakistan Board o f  Investment (as above).
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central Lahore in partnership with Team A Ventures, a Pakistani retail franchise 
specialist.46 Team A Ventures also owns the Mothercare franchise in Pakistan and is 
part of the Gulsons Group, a business established in Pakistan in 1965 in Karachi and 
also involved in ocean and airfreight, warehousing and distribution 47 Foreign entrants 
included cash and carry stores Makro in a joint venture with Habib Group, as well as 
Carrefour through its Dubai based franchisee.
Foreign firms also tend to have a stronger presence in sectors such as oil and gas, 
consumer goods and pharmaceuticals. In the oil refining and marketing sector, in 
2005, for example, Shell Pakistan -  which has been operating in the country since 
1899 -  had the second largest market share of 22 per cent (after the state-owned 
Pakistan State Oil which had 67 per cent market share).49 Caltex Oil (part of Chevron) 
had 7 per cent of the market, followed by Attock Petroleum, a subsidiary of Attock 
Oil Company UK with 2 per cent.50 There have been some recent new entrants 
including Bosicor Pakistan. It had Pakistan’s fifth largest refinery in 2008 and its 
market share had increased from 6.5 per cent in 2006 to 12.0 per cent in 2008. It was 
founded in 1995 by Parvez Abbasi, a former marketing executive for Caltex, and a 
stake in the firm was later purchased by Abraaj Capital -  a private equity firm -  with 
the aim of creating a refining and petrochemicals conglomerate.51
The entry trends and current composition of domestic growth sectors such as fertiliser, 
cement and automobiles — as well as export-oriented, knowledge-intensive segments 
such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and information technology -  also reveal the 
types of firms which have driven growth in these sectors. The origins and scope of
46 ‘Next adds Pakistan to its overseas collection’, The Telegraph. 18 February 2007.
47 Gulsons Group, http://www.gulsons.com/, accessed 25 March 2009.
48 Sources: ‘Making retail business competitive’, Dawn. 5 May 2008,
http://www.dawn.com/2008/05/05/ebr2.htm, and ‘Dubai Group to set up retail hypermarkets’, Dawn.
16 October 2008 http://www.dawn.com/2008/10/16/ebrl8.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
49 Sources: Pakistan Board o f Investment, ‘Oil and Gas’, date unknown but approximately 2005, 
http://www.pakboi.gov.pk, and Shell in Pakistan, http://www.shelI.com/home/content/pk-en, accessed 
25 March 2009.
50 Sources: Caltex in Pakistan, http://www.caltex.com/pk/en/caltexPK.asp, accessed 25 March 2009, 
and Attock Refinery Limited, Analysis o f Financial Statements Financial Year 2004-Financial Year 
2008, Business Recorder. 1 December 2008
51 Sources: Parvez Abbasi (late), The founder chairman, Bosicor Pakistan,
http://www.bosicor.com.pk/founderchairman.html, accessed 25 March 2009, and Bosicor Pakistan, 
Analysis o f financial statements 2004-2008, Business Recorder. 24 Nov 2008.
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this growth have implication for development policy as well as Pakistan’s future 
development trajectory. It is to this analysis to which I now turn.
7.3 The origins of growth in traditional industrial sectors: cement, 
fertiliser and automobiles
As outlined above, three traditional industrial sectors which have shown growth in the 
post-1990 period in Pakistan include cement, fertiliser and automobiles. It is typically 
business groups and former textile firms that have driven diversification into these 
sectors shaped by acquired organisational capabilities. Case studies below outline 
which types of experience were applied in the new industry and founder entry 
strategies. I also use comparisons of firm size and profitability with that of the textile 
sector in order to explore firm performance, the potential value-added of the new 
sector, and the links between founder experience and firm growth.52 However, I 
outline how economic policy has often continued to limit firm entry and performance 
in these new sectors. I argue that policy has often constrained growth in the industries, 
and hence wider industrial development.
Cement
The cement sector was identified above as one which has been performing well in 
both local and export markets. It is also one which has been a diversification target for 
several textile mills. In 2007 and 2008, Pakistan had 29 cement plants producing 
around 37 million tonnes of cement of which 21 were listed companies.53 The 
industry has traditionally been dominated by business groups. The older Dadabhoy 
Group, for example, operates Dadabhoy Cement. In 2007, it had sales of only Rs704 
million but a profit before tax (PBT) of 21.1 per cent (in contrast with the largest 
textile firm on the KSE which had sales of Rsl7.2 billion -  Nishat Mills -  and the 
highest PBT at 17.6 per cent — Artistic Denim Mills). Fauji Cement Company, an 
army-related firm, is also engaged in the sector and had sales of Rs3.5 billion in 2007 
and a PBT of 22.8 per cent. While the top executives in the company are ex-army
52 Note: Protective economic policy would inflate the profitability o f  firms in such sectors, however 
there is still a distribution in firm performance within any one industry.
5j Pakistan Economic Survey, 2007-2008.
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officers, its management is also composed of senior technical personnel with 
experience of operating in the local cement sector.54 However, were some new 
entrants from other backgrounds. Bestway Cement, for example, is a subsidiary of 
Bestway Group of the United Kingdom. It owns Bestway cash and carry and was set 
up by Sir Anwar Pervaiz as an Asian food store in West London in 1962.55 In 2007, 
Bestway reported revenues of Rs5.6 billion but a PBT of 0 per cent.56
Several textile mills have also diversified into the cement sector. Lucky Cement, for 
example, was the market leader in 2008 in both capacity (with 18.7 per cent of the 
total) and sales.57 It is part of Yunus Brothers, a large textile group, and in 2007 had a 
turnover of Rs 17.0 billion with a PBT of 13.6 per cent.58 DG Khan Cement is a unit of 
the Nishat Group -  Pakistan’s largest textile exporter -  and entered the sector in 1992 
with the purchase of a privatised unit.59 The firm reported revenues of Rs6.4 billion in 
2007 with a PBT of 26.8 per cent.60 Maple Leaf Cement became part of the Kohinoor 
Group -  owner o f Kohinoor Weaving and Kohinoor (Textile) Mills -  in 1992 
following the privatisation of the unit. In 2007 reported revenues of Rs3.7 billion but 
with a loss before tax of 3.8 per cent61
One textile firm outlined its reasons for entering the cement sector and challenges 
they faced when doing so. The case highlights the motivations for firm entry, as well 
as the application of transferable knowledge to the new sector. Firm 50 is an 
established textile trader and manufacturer that commenced cement production in the 
1990s. The founding chairman was described as having “the idea for cement” when 
seeing the construction boom in the neighbouring Middle East as well as the likely 
future development of Pakistan itself. According to the current Director, the father 
would have considered other opportunities, but a particular attraction was the taxation
54 Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim, http://www.ffbl.com.pk/, accessed 25 March 2009.
55 Bestway Group, http://www.bestwaygroup.co.uk, accessed 25 March 2009.
56 Bestway Cement, Annual Report 2008. Another one o f its group companies is United Bank in 
Pakistan as well as a property investment division in the UK.
57 Lucky Cement Company, Analysis o f financial statements year 2003-2008, Business Recorder. 6 Oct 
2008
58 Lucky Cement, Annual Report 2008
59 D.G. Khan Cement Company, About Us, http://www.dgcement.com/article.php7nCatIdH 13, 
accessed 25 March 2009.
60 D.G. Khan Cement Company, Annual Report 2008
51 Kohinoor Maple Leaf Group, Company profile, http://www.kmlg.com/kmlg/cement_history.php, 
accessed 25 March 2009.
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incentives to enter the cement sector. The founder set out to become the largest 
producer in Pakistan. The unit was later managed by his son, educated in Pakistan in 
business. While textiles drove the growth of the group for many years, it is now only 
reliant on textiles for 40 per cent of revenue (and has the aim of reducing this 
dependence to 20 per cent).
An initial investment of $100 million was made in the unit, with “complementary 
infrastructure” provided by the government. The firm took a commercial approach to 
the unit from the outset, including a strategy to fill knowledge and capability gaps. 
Consultants were hired to advise on the feasibility of the unit as well as on recruitment 
and the design of production. They also used established business contacts in 
recruitment because in the 1990s “staff were hard to get and there was a lack of 
professionalism”. Experienced employees and marketing staff from the cement 
industry were hired to organise sales and distribute cement through network of 
dealers.
It took twelve months in total to construct the unit and growth was slow at first. 
Indeed, production was running only at 50-60 per cent of capacity between 1998 and 
1999. However, the attitude to improving performance was one which they had also 
expressed when moving into higher value-added textile products (they succeeded in 
maintaining textile exports in the post-quota period). They attempted to get a better 
return from the plant and considered “cost, quality and distribution” as necessary to 
maintain a competitive edge. The firm diversified away from 100 per cent sales in the 
local market to the export market -  cited by the Director as the best strategic move 
they had made. When asked about obstacles in creating the new unit, there were some 
difficulties in transporting machinery and “interest rates were high”. But over time the 
reputation of the mill was built and the firm was performing well in 2007 -  at the time 
of interview the firm had managed to increase its sales five-fold.
However, cement is one of the many of Pakistan’s local industries that remain 
protected. Between 2008 and 2009 white and aluminous cement was still subject to a
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tariff of 20 per cent62. According to a Business Recorder report, in 2008 the 
Competition Commission of Pakistan was investigating a price fixing cartel of cement 
companies within Pakistan.63 Indeed, industry protection was cited as a motivation to 
enter among one textile mill. The current director of Firm 9 explained that over the 
years the family group had tended to enter sectors that were relatively protected — 
including cement -  as high profitability was guaranteed. But the textile mills of this 
group had failed to maintain sales in the post-quota period and exhibited poor 
organisational capabilities (such as a lack of targets and monitoring). In 2007, the 
cement unit gained profit after tax of under 5 per cent in contrast with over 20 per cent 
in Firm 50 above.
As a result, while the cement sector has shown some export growth and new firm 
entry, the industry remains highly protected and economic policy has allowed the 
entry of some poorly-performing firms. Further, the underlying capabilities of firms 
are associated with performance even when facing a similar institutional environment. 
This suggests similar findings in the relationship between accumulated capability and 
performance as outlined in the textile sector above.
Fertiliser
Fertiliser was also identified above as a growth sector above and saw its final 
privatisations in the post-2000 period. However, the industry has also continued to be 
extensively protected in economic policies. A stated objective of the 2001 Fertilizer 
Policy, for example, was “[t]o enable local fertilizer price to stay below imported 
fertilizer prices” -  particularly from the Middle East -  through adaption of feed gas 
prices.64 In 2007, there were only six urea manufacturers in Pakistan and in 2008 there 
were zero exports of fertiliser 65 While managerial capabilities remain important, there 
is also a large presence of both established business groups and army-run units. This
62 Pakistan’s customs tariffs 2008-2009, Federal Bureau o f  Revenue, http://www.fbr.gov.pk. There are 
also rumours of corruption in the industry in relation to firms’ attempts to enter the sector.
63 CCP seeks data o f  cement makers from FBR, Business Recorder 12 Sep 2008.
64 Fertilizer Policy 2001, National Fertilizer Corporation o f Pakistan, http://www.nfc.gov.pk, accessed 
25 March 2009.
65 Note: Urea is an input into fertiliser industry as well as natural gas. Sources for data: Pakistan 
Economic Survey 2007-8 and Federal Bureau o f Statistics.
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suggests that the sector is more restricted than that o f cement, and all firms were 
making large profits in the post-2000 period.
Dawood Hercules, for example, has been involved in urea fertilizer production since 
1968 when it was formed as a joint venture between Dawood Group of Industries and 
Hercules Inc USA.66 It was the first private sector venture in Pakistan to receive a 
loan from the World Bank and was the largest ammonia plant in country at that time. 
The Chairman of Dawood Group, Hussain Dawood, obtained a degree in Metallurgy 
from the UK in 1966, followed by an MBA from the USA, showing a similar
tY7emphasis on professional training as in some textile firms. Its sales in 2007 were 
Rs5.0 billion, with a PBT of 16.3 per cent.68
The army has two units in the cement sector, Fauji Fertiliser and Fauji Fertilizer Bin 
Qasim. Fauji Fertiliser, for example, claims to have 40 per cent of Urea 
manufacturing in Pakistan and was incorporated in 1978 as a joint venture between 
Fauji Foundation and Haldor Topsoe of Denmark. In 2007, Fauji Fertiliser had sales 
of Rs28.4 billion and a PBT of 27.5 per cent.69 The Bin Qasim unit also had a large 
turnover -  Rsl2.2 billion in 2007 and a PBT of 31.9 per cent.70 These levels of sales 
and profitability were some of the highest seen across the growth sectors. In 2002, the 
Fauji Foundation also acquired the Pak Saudi Fertilizers urea plant from the National
71Fertilizer Corporation through the privatisation process.
There has also been a new entrant from the textile industry. In 2006, Azgard9 -  a 
large jeans exporter that performed well in the post-quota period (see Chapter 6) -  
purchased Pak-American Fertilizer for $272m upon its privatization.72 By 2007, it 
claimed to have captured 8 per cent of the urea market and consolidated accounts 
suggest revenues of Rs6.5 billion and a PBT of 13.5 per cent (in contrast with 17.4 per 
cent in apparel).
66 Dawood Group was engaged also in services with the creating o f  Central Insurance Company in 
1960, jute in East Pakistan, and later in 2004 acquired a majority stake in Inbox Technologies, a 
computer brand in Pakistan.
67 Si3 Board o f  Directors, http://www.s-iii.com/abt_bod_hd.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
68 p g y  here been adjusted to remove other sources o f  income not linked to operating profits.
69 Fauji Fertiliser Annual Report 2008
70 Fauji Fertiliser Bin Qasim Annual Report 2008
71 Fauji Fertilizer Company, http://www.ffc.com.pk/contents/aboutffc.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
72 Azgard9, Chemical division, http://www.azgard9.com/chemical.htm
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The concentration of this sector and limited degree of entry has implications for 
development. Aside from the impact on efficiency of the extensive protection of 
incumbents, concentration is also likely to have an impact on the agriculturalists that 
rely heavily on the fertiliser industry. Again, business groups, the army and textile 
firms dominate a traditional industry sector, showing little evidence of entry from 
other backgrounds based on prior experience.
Autom obiles
The automobile and auto parts sector is another growth sector outlined above and 
contributed $3.6 billion to GDP in 2006.73 However, the industry is also heavily 
protected. In 2006, tariffs were between 50 and 75 per cent on complete built units of 
cars, 90 per cent on motorcycles and 60 per cent on light commercial vehicles. 
Despite rapid growth in vehicle production and use in Pakistan, from 2005 to 2006 
there were only 9 assembly units for cars. Likewise, the motorcycle segment was 
dominated by Honda Atlas that produced 48 per cent of the total 751,000 motorcycles 
in the same period.74
The sector is dominated by joint ventures between Pakistani business groups and 
foreign firms. Pak Suzuki Motors, for example, is the largest producer of cars in 
Pakistan and is a joint venture between Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan and 
Pakistan Automobile Corporation (a government-established firm set up in 1973) 
which started production in 1984.75 Toyota cars are the next largest brand in 
production through the Indus Motor Company which is a joint venture between the 
House of Habib (which set up the first Muslim bank in pre-Partition India and entered 
into retail with Makro, the cash and carry store), Toyota Motor Corporation and 
Toyota Tsusho Corporation.76 It has manufactured and marketed Toyota and Daihatsu 
vehicles in Pakistan since 1990. Honda is the third largest brand produced, and Honda
73 Pakistan Board o f Investment, ‘Automobile Sector’, date unknown but estimated to be 2007, 
accessed 23 March 2009, http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/word/Automobile%20.doc
74 Honda Atlas showed poor financial performance between 2004 and 2008 and PBT was no more than 
5 per cent in any year between 2005 and 2008 (with a loss within one year). This is very low for a 
protected sector with such high growth, suggesting poor performance. Source: Honda Atlas Annual 
Reports.
75 Source: Pakistan Automobile Corporation, Export Development Bureau overview, accessed 23 
March 2009 (no longer available) http://www.edb.gov.pk/Corporations/PACO/PACO.pdf and 
http://www.paksuzuki.com.pk/company_profile.html, accessed 23 March 2009.
76 Indus Motor, History, accessed 23 March 2009, http://www.toyota-indus.com/company/history.asp
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Atlas Cars Pakistan is a joint venture between Honda Motor Company Limited Japan, 
and the Atlas Group of Companies in Pakistan, a group also engaged in financial 
services and lubricants. One textile group, Dewan Group, is also involved in the 
import and assembly of Hyundai and KLA cars with 9.1 per cent o f Pakistan’s total car 
production capacity.77
However, local firms have remained dependent on the technical skills of their foreign 
partners. In Honda Atlas, for example, senior technical roles within these joint 
ventures such as Chief Engineer Paint Shop and Chief Engineer Assembly shop in
no
2008 were allocated to technical staff from the foreign partner. Similarly, the 
Director of manufacturing in Indus Motor Company in 2008 was also Japanese79. 
Further, export values for auto parts from Pakistan are still tiny at $16.9 million in 
2006, in contrast with textiles exports of $13 billion, suggesting a lack of international 
competitiveness in the sector.80
When outlining its entry to the auto sector one firm demonstrated capability in 
connections rather than production. Firm 51 started motorcycle production in the 
1960s through a joint venture with an overseas partner. The founder was the son of a 
farmer but from a family he described as “rich”. Following an early career in 
journalism and then the civil service, the founder left to set up his own company 
based on the experience he had gained in the government’s income tax department in 
“accounts, finance and how markets operate”. Together with a colleague and a friend 
(who was also from a wealthy family) they borrowed money and invested in a new 
business.
Initially they created a small finance company engaged in leasing, but the founder had 
visited a motorcycle plant in India and the idea “stuck in [his] mind”. They travelled 
over the world to look for a partner with whom they could manufacture cycles in 
Pakistan. It was necessary to obtain a licence to manufacture according to the
77 Pakistan Board o f Investment, ‘Automobile Sector, as above.
78 Atlas Honda, Annual Report 2008
79 Toyota Indus Motor Company, http://www.toyota-indus.com/company/management.asp, accessed 25 
March 2009.
80 Source: Pakistan Board o f Investment, Pakistan Light Engineering Sector, date known, p. 38, 
accessed 23 March 2009, http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/pdf/Light%20Engineering.pdf
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prevailing system, which the founders succeeded in doing.81 Initially they found one 
firm who already had a distributor in Pakistan, and another that had poor 
manufacturing capabilities. They started manufacturing with this latter company as 
their previous local partner wanted to exit. I asked how the firm showed 
manufacturing capabilities in order to obtain the joint venture, he responded: “we had 
the licence”. In terms of his contribution to the new unit, the founder interviewed was 
responsible for accounts, sales and the management of the factory with “a small staff’.
The company has grown over time to be a large manufacturer in Pakistan. The 
founder explains that he company’s biggest advantage was the technical co-operation 
with the overseas partner. He admitted that over time management of the firm has 
improved: previously staff were ‘less educated’, but now they assist staff in obtaining 
diplomas and send a couple of senior staff abroad for executive MBAs each year. He 
himself completed an MBA in the late 1970s in order to learn “how to manage in the 
right manner”. However, the founder commented that his son who is now engaged in 
the firm “asks why we didn’t choose an easy sector”. He also commented that “we 
don’t know we chose engineering” and attributes their success down to being “lucky”.
This case illustrates the lack of dynamism in the industry and the negative impact of 
the protective policy environment. The impact is apparent when travelling between 
India and Pakistan. In India, the latest motorcycles and cars fill the roads, while in 
Pakistan there is an absence of newer models and an associated impact on the quality 
of vehicles available for Pakistani businesses and consumers.
Other textile diversification trends
In addition to the sectors mentioned above, textile groups have also diversified into 
other growth sectors such as retail, services, construction and real estate development.
The retail sector has been a choice of industry for many. Kohinoor Group, for 
example, has moved into retail as well as energy production and cement. The group 
opened the first store of its Q-Mart chain in District Sargodha in April 2006, a
81 Informal sources informed me that this particular founder used his connections in the government 
system to obtain this, but this was not revealed to me at the time o f the interview.
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discounter which stocks products ranging from food and home maintenance to
* R9electronics and is focused on market outside the main metropolitan cities. Crescent 
Group, which manufactures jeans at its Crescent Bahuman unit, set up a chain of 
‘Stone Age Jeans’ stores in Lahore, Karachi, and Faisalabad.83 Firm 50 — the cement 
manufacturer -  was also considering a move into the retail sector to “cater to the 
masses” of Pakistan. In particular it was considering local furniture retail as it 
complemented the existing home-textile business.
A handful of textile firms have also entered selected manufacturing segments such as 
tin and paper. Pakistan’s best known business group, Nishat, has diversified into 
banking, paper packaging, cement and power generation since its formation in 1951. 
Siddiqsons Group, one of the largest privately held exporters of woven garments 
under the MFA, created Siddiqsons Tin Plate in 1999. The firm describes itself as 
‘Pakistan’s first and only tin plate industry’ and was established in collaboration with 
Sollac of France and Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan. By 2007 its sales had grown to 
Rs3.4 billion with a PBT of 7.9 per cent. Sapphire Group, which has two of the largest 
textile units on the KSE and is entering the independent power sector, was reported to 
be in the process of establishing a joint venture with Shanghai Baosteel Group 
Corporation in the field of steel manufacturing.84
A number of textile firms have chosen to move into construction and real estate 
development. Firm 36 chose to move into real estate development in 2006 -  and the 
hotel sector in particular - because of the perceived income growth in the economy of 
Pakistan and an increase in the number of overseas visitors coming to the country. 
The underlying motivation of this strategy was that it creates demand for the 
company’s existing product — towels and home textiles inside the hotels, for example 
-  as firm integration is the main priority. Firm 25 had also moved into the 
construction sector, citing the policy of the government to move to make Pakistan a 
‘rental economy’ and expressing dismay at the poor environment for manufacturing 
projects in the country. At the time of interview in 2006, Firm 28 was also considering 
diversifying into the real estate sector.
82 Q-Mart, accessed 25 March 2009, http://www.qmart.com.pk/stores.php.
8j Stone Age Jeans, accessed 25 March 2009, http://www.stoneagejeans.com/storelocator.htm
84 ‘40 new Pak-China joint ventures to add existing 42 JVs in private/public sectors5, The Pakistan
News wire. 14 May 2007
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Services were of interest to several textile firms. Banking, for example, has been a 
focus of groups like Nishat which owns Muslim Commercial Bank.85 Firm 26, a 
spinner and weaver, entered the logistics and transportation sector in partnership with 
an experienced firm with whom the management had contacts. They were brought in 
to contribute the capital. A couple of firms also entered, or had plans to move into, the 
agriculture sector. Quetta Textile Mills, an established textile and leather producer, 
moved into livestock production in 2007. Firm 41, a garment manufacturer, explained 
its interest in entering the olive oil producing sector in Pakistan in partnership with an 
overseas contact.
However, on the whole these moves reflected the application of existing transferable 
capabilities such as marketing, organisational design and management practices. Only 
a few firms have moved into manufacturing or more ‘modem’ industrial sectors in the 
post-2000 period. Indeed, when asked why diversification into export products was 
not considered, however, the CEO of Firm 50 stated that it is “not possible to 
manufacture competitively” in Pakistan. Others had decided not to diversify in order 
to focus on their existing textile business in the post-MFA era, such as Firm 12, a 
large garment producer. There are only a few exceptions. Firm 29, for example, a 
small spinner, had a chemical unit as part of the business created by his son who had 
completed an undergraduate in chemistry in the UK. Firm 42, had created a spinoff of 
its IT unit following heavy investments in IT in response to the demands of a foreign 
buyer. The Financial Times has also reported that the Gul Ahmed Textile Mills in 
Karachi had opened its own business process outsourcing company.
Underlying capability was an important driver of diversification paths. In its joint 
venture in logistics with friends of the family who are involved in the transport sector, 
Firm 26 contributed management expertise as well as finance for the new venture. 
According to the Director, it is important to “pick up the skills from the existing 
company” when choosing the target industry for diversification. Several textile firms 
also set up independent power companies alongside in-house power generation in the
85 Although there have been several allegations o f corruption in the way this privatisation took place (a 
number o f  directors o f  textile firms are on the board o f Muslim Commercial Bank) and o f cartelisation 
among certain banks. Source for cartel reference: ‘Tareen sees banks' cartel behind currency fall’, 
Business Recorder. 9 October 2008.
86 ‘Minnow plans to become big fish’, Financial Times. 1 Jun 2005.
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R7textile mill, and include Gul Ahmed Energy, Kohinoor Energy and Liberty Power.
In firms 12 and 29 above, the move into IT and chemicals was shaped by the 
education and accumulated experience of family members. However, the economic 
policy environment and existing business connections had clearly shaped the choice 
o f target industry.
The presence of export quotas under the Multifibre Agreement also appears to have 
shaped diversification trends among Pakistan’s textile firms. Many cited declining 
profits in the textile and clothing sectors as their recent motivations for diversification. 
The Director of Firm 12, a leading garment unit, stated that “companies are starting to 
regret that they didn’t invest their money more wisely during the quota”. Several 
others were trying to rapidly reduce their reliance on textiles. Indeed, the MFA 
distorted the industry, making it more profitable for the quota holder than it would 
have been otherwise. This suggests that the quota policy which was designed to help 
firms in developing countries actually discouraged their diversification into 
potentially more profitable industries.
7.4 The origins of growth in knowledge-intensive sectors:
pharmaceuticals, chemicals and information technology
Knowledge-intensive ‘modem’ sectors such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and 
information technology (IT) have also shown growth in recent years in Pakistan. The 
origins of these firms indicate that diversification into the ‘new economy’ in Pakistan 
tends to be driven by entrants with industry-specific education and experience rather 
than general management experience, capital or even connections. As a result, there is 
only a limited presence of firms originally involved in textiles and clothing or those 
originating from business groups.
87 Pakistan Board o f Investment, ‘Pakistan Power Sector', date unknown but approximately 2005, 
http://www.pakboi.gov.pk. Competitors in this sector included Hub Power, set up in 1985 with the help 
o f  the World Bank, and now run by National Power o f  the United Kingdom, and Fauji Kabirwala 
Power was set up by the Pakistan army’s Fauji Foundation in 1994. Sources: Hub Power, History, 
http://www.hubpower.com/history.php and Power Generation, Fauji Foundation, 
http://www.fauji.org.pk.
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Pharmaceuticals
According to Weiss only a few firms were operating in Pakistan’s pharmaceutical 
sector prior to 1947. New entrants after Partition had previously been involved in 
trading and “felt that there were profits to be made in repacking and manufacturing 
pharmaceuticals” (1991:52). Founders had no previous knowledge of the industry but 
hired skilled technicians and were helped by foreign manufacturers to set up joint 
ventures. It was only in the 1970s that pharmacy graduates or experienced workers 
chose to enter the sector and many firms started off by converting bulk 
pharmaceuticals into dosage form (ibid:62).
As a result, the pharmaceuticals sector in Pakistan has been historically dominated by 
multinational firms such as Johnson & Johnson, Aventis, Roche, Abbott Labs, 
Novartis and Pfizer. According to Basant, interview data suggest that in the early 
1990s the share of MNCs in the entire pharmaceutical segment was about 80 per cent 
(Basant, 2007:3971) and in 2006 GSK was the market leader followed by Abbott and 
Pfizer, with the highest local firm — Hilton Pharma — in tenth position.88 Foreign firms 
have a monopoly over the premium market with a market share of over 90 per cent 
(ibid). However, there is evidence that many domestic firms have recently entered
on
pharmaceutical segments which were previously dominated by foreign firms. 
Pakistan’s Board o f Investment estimates that between 1999 and 2003 the share of 
local producers in the pharmaceutical market rose from 39.0 to 43.8 per cent.90
88 ‘Pakistan health and pharmaceuticals sector’, Board o f Investment, Government o f  Pakistan, date 
unknown (earliest 2006), accessed 25 March 2009 from http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/sectors.htm.
89 A number o f policy changes shaped the composition o f the industry. The Generic Act o f 1972 meant 
that brand names were no longer to be used in medicines and were only to be sold under generic name 
in order to make quality drugs more accessible (1991:80). The 1976 Drugs Act required companies to 
apply for licences to produce each drug, a hurdle that larger firms found easier than smaller firms to 
overcome according to Weiss (1991:81). A complex regulatory environment has continued into the 
post-2000 period, and in 2007 the Ministry o f Health still sets the price for each drug in the market. It is 
accepted that Pakistan has achieved self-sufficiency in the manufacture o f  pharmaceuticals, but 
critiques o f  the sector include a dependence on imports for raw materials. A total o f  90-95 per cent o f  
the active ingredients for pharmaceutical products are imported, with as little as 35 pharmaceutical 
chemicals produced in Pakistan (Basant, 2007:3971). This is in contrast with India where two thirds of 
the raw material is produced internally, and is often argued to be the result o f  the small size o f the 
Pakistan market (ibid). Further, according to the CEO o f  Firm 49, only 4 or 5 companies were 
exporting to Africa and South Asia and there was a need for a certain level o f  infrastructure for that 
such as an air handling system, filtration.
90 Pakistan Board o f Investment, ‘Pakistan health and pharmaceuticals sector’ as above. Although it is 
noted that without original data, that this could just be random variation in the market share.
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Further, in the two decades leading up to 2007, Pakistani producers have been able to 
take over virtually all o f  the m arket for branded and bulk generics.91
At the firm level, there was a large rise in firm incorporations in the pharmaceutical 
sector from the 1980s onwards (see Figure 7-5). O f the 835 firms listed in 2006, only 
18.4 per cent were incorporated before 1990. However, the CEO o f  Firm 49, a large 
local m anufacturer, explained that in terms o f  performance it is mostly the older 
players that control the m arket and there are only “a couple o f  new people” from the 
1990s. Indeed, he also explained that the SECP incorporation list is likely to be 
overstating entry post-2000 as many will not be manufacturers but rather ex­
em ployees o f  pharm aceutical firms (who retire and set up their own shops to market a 
small num ber o f  products). He also said that on average spinoffs have not been 
successful in m ost cases due to a lack o f  finance, product knowledge and adequate 
production setup.
Figure 7-5 Incorporation trends in pharmaceuticals and chemicals (1947-2006)
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However, the backgrounds o f  pharmaceutical firms show greater industry-related 
experience than those in traditional industrial sectors outlined above. Adnan 
Naseem ullah has classified Pakistan’s pharmaceutical firms into two categories, 
‘international orig in’ and ‘local origin’.92 International origin firms include a Pakistan
91 Personal correspondence with Adnan Nassemullah, University o f  California Berkeley who is 
researching Pakistan's pharmaceutical sector, 2008.
92 ibid
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educated-doctor with work experience in Bahrain who returned to Pakistan with his 
own capital; a banker with experience in the Middle East who wanted to enter a 
technology intensive industry; an individual with an MSc in pharmaceutical chemistry 
from Pakistan who had worked as a pharmacist in a US hospital; and a founder with 
an undergraduate in pharmacy from Pakistan who traded in pharmaceutical products 
before obtaining a licence to manufacture. Those of local origin include a founder 
with a degree in pharmacy and an MBA-educated founder who worked for family 
business, as well as an established business group whose pharmaceutical unit is 
currently being managed by the overseas- and business-educated third generation of 
the family.
While performance data on pharmaceutical firms were not available, the origins of the 
largest firms by paid-up capital in 2006 could be traced.93 The evolution of these firms 
show the entry routes and presence of both new and old actors, and how they have 
moved from producing and marketing of products for multinationals to the sale of 
their own branded products. While many firms are smaller than multinationals, such 
as GSK with a turnover of Rsl0.6 billion in 2007 and a PBT of 25.1 per cent, they can 
often show strengths in product development and manufacturing and exhibit similar 
profitability.
Himont Chemicals, for example, is the 11th largest pharmaceutical firm by paid up 
capital and was set up in 1994 by a group of professionals mostly returning from the 
USA. They formed the unit after completing their education and several years of 
experience with multinationals such as GSK, Novartis, Aventis and Servier.94 The 
primary objective of the firm was to a establish high quality, branded-generics 
company to represent multinationals in Pakistan via a bulk drug plant in line with both 
European and Food and Drug Administration (of the United States) specifications. 
The company established its first plant for active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in 
1996 with technology acquired from an experienced Taiwanese engineering company 
and succeeded in selling products to buyers such as GSK, Roche and Boots. 
Following the sale of this unit to a pharmaceutical company in 2006, in 2007 it
93 Source: Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan, 2006
94 Himont Chemicals, ‘History5 and ‘Active pharmaceutical ingredients5, http://www.himont.com/, 
accessed 25 March 2009.
297
established a new bulk chemicals facility for manufacture APIs and this time 
developed its own technology for the unit.
Highnoon Laboratories was incorporated in 1984 in Lahore and was the 14th largest 
firm by paid-up capital. Over the years has established strategic alliances with well- 
known foreign pharmaceutical firms.95 The firm works with multinational companies 
to licence products in the local market and has emerged with a focus on products for 
cardiology, gastroenterology, and psychiatry. The Chairman of Highnoon Group of 
Companies, Jawaid Tariq Khan, is described as a former senior banker.96 The firm 
started off by marketing a number of Japanese products, but in 1986 built its own 
manufacturing facility in Lahore followed by the introduction of in-house R&D 
activities in 1986. It started local manufacturing of Duphar’s (now Solvay) -  a 
pharmaceutical and chemical group — products in 1993, and in 1997 launched its own 
brand of product. In 2004, it secured a patent in the UK for an oral rehydration 
formulation and introduced a range of new products in 2007 and 2008.97 In 2007, 
Highnoon had a turnover of Rsl.9 billion and a PBT of 6.6 per cent, a similar profile 
to many textile firms.
Diversification in the pharmaceutical sector was also driven by incumbents. Ferozsons 
Laboratories was Pakistan's first local pharmaceutical company to be listed on the 
country's stock exchanges (in 1960) and initially started production in 1956. It is 
currently the 31st largest firm by paid-up capital. The company was originally 
established in 1894 as a publishing house -  Ferozsons Limited -  which still has 
bookshops in Pakistan. The firm started out manufacturing drugs for companies such 
as Boots and Procter and Gamble, but now has own line of branded generics in 
segments such as gastrointestinal and cardiovascular medicine.98 In 2007 announced 
creation of a bioscience subsidiary, BF Biosciences, also has a retail venture called 
Farmacia. This case shows how the entry of firms into higher value sectors such as 
biosciences -  or growth sectors such as a retail -  can be driven by existing firms in
95 Highnoon Laboratories, http://www.highnoon-labs.com, accessed 25 March 2009.
96 ‘Highnoon offers free solar electrification o f  a village’, Business Recorder. 6 Nov 2008
97 Note: the firm has a textile unit which failed to maintain its sales after the ending o f the MFA, and 
has recently moved into energy sector, Highnoon Solar. Source: 
http://www.highnooninternational.com/home.html, accessed 25 March 2009.
98 Ferozsons Laboratories, http://www.ferozsons-labs.com/about_us.htm, accessed 25 March 2009.
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related sectors. The turnover of the firm in 2007 was Rs922m, with a PBT of 28.1 per 
cent, making it still profitable after more than 50 years of operation.
Firm 49 -  the 53rd largest firm by paid-up capital -  outlined its own entry into the 
pharmaceutical sector. The case illustrated the role of education and pre-founder 
experience in shaping firm entry strategy, as well as how the firm accumulated 
production and organisation capabilities over time. The founder graduated with a 
Ph.D in pharmacy from an overseas university. He returned to Pakistan for family 
reasons after which when he began to teach in a university (as he did not want a job 
within the government and all the multinational firms were located in Karachi when 
he was located in Punjab). While still at the university, he partnered with a relative 
already in the pharmacy business to buy a “shop size unit” with 8 or 9 staff, using his 
own savings and a loan from his father (but described the initial finances as “not 
great”). He later left the university in 1978 but was invited to be the president of one 
of a trade associations as he had been teaching the technical directors of many of the 
members.
The founder’s education helped shaped the new firm’s entry strategy. When planning 
the new venture, he wanted to enter a “difficult area” that not everyone would be able 
to enter and saw a gap in the market for good quality eye medicines. At three per cent 
of the market, it was not a segment that many other firms were choosing to enter and 
there were no ‘big players’ competing at the time. It was not part of the founder’s 
original Ph.D research, but in the final year of his PhD, supervision of other students 
had opened him up to other types of pharmaceutical research. The founders examined 
what the local companies were producing, and aimed to deliver a better quality 
product and become “number one” in the market. Most ophthalmic products were 
imported at that time and there was no technology available locally.
The prior education and experience of the founder was also important in shaping the 
capabilities of the new firm. From the outset, an R&D unit was created inside the firm 
because the founder himself was a “research person”. In contrast, other firms in the 
market were just “following the books”. Professionals were recruited early into the 
business as the founder saw that “each step should be done by a pharmacist”, in 
contrast to other firms that “wanted to cut costs with no professionals”. The firm often
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sold on credit or gave discounts to attract first-time buyers, and started their own 
distribution system, going door-to-door to pharmacies and purchasing doctors to 
convince them that their product was better. A particular strategy was to target “far 
flung areas” in each district. Profits were reinvested into the business over time.
This initial start shaped the firm’s rate of capability accumulation and growth 
trajectory. The company is continually engaged in product and process development 
and its engineers make use of exhibitions and visits to other plants in order to upgrade 
knowledge. They also make extensive use of good consultants with whom he is able 
to build a relationship based on being a “research person” rather than just a 
businessperson. Their goal was to reach number one position in the niche segment, 
and the founder argues it was this goal that helped attract the best employees from 
multinational firms. The founder was also attempting to hire non-resident Pakistanis 
from abroad, many of whom were classmates who later worked in the US 
pharmaceutical industry. There were several achievements: they had started producing 
ear, nose and throat products a few years before the interview, and were looking into 
new technologies such as chewable tablets in their development research. Further, 
while the company was not initially in the prescription market since it was “controlled 
by multinational companies”, by the 1990s the firm had managed to enter this 
segment. In order to break into the brand segment, they hired a new marketing 
manager: the targets were different in the new approach, and were evaluated every 
three months.
These backgrounds show that these firms tended to come from education and 
employment backgrounds closely related to the pharmaceutical industry itself. This 
stands in contrast to entry into sectors such as cement and fertiliser outlined above 
which have attracted textile firms and business groups with transferable organisational 
capabilities. It also shows that firms have been able to develop in-house capacity 
based on founder experience and strategic partnerships. This has implications for the 
kind of diversification that Pakistan will follow in the absence of higher levels of 
educational achievement or potential founders with industry-related experience.
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Chemicals
Pakistan’s chemical industry, which covers industries such as pesticides, paints, 
varnishes, dyes and pigments and petrochemicals was dominated by the state after 
Partition. In the early 1950s a number o f chemical companies were set up including 
Pak American Fertilizers and Pak Dyes & Chemical, while in the 1960s another 
chemical complex was set up at Kala Shah Kalu in Lahore." In the 1970s, however, 
several private chemical firms were nationalised and the industry started to decline. 
As late as the post-2000 period Pakistan lacked facilities to produce basic 
petrochemicals like ethylene, propylene, butadiene and styrene and relied on bulk 
imports (ibid). Many chemicals are subject to import tariffs of up to 25 per cent so this 
lack of development of the local market has occurred while protection has remained in 
place. However, more recently the chemical sector has witnessed export growth and 
shown an increase in firm entry similar to that of the pharmaceutical sector (see 
Figure 7-5 above). Of the 971 firms listed as operational in 2006, 86.5 per cent of had 
entered since 1990.
Data suggest that both local and foreign firms have played an important part in this 
rise in incorporations. Clariant, for example, is the subsidiary of the Swiss 
multinational company and has factories in Karachi, Lahore and Jamshoro in Sindh. 
Established in Pakistan in 1996, it produces textile, leather and paper chemicals, 
pigments and additives. It has seen both growing sales from 2002 to 2007 (with sales 
of Rs5.0 billion in 2007) and stable PBT (between 11.6 and 14.0 per cent since 
formation).100 Jotun group of Norway was incorporated in 1995 in Lahore and set up 
its first production facility in 2004 (following its exports to Pakistan since the early 
1980s). It produces powder coatings for decorative and construction markets and its 
aim was to supply the Pakistani market as well as rising demand from the Middle 
East.101 Some older multinationals also continue to have a large presence. ICI 
Pakistan, now part of AkzoNobel Group, originally set up a soda ash manufacturing
99 Experts Advisory Cell, Ministry o f Industries and Production, Prospects o f Chemical Industry in 
Pakistan, April 2003, accessed 25 March 2009 from
http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/industriesandproduction-division/media/chemicalindustry.pdf.
100 Clariant Pakistan. Our Divisions, http://www.clariant.com.pk, accessed 25 March 2009.
101 Sources: Experts Advisory Cell, Prospects o f Chemical Industry in Pakistan, as above and Jotun 
press release, ‘Jotun meets Pakistan's president’, 23 January 2006, accessed 25 March 2009 
http://www.jotun.com/www/20020059.nsf7viewUNID/FD4A43 51BE9EF6D8C12571000032D73470p  
enDocument&r=2
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facility in Khewra in 1944. This facility was sited next to the salt range as rock salt 
and limestone; two key raw materials for manufacturing soda ash. Today ICI 
manufactures polyester staple fibres, soda ash, sodium bicarbonate, paints, specialty 
chemicals, and adhesives.102 The firm had a large turnover in 2007 of Rs26.0 billion -  
nearly twice the size of the largest textile mill on the KSE -  and a PBT of 11.4 per 
cent.
Similarly, there has also been an increase of local firms entering the sector. The 
Director of Firm 52, a Lahore-based chemical manufacturer, explained that there have 
been some small spinoffs from established firms in the industry. All the local paint 
firms, for example, were created by former staff members of ICI. There have even 
been spinoffs from Firm 52, and some are “doing well”. While there is a lack of data 
for market share in chemicals, the list of top firms by paid-up capital includes names 
such as Engro Asahi Polymer and Chemicals (4th) and Olympia Chemicals (13th).103 
These case studies highlight the origins of these local companies as well as the role of 
founder experience in shaping firm performance and growth.
Engro Chemical grew out of the operations of Esso in Pakistan. The company 
established a fertiliser plant in 1968 and was the largest foreign investment at that 
time.104 In 1991, however, Exxon Chemical (as it is now known) divested the unit. 
The employees of Exxon purchased 75 per cent of the company’s equity and renamed 
the firm ENGRO Chemical. The purchase was assisted by international institutions 
such as Actis -  the British development finance company -  and the International 
Finance Corporation (that has made several investments in Engro between 1991 and 
1998).105 Performance was good in the firm. The company continued the fertiliser 
business and by 2008 it was the second largest producer o f urea fertiliser.106 In 1995 it 
also established a bulk liquid terminal at Port Qasim in a 50:50 joint venture with 
Royal Vopak of the Netherlands. In 2008, the company was constructing Pakistan’s 
first ethylene storage facility, while Engro Polymer and Chemical is engaged in the 
manufacture of polyvinyl chloride (PVC). The group established a dairy processing
102 ‘ICI Pakistan, Analysis o f financial statements, 2002-2008", Business Recorder. 9 October 2008.
103 Securities and Exchange Commission o f  Pakistan
104 Pakistan Board o f Investment document,
http://www.pakboi.gov.pk/pdf/Success%20Stories/Engro_SS.pdf, accessed 25 March 2009.
105 Biography o f David Morley, partner at Actis, http://www.act.is, accessed 25 March 2009.
106 ‘Engro Chemicals, Analysis o f financial statements 2003-2008’, Business Recorder. 10 Nov 2008
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food arm in 2007 and immediately gained 18 per cent market share for its milk and 
cream brands. Engro Chemical alone had a turnover of Rs23.1 billion in 2007 with a 
PBT of 18.3 per cent.
Some textile firms have moved into the chemical industry, highlighting the close 
synergies with a sector which is a large consumer of chemicals. Olympia Chemicals, 
for example, incorporated in 1995, is the second largest producer of soda ash and 
sodium bicarbonate in Pakistan and is part of Olympia group of companies. This 
group is run by the Monnoo family which has operated in Pakistan for several decades 
in sectors such as yam, synthetics and carpets as well as and poultry farming. The 
President of the group completed his higher education in textiles in North Carolina, 
USA, and is now involved in politics, holding positions in the privatisation,
107commerce and textile ministries in 2008. Financial performance information was 
not available for this firm, but it the company itself states that they have been 
exporting to the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, and Bangladesh.108 Sitara 
Chemical Industries also started as a textile weaving unit in 1956 under the leadership 
of two brothers.109 Sitara Chemical was established in 1981 and since then it has 
moved into the production of caustic soda (1985), liquid chlorine, specialty chemicals 
and export (2001) and agri-chemicals (2003). In 1995, it also entered into textile 
spinning. More recently the firm has created a new unit, Sitara Peroxide, and 
established a captive power plant with installed capacity of 80 MW.
One local firm explained its history in the chemical industry and its recent strategy. 
Firm 52 specialises in the production of polyester resins, acrylic emulsions and textile 
chemicals and was set up in Pakistan in the early 1980s. The current Director is a 
family member who joined the business in 2001 following a degree in industrial 
engineering and an MBA. The firm was initially part of a larger business group which 
was set up after Partition but following a family split the founder set up the company 
on his own. The original group was active in products such as textiles, fertiliser and 
petroleum. The founder was an engineer himself and saw that there was no
107 Press release, Privatization Commission, ‘Monnoo gets additional charge o f Ministry o f  
Privatisation and Investment’, http://www.privatisation.gov.pk, accessed 25 March 2009.
108 Olympia Chemicals, http://www.ocl.com.pk, accessed 25 March 2009.
109 Sitara Group, http://www.sitara.com.pk, accessed 25 March 2009.
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professional engineering contracting company operating in Pakistan, so decided to 
enter this sector in the 1970s.
The firm started off small, but over time moved into larger construction projects such 
as dams, fertiliser plants, cement and refineries. The entry into the chemicals sector 
was described as ‘ad hoc’ when the firm bought a sulphuric acid plant and found itself 
as one of the only firms producing this chemical. This unit was later sold when 
several small plants entered the market and the profitability shrunk. However, more 
recently the firm has been trying to move into speciality chemicals. Important drivers 
of this product innovation were a shift was the vision inside the company as well as 
the Director’s own push for exports. Until 2001, for example, they had none of what 
the Director described as “foreign qualified individuals” but now they have five Ph.Ds 
on staff, and a small R&D team to build “in-house capability for development”. The 
firm now has only professional CEOs with no family members in these positions. 
Further, the Directors also attempt to give the staff freedom to take risks and referred 
to a three-day strategy session that had taken place the week before.
He also gave the example of a recent printing and packaging product developed inside 
the firm -  a metallic film which is printed on top and used in potato crisp packets. It is 
an item that is not being produced in Pakistan at present as it is “hard to manufacture” 
and is thus usually imported by local buyers. In order to develop manufacturing 
capability in-house, he hired people from the printing ink industry who then 
developed the product inside the firm. It was now starting to capture market share, 
and according to the Director the investment “pays off even if you have to make 
mistakes or lose money”.
His education in engineering and business was also useful in knowing where to look 
for information regarding new product or process developments. A challenge, for 
example, was to acquire technology already established in the worldwide chemicals 
industry as it is “not in the interest” of companies such as Dow and Bayer to share 
technology with the firm (royalties are high to acquire the technology, making the 
investment expensive, and if they were approached with machinery they would be 
concerned it was obsolete). Another challenge is to find individuals with the right 
know-how as there are only a few people around the world who have knowledge of
304
how to manufacture such products. One route the firm has used was to place an 
advertisement in an overseas newspaper for specialist staff. An individual contacted 
them through this method and they have now formed a business relationship, which 
has opened up other contacts in the industry. In another instance it was “sheer luck” 
that they came across someone who was looking to sell technology within Pakistan. 
For marketing, to find the first overseas buyer the firm spent two years finding an 
appropriate agent for its specialised chemical products. This agent helped establish 
relationships with customers who now go directly to the firm.
As a result, the firm has been performing well in recent years. It has a small amount of 
exports and was assisted by external shifts in the policy environment where the 
government would refund 25 per cent of the freight costs if the firm exported more 
than $5m of products to a buyer. They have also recently added a hydrogen peroxide 
plant because there was no local manufacturing and because there are synergies with 
the cement, textile and paper sectors.
In the chemicals sector therefore it was again founders and Directors from industry- 
related education and employment backgrounds that have chosen to create new firms 
and drive innovation inside incumbent firms. In this case, a link with the textile 
industry was also present as it is heavily reliant on chemicals in the processing of 
cloth and finished fabric. However professional management practices and innovative 
marketing were also important in this sector to encourage new product development 
and firm growth.
Information technology
The final ‘modem’ sector which has witnessed growth and a rise in new firm entry in 
Pakistan is software and information technology. As illustrated above, exports in 
computer and information services have shown some growth since 2005, and export 
data on electrical machinery and equipment show a rise from 0.3 per cent of total 
exports in 2002 to 0.7 per cent of the total in 2006.110 The first software house to be
110 UN Comtrade, HS2002 data, code 85. In fact, Pakistan’s IT export figures are often considered to be 
unreliable due to the way they are recorded, and many industry observers believe revenues are kept in 
Dubai and could be much higher than export figures indicate.
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established was System s Limited in 1977 in Lahore, by Syed Babar Ali, the 
industrialist behind Packages Limited, and Aezaz Hussain a ‘pioneer o f  IT ’ in 
Pakistan’.1,1 Firm incorporation began in the late 1970s but since the 1990s there has 
been a rapid rise in firm formation (see Figure 7-6). The founder o f  Firm 53, a local 
software exporter, felt that growth within the IT sector was occurring as a result o f  the 
good reputation o f Pakistani IT engineers in the US and the em ergence o f  local talent. 
Several buyers also wanted to diversify sources from their reliance on Indian IT 
service providers. However, according to several interviewees, many firms were 
incorporated during the IT boom in the late 1990s and subsequently exited after the 
dotcom bust, 9/11, and as a result o f  poor management.
Figure 7-6 Incorporation of IT firms in Pakistan (1980-2006)
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A study conducted by Pakistan’s Software Export Board in 2007 (PSEB) identified a 
sample o f  60 IT businesses. It found that 57 per cent made packaged software, 48 per 
cent provided IT services and 32 per cent were engaged in IT consulting. A total o f  43 
per cent were set up with savings o f  founders, 32 per cent from foreign partners, 13 
per cent from a local business house, while other sources included cash flows, venture 
capital and banks (34 per cent). One third had revenues o f  more than £ lm , one third
111 Systems Limited, http://www.systemsltd.com/, accessed 25 March 2009. In 2008, Systems produces 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems for the textile spinning and sugar sectors and has a 
partnership with Microsoft to promote one o f its ERP products.
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between $200k and $lm, and 32 per cent had less than $200k. They found no 
differences in technical backgrounds among local or exporters but that high level 
contacts were important in establishing business relationships. They also found that 
better performing companies had employee friendly management practices such as 
profit sharing and high quality managerial talent (such as a mix of technical and 
business backgrounds, prior experience and financial discipline) than the rest of the 
industry.
Similar to the pharmaceutical and chemical industries outlined above, firms often 
grew out of the educational and employment experience of founders. In 2006, three 
firms were identified as the top exporters of IT products: NetSol Technologies, with 
$4.2m; Ovex Technologies, with $2.9m, and TRG, with $2.2m of exports.112 NetSol 
was set up in 1999 as a software developer and Najeeb Ghauri -  listed as the founder 
of the firm’s US subsidiary -  had acquired 15 years of combined marketing and
in
management experience with Fortune 500 companies such as Unilever. He 
manages both firms with Naeem Ghauri who has several years management and IT 
experience, and Salim Ghauri (both assumed to be family members) who has been a 
software developer since the 1980s. One of its main clients is Daimler-Chrysler, a car 
company that uses Netsol’s leasing software to manage its auto-leasing operation in 
several countries in the Asia-Pacific region.114 Revenues in 2007 were R sl.l billion 
and it had 31.0 per cent retained profit, one of the highest figures witnessed in any of 
the sectors covered in this chapter. This stands in contrast to the highest level of profit 
after tax among Pakistan’s listed textile firms in 2007 of 19.1 per cent in Azgard9, the 
jeans exporter.115
Ovex Technologies was founded by Omar Saeed in 2003. It is a provider of IT 
outsourcing services to support the design, installation, operation, management, and 
improvement of IT infrastructure in client companies. The employment experience of
112 ‘Industry Overview’, Pakistan Software Export Board (PSEB), accessed February 2007 (but no 
longer available), http://www.pseb.org.pk/page.php?pid=2,
113 NetSol Technologies, Management Team, accessed 25 March 2009, 
http://www.netsoltech.com/html/about_us/management.html
114 ‘Pakistan’s Software Industry Best Practices & Strategic Challenges: An exploratory analysis’ 
(2005) Pakistan Software Export Board (PSEB), February 2005, p66. Accessed 25 March 2009,
http://www.pseb.org.pk/UserFiles/documents/Best_Practices_Study.pdf,.
115 Azgard9 Annual Report 2007, Karachi Stock Exchange
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Saeed includes two Silicon Valley companies: the first an early stage employee at 
Homewarehouse.com which was acquired by Walmart, and the second a supply chain 
company that was founded by McKinsey and Co. Now run with professional 
management, Saeed remains the Chairman of the firm and in 2006 it was acquired by 
Nasdaq-listed En Pointe Technologies, a US corporation which offers hardware, 
software and consulting services.116 Saeed has an undergraduate degree from Brown 
University and an MBA from Harvard Business School.
The role of overseas technical education among founders and an IT-educated 
workforce were also continued themes among many o f the firms. Xavor Corporation, 
for instance, is rated as one of the top 40 IT firms in Pakistan by the PSEB, and is a 
Lahore-based management and technology consulting firm. One of the firm’s co­
founders, Humayun Rashid, has a Bachelors degree in Information Systems from the 
University of Texas, an MBA and a doctorate in Management.117 Rashid also worked 
and consulted with companies such as AST Computers, Paramount Pictures, Boeing, 
Broadcom, Standard Chartered Bank, IBM and Microsoft prior to founding Xavor in 
1995 in functions related to IT-enabled business transformation and change 
management. Several of the company’s staff also have undergraduate or postgraduate 
degrees in computer science.
Returnees from overseas were also present in the sector. Si3 was set up in 2003 in 
Karachi by Amer Ahmed Hashmi.118 Following a business degree he spent ten years 
at MCI Systemhouse and IBM Global Services managing projects in the US and 
Canada. For the founding of Si3, he attracted the interest of Khalid Rafi, a former 
senior partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers in Pakistan and now Si3’s chairman, and 
the industrialist Hussain Dawood of Dawood Group. The company’s first contract 
was for $2 million with the National Logistic Cell -  a company owned by the 
Pakistani army and the largest logistics company in the country -  for which it was in 
competition with Siemens and KPMG. In 2005, it entered a $5 million, seven-year
116 Ovex Technologies, Board o f  Directors, http://www.ovextech.com/bofd.html, accessed 25 March 
2009.
117 Xavor, http://www.xavor.com/AboutUs/OurLeadership.aspx, accessed 25 March 2009.
118 ‘Techies Come Home’, Forbes Asia, 19 Jun 2006 (reprinted on http://www.s- 
iii.com/nr_press_media.htm, accessed 25 Nov 08)
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outsourcing deal with Mybank, a Karachi bank with 50 branches in 22 cities. The firm 
is also considered one of the top 40 IT firms in Pakistan by the PSEB.
There are also several firms created by IT specialists with local industry experience in 
Pakistan. Vectracom, for example, a wireless information provider based in Karachi 
was set up in 1999 by Emran Ahmad Riyaz. Riyaz obtained his Bachelor degree in 
Electrical Engineering from Pakistan’s NED University of Engineering & 
Technology, Karachi in 1988, after which he worked in several IT-related roles such 
as the design of digital communications, digital radio, and software development. In 
1997, he left CresSoft, a IT company created by the Crescent Group, to form a 
company dedicated to the design and development of Wireless Messaging 
Solutions.119 There are now four companies in the Vectracom group covering 
software and wireless services and the firm has an international office in Dubai. It also 
counted firms such as ABN Amro Bank, the mobile operator Mobilink, and Muslim 
Commercial Bank among its clients.120. The Group Operations Director, Asim Zafar, 
is also a former employee of CresSoft.
International investors have also taken an interest in firms created by educated and 
experienced founders in Pakistan’s IT sector. LMKR is a technology company which 
provides Geo-Technology and Information Technology services to businesses and 
governments.121 Founded in 1994, the company operates in over 20 countries the firm 
and has become known for its GIS solutions, especially for the petroleum industry, 
and is now attempting to diversify.122 The firm is held within the Khan Group, headed 
by Atif Rais Khan, whose career profile includes an MS degree in Geology from the 
University of Karachi, an MS Degree in Petroleum Economics from Colorado School 
of Mines, and a 20 year professional career working in the US, Middle East and
119 CresSoft was set up as a US corporation based in Denver, Colorado in 1994, and owned by the 
Crescent Group, one o f  Pakistan’s best known business groups that grew out o f  the textile industry. The 
firm provided e-business and other IT solutions to Fortune 500 and other clients and offshores its 
design, coding and development work to Pakistan. However, it was reported in 2005 by the Pakistan 
Software Export Board that the firm was “all but eliminated” following its entry into the export market. 
Source: PSEB (2005) and CresSoft, Inc. http://www.cressoft.com.pk/overview.htm, accessed 25 March 
2009.
120 An exclusive interview with Chairman VectraGroup o f Companies, 15 Jan 2007, 
http://www.vectracom.com/news_highlights/news/default.aspx?subcat=0&contentID=220, accessed 25 
March 2009.
121 LMKR, http://www.lmkr.com/about-us/index.htmI, accessed 25 March 2009.
122 PSEB (2005)
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Pakistan.123 In 2007, Actis -  the British private equity investor - acquired a 49 per 
cent interest in LMKR Holdings, stating that the firm had potential “to become a 
significant national and global player in oil and gas and IT enabled services”.124
Business groups were less present in the sector. The PSEB notes that large business 
houses were a source of finance during the dotcom bubble, but following the 
“high-profile failures of several of these ventures” such as Cressoft and Atlas 
Software this activity has declined. One business group involved in chemicals, for 
example, Firm 52, failed to enter the IT sector despite one attempt. The company 
created an IT wing in the late 1990s to outsource their own IT work, formed with the 
company’s own IT staff. However, the service provided was data entry based on low 
labour costs, and following an initial start with local clients in the insurance and real 
estate sector, the Director admitted that they have not been able to grow the business. 
They realised that they had failed to appoint professional outsourcing people for the 
role, in particular an aggressive enough manager to introduce the right product. The 
Director also admitted they did not have the understanding of the IT business needed 
to grow the firm.
The origins of some of Pakistan’s IT firms therefore show that the founders have 
emerged from very different backgrounds than those in traditional industrial sectors. 
They often possess industry-related education and experience, and appear more likely 
to start with independent sources of capital. This suggests that the roots of industrial 
development may rest on education and accumulated knowhow not often available in 
existing industries, as was the case in the pharmaceuticals sector. The implication of 
these findings will be discussed further in Chapter 8.
Conclusion
In this chapter I examined the patterns of industrial diversification in Pakistan from 
1947 to 2007, focusing mainly on the period since 1990 when barriers to firm entry
123 PSEB CEO Forum 2007, Mr A tif Rais Khan, http://www.itcnasia.com/ceoforum/atif.htm, accessed 
25 March 2009.
124 Actis, a leading private equity investor acquires 49% interest in LMKR Holdings, Press release, 10 
August 2007, accessed 23 March 2009, http://www.Imkr.com/about- 
us/news_events.asp?rec=50&kw=Actics
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were rapidly removed. I outlined diversification trends in both industry and service 
sectors and identified firm backgrounds in high-growth traditional and knowledge- 
intensive industries. In particular, I examined how prior experience and capabilities 
shaped entry decisions among both incumbents and newly-created firms.
I find that some textile firms and business groups have diversified into growth sectors 
such as cement, fertiliser and services. Drivers of diversification included increased 
demand in particular sectors of the economy, changes in the policy or macroeconomic 
environment, education o f a family member, or existing relationships with firms in 
other sectors. Some have used external consultants to gain knowledge of new 
industries while others have appointed professional staff. Firms have also exploited 
knowhow accumulated within the original firm -  such as commercial strategy, 
organisational design and professional management -  in their approach to the new 
unit.
However, I find that on average textile firms and business groups have moved into 
protected domestic segments. These firms have failed to enter export-oriented, 
knowledge-intensive sectors. Instead, they have built on existing managerial 
capabilities rather than industry-specific education and experience. Indeed, many 
firms seem to have relied on their existing presence in business -  and perhaps political 
connections -  as a route to diversification. Further, the protected nature of many of 
these sectors -  and the minimal focus on exports (with the exception of cement) -  
shows a lack of competitiveness in the world market. This does not bode well for 
Pakistan’s future development. Protection of the textile sector under the Multifibre 
Arrangement also seems to have delayed diversification in many of Pakistan’s best 
firms.
In contrast, new firms that are emerging in higher value-added growth segments such 
as pharmaceuticals and information technology are typically formed by entrants with 
more industry-specific experience -  these are among the few sectors showing export 
growth in the post-1990 period. In these cases the education and experience of 
founders or Directors is reflected in entry strategy, product choice and production 
capabilities. As a result, existing textile firms and business groups are not responsible 
for the transition into the export-oriented, knowledge-intensive industries that have
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been associated with growth elsewhere. Instead, the move into such higher value- 
added sectors is more reliant in industry-specific education and experience than in 
traditional industries such as cement, real estate and services.
What remains to be discussed further are the implications of such findings for 
development theory and policy. It is to this wider context that I now turn in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8 The heterogeneous roots of development: 
rethinking industrial development theory and policy
Academic and policy research on industrial development has typically identified two 
important policy drivers of firm formation and growth. Firstly, the role of a stable 
macroeconomic and institutional environment in creating a demand side for 
entrepreneurship. Secondly, the role of state-led investments in infrastructure, 
education and publicly-funded research in shifting the economy towards higher value- 
added industries. The former has suggested that firms emerge and grow as a result of 
privatisation, deregulation and competition, while the latter suggests that industrial 
development is driven by a coherent state structure which takes proactive steps to 
direct firm learning and industrial growth. Both accounts been proposed as 
explanations for the rapid rate of economic development in East Asia and Latin 
America.
These accounts have also been present in this study in the analysis of firm entry, 
growth and diversification in Pakistan’s textile industry during trade liberalisation. 
Economic policy at the national level limited firm entry and growth in Pakistan’s 
early decades, while later liberalisation of entry at the end of the 1980s led to 
increased incentives for firm formation and diversification. Similarly, global trade 
policy in the form of the Multifibre Arrangement constrained the expansion of some 
firms, while prolonging the protection of others. The weakness of the Pakistani state 
has also shaped industrial development. Poor infrastructure and political instability 
have created a challenging operating environment for businesses, while limited 
investments in education have constrained opportunities for many to engage in the 
economic development process. These institutional and state-led factors go a long 
way to explain Pakistan’s limited industrial development to date.
However, evidence from this research has also shown that within this policy 
environment firms have shown much variation in performance. In the textile and 
clothing industry, exports and product upgrading have been dominated by a small
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number of firms, and an increase in competition during trade liberalisation led to 
shakeout and the reallocation of export share from poor to good performers. Similarly, 
I have argued that firm growth has been heterogeneous with very specific roots. A 
firm’s initial capabilities, its subsequent rate of capability accumulation and its long- 
run firm performance is directly related to founder experience and the. Founders of 
companies in knowledge-intensive sectors also differ dramatically from those in 
traditional industrial sectors -  they show greater industry-specific education and 
experience than the textile firms and business groups that have expanded in protected 
domestic industries.
I propose that an analytical framework that acknowledges the heterogeneous roots of 
industry growth offers the opportunity to reconsider dominant understandings of 
industrial development. Firstly, I show how an analysis of the supply side of industrial 
development -  including employment experience, organisational capabilities and firm 
heterogeneity -  can improve our understandings of industrial development in addition 
to the ‘demand side’ of either a stable institutional environment or state-led industrial 
policy. In particular, I argue that it is the entry of high capability firms can actually 
help developing countries break out of a low equilibrium of industrial development. 
Secondly, I argue that greater policy attention should be addressed to the 
accumulation of industry-related experience among workers. Specifically, I highlight 
the role of competition in breaking down the dominance (and often inefficiency) of 
family business groups, as well as the need for an increased focus on industry-related 
placements, the potential role of experienced expatriate workers, mentoring, and 
efforts to attract overseas investors. Finally, I outline how these findings contribute to 
our understandings of the association between pre-founder experience and firm 
performance and offer directions for future research.
8.1 Macroeconomics, institutions and industrial development
Academic and policy research has typically identified two important policy drivers of 
industrial development. The first is the importance of a stable macroeconomic 
environment in providing the incentives for firm formation and growth. This includes 
policy predictability, low inflation and fiscal prudence and an institutional 
environment which enforces property rights and financial regulation as well as
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adequate investments in physical and human capital. This set of policies has come to 
be known as the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ -  as described by Joseph Stiglitz in his 
position as World Bank Chief Economist in 1998 -  and has moved beyond the 
previous policy consensus of liberalised trade, privatisation and the deregulation of 
industry. It is also what Khan has described as the “service delivery model” 
(2004:165) of the state and can be understood as the demand side of firm formation 
and growth.
Several authors have outlined the central role of the institutional environment in the 
rapid emergence of several economies. In its assessment of the ‘Asian economic 
miracle’ in 1993, the World Bank attributed Asian growth to “getting the basics 
rights” (1993:5): private domestic investment, human capital accumulation and good 
macroeconomic management. According to Nelson and Pack (1999), the stable policy 
environment of East Asian economies (in relation to inflation and exchange rates) 
meant that firms could focus instead on addressing on productivity improvements 
(1999:417). Sutton notes that the institutional environment also shapes the country- 
specific cost of doing business -  a reduction in the cost of doing business is equivalent 
to a rise in capability across all firms in the country concerned (2007b:485). More 
generally, the institutional environment can also shape the degree of technology 
acquisition, foreign investment and learning. Branstetter et al (2006) have shown that 
in environments with more clearly defined property rights, for example, greater 
technology transfer takes place between foreign and local firms.
This understanding of how economic development occurs has also been dominant in 
policy making among development institutions. The top spending priority for global 
World Bank lending in 2007, for example, was Law, Justice and Public 
Administration (with 22.1 per cent of the total), followed by transportation (20 per 
cent) and Water and Sanitation (12.4 per cent) (see Table 8-1). Similarly, in South 
Asia the top priority for regional spending was Law, Justice and Public 
Administration (with 20.7 per cent of the total), followed by Health and Other Social 
Services (17.9 per cent) and Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry (13.0 per cent). 
Likewise, the activities of the International Finance Corporation include the 
development of financial markets and the provision of advisory services to improve
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the regulatory environment.1 Further, in the private sector policy of the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development in 2005, the focus was on 
reducing regulation and red-tape, reforming competition policy, developing 
infrastructure, strengthening international trade, and making financial markets work 
for the poor.
Table 8-1 World Bank spending by theme: World and South Asia (2007)
World South Asia
1 Law & Justice & Public Admin. 22.1 Law & Justice & Public Admin. 20.7
2 Transportation 20.0 Health & Other Social Services 17.9
3 Water, Sanitation, Flood Protection 12.4 Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 13.0
4 Health and Other Social Services 11.1 Education 12.9
5 Education 8.2 Finance 12.0
6 Energy and mining 7.2 Transportation 9.9
7 Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 7.0 Industry and trade 5.2
8 Finance 6.5 Energy and mining 4.3
9 Industry and trade 4.8 Water, Sanitation, Flood Protection 4.0
10 Information and Communication 0.6 Information and Communication 0.1
SOURCE: World Bank Annual Report 2008
The account of Pakistan’s industrial development presented in this thesis indeed 
suggests that the macroeconomic and institutional environment directly shaped levels 
of economic development. A lack of transparent institutions and effective economic 
policy, for example -  as embodied in Pakistan’s licence system -  meant that the entry 
of many firms occurred on the basis of connections rather than capability in the early 
decades of Pakistan’s formation. The use of political influence on banks in the 1990s 
led to the entry of several poor performers and the accumulation of large number of 
non-performing loans, which have only reduced in the post-2000 period following the 
privatisation of much of the banking sector. Similarly, the turnaround in policy 
towards the end of the 1980s led to a rapid rise in firm entry and competition in 
several industries. However, a lack of competition policy has led to concerns over 
cartel activity in banking, sugar and cement, and domestic markets for products such 
as automobiles remain protected and often inefficient.
Macroeconomic policy has also constrained opportunities for development and 
growth. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there was a rapid build up in external debt during 
the Zia-ul-Haq era, and the several financial crises o f the 1990s (alongside other
1 International Finance Corporation, http://www.ifc.org
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political developments) led to instability and the eventual coup of Pervez Musharraf 
in 1999. Firms have had to operate in the face of balance of payments crises and rising 
interest rates and inflation, while frequent changes of government have led to 
uncertainty and a lack of policy continuity. There were drops in industry activity in 
the 1970s, 1990s and towards the end of 2007 when the political environment was less 
conducive for business. In contrast, firm entry and industrial growth picked up during 
the period of relative stability under the rule of both Ayub Khan and Pervez 
Musharraf (albeit correlated with fluctuations in global GDP growth). Ethnic violence 
in the traditional business city of Karachi has also reduced new levels of firm 
incorporation, while similar issues in Balochistan have interrupted fuel supplies to 
industry.
In 2008, there was a particularly dramatic change in Pakistan’s operating environment 
-  including Pakistan’s receipt of a loan from the International Monetary Fund to 
address its current account deficit and the deterioration in Pakistan’s internal politics.2 
This shift started to take its toll on some of Pakistan’s best textile and clothing 
exporters. Financial data from 2008 on textile firms listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange showed, for example, that Chenab Limited -  the owner of the Chen One 
chain of stories and a leading exporter of garments and home textiles -  made its first 
annual loss throughout the period of study. In its 2008 annual report, Kohinoor Textile 
Mills also stated that “The financial year under review was perhaps the most difficult 
year since the Company's inception”, citing political uncertainty, heightened terrorist 
activity and seriously deteriorating economic conditions. Kohinoor also explained in 
this report that the recession in the United States was dampening demand and lower 
prices in home textiles.
Investments in physical and human capital in Pakistan have also been poor and have 
constrained economic development. In gross fixed capital formation, for example, 
Pakistan has trailed India since the early 1980s (see Figure 8-1) and in the post-2000 
period levels were lower than Bangladesh, China and India.3 According to Lorie and
2 Pakistan Gets $7.6 Billion Loan from IMF, IMF Survey online,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/CAR112408C.htm, Accessed 17 Feb 2009.
3 Source: World Development Indicators, December 2008. Definition o f gross fixed capital formation 
(formerly gross domestic fixed investment) includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so 
on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction o f roads, railways, and the like,
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Iqbal the current state o f  the physical infrastructure o f  the country contributes to the 
high cost o f  doing business (2005:24). Pakistan has also invested less in education as 
a percentage o f  GDP than India, China, Korea and Bangladesh (see Table 8-2). 
Indeed, firms have had to be collectively proactive in the provision o f  energy, skills 
and basic local services, often internalising power production and implementing skills 
developm ent programmes. The members o f  one trade association in Faisalabad had 
jo ined  together to establish a local fire service in order to be prepared in the event o f  a 
factory fire, while industrialists in the textile industry o f  Faisalabad were instrumental 
in setting up the Pakistan School o f  Fashion Design to address the shortage o f  trained 
fashion and textile designers in Pakistan.4
Figure 8-1 Gross capital formation as share of gross domestic product (1960- 
2007), Pakistan, India, China and Bangladesh
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SOURCE: W orld Developm ent Indicators, World Bank, Decem ber 2008
including schools, o ffices, hospitals, private residential dw ellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings.
4 For GC University Faisalabad see http://www.gcuf.edu.pk/blue/about-gcuf.php and for Pakistan 
School o f  Fashion D esign see http://www.psfd.edu.pk/history.htm , accessed 25 March 2009.
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Table 8-2 Public spending on education as percentage of gross domestic product,
selected years, Pakistan, India, Republic of Korea, China and Bangladesh
Country 1999 2003 2004 2005
Pakistan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3
India 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.3
Rep. Korea 3.7 4.6 4.6 -
China 1.9 - - -
Bangladesh - 2.4 2.3 2.7
SOURCE: World Developm ent Indicators, W orld Bank, Decem ber 2008
A particular concern in Pakistan is the presence o f  the military in both politics and 
economics. In addition to its control o f  the governmental on several occasions, 
m ilitary expenditure as a proportion o f  GDP remains higher than countries such as 
India, China and Bangladesh (see Figure 8-2). Although it has been dropping 
continuously since 1991, according to the IMF (2002) high m ilitary expenditures and 
a rising debt service burden have “squeezed social expenditures” over the past two 
decades (2002:18). Further, according to Siddiqa-Agha, the defence establishm ent 
“plays a key role in obtaining public-sector business contracts and securing industrial 
or financial inputs at subsidized rates”, preventing the creation o f  a level playing field 
(2007:117).
Figure 8-2 Military expenditure as share of gross domestic product (1988-2007),
Pakistan, India, China and Bangladesh
cn
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SOURCE: World Developm ent Indicators, W orld Bank, Decem ber 2008
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The policy environment has also shaped firm-level diversification decisions, even 
among good performers. The majority of industrial development by some of the most 
able industrial groups has taken place in the protected domestic sector rather than in 
exports. Local industrialists move into sectors such as real estate and retail have been 
motivated by Pakistan’s move towards a ‘rental economy’, while others have state 
that “exporting is impossible” given current levels of human and physical capital. 
According to Saqib Sherani, Chief Economist of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 
Pakistan many large businesses have often been reluctant to invest money back into 
the Pakistani economy. Indeed, some business observers comment that most of 
Pakistan’s industrial wealth from sectors such as information technology has 
accumulated in the Middle East.
As a result of this institutional and policy environment, industry in Pakistan has been 
unable to replicate the patterns of export-oriented industrialisation observed in 
economies in East Asia and Latin America which have involved the move from labour 
intensive to skill-intensive exports.5 While Pakistani firms have achieved commodity 
exports, primary import substitution and secondary import substitution, they have 
only become internationally competitive in products such as cement and 
petrochemicals rather than automobiles or heavy machinery. Exports have remained 
labour-intensive, with only a marginal shift into technology-intensive products in the 
post-2000 period. Further, the local market remains closed to foreign competition in 
many cases, and -  even when protected -  some leading automobile manufacturers 
remain reliant on overseas partners for technical input and show poor profitability. 
Consequently, this framework goes a long way in explaining Pakistan’s limited 
industrial diversification to date.
5 Gereffi and Wyman (1990) identify production phases that both East Asian and Latin American 
economies have passed through. This includes the shift from commodity exports to primary and 
secondary import substitution (from goods such as textiles to automobiles and steel), and then to export 
oriented industrialisation (from labour intensive to skill-intensive exports). According to Gereffi and 
Wyman, primary import substitution industrialisation (ISI) covers the production o f local manufacture 
of goods such as textiles and footwear, while secondary ISI includes capital and technology-intensive 
goods (such as automobiles), intermediate goods (petrochemicals and steel) and capital goods (heavy 
machinery). Primary export oriented industrialisation (EOI) includes labour intensive products, while 
secondary EOI covers skill-intensive products.
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8.2 The developmental state?
Several authors have challenged the above institutional account as limited in its ability 
to explain economic growth, particularly in East Asian economies. Instead, they focus 
on the role of state capacity in delivering economic and social development. Wade has 
described the ‘developmental state’ as one which is “able to influence the use of 
public and private resources in line with a vision of how the industrial structure of the 
country should be evolving” (Wade, 1990:233). It is what Khan has also called social 
transformation: “the transformation of essentially precapitalist and pre-industrial 
societies into dynamic and essentially industrial, capitalist ones” (2004:165).
Chang, for example, argues that neo-liberalism — which refers to privatisation, 
deregulation, the opening of goods and capital markets and the tightening of 
macroeconomic policy -  has a “miserable economic record [and] simply has not been 
able to generate rapid growth” (2003:5). Lall argues that “[f]ree trade leads to 
latecomers under-investing in ‘difficult’ technologies, because firms cannot fully 
recoup their costs when faced with competitors that have already undergone learning 
or have stronger national learning systems” (2003:292). Lall also argues that in 
contrast to the institutional account, Korea set up a massive technology infrastructure 
geared to the needs of selected industries and that it ignored intellectual property 
rights to promote copying and reverse engineering” (2003: 293-294). Indeed, Cimoli 
et al (forthcoming) point out that knowledge accumulation does not occur exclusively 
within business firms but is supported by applied research, training and the work of 
universities and public laboratories to adapt technologies to local conditions. Further, 
Stiglitz notes that several African countries that have reformed economic policy have 
not been able to attract investors (2002:6).
Instead, authors provide several accounts of the positive role of state intervention in 
industrial development. Amsden and Chu, for example, have argued that “the Taiwan 
government has systematically planned and promoted the growth poles around which 
networks and high paid jobs have emerged” (2003:7). In this case, the government 
was responsible for the creation of new market segments, the incubation of start-ups 
(using spinoffs from government labs and science parks), investments in publicly 
funded research institutes, and promotion of private R&D” (ibid:78). Breznitz (2007)
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gives an account of how the Israeli state from the late 1960s supplied financial 
backing to R&D projects developed and executed by private firms and entrepreneurs, 
leading to the emergence of a dynamic IT industry. Amsden (1989) argues that South 
Korea grew faster than other developing countries because the state selectively 
invested in industry by subsidizing certain industries to stimulate growth” (1989:v), 
setting stringent performance standards in exchange for subsidies (such as the loan of 
long-term capital at negative real interest rates). Further, Stiglitz (1998) argues that 
the East Asian economies emphasized the role of government in providing universal 
education which, left to itself, the market will tend to under provide human capital. At 
the very least, as Cimoli et al point out, “countries have the choice of steering their 
future paths of capability accumulation, and together their patterns of production and 
trade” (forthcoming).
This account also challenges the apolitical view of the state as a provider of services 
and highlights the political roots of effective states. According to Schrank, East Asian 
policy makers were “indeed made out of flesh and blood” (2007:186) and were 
enabled by power relations in the agrarian-social structure — such as land reform — 
which prevented opposition to policies desired by the landed elite. In his comparison 
of the economic performance of East Asia and Latin America, Kay (2002) adds that 
while landlords can still halt agrarian reforms in Brazil, they were swept from power 
at the time of reform in Korea and Taiwan.
A key foundation of policy effectiveness was also the quality of governmental staff in 
newly emerged economies. Indeed, Wade (2004) describes state officials in East Asia 
as well-motivated, ‘learning directors’, who aggregated the preferences of 
industrialists. Similarly, Breznitz (2007) notes that in the Israel’s Office of the Chief 
Scientists in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Israel’s science and technology 
industrial development agency) the heads are recruited outside the agency, with a 
particularly large number of executives and employees brought on either as 
consultants or recruited directly from other organizations. In Taiwan, Breznitz also 
notes that almost all the top bureaucrats of the development agencies and ministries 
have doctoral degrees in various engineering disciplines.
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Several aspects of this approach help understand Pakistan’s failure to deliver 
economic and social development. Firstly, the balance of power in society has often 
prevented progressive policy change. There has been an ongoing power struggle 
between the military and elected politicians often related the Pakistan’s ongoing ‘cold 
war’ with India as well as internal struggles for power between ethnic, political and 
regional groups. Frequent government changes have led to a lack of momentum and 
consensus on economic and social development. Secondly, Pakistan’s feudal structure 
has also led to power struggles between landlords and development interests, and land 
reform has been limited. According to Easterly, the large feudal landowners that 
dominate rural areas have been present in virtually all Pakistani government coalitions 
and able to block direct taxation of agricultural income, preventing an important 
source of revenue for government (2003:460-461). Further, according to Easterly, 
class (elite dominance) and ethnic fractionalisation in Pakistan is related to poor levels 
of human capital investment for its level of income (ibid:467). Easterly argues that the 
Pakistan story is consistent with political economy models of growth in which the 
educated elite do not want to invest in the human capital o f the majority. As a result, 
there been a failure to make necessary investments in physical and human capital for 
growth, a lack of effective policy making capacity, and the absence of proactive 
approaches to industrial development.
If proactive action on the part of states to invest heavily in education, for example, has 
been a driver of growth in other countries, Pakistan has lagged behind. While men’s 
and women’s literacy has improved (as shown in the 12-18 percentage point gap in 
youth and adult literacy in 2005), Pakistan is still trailing countries such as India, 
China and Bangladesh (see Table 8-3). Youth female literacy in Pakistan in 2005, for 
instance, was 53.1 per cent, in contrast with 60.3 per cent in Bangladesh, 67.7 per cent 
in India and 98.5 per cent in China. Literacy rates also vary widely across Pakistan -  
as low as 22 per cent among women in Balochistan in 2007 (where only 20 per cent of 
women have ever attended school) and 28 per cent in the North West Frontier 
Province (see Table 8-4). This shows an interaction between educational achievement 
and cultural and religious beliefs, as well as poverty. Political instability also reduces 
the time horizon for people to invest in their own education. According to the Director 
of an agricultural trade association in Punjab, it was only in the post-2000 period that 
families began to send their children back to school. A lack of literacy and education
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also undermine the accumulation of both worker and managerial skills and 
capabilities: at the very least, workers on the shop-floor have to be able to follow 
quality instructions. Further, according to Lorie and Iqbal, Pakistan’s workforce is 
often ill-equipped with the skills for higher value-added production (2005:24).
Table 8-3 Literacy rates of adults and youths by gender (per cent), Pakistan,
India, China, Bangladesh and Thailand
Country Year Adult female Adult male Youth female Youth male
Pakistan 2005 35.4 64.1 53.1 76.7
India 2003 47.8 73 .4 67.7 84.2
China 2000 86.5 95.1 98.5 99.2
Bangladesh 2001 40.8 53.9 60.3 67.2
Thailand 2000 90.5 94.9 97.8 98.1
NOTE: The latest year o f data available is included in the table 
SOURCE: World Development Indicators, World Bank, December 2008
Table 8-4 Literacy rates in Pakistan’s provinces (10 years and above) (2006-7)
Location Male (per cent) Female (per cent)
Pakistan (A ll) 67 42
Punjab 67 48
Sindh 67 42
NW FP 67 28
Balochistan 58 22
Urban Rural
Pakistan (A ll) 72 45
SOURCE: Pakistan Economic Survey 2008, Ministry o f Finance, Government o f Pakistan
There has also been a lack of a formal approach to institutional building and policy 
research. Professionalisation of key institutions such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has only commenced in the post-2000 period, where employees now 
receive professional development training and electronic data systems are being 
implemented.6 The Ministry of Commerce only established a World Trade 
Organization Cell in 2000 to formalise its trade negotiations.7 Industry-related policy 
makers have been put in place within ministries, however it has often been members 
of the older, large business groups rather than those appointed on the basis of effective 
policy experience. Army staff have been given positions in trade associations and in 
the running of enterprises, while in the textile sector leading quota holders under the
6 Own observations.
7 Source: Hussain, R. Managing the challenges o f  WTO participation, Case Study 34, World Trade 
Organization, accessed 23 March 2009,
http://www.wto.org/engIish/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case34_e.htm
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oMultifibre Arrangement were invited to negotiating sessions in Washington DC. 
Further, as outlined in Chapter 1, policy decisions were historically made in relation 
to personal interest and rent-seeking, rather than in the best interest of the economy.
Finally, the Government of Pakistan has also failed in its attempts to implement 
industrial policy. According to Hardy and di Patti, in the period before deregulation 
the activities of the financial sector in Pakistan were largely directed by the 
government as a means to implement its development strategy: “banks were given 
detailed instructions on the allocation of credit to specific sectors, and a plethora of 
administrative interest rates were set for various purposes.” (2001:4) However, banks 
often had “little incentive and scant means” to make lending decisions based on 
creditworthiness (ibid), leading (in the textile industry) to rapid exit amongst 
inexperienced firms and a build up of nonperforming loans in the industry. During the 
1990s, the state-owned Pakistan Steel Mills, Pakistan International Airlines, and 
Pakistan Railways incurred substantial losses, and poor governance was singled out 
frequently as a key cause (IMF, 2004:58). As GDP growth slipped downwards in the 
1990s, leaders were accused of having “failed to create any independent economic or 
industrial development programme” (Zaidi, 2004:105).
As a result, the state-led approach to understanding processes of industrial 
development also sheds light on the failure of Pakistan to deliver economic and social 
development.
8.3  T h e h eterogen eou s roots o f  d evelop m en t
However, evidence in this thesis has also shown heterogeneity in firm capabilities and 
performance when facing the same institutional environment. In particular, the 
findings suggest that a small number of firms are responsible for much of industry 
growth, and that variation in education, employment experience and industry 
exposure are important determinants of heterogeneous firm entry, growth and 
diversification. This makes explicit the role of firm-level factors driving industrial 
development, complementing institutional and state-led accounts and draws attention
8 Own observations.
325
to the role of policy in assisting the accumulation of high quality, industry-related 
education and employment experience.
Firm  entry, growth and diversification in Pakistan -  the role o f founder 
experience
The most important finding from this thesis was the positive and significant 
association between pre-founder experience (PFE) and firm performance. Firms with 
industry-related PFE were initially larger, had an elevated growth trajectory, and were 
more likely to survive and maintain export sales in the period following the ending of 
the Multifibre Agreement. PFE shaped the firm’s entry strategy -  including product 
choice and market niche -  as well as the production capabilities and organisational 
structure which shaped long-term learning and growth. The education and experience 
of Directors and technical managers was also an impetus for shop-floor 
improvements. There was also strong evidence that a small number of firms were 
responsible for the bulk of exports, drawing attention to the very specific roots of 
aggregate industry growth.
Evidence from this research also made explicit the role of industry-related education 
and experience in driving industrial diversification. Diversification trends of textile 
firms were often driven by accumulated production and organisational capabilities, 
including commercial awareness and general management practices. In contrast, firms 
in knowledge-intensive sectors were more likely to have closer industry-related 
employment experience. Further, among firm founders in higher value-added sectors, 
industry exposure and experience was a key driver of firm development in addition to 
founder education.9 The evidence of the emergence of spinoffs in the Pakistani 
economy -  often with this combination of education and industry experience -  also 
highlighted the particular origins of important new competitors to the existing 
business groups.
9 However, I note that this channel o f  capability accumulation is more particular to manufacturing 
industries. In knowledge-intensive industries such as biotechnology and computer science, the 
capabilities required for firm entry and growth are more closely related to the activities carried out in 
an academic research environment. This is another case o f how industry structure is strongly related to 
technology and demand in that particular sector.
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Additionally, I identified the channels through which firms were able to improve 
performance as competition increased during trade reform. Similar to the findings of 
other empirical studies, age was related to firm performance as firms gained 
experience through the use of consultants, recruitment, trial and error, and interactions 
with buyers and suppliers. However, evidence from this study also suggests that firms 
learned at very different rates. Specifically, the effectiveness of learning was shaped 
by the initial conditions of the firm, including both production capabilities and 
organisational design. This stands in contrast to academic work which associates 
upgrading with ‘technology transfer’ or ‘buyer-led upgrading’. I argue instead that 
firms actively self-select into ventures with overseas partners and export markets 
based on prior capability, and that the focus on buyers as a source of learning in 
aggregate is misplaced. Entry, growth and diversification in the textile and clothing 
sector is a very challenging activity in itself, a counter-intuitive finding for many 
development scholars.
A determinant of performance was also the innovative environment present inside the 
firm as a result of professional management practices. Indeed, while most companies 
were engaged in imitation rather than innovation, it required considerable effort and 
expertise to acquire new technology and product knowledge. As Teece et al point out, 
most technology does not enter the market as firms are unwilling to sell it as it cannot 
be protected or because it is difficult to transact (2002:345), as illustrated in the case 
of the chemical firm. Instead, at the core of innovative activity was a focused, high- 
incentive environment which encouraged worker autonomy and the delivery of new 
product development on the shop floor. As a result, the academic focus should be on 
making explicit these underlying drivers of firm performance as well as channels such 
as recruitment and in-house adaptation of products and processes.
Finally, I identified the role of competition in driving upgrading and diversification at 
the firm level -  and thus aggregate industry performance. Indeed, it was the rapid 
increase in competition that led firms to invest in additional capacity, improve 
processes and organisational capabilities and conduct new product development. 
Firms that had previously relied on personal or political connections for firm entry 
and growth, or tolerated poor quality in production, saw a fall in sales, while those 
with the most innovative approaches acquired new buyers and greater export share. In
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particular, firms with professional management were more likely to remain in the 
market and saw shop-floor improvements as a direct result of the autonomy and 
incentives given to workers. Further, an increase in competition often provoked firms 
to consider other economic sectors such as cement, services and logistics, although 
their diversification choices were limited by the capabilities accumulated in the textile 
sector.
In summary, these findings challenge the exclusivity of the demand environment in 
driving firm entry, growth and diversification. It suggests that a good deal of 
knowledge accumulation takes place within firms, outside o f the realm of institutional 
or state control. Instead, the drivers of industrial development are capability 
accumulation prior to firm entry, and subsequent incentive-based learning and 
performance.
R ethinking industrial development theory and policy
These are powerful findings for development research and policy and can help rethink 
several building blocks of development research and policy. These include how rapid 
industry growth occurs, how the transition between industrial paradigms within 
countries takes place, and the conditions under which how capability transfer occurs 
between firms. The findings also highlight the role of competition in driving 
capability accumulation and poverty reduction, as well as the negative impacts of 
industry protection. The analysis points to new areas for development research and 
policy and the potential rewards from the analysis of firm heterogeneity and 
managerial quality.
Firstly, many accounts of industry in poor countries identify the relative technological 
and managerial ‘backwardness’ of firms in relation to overseas competitors. However, 
if a founder with industry-related technical and organisational knowledge can enter 
the industry in a developing country above the minimum ‘window’ needed to compete 
in price and quality this firm could be relatively ‘forward’ in comparison with 
competitors. Consequently, the firm could increase capability accumulation at the 
worker level, raise the likelihood of spinoff formation, and induce an equilibrium 
breaking shift in industrial growth. Indeed, the high-profile performance of firms
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founded by overseas-educated and experienced workers -  such as Infosys in India, 
one of the most successful of the country’s IT firms — show the potential impact of 
such an entrant.10 Of course, the performance of a firm is intricately related to its 
operating environment. There will be an upper bound on firm performance as the 
costs of in-house provision of energy and training in a country such as Pakistan raise 
the cost and competitiveness of the business. However, firm formation by such 
experienced founders challenge conventional accounts of development and often 
matches trends observed in ‘the new economy’. This insight could open up a new 
field of academic research in this area of how shifts in industrial paradigms take place 
within developing countries.
In terms of economic policy, the attraction of overseas workers back to the country of 
origin takes on the potential to induce an equilibrium breaking shift in industrial 
development. Indeed, Nelson describes how all successful cases of catch-up have 
included considerable cross-border flow of people, ranging from the import of textile 
manufacturing methods to the USA by British technicians, the use of overseas 
technical advisors in the development of Japanese industry, and the development of 
Korean and Taiwanese electronics industries by people who had studied and worked 
in the USA (2007:7). The same application of highly experienced individuals can be 
applied to policy making. In Taiwan, for example, Morris Chang went to Taiwan at 
the government’s invitation in 1985 to head the Industrial Technology Research 
Institute and later the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (Amsden and 
Chu, 2003:107). Chang had been a senior vice president in Texas Instruments and the 
highest ranking Chinese-American in the US high-tech industry. Again, the impact of 
individuals with high-quality, industry-related experience gives additional insights 
into the potential of economic policy to shape firm formation and growth through the 
application of experience.
Surprisingly, the analysis of heterogeneity among firms is minimal in most academic 
or policy studies of industrial development, either in the institutional or state-led 
traditions. When such a combination of analysis has been conducted, the outcomes
10 Infosys was founded by Narayana Murthy (with six friends), an electrical engineer with a Masters 
degree from IIT Kanpur and experience developing software for the air traffic control system at Paris' 
Charles de Gaulle airport. Source: Infosys Technologies profile, Hoovers, accessed October 2006.
329
have been powerful, as in the study of Taiwan’s industrial development by Amsden 
and Chu (2003), and the analysis o f the social foundations of export diversification in 
the Dominican Republic by Schrank (2005). Roy (1999) has also challenged dominant 
understandings of the impact of colonial rule on industrial development in India by 
showing that the impact of British exports on the local textile industry varied by 
product and had both a negative and creative impact on local industry through 
increased competition, the availability of inputs and capital and the adoption of new 
methods.
An analysis of heterogeneity rather than the emergence of winners would offer richer 
insights into the firm-level drivers of development. It could be used in the analysis of 
newly emerging industries such as biotechnology in Taiwan, in the emergence of 
firms in China’s economy, or to evaluate the role of industrial policy in economies 
such as Mexico when individuals firms such as Volkswagen may have actually played 
a central role in the emergence of sectors such as automobiles.11 Specifically, an area 
of future research in Pakistan could be the extent of spinoffs from leading 
multinational firms such as Siemens, GSK, Unilever or Telenor and their contribution 
to industrial development. More generally the analysis of spinoffs may offer insights 
into financial sector development, and the impact of the presence of multinational 
firms in developing countries.
A specific industry application of the PFE framework of contemporary relevant to 
development policy could be use to analyse managerial quality in the banking sector. 
Indeed, banking is an industry where performance is dependent on managerial quality 
as well as the incentives provided by the regulatory environment. Further, the sector is 
of central importance in financing entrepreneurship. Research on this sector could 
reveal the extent to which finance is allocated in developing countries by contacts 
rather than on active management of investments by bank managers to firms which 
offer attractive returns (such as firms created by small, but experienced founders). 
One leading Chartered Accountant in Pakistan, for example, believes that banks still
" See Mathews and Hu (2007) for a discussion o f the relationship between universities and sectors 
such as biotechnology in Taiwan, as well as Wade (2004) for a discussion o f the role o f  industrial 
policy in the growth o f Mexico’s automobile industry. An episode o f  the BBC radio programme ‘In 
Business’, for example, found that many new manufacturers in China’s manufacturing sector were 
previously traders o f the same goods. Source: Cracked China, 15 Jan 2009, accessed 20 March 2009, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/news/inbusiness/inbusiness_20090115.shtml.
330
operate according to patterns o f influence and that many applicants are still not 
receiving loans on merit.12 In theory, this would reduce the returns to banks and their 
performance. Many Pakistanis have worked in the banking sector overseas, only to 
return to take up positions in local banks or financial institutions, including former 
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz (a former employee of Citibank13), and Syed Salim Raza 
who was appointed State Bank Governor in 2009 (also a former employee of 
Citibank).14 An investigation of whether such experience matters for bank 
performance could offer useful academic and policy insights. Some donors have 
already taken note of this possibility. DFID’s work in Pakistan, for example, supports 
the banking sector project which aims to strengthen standards of reporting and 
supervision in Pakistan (Nadvi and Robinson, 2003).
A second implication of this study is the need for increased emphasis in policy 
making on the provision of industry-related education and work experience. Indeed, 
while education has been recognised as a key aspect of economic development policy, 
evidence in this thesis suggests that it should be complemented by industry 
experience. In particular, this study has drawn attention to the role of organisational — 
or managerial -  capabilities in shaping firm growth and diversification. While there 
has been academic and policy recognition of the importance of technology transfer 
and technical education, there has been a lack of attention on the accumulation of 
organisational capabilities. However, these capabilities are a direct complement to 
education and skills held in the workforce and may themselves be a source of 
externalities in the economy. Engerman and Sokoloff state, for example, that 
“[sjtudies of both agriculture and manufacturing have found that productivity 
increased substantially during the first stages of industrialization and that the advances 
were based largely on changes in organizations, methods, and designs that did not 
require much in the way of capital deepening or dramatically new capital equipment” 
(1997:282-283).
12 On a positive note, he estimated that between 20 and 30 per cent o f  loans were now being allocated 
to emerging business groups.
13 Profile: Shaukat Aziz, BBC News. 19 August 2004, Accessed 20 March 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/3941185.stm
14 Present Governor o f the State Bank o f Pakistan, Syed Salim Raza, State Bank o f Pakistan, Accessed 
20 March 2009. http://www.sbp.gov.pk/about/govemors/index.htm. Mr Raza was also interviewed for 
this thesis in his former capacity as CEO o f the Pakistan Business Council.
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However, according to Nelson these organisational and managerial aspects of 
operating a technology often are “much more difficult to master” than the engineering 
aspects (2007:5). In addition, performance can also be driven by marketing and other 
forms of non-technological skills. Indeed, some of the most successful activity among 
Pakistan’s textile firms has been the move into branding and the targeting of local 
consumers. This places greater emphasis on the role of these capabilities in firm 
formation and growth rather than technology transfer in both theoretical and policy 
work. As a result, this presents new academic and policy challenges as well as the 
scope to increase the provision of opportunities to acquire such capabilities through 
education and work experience.
Examples could be the provision of funded industrial placements in local or 
international firms as part of educational training -  particularly important in countries 
like Pakistan where personal connections and individual wealth limit access to such 
opportunities. Another possibility could be mentoring schemes at the local level 
between experienced and less-experienced managers. Support for the development of 
organisational capabilities among technical managers in particular could help break 
through the ‘marble ceiling’.
Thirdly, the findings in this study indicate that the accumulation of experience is 
reliant on the existing stock of firms in the economy. This can leave developing 
countries in a trap when the local ‘stock’ of firms is low, as in Pakistan and several 
African countries. Capabilities are difficult to construct and are typically built up in a 
high-incentive, competitive environment. This gives additional impetus to the need to 
attract high capability, overseas firms to the country to increase the potential stock of 
‘spawning’ firms. Further, it draws attention to the need to improve provision of 
education in the workforce (either via the public or private sectors) as a route towards 
capability accumulation and to attract foreign firms.
In fact, findings from this thesis help understand how -  in relation to foreign 
investment -  industrial policy might be effective. It can help understand why 
academics from two very different traditions -  Robert Wade and John Sutton -  both 
concluded that local content requirements had led to capability accumulation among 
firms. In his study of productivity and quality standards among Chinese and Indian
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auto-component producers, Sutton (2002a) found that in the decade prior to entry to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), both countries used domestic content 
restrictions to stimulate development of the component industry. However, he 
discovered that following WTO entry instead of taking advantage of the ability to now 
source components abroad, international car makers would not attempt to import 
components and sub-assemblies. According to Sutton, “This suggests that the 
development of the local supply chain under local content restrictions in the years 
prior to WTO entry has, in these industries, been highly successful” (2002a:25).
Similarly, according to Wade, “below the radar” industrial policy in Taiwan 
(involving officials of the Industrial Development Bureau) was successful. This 
involved “nudging” foreign firms to switch supplies from imports to domestic 
producers, or nudging established industries quickly to provide markets for firms in 
innovative sectors (Wade, 2004:xxi). In these cases, it appears that if high-capability 
firms are keen to access particular markets for manufacturing or retail, they will have 
a high incentive to transfer capabilities, even if it requires local sourcing from less 
efficient producers. It was this high-incentive environment — specific to a small 
number of firms -  that encouraged the deep transfer of capabilities between workers.
However, the ability to do so also relates to the relative bargaining power o f the 
government. Indeed, informally one business observer in Pakistan lamented the fact 
that the government had failed to negotiate local content agreements upon the arrival 
of Makro in Pakistan. This is likely to be as much a result of political instability as the 
poor human and physical capital available in the Pakistani economy.
Fourthly, in addition to the role of competition in fostering entry and growth of 
efficient firms (as in the institutional account), analysis in this thesis suggests that 
competition also has a role in capability accumulation. In a society based on familial 
and personal connections -  as in Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry -  the failure 
to introduce professional management has led to suboptimal firm performance and 
limited industrial development.15 This structure also means that opportunities to 
acquire PFE are closed to many regardless of the quality of education acquired by
15 Further, if  finance for new ventures mainly comes from existing businesses, then family members 
would be reluctant to finance a venture of a non-family member.
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individuals. In contrast, an increase in competition during trade liberalisation led to a 
rapid shakeout among such firms. As price and quality competition increased, those 
firms with better quality management practices saw relatively stronger growth and 
were able to upgrade, both inside and outside the textile industry (and raised the 
aggregate level of management practices as poor performers exited).
As a result, an increase in competition currently protected industrial sectors in 
Pakistan could reward firms on the basis of capability and encourage upgrading and 
diversification. Indeed, a lack of competition can act as a bottleneck on the 
accumulation of capability among the best workers, the formation of spinoffs, 
diversification and aggregate industrial development. Alongside improvements in 
access to finance, greater opportunities for the accumulation of experience among 
workers, for example, could raise the likelihood of spinoffs. A rise in competition in 
the workplace could also help break down the often-cited “marble ceiling” in Pakistan 
in which very few technicians rise to top management in firms. In these cases, an 
increase in competition could be an equilibrium breaking shift and can lead to rise in 
the aggregate quality of management, capability accumulation and industry growth.
A further question underlying this thesis is whether ‘ordinary’ people in Pakistan can 
obtain opportunities to acquire industry experience given widespread family 
ownership and the frequent use of political and personal connections within industry. 
While academic commentary on livelihoods in Pakistan is limited, an insightful study 
on education and career paths in India by Jeffrey, Jeffrey and Jeffery (2008) shows the 
importance of personal connections, and social status, in gaining access to education 
and employment. In this account, access to the best schools is often obtained by bribes 
from parents, and as a result, many from less privileged backgrounds are excluded 
from places in English-medium schools.16 In the attainment of government 
employment, even if the individual has obtained the necessary qualifications to 
compete, high-caste groups could often obtain the personal recommendations 
important to secure posts. Richer Jats (an Indian caste) established businesses such as 
internet cafes, shops, phone booths, fertiliser agencies with parental money (ibid:92),
16 The authors point out that “Due to intense competition for places at English-medium schools, it was 
typically necessary for parents to pay large ‘donations’ to the school to ensure a child’s admission, and 
parents and children were sometimes interviewed, chiefly to verify applicants’ familiarity with urban 
middle class norms o f comportment” (2008:46).
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while Muslim men found jobs among the large Muslim middle class in Bijnor using 
relations based on caste or religion. As in Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry, 
success often required beating the system. One individual -  Zamir -  was training in 
computing in order to get government employment: “Zamir perceived computing as a 
means of obtaining government employment without having to pay a bribe” as 
“people without computing skills who use bribes to secure government employment 
that entail computing found it impossible to maintain their position” (ibid: 141).
As a result, increased competition can also help tackle deep rooted discrimination and 
disadvantage in society. I believe that increasing competition among other industrial 
sectors in Pakistan could lead to improvement in the market for talented of workers, 
regardless of class, religious or caste background. Indeed, as shown in the shakeout in 
Pakistan’s local textile market, when under competitive pressure firms can no longer 
maintain suboptimal relationships with suppliers, partners or staff. Similar trends have 
been observed in more competitive industries in India. Harriss (2003) has shown that 
in the IT sector in India — which has witnessed a decline in family ownership — there 
were many new entrants from different class and caste backgrounds.
A direct corollary of this argument is a critique of the central role of protection 
underlying many accounts of industrial policy, where the central role of the 
‘developmental state’ was often the application of tariffs and quantitative restrictions. 
Wade (2004), for example, argues that restrictions on the import of yam were put in 
place in Taiwan in order to encourage development of the yam sector. Similarly, 
Amsden (1989) argues that in Korea the state protected domestic markets in order to 
encourage industrial development but also required firms to sell abroad. Giving an 
indication of the process of capability accumulation under such an environment, Lall 
(2003) argues that because new technology is not simply transferred and used 
efficiently -  hence full exposure to markets may not be beneficial. Wade summarises 
a common argument that “Almost all now-developed countries went through stages 
of industrial assistance policy before the capabilities of their firms reached the point 
where a policy of more (or less) free trade was declared to be in the national interest” 
(2004:xv).
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The case of the MFA gives an opportunity to examine the heterogeneous firm 
performance under such an arrangement. As illustrated in this thesis, the MFA had 
many similar elements to industrial policy including guaranteed market access, lack of 
competition, and requirements for buyers to source products from specific countries. 
Certainly, buyers were compelled to work with several suppliers in the sample of 
firms interviewed. Further, some firms interviewed were protected between 1973 and 
2004 -  an adequate period of time in which to learn and acquire capability.
However, evidence from this period suggests that protection was not the direct driver 
of capability accumulation and firm performance and often had negative outcomes. 
Firstly, some firms entered the market in order to exploit the quota rents to be gained 
through guaranteed market access which led to inefficient production and later exit. 
Secondly, even though buyers were forced to source products from Pakistan and some 
technology transfer did take place, this interaction does not seem to have improved 
survival prospects in all cases. Thirdly, there was no direct relationship between quota 
participation and performance, indicating that additional factors were underlying firm 
survival and performance in the post-quota period. Fourthly, given that several firms 
have diversified in response to the final abolition of export quotas, it appears that 
protection actually held back the firms at the top end of the spectrum from 
diversifying into other industries due to ongoing high profits in this lower value-added 
sector. Instead, firm performance and the rate of capability accumulation over time 
was determined by factors underlying firm heterogeneity such as the education, 
experience and industry exposure of founders and Directors. In the chemical firm, for 
example, strategy was informed by the engineering education of the Director, while 
shop floor R&D -  and types of product import substitution -  relied on the technical 
and imitative capabilities of shop floor staff within a supportive learning environment.
Given that much academic research has also focused on the emergence of ‘winners’ in 
East Asia, it also begs the question of whether highly capable firms would have 
performed equally well under a less protected environment. In fact, the discussion of 
tariff protection itself has failed to acknowledge that firms in the economy may be at 
various degrees of development and sophistication, and that protection might hold 
back the emergence of firms at the top of the spectrum. Further, if capabilities are 
gained through education and employment experience in a high-incentive
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environment, arguments that state intervention per se can directly generate these 
capabilities is unclear at best and the causal link between state policy and capability 
accumulation absent.
There may be a case for a gradual increase in industry competition. Evidence from 
this thesis shows that firms actively invested and prepared for the abolition of export 
quotas, and these investments were directly related to the firm’s post-quota 
performance. Further, it appears that when the shock did hit and firms such as Nishat 
Mills and Quetta Textile Mills saw a drop in sales in the first year, they rebounded in 
the following three years (even in deteriorating economic circumstances). This 
suggests some form of gradual adjustment to the new competitive environment.
Further, while Kochar et al (2006) have argued that diversification and industrial 
development in India stemmed from the protectionist policies of the 1960s (allowing 
firms to ‘experiment’ in various industrial sectors), evidence in this thesis questions 
the validity of such a phenomenon in Pakistan. In the case of the chemical firm which 
entered the sector by accident in the 1980s, it was only later when the firm began to 
take the sector ‘seriously’ — implementing professional management, highly-educated 
shop-floor staff, and a Director educated in engineering himself -  that the unit took 
off, suggesting separate drivers of firm growth. Performance trends among established 
older groups in particular also broke down in the post-quota period. Further, several 
new industries have emerged in the post-1990s period when many barriers to firm 
entry had already been removed and tariffs reduced. Firms have been accumulating 
capabilities in this period — in chemicals and information for example -  without 
protection, and have seen a small rise in exports.
As a result, the findings from this thesis help rethink several key elements of 
development research and policy: how rapid industry growth occurs, the transition 
between industrial paradigms within countries and how capability transfer takes place 
between firms. The analysis also draws attention to the role of competition in driving 
capability accumulation and poverty reduction, as well as the negative impacts of 
industry protection. Evidence on the heterogeneous composition and performance of 
firms shows how a small number of good performers can generate equilibrium- 
breaking shifts in industrial composition even when facing a similar institutional
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environment. While the institutional environment and the state contribute to the 
emergence of high ability firms, the evidence in this thesis illustrates the 
heterogeneous channel through which individual firms make significant contributions 
to industry growth and economic development.
8.4 Founder experience and firm performance: contributions and 
future research
In contrast to most studies examining the relationship between pre-founder experience 
and firm performance that have focused on highly-developed economies and 
industrial sectors, this thesis has contributed a unique case study from a developing 
country. I have found that an association between founder education, experience and 
firm performance is also observed in this particular developing economy despite a 
very different institutional environment. As a result, the study provides additional 
evidence for the association between founder experience and firm performance, and 
offers rich insights into the processes of firm growth and industrial development in 
emerging economies. The potential application of such a framework to the study of 
industrial transition in low-income countries is huge, but the research has also shown 
the need for an interpretation of the founder experience framework in the developing 
country context.
Firstly, the study has found relevance for existing tools such as the use of pre-founder 
experience as a proxy for firm capabilities. Specifically, the research has examined 
the relative contributions of pre-founder experience to production and organisational 
capabilities, explaining variation in performance by background as well as aggregate 
trends. The analysis of spinoffs has also proven fruitful -  the emergence of true 
spinoffs in this context has shown to be an indicator of financial sector and economic 
development. Further, the research has uncovered determinants of inter-temporal 
learning in firms -  an element of path dependency has been confirmed in how these 
capabilities interact to determine long-run trends in growth, with changes in 
performance only possible after a radical change of management or motivation among 
Directors. Finally, the study of the relationship between professional management and
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performance has explained contradictions in the performance of the business groups 
dominating such emerging economies. The breakdown of performance in some 
business groups in response to competition due to poor management practices sheds 
light on the reasons why these groups are often identified as parasites as well as 
paragons.
Secondly, the study explored firm-level drivers of industrial diversification. The 
findings suggest that the diversification paths of firms are based on accumulated 
production and organisational capabilities, and that firms tend to diversify into sectors 
to exploit transferable capabilities. In this context, firms filled knowledge gaps with 
the use of consultants for technology and recruitment, or diversification can be driven 
by the education of a family member or changes in consumer demand. In contrast, 
firms in new, knowledge-intensive industries were not established by incumbents, but 
by new entrants with greater industry-specific education and experience. 
Consequently, firm-level factors emerge as important in escaping locked-in patterns 
of specialisation as well as country-specific factor endowments and the efficiency of 
individual industries (as recognised by Redding, 2002:300-301).
Thirdly, the study also provided new evidence on the relationship between firms, 
trade and development. It confirms Sutton’s expectation, for example, that the shift in 
the cost and quality ‘window’ leads to a rise in the marginal returns from investing in 
quality improvements for all firms in which “remaining at the old levels of quality is 
not an equilibrium” (2007b:489). It also confirms that increase in quality competition 
and the size of the market lead firms to “firms re-assess the investments they made in 
fixing their respective levels of quality and productivity, in the light of their newly 
acquired access to the larger, global, market” (ibid:487). In terms of the relationship 
between firm-level capabilities and the institutional environment, it also offers 
evidence to Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) proposal that country, industry and 
firm characteristics interact to determine nations’ responses to trade liberalisation. 
Trade also appears to reallocates market share from less to more productive plants, 
and there is evidence that firms do diversify in response to increasing competition as 
the profitability of existing sectors fall.
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Fourthly, the findings raise several opportunities for the future study of PFE itself. In 
many cases founders from a similar educational or industry background had very 
different impacts on performance. This raises future theoretical and empirical 
challenges regarding the separation of PFE from other determinants of performance 
(such as chance, demand, founder motivation or general distributions of unobservable 
factors). Indeed, as Dosi et al have previously pointed out, most of the work to find 
statistical proxies for capabilities is still to be done (2002:16).
Further, not all highly-experienced workers become entrepreneurs. This requires an 
interaction of the study of entrepreneurship — with its sociological and psychological 
dimension -  with that of founder experience, and may require analyses of factors such 
as industry exposure in shaping the likelihood of firm formation.17 Indeed, anecdotal 
evidence from Pakistan suggests that many entrants to industries such as knitwear, 
surgical instruments and sports goods were often ‘inspired’ to enter following the 
rapid growth witnessed in these sectors.18
There are also opportunities to explore the interaction of organisational and technical 
capabilities in shaping firm performance. Here founder experience was categorised by 
industry background, but management practices played a clear role in explaining 
variation within and across founder backgrounds. As mentioned above, the transfer of 
organisational capabilities have been less explored in the development literature, and 
further research could enhance the traditional study o f ‘technology transfer’.
Finally, the analysis of industry evolution in a developing country like Pakistan has 
required a change in concepts and methodology. The approach is complicated, for 
example, by the family business structure which increases industry exposure but
17 This interaction has not been explicitly addressed in this thesis, but several studies o f  
entrepreneurship show similar themes to that o f the PFE framework. Djankov et al (2005), for example, 
find in a study o f Russian entrepreneurs that that while individual characteristics such as motivation are 
important, entrepreneurs differ from non-entrepreneurs in family background. They find that the family 
members o f entrepreneurs, for example, had more education, better jobs and were richer (2005:593). In 
a similar study conducted in China, Djankov et al (2006) find that the parents o f  entrepreneurs do not 
have a higher education than non-entrepreneurs but they were more likely to have been bosses or 
directors and were richer on average. While the Russian or Chinese contexts may have shaped these 
relations, and may be dissimilar to entrepreneurs in economies like the United States, this data raises 
the possibility that entrepreneurship is at least partly socially constructed and perhaps addressable with 
policy interventions.
18 However, many business people referred to this as a negative characteristic of industry in Pakistan, 
terming it the ‘sheep mentality’.
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confuses incentives within the firm. It also obscures the impact of education and 
employment experience on performance. Further, the distinction between family 
spinoffs and true spinoffs requires a re-categorisation of the new unit. When analysing 
the relevance of the capabilities of family spinoffs, the quality of experienced gained 
within the existing firm became important, as well as the motivation of the firm 
founder or Director. As a result, new theoretical approaches are necessary to 
understand the emergence of firms in developing economies, part of which has been 
developed in this thesis.
The study of the impact of founder experience in low-income countries also requires a 
change in methodology. This study has triangulated several sets of performance data 
to gain insight into over half Pakistan’s textile and clothing industry and used a 
unique opportunity to gain insights into the origins and evolution of firms, despite the 
lower quality of data. However, the experience showed the challenges of conducting 
fieldwork in a less-developed country where data sources are less formal and the 
importance of research design. Data collection required, for example, the building of a 
high-level network to access information making academic research itself more 
difficult. The lack of industry sources also made it difficult to trace industries since 
inception and analysis of survival by PFE since entry was only available for the 
smaller sample of KSE-listed firms. Further, data limitations often prevented the reach 
of the study to smaller and less formal firms. Indeed, in the absence of performance 
data any investigation of pre-founder experience among these firms would have 
lacked a framework for inference.
Consequently, some research questions remain open. Future research is required to 
assess whether the relationship between PFE and performance in small and less 
formal firms mirrors that observed in larger, more formal firms. Additional research 
could also assess the extent to which business groups continue to dominate via 
personal and political connections, or whether industrial transformation in Pakistan is 
occurring at a deeper level. There is also a need for additional evidence from 
developing countries on which firms drive industrial diversification over time and the 
firm-level factors which enable diversification. Fortunately, data collection in 
countries such as Pakistan is improving with computerisation, and firm Directors can 
now be identified by a unique number in both India and Pakistan. This creates many
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new opportunities for research into the role of founder education and experience in 
firm entry, growth and diversification in emerging economies and highlights the 
potential application of this framework.
Conclusion
The exposure of Pakistan’s textile industry to trade liberalisation between 1994 and 
2004 provided a unique opportunity to identify determinants of firm performance and 
industrial development in an emerging economy. As price and quality competition 
increased during the phase-out of the Multifibre Arrangement, a large shakeout 
occurred in which only some firms survived and market share was gained by better 
performers. In this thesis I have argued that pre-founder experience -  including 
education, employment experience and industry exposure -  shaped firms’ entry 
strategies, initial production capabilities and organisational design, and their 
subsequent ability to improve productivity, quality and marketing during 
liberalisation. Founder experience also shaped the rate of capability accumulation and 
the long-term ability to upgrade either within the textile and clothing industry or to 
diversify into other sectors.
While institutional and state-led accounts of development go a long way to explain 
Pakistan’s development performance to date, this research has shown that -  as argued 
by Sutton -  the primary driver of growth is the gradual build-up in firms’ capabilities 
(2002b:9). The findings also echo the assertion of Dosi et al that “[i]mproved 
understanding of the dynamics of capabilities at the level of the individual 
organization provides the foundation for an improved and qualitatively different 
understanding of the mechanisms of aggregate economic growth” (2002:18). In 
particular, I have argued that it is the formation of firms by founders with high quality 
industry-related education and employment experience that can deliver industrial 
diversification and equilibrium-breaking growth in low-income countries. In Pakistan 
specifically, if political reform could take hold, investments in education and 
infrastructure could build on the existing stock of capabilities in order to deliver long­
term industrial growth and economic development.
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